

SELECTIONS FROM THE STATE PAPERS OF THE
GOVERNORS-GENERAL OF INDIA

WARREN HASTINGS

II

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THE STATE PAPERS
OF THE
GOVERNORS - GENERAL
OF INDIA

EDITED BY
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WITH PORTRAITS AND MAPS.

VOL. II
WARREN HASTINGS
DOCUMENTS

OXFORD
B. H. BLACKWELL, BROAD STREET
LONDON
CONSTABLE & CO., LTD.

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MEMOIRS
RELATIVE TO
THE STATE OF INDIA

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THE AUTHOR'S ADVERTISEMENT

THE following sheets were written at sea, during my passage from India to England. When I began them I had no other design than to preserve and concentrate all the miscellaneous transactions of the three last months of my administration, while they were yet recent in my remembrance.

In the course of this Review, I was imperceptibly led to take in a larger scope, as I have stated in the work itself; and it has acquired such a degree of importance in the judgement of those who have perused it, (authorities of which I should speak with the highest veneration on any occasion, but one which like the present could not but reflect a praise on myself;) that I have been induced to cause a few printed copies to be struck off, for the private information of such persons as from their official situations are intitled to the knowledge which they may be thought to contain.

WARREN HASTINGS.

BATH, *Jun.* 14, 1786.

MEMOIRS RELATIVE TO THE STATE OF INDIA

ON the 20th of March 1783, I addressed a letter to the Court of Directors, in which I apprised them of my intention to resign the service of the Company, leaving a sufficient interval for the appointment of a successor to my office. Had I formed my opinion of the propriety of this intimation on any estimate of my own consequence, the total disregard which was shown to it might have taught me an humbler lesson. But in truth, I had simply considered it as a point of common obligation; and was convinced in my own mind, that the member of the council who stood next to me in the regular line of succession, was at least as likely to fill the station with ability as any person, wanting the same local experience, whom the chance of competition might substitute in his stead; for he had been bred and practised in the habits of business, and his manners were conciliating. It would be therefore, at this time, superfluous to assign any reasons for the resolution which I had taken. Yet these were detailed at large in my letter; and if they produced no other effect, they certainly were, as they were intended, a pledge to my first constituents for the performance of the declaration which I had thus formally made, if no circumstance intervened which might lessen the weight of it as an engagement, or which, as a superior claim, might require it to be sus-

pended. In effect, such a contingency did actually come to pass within a very few months after the date of my letter. This originated in an appeal which was made by the Nabob Vizir and his Ministers, against the acts of Mr. Bristow, the Company's Resident at his Court, and impelled me, by every tie of justice, honour, and public duty, to sacrifice every consideration that regarded myself alone, if necessary, for his redress: And that my stay for this purpose was necessary, I may with safety at this time affirm, since it is demonstrable, that the purposes which were the professed objects of my stay have been attained, and could not have been attained without it.

I had fixed upon the beginning of last year for my departure to England. This event determined me to postpone it to another season; and I may be allowed on such an occasion to appeal for the evidence, and the strongest evidence that could be produced, of the rectitude of my motive, even to an argument of private relation to my own interest and feelings, but immediately connected with the resolution I had taken; since it compelled me to submit to a privation of all domestic society, and to an expence which must be unavoidably repeated whenever I should prosecute the design of my own departure to England, and which my fortune could ill afford.

It was not incumbent upon me to apprise the Court of Directors formally of this change of my determination, or of the ground of it. Both were obvious. But the original obligation still remained, subject to the reservation of the same circumstances under which it was imposed. My return from Lucnow, after a long and successful application to the re-establishment of the affairs of the province of Oude, and the due authority of its ruler, replaced me in the situation from

which I had been drawn by the necessity of that attendance. It was, therefore, my first care to provide for the execution of the engagement dependant on it, after my arrival.

About the same instant of time advices were received from England of a bill depending in Parliament for the more effectual regulation of the government of the British possessions in India ; and as I had deemed it a proper respect to the Court of Directors to refer myself to their pleasure for my continuation in the service, if they should think me deserving of being entrusted with the powers which I had stated as necessary to enable me to conduct it, I held it proper to wait the result of this intelligence, in the possibility of its producing that change in the administration of Bengal, which I had prescribed as the condition of my stay. Of this I advised the Court of Directors, in a letter which I wrote to them, dated the 22d of November, by the *Surprise*; repeating my former declaration, and informing them of my intention to wait the arrival of the next dispatches which I had been made to expect with the *Fox* packet, which was waiting at the date of the last advices to bring the orders which would be required with the publication of the bill impending.

In the meantime I applied myself early and assiduously to the dispatch of such arrears of business as I found depending; and to those exigencies of the government which were likely to press, with the severest weight, upon it, in the event of a change not effected by express authority from home, and therefore wanting the confidence and respect of a fixed appointment. The first object, and that recently urged by injunctions from the Court of Directors, which rather augmented our difficulties than facilitated the removal of them,

was to clear off the debt which we had contracted during the course of a long and multiplied war. This consisted of two kinds:—First, the regular debt at interest, which had continued for some time at the fixed sum of one hundred and sixty lacks: and, Secondly, orders granted on the Treasury and Deposits, which at this time amounted to about rupees 144,47,860:8:1. Of these orders, some, which were in lieu of payment made by the Board of Trade, were charged with the customary interest.

When I left Calcutta at the beginning of the year, I had vainly flattered myself, with a confidence which impelled me to express the same expectation to the Court of Directors, that we should be able to pay off all the Treasury orders, and discharge a part of the debt at interest, by the end of December. I was certainly warranted to form and give this assurance by a fair state, which I transmitted at the same time to the Court of Directors, of our probable receipts and disbursements to the prescribed period. The causes of my disappointment arose from the unexpected, and equally unnecessary, detention of Col. Pearse's detachment at Massulipatam, when it was on its return to Bengal; by which an expence of near seventeen lacks of rupees was continued a twelvemonth beyond its computed duration; and from the enormous sum of a crore of rupees, distributed in remittances to the other presidencies, of which that of Fort St. George alone, which least wanted it, and of whose disbursements, whatever they were, our Board was kept in utter ignorance, had received for its separate share more than sixty-five lacks. A detail of this subject would be too long an interruption of the general recital; [and] as it is fully comprised in a letter which was written expressly upon it to the Court of Directors,

dated the 6th of December last, and has long since been published.

I was not apprised of these unexpected charges till my return to Calcutta, having trusted to the estimate of receipts and disbursements made at the beginning of the year above quoted, as a sure provision against them. I was anxious to put an immediate check to the continuance of a drain which our finances could ill sustain, and happily found the other members of the Board in the same disposition and opinion. At our first meeting in council on the 8th of November, I proposed, and it was agreed to with such a promptness that our orders were written and signed before we parted, to send a peremptory injunction to the presidency of Fort St. George, to desist from farther drafts upon us, declaring that we would answer none that were granted after the receipt of our letter.

To Bombay, whose wants were more pressing, but had already received a very ample and acknowledged relief, we wrote to confine their demands within five lacks of rupees, until they should receive our license for a larger supply; and to this we afterwards added the promise of a farther remittance, by bills from the treasury of Lucnow in the month of May next; for which a provision had been expressly made on a very profitable rate of exchange in the Kistbundy, or account of instalments, agreed upon by the Nabob Vizir in payment of his debt to the Company.

A few days before my return to Calcutta, but while I remained at a small distance from it, a packet was received from the Court of Directors, which had been despatched by land, and contained a letter dated the 15th of June; in which they severely censured the Governor-General and Council, for having agreed in the month of November, 1784, to take up the sum of

fifty lacks on loan for draughts on the Court of Directors, to supply a deficiency of nearly that amount in the advances made for the investment of the year ; when, as it appeared to them, our former advances had greatly exceeded the value of the allotted provision ; and they therefore recommended to the Board to prevail upon the subscribers to accept of a redemption of their loans in lieu of the promised bills.

As this dispatch had been made for the sole and express purpose of conveying the sentiments and orders of the Court of Directors on that single subject ; and therefore strongly manifested the impression which it had made on their minds and impressed the consequent necessity of compliance on ours ; the part which we had to chuse was both difficult and hazardous. The order was evidently founded on a mistake ; for the Court of Directors, or rather, as we must suppose, their official reporter, had confounded the advances of two years with those of one. It was a becoming deference to conclude that, as the propriety of the order was inseparably connected with the truth of the fact to which it was applied, they would not have passed the order under a contrary supposition ; and that a discovery of the error would induce them to revoke it.

Our engagements had hitherto been held most sacred, the Court of Directors having contented themselves with expressing their disapprobation of such as they deemed not sufficiently warranted ; but never disputing their validity, or withholding their effect, if it depended on them for giving it ; and the former loans, which had been contracted on the same conditions, and for the same exigency, had received their express approval in terms of applause. To receive their recommendation in the construction of an absolute order, and to execute it literally as such, under the

circumstances which have been recited, would have been injurious to the service, highly culpable in its principle, productive of much aggravated distress in its immediate operation, and destructive of our future credit; fatally, perhaps, to the Company's existence, if ever a season should recur of the like difficulties with those which our credit hath hitherto enabled us to surmount: at the same time, to persist in a literal adherence to our engagements with the knowledge of such an indisposition in the Court of Directors towards them, would have been an injury to the subscribers, if the Court should refuse to ratify them. Upon the whole, after much discussion, but little debate, a middle expedient was adopted; which was, to publish the whole state of the case, and to give the subscribers an option, either of the redemption of their loans, or of the acceptance of their bills, and to refer the latter to the justice and candour of the Court of Directors for their ratification of them. This subject engaged much of the attention of the Board in their two first meetings, held on the 8th and 9th of November, and passed with their unanimous assent. The instant effect was such as could not fail to afford us the most complete satisfaction; for the publication made no alteration in the minds of the subscribers, who retained their original interest in the subscription, only 2,51,500 rupees of it having been withdrawn principally by persons acting as trustees for others, and therefore not choosing to exercise the same latitude of judgment with those whose property was at their own disposal.

I found the Board engaged in an unpleasant altercation with the Board of Trade, which had originated from prior orders of the Court of Directors, received by the Surprise Packet, which had left England on the 29th of April, and arrived in Calcutta on the 28th of

August. These contained some severe censures upon the Board of Trade for a latitude assumed in their allotment of contracts for the provision of the investment, and a peremptory injunction to grant them after due advertisement, to the best bidder. Our Council, in implicit submission to the letter of the order exacted from the Board of Trade an immediate obedience to it; to which the Board of Trade objected, pleading that in consequence of an intimation given them by the Superior Council, early in the year, of their intention to appropriate one complete crore of rupees for the service of the investment of the season, not accompanied or followed by any other instructions, they had issued immediate orders to their former agents and contractors, that no time might be lost for so large a provision to continue their advances on the terms of the last year; that these orders were intended and received as actual engagements, though not confirmed by any formal deeds, and had certainly the same effect after so long a lapse of time; that the season for making the advances, and other preparatory acts, was long since passed, and the season for the returns approaching; and that any attempt to cancel the existing engagements, against which they thought the contractors would have their remedy at law, and to transfer them to new adventurers, with the necessary time allowed for public notice, and for possession, would occasion a total loss of the investment for the season.

To these objections, which really possessed all the weight given to them by the Board of Trade, it might have been added, that the order of the Court of Directors, though, as I recollect, rather indefinitely worded, must have been intended for a rule of general practice, and could not possibly be meant for imme-

diate application; since it would not have been received till the latter end of October, or the beginning of November, if the Surprise had made her passage in the ordinary time, which she had shortened by two months; and of course the Board of Trade would have been in the receipt of part of the goods provided, and the rest would have been in the course of delivery. At all events, the order was now become ineffectual. It was therefore proposed, and happily agreed to, to close the contest, by yielding the point of it to the Board of Trade, and allowing their engagements to stand with the responsibility thrown on them for its effects with relation to the orders received from home. At the same time, as the Court of Directors in their Report delivered to the House of Commons on the 23d of March 1784, and which they had called upon us with much solemnity to verify, had stated the whole sum of the expected cargoes from India for that year at one million sterling, of which the proportion that Bengal alone bore to the other presidencies was but thirty lacks; the Board of Trade was required to limit the provision to that sum for the prescribed articles of their investment, with the addition of fifteen lacks for raw silk, which was not in the list; both to allow for the provision actually made, and to preserve the manufacture, which had been much improved both in price and quality. The Board of Trade contended for a larger allowance; but a peremptory declaration of the Superior Board prevented a repetition of the demand.

I have said, that it was the first object of the Board (it was at least my own) to clear off our debts, by lessening our disbursements, as the only means of fulfilling the commands and expectations of the Court of Directors, and of affording an effectual relief to the

other presidencies ; since a lavish dissipation of our treasures beyond our current income, however specious the occasion might appear, or however urgent the call might be, as it was in the instance of the orders of the Court of Directors, grounded on their Report presented to the House of Commons, would only add to our difficulties, not unlike a thread drawn to its utmost length from an entangled skain. Our natural exigencies must be supplied ; the army must be paid a portion of its arrears for its subsistence, and the larger was their amount, the less would it admit of increase ; the whole amount, therefore, of the annual pay, of whatever denomination, must, after a certain run, be distributed to them : the restoration of peace, and the return of our foreign detachments, required that as large a portion of the army should be disbanded as had been superadded to our fixed establishment in the course of the war ; but the corps which were to be disbanded, were to be first paid up to the period of their service ; nor could they be paid, and the others neglected, without exciting general discontent, at all times dangerous in transactions of military œconomy ; but above all, when the necessity of retrenchments, and the known intention of making reformatations, had disposed the minds of men to a quicker reception of such impressions as led to mutiny : expedients, if they were to be found, must be used, either to answer or to shift the actual demand ; and every such expedient will be found to be the present gain of one rupee for the future loss of two : the debt as it increased, would throw the prospect of payment to a greater distance, and proportionably increase the discount of the original sums, which was already very large both on the Interest Notes and Treasury Orders : the multitude of bills unpaid created the like accumulation of accounts un-

audited, and the consequence licentiousness of contingent charges, besides the natural incitement to irregular claims when the expected receipts were either partial or remote. Though the Treasury was ostensibly charged with the established rate of interest, its substantial loss was equal in most cases to the discount, since every contractor, and other dealer on trust, either with the Board, or Board of Trade, took the difference into the account, either by enhancing the rates of originating engagements or eluding the conditions of the old. Yet the debt itself was inconsiderable : and here it may not be amiss to take notice of the fallacy of the general cry which has prevailed for some time past, of the loss of our public credit ; than which nothing can be more foreign from the truth.

The fact is, that our public credit, by which I mean the credit of our Interest Notes, and Treasury Orders, never extended beyond the English servants of the Company, and the European inhabitants of Calcutta ; and to these may be added a few, and a very few, of the old Hindoo families at the presidency. All the other inhabitants of the provinces are utterly ignorant of the advantage and security of our funds, and have other ways of employing their money, such as purchases of landed property, loans at an usurious and accumulating monthly interest, and mortgages ; to which, though less profitable in the end, and generally insecure, they are so much attached by long usage, and the illusion of a large growing profit, that it would not be easy to wean them from these habits for others more difficult of comprehension, and to them of insuperable discredit from the idea of insecurity, attached to the dependence on power. And happy for the Company is it, that such bounds are prescribed by

necessity to their public credit; and that it is not in the power of a weak administration to load its successors with debts improvidently contracted for the relief of its own exigencies.

The want of credit, as it is falsely called, in Bengal, is not, as the term implies, a want of confidence, but of means, in those who were the creditors of our Treasury. When these had no more ready money to lend, the government appeared to be greatly distressed, because its expenses continued at the same amount with the resource stopped, by which they had been supplied beyond the extent of its current income; and as the prospect of discharging the debt which it had contracted became so much the more remote, and in a degree doubtful from the hazards of a state of multiplied warfare, its notes first lost their equal currency by a natural consequence, and afterwards sunk yet more in their value. The same causes afterwards affected the orders on the Treasury, although in the course of payment, but at uncertain periods. Yet, when I left Bengal, our debts of every denomination amounted to no more than 304,00,000 current rupees, which is little more than one half of our annual revenue, which may be fairly estimated at $5\frac{1}{2}$ crores of current rupees, or $5\frac{1}{2}$ millions sterling.

With this clear, and certainly true state of the question, how will it appear to any candid judgement, that after a war sustained during the course of five years with three States of the greatest relative power to our own situation and connections, the Marattahs, Hyder Ally Cawn, and the French; after having sent two great armies to the extremities of Indostan and Deccan; after having furnished subsistence to the other presidencies, supplied the China Trade with yearly remittances, and made richer investments for

England than were ever purchased in the same space of time under any preceding administration; our resources are exhausted, and our credit gone, because we owe a sum which we cannot instantly discharge, but *which scarcely exceeds half our annual revenue!* I repeat the position in the same terms, because it cannot be too often repeated, nor its impression too forcibly made in such a discussion. Let the same case be put of a private estate so encumbered, and its proprietor reduced by it to a state of bankruptcy. It is an absurdity in terms:—but if the comparison be carried higher to the enormous magnitude of the sum in which the parent state is indebted, a sum which all the treasures of this habitable world could not realise, the attempt to fix the imputation of insolvency on the Treasury of Bengal would be too contemptible for argument*.

When I took charge of the government of Bengal in April 1772, I found it loaded with a debt at interest of nearly the same amount as the present; and in less than two years I saw that debt completely discharged, and a sum in ready cash of the same amount actually accumulated in store in the public Treasuries: and in effect the present debt ought to be cleared off, as I have no doubt it will be, completely, in two years of peace, if the present peace is of that duration.

Some time before my departure the Accomptant General delivered in to the Board an estimate of the probable resources and disbursements of the Bengal government from the 30th of April 1784 to the 1st of May 1785; from which it appeared, that at the end of

* The debts of every denomination, contracted in Bengal during the late successful war in India, scarcely exceeded three millions sterling. The unfunded debt alone of Great Britain was, two years after the peace, thirty-six millions.

that period the claims on our Treasury would exceed our resources by 1,49,01,433 current rupees: or, in other words, that independently of our bonds we should be indebted this sum, either for loans, or for arrears of pay, or other current disbursements. On the supposition that this statement were just, this would be a heavy debt or deficiency. But even this, which I deem exaggerated, will be found, on a comparative examination, to be considerably less than what actually existed at the time when the account was formed. For the proof of this assertion, I refer to the account itself, No. in the Appendix. From thence it appears, that on the 30th of April, 1784, we were indebted as follows:—

Balance due to sundry departments	2,87,146:12:11
Disbursements in arrears, viz.	
Civil	16,55,934: 6
Military	51,38,887:13: 5
Marine	3,39,486:15: 1
Revenue depart.	17,77,126: 6: 7
	<hr/> 89,11,435: 3: 7
Extraordinary disbursements in arrears, viz.	
Deposits due from the Treasury	10,47,600:13: 2
Due on sundry orders thereon	2,87,142:11: 5
Due on ditto in favour of the Board of Trade	45,45,897: 5: 7
Due on ditto for surplus to, and drafts of the other presidencies	24,39,750: 3
Due from the <i>Lucnow</i> Treasury to the Bankers and Mr. <i>Scott</i>	18,21,707: 8: 8
Due on various accounts	63,886:13:10
	<hr/> 102,05,985: 7: 8
Current Rupees	<hr/> 1,94,04,567: 8: 2

The amount therefore of our debt and arrears, independent of Bonds, on the 30th of April 1784, was 1,94,04,567:8:2 current rupees; but from this we should in justice deduct the amount of the sums remaining at the same period in charge of the different offices, being 40,63,877:2:6 current rupees: and the real deficiency of our finances at that time will be found 1,53,40,690:5:8 current rupees, being more than the deficiency calculated for the 1st of May, 1785, by 4,39,256:9:9 current rupees.

Many of the articles which composed our debt in April 1784, would run on without much inconveniency to the creditors till May 1785; and there are some even which could not with propriety be discharged. Of the former kind, are the orders on the Treasury, of which as some were paid off, others might be granted to an equal amount.

Such also are the arrears of some of the offices. Of the latter kind are the deposits in the Treasury, which are never restored until demanded, and which have continued for a long series of years at nearly the same amount.

But in fact, this estimate, though formed with all possible accuracy at the time, has, from changes of circumstances in the intervening period, already proved in many particulars erroneous; the receipts being under-rated, and the disbursements stated beyond their real amount. I will mention a few instances.

The sales of the Salt are rated in this account for the whole year at only thirty lacks of rupees; whereas, it appears from an actual account delivered to me by the Controller, that on the 31st of December 1784, he had paid into the Treasury 44,20,000 sicca rupees; and he expected to make farther payments

by the 30th of April 1785, to the amount of nine lacks, making altogether 53,20,000 sicca rupees, 61,71,200 current rupees; and the event has hitherto always more than verified the amount of his estimates.

The receipts from the Opium are in the same manner estimated under their probable amount, having already been exceeded by the proceeds arising from only a part of the Opium, which was sold a few days before I left Calcutta. The whole sales, when completed, would yield about seventeen lacks, being five lacks more than Mr. Larkins has stated in his account.

I do not see any estimate in this account of the receipts arising from the sales of the Company's Europe imports; these may be computed on a medium at nine lacks.

The grounds on which I suppose that Mr. Larkins has stated the disbursements at a higher rate than they will actually amount to, are these: the estimate is calculated at the rate of our establishments in April 1784; but in the month of January 1785, a general reduction took place in all our establishments, both civil and military, which would have a considerable effect in diminishing the disbursements of the three remaining months of the year. As this reduction extended generally to the establishments dependent on the various offices which were abolished, without particularizing each article; the exact amount of the whole saving cannot be ascertained, until the particular accounts formed in consequence of it are received from Bengal. Setting aside the effects of this reduction, if the circumstances which I have before mentioned are taken into the estimate, the state of our deficiency may be corrected as follows:—

Deficiency per Mr. Larkins' estimate on the 30th of April 1785, viz.	1,49,01,433:11:11
Deduct receipts beyond what Mr. Larkins has estimated, viz.	
Farther receipts from the Salt	23,00,000
Ditto the Opium	5,00,000
Receipts from the import sales	9,00,000
	<hr/>
Sicca rupees	37,00,000
Batta 16 per cent.	5,92,000
	<hr/>
	42,92,000
	<hr/>
Total deficiency estimated for the 1st of May 1785	1,06,09,433:11:11

Which is less than what I have shown was our deficiency on the 30th of April 1784, by 47,31,256:9:9 current rupees.

I now proceed. As almost every act of the Board which was not in the ordinary course of business, during the short interval comprehended in this review, was formed on the principle which I have already mentioned, or with a view to it; I shall recite them as they accord with the general subject, leaving such as are of a different kind to follow, without regard to the order of time in which they passed.

In the consultation of the 22d of November, two other resolutions passed, which afforded the prospect of considerable relief in our means of expence: One, to withhold the supply to Canton, which was the less necessary, as the supercargoes, who best knew their own wants, had not required it; and we knew that they could generally command any sum that they might have occasion for by drafts on the Court of Directors. The other was immediately connected with it. The usual mode of remittance to Canton was by opium, either sent on account of the Company, or by sale to individuals, the amount of the sales being payable to the Company's cash in China.

By the first we were constantly losers, and I believe such will be the invariable consequence of attempts of the superior Administration, charged as it is with so great a variety of affairs, to entangle itself in the nice and intricate minutiae of commerce; and in the latter the opium had always sold below its real value, or, to speak more properly, below the value which the first sale ought to bear in the proportion of its demand, and easy sale abroad.

It was agreed to advertise the sale of it in lots at public auction, and to receive Treasury Orders in payment. By this advantage fairly taken of the eagerness of individuals to convert their Treasury Orders into cash, or useful merchandise, we cleared off more than sixteen lacks of our current debt, and raised the sale of the opium to a profit exceeding by much the discount of our Treasury Orders.

At this time we had more ships on hand, reckoning those which were expected, than we could provide with cargoes. Our supplies to Bombay, though very ample, were yet insufficient for all their wants. Their investments of coffee we understood to be an essential article; insomuch, that in the last year they had sent one of the Company's ships to Mocha for a cargo of coffee in the expectation of obtaining it on credit, but failed, and the ship returning empty, they purchased at an advance of fifty per cent. on the prime cost, and drew upon Bengal for the amount, a quantity sufficient for her lading, from a private adventurer. This may serve for one illustration of the improvidence of desultory expedients. It occurred to us that one of the ships which was then laying in the river might be profitably employed in this service, and the *Camden* was accordingly chosen for it. The Board of Trade was directed to provide for the purpose a small invest-

ment of cloth and rice, the produce of which was to be invested in coffee, with an allowance to the commander to draw upon the Company for the deficiency.

I am aware that it will perhaps be objected to some of these measures, that in relieving our own exigencies we have only increased the burden of the Company, by leaving it to fall on them with accumulated weight from other parts of their general administration ; that for instance, in stopping the supplies to China we have entailed on the Company the expence of paying the bills which the supercargoes must draw for money taken up at Canton ; or, that in prohibiting farther drafts from Madras, we have obliged that presidency to reduce their investment, or to borrow money at a large interest, or, in more propriety of speech, to issue bonds in lieu of payment for their current expences.

Such objections, though they are in reality inapplicable, yet being mixed with facts, to those who consider the subject superficially, will appear just, and more especially where the mind is already prepossessed with those ideas which have been so universally adopted, and which, in truth, have been one great cause of our present embarrassments.

It seems to have been supposed that the resources of Bengal were inexhaustible ; and to the measures which sprung from such ideas must we ascribe a great part of the distress which its government has experienced.

Whatever charges might be incurred at the other presidencies, whether occasioned by speculative plans of increasing their investment, or by a lavish waste of their treasure, it was the less regarded how far their own resources fell short of their disbursements, since

Bengal was looked on as an inexhaustible fund from whence the deficiency might easily and readily be supplied. Hence it is, that the drains from Bengal for the support of the other presidencies have been annually increasing, till at length they have amounted in 1784, as I have already observed, to the enormous sum of a crore of rupees.

It is true that the resources of Bengal are great; but they are not inexhaustible. After defraying all the charges of its government, and all expences of its civil and military establishments, Bengal is perhaps capable of yielding an annual tribute of one crore of rupees to the company; nor is it material to the country whether the remittance be made entire in cargoes exported to England, or divided by aids sent to the other presidencies and China; but it can only be made through the medium of trade. Every rupee drawn from its currency, whether in specie or in bills, which will amount to the same effect in the end, will gradually exhaust it of its vital strength; nor will the effect be felt until it would be too late to administer a remedy for it. The sources of opulence which it possesses in the fertility of its soil, and the number and industry of its inhabitants, will, I think, admit of its yielding the tribute I have mentioned; which is perhaps greater than any other country in the world could bear, possessed only of the same sources, and like it, without any mines of gold or silver. But if more is to be improvidently exacted, these sources may fail, and Bengal be rendered incapable of yielding what it might have done with ease. The ordinary supplies to the other Presidencies, which were once moderate, were sufficient for their wants; such may not now be adequate to the effectual relief of their present exigencies; yet it is certainly better, that the means of

furnishing them in future should be preserved, than that by attempting too much, they should be cut off for ever. Bengal wants only a little respite to retrieve its own affairs. It will then with ease furnish the usual supplies to the other Presidencies, and perhaps be able to increase them, so as to assist in clearing off their incumbrances. But if the strain be carried too far on Bengal in its present state, I predict, that not only its capacity of assisting the others must annually diminish, but its own embarrassments increase so as to endanger its very existence, if ever it should be pressed by any calamity. The recovery of Bengal is the object therefore of the first consequence to the Company, and is in effect the first mode of substantial relief to the other Presidencies.

Of the two foreign detachments, one had been some time returned from Surat, under the conduct of Colonel Charles Morgan, and dissolved. The other, commanded by Colonel Pearce in the Carnatic, had been unfortunately detained at Massulepatam, as I have before observed, during the last season preceding the rains, and did not repass the boundary of Bengal till the end of the last year. I staid long enough for the melancholy pleasure of seeing the remains of this valuable corps after its return, and to join in the regretful, but necessary order for its dissolution. These reductions, by the abolition of an expensive staff, and a heavy contingent expence, will prove a considerable relief to our general military charge. But a more extensive and radical cure was yet wanted for the great disease of our finances, and this I had the inexpressible satisfaction to see completed, and administered before my departure. One plan was formed for a general retrenchment of all the civil, and another of all the military establishments. These appeared

before the Board in their first and rough state on the 20th of December, and were passed on the 4th of January.

Among the many invectives, whether excited by policy, malevolence, or truth, which have been thrown upon the administration of Bengal, that of a lavish expenditure of the public money, in current expences and in fixed establishments, has been a constant and laboured subject of declamation. Allusions are made to it as to a fact of such notoriety, as to preclude the necessity of evidence; at least, no instances have been adduced in proof of it, which have come to my knowledge. No credit has been given to the government of Bengal for having added more than a crore of rupees*, in the midst of all its difficulties, to the public revenue; no remembrance retained of the applause bestowed on the same administration for former retrenchments made, and a system of œconomy formed, when the temper of the times admitted it; no consideration allowed for the sums invested in the support of the Company's commerce, which it has alone supported; nor for the defence of the Company's other Presidencies, which but for that defence would have been lost; no merit ascribed to it for having maintained the splendour of the national character in all its military operations, unalloyed by a single failure of success, or imputed error; nor for having insured the blessings of peace, security, and abundance to the subjects of its immediate dominion, while it dealt out the terrors of conquest to the remotest enemies of the parent state, and of its own associate members; and while every other member of the British Empire was afflicted with the plagues of war or insurrection. As

* One million, one hundred thousand pounds sterling.

little was it noticed, with how inconsiderable a charge upon its fixed resources these services were performed, and how disproportionate, beyond all degrees of comparison, with the growth of the national debt, or with the product of that debt in the national services, within the same period. It was sufficient that our expences had greatly exceeded those of our peace establishment, to infer from it, without farther inquiry, that the excess was solely the effect of dissipation.

Yet let me be allowed to repeat the supposition which I have already taken occasion to make : were Lord Clive to awake from the dead, or Mr. Vansittart, great as was the mind of the former, and extensive as the knowledge, and ready the resources of the latter, and to be told what powerful exertions had been made by Bengal within the last six or seven years, and what was its actual state and capacity ; neither one nor the other would give credit to the information, but pronounce it to be impossible from the recollection of what they knew of the powers of that Government, and from any allowance which they could make for its subsequent improvements.

Yet I do not affirm that the charge was absolutely groundless. There never yet was a system of public oeconomy to which it would not in a degree apply. Some of its offices were overpaid, nor were the emoluments allotted to all exactly proportioned to their importance, trust, or the ability required for discharging them. It is impossible that they should, where offices exist at the time in which their salaries are determined, and many are to determine them. Men were not invariably appointed to offices to which they were suited, or best suited by their talents, experience, or integrity. It is impossible that they should, where the power

of patronage is in many hands, and exercised under the influence of personal favour, or of superior patronage.

Contingent bills, which form the most uncontrollable source of the general disbursements, were neither audited as they came in, (and every delay is in this case a cause of increase in expence) nor when audited, corrected with that severity with which contingent accounts ought to be corrected; and the foregoing causes may be alledged for this effect also.

To enumerate every case would be endless. In a word, while the power of Government is in the hands of many; and the smaller the number is, the greater is the evil in this case; while each hand holds an equal share of it; while the members of Government retain their places by sufferance, and the terrors of dismissal and disgrace are held out against them at home; when their accusers and the expectants of their places are the judges of their conduct, and preparers of the evidence on which it is to be tried; when the members of the Government themselves are in disagreement with each other, and that disagreement (with regret and shame I suppose it) is excited by the voice of authority; when each member stands in need of support from home, and owes returns for the support which he receives; when each claims an indulgence from the others, and has it in his power to retaliate every disappointment, which may be easily understood, but can never be imputed; and lastly, when the meritorious conduct is denied its credit, and even the sacrifices of interest are branded with the reproach of venality; from a government so constituted, what reformation can be expected?

Yet what could be done, has been done; and I know not whether I feel most satisfaction or regret in the

reflection, that my administration closed with an act which, though most necessary to the public expectation, will give cause of mortal offence to numbers both in India and in England, and subject me to the charge of ingratitude from every friend at home who regards the return of personal favour as an obligation superior to the consideration of public exigency ; and I expect to experience this, and worse effects of it. Yet there never was a time in which I stood in more need of personal support, or had a stronger private inducement to court it. But as I saw a necessity for attempting a new and complete reformation, I could not reconcile it with duty or honour, to leave so invidious a work to my colleagues, when I could render it less odious, to them at least, by taking a share, and a principal one, in the formation of it ; when I thought (as every man in my station ought to think) that I could perform it with more effect than others could ; and especially when I considered, that it was an act that would, or ought at least, to extend in its operation to the distance of years beyond my own time, and was therefore the most important subject of my attention, as the most laudable of my ambition, as to the execution, that is the most easy part of it ; for when the plans are formed and issued in orders, what remains is merely negative : and it will require little trouble to refrain from creating new offices, or additions of salary ; nor stretch of capacity to refuse unnecessary advances of cash, or the sanction of prohibited charges.

Before I left Calcutta on my visit to Lucnow, in February 1784, I with some difficulty prevailed on the Board to constitute a committee for auditing accounts. I was induced to recommend this measure, by the long experience of the insufficiency of the superior Board for that kind of detail, especially where the members

of it did not mutually possess an implicit confidence, and most cordial agreement. Besides, the examination of accounts requires an ocular inspection, and that kind of abstracted attention which cannot be bestowed on a Secretary reading them, nor by many ears attending. In effect, though the Board assembled regularly on every Thursday in their department of inspection, for the professed purpose of examining accounts; I can securely affirm, that the whole aggregate of business transacted by the Board in this department collectively, in the course of a twelvemonth, was not equal to that which a single member, uninterrupted, could have discharged, in one morning.

In the plan which I gave in for the formation of the new office, and which was passed with little alteration, I adopted the construction of the Board of Accounts which existed at Fort St. George at the time in which I was a member of the Council there; and which was admirably calculated for quick dispatch, as well as to preclude, as much as possible, all unfairness from prejudice or favour.

I was the more desirous of effecting this point at the time, from the apprehension of being long absent from the Presidency; and I flattered myself that by this expedient the most important and essential part of the current business would be dispatched with regularity. The event did not answer my expectations, the construction of the Committee differing essentially from the principles of its constitution. The civil audits were indeed brought up to the latest period, which was a very material point attained; but the military, the most important, were in long arrears, and the accounts of all the foreign detachments, which the Board had with great labour examined, and either passed the minuter corrections, or laid down the

general rules for those which were of the same kind, but of more frequent occurrence, with orders for their reference for complete adjustment to the Commissary General, remained after the lapse of a year unnoticed, having neither been transmitted to the Commissary General, nor even transcribed from the rough minutes. These, and all the other depending accounts, underwent the separate inspection of the members of the Board, a work of great labour; those of the military detachments referred with proper instructions to the Commissary General, and all the rest brought up to the end of the month of December, by the 27th of the month ensuing.

I have enlarged on this subject beyond the claim which it may appear to have from its obvious consequence; both because it is connected with the general principle of frugal oeconomy, and with the principle of that duty with which I shall close this recapitulation; I mean the obligation of leaving as few incumbrances as possible on the hands of my colleagues, and especially of my successor; and for that purpose of bestowing an unusual portion of my own personal labour upon them before my departure.

In my accommodation with the Nabob Assoph ul Dowlah, I had agreed to withdraw the detachment commanded by Col. Sir John Cummings from Furrukabad, and had continued the estimate of its expence in the sum which the Nabob was charged with for the current year no longer than to the end of December, allowing the intermediate time for the return of the detachment within our own borders; and I left orders for that effect in the hands of my military secretary Major Palmer, whom I left as my agent at Lucnow, to be issued whenever the force destined to supply its place from the Nabob's own

establishment should be ready to occupy the station. This detachment stood at a yearly charge of near twenty-three lacks of rupees, of which nine lacks consisted in staff allowances, and exclusive disbursements appertaining to it as a separate corps. The last sum would have been immediately saved by the reduction; and a saving of the whole, or nearly the whole, might have followed by the discharge of as many sepoy regiments as the number composing the detachment, no longer wanted with the termination of the service in which it was then employed. I had once before attempted the same measure in the year 1782, and had even recalled the detachment then stationed at Furruckabad; but I was under a necessity caused by many considerations of a policy to which I should have yielded little respect under a better constituted system of government, to revoke it. The Nabob had never solicited the aid of a military force for the defence of that frontier, and he alone was, or ought to be, the judge of his own wants. In truth, it was not wanted; but it greatly injured his authority, it affected his revenue, and added a large sum to the annual excess of his debt to the Company, without any real saving to our own disbursements; since it was a superfluous increase of our military strength, if not required for that specific service. Besides, it was too remote for discipline and control; and many foul evils, unknown to the service before the formation of the corps which were entertained by our government for the Nabob's service and pay in the year 1775, had originated from this deleterious source.

The opportunities which my residence at Lucnow, and a nearer and more intimate intercourse with the King's ministers afforded me, of estimating the strength

of the different states whose possessions bordered on the Nabob's northern dominions, or who might approach them in their occasional incursions, impressed me with the strongest conviction of the inutility of the appropriation of any part of our military strength to such a defence, for which a much smaller force of the Nabob's own sepoys, rabble as they were, were more than adequate against a worse rabble of any that could be opposed to them. But the other members of the Board judged otherwise, and resolved on continuing the detachment; and, however I might feel the instant mortification of seeing my own judgement, formed on actual knowledge and intimate observation, superseded by private suggestions; for no knowledge could the other members have had, but from individuals; I was but too sensible of the disadvantage under which I should contest this point, if I did contest it, in my approaching separation from the service, which invested my successor with a plea, specious at least, for an exclusive option in the provision of measures which were required by his sense of the public danger in which I had no longer any concern. And when I found both him and the other Member of the Council inflexible against the arguments which I urged in support of my own proposition, I submitted; making the repeal of my former orders an act of my own authority, that it might not appear the effect of opposition, and produce a dangerous influence on the credit of the succeeding administration.

More need not now be recapitulated of it than its termination, which was a corrected adjustment of the Nabob Vizir's debt, now settled, with the growing subsidy and other current payments due for the year of the computation called Füsselee, which ends with the English month September 1785, at 1,05,00,000

rupees of the Lucnow standard, and made payable according to the following monthly installments :—

To be paid to the end of Bhadoon,					
In ready money	-	-	-	-	9,00,000
In bills	-	-	-	-	10,00,000
					<hr/>
					19,00,000
To be paid to the end of Coar					
Ditto	-	-	Kateg	-	5,00,000
Ditto	-	-	Augun	-	5,00,000
Ditto	-	-	Poos, viz.	-	5,00,000
In ready money	-	-	-	-	5,00,000
Bills on Surat or Calcutta	-	-	-	-	15,00,000
					<hr/>
					20,00,000
To be paid to the end of May					
Ditto	-	-	Phagoon	-	3,25,000
Ditto	-	-	Cheynt	-	3,25,000
To be paid to the end of Bysaak	-	-	-	-	3,25,000
Ditto	-	-	Seyt, viz.	-	3,25,000
In ready money	-	-	-	-	3,25,000
Bills on Surat or Calcutta	-	-	-	-	10,00,000
					<hr/>
					13,25,000
To be paid to the end of Assar					
Ditto	-	-	Sawan	-	3,25,000
Ditto	-	-	Bhadoon, viz.	-	3,25,000
In ready money	-	-	-	-	3,25,000
Bills on Surat or Calcutta	-	-	-	-	15,00,000
					<hr/>
					18,25,000
Lucnow Rupees of 23, 24, 25, and 26 Suns					<hr/>
					1,05,00,000

I had the satisfaction of learning a few days before my departure, that the kist, or demand for Poos, which was the last due, and which was the heaviest kist of the year, had been completely discharged ; and I have every well-grounded reason to believe, that the remaining payments will be as punctually made ; so that the Nabob's debt, which, when I went to Lucnow, amounted to 72,95,656. 4. 7. current rupees*, and

* Vide Account drawn out by the Accomptant-General, and laid before the Board, with his letter of the 24th of February 1784.

was the accumulated growth of many years, was now reduced to about 23,00,000 rupees*.

The other transactions of the Board, which passed in the period of this review, having arisen out of accidental emergency, unconnected with any fixed and followed rule of conduct, I shall be brief in my recital of them.

On the 16th of November, letters were written to the Marquis de Bussy, to the Director and Council for the Dutch settlement at Colombo, to the Government General of Batavia, and to the President and Select Committee of Fort St. George; proposing, and warranting the means for accommodating the long-depend-ing dispute betwixt the latter and M. de Bussy, respecting the mode of transferring the cession of Trincomale, according to the late treaties with France and Holland, to the representatives of the latter; the Marquis de Bussy claiming to deliver it immediately to the Dutch Government at Colombo, according to the intent and spirit of the treaties, and Lord Macartney and his Committee, to be put in possession of it on the part of Great Britain, that it might be delivered on their part, and by their agents, to the Dutch, according to the letter of the treaties. After a variety of elaborate and subtile discussion of this unsubstantial difference, by which, if all parties were not losers, none apparently gained; it had been agreed between the two Governments of Fort St. George and Pondicherry, to refer the point in dispute to their respective Courts

* By late advices from Bengal, the East India Company are informed that the Nabob Vizir has faithfully complied with every engagement he entered into with Mr. Hastings—that his debt was not only completely cleared off, but he was actually in advance in his current monthly payments: the debt here alluded to is that which was struck out of the Company's statement in November 1783, and pronounced absolutely irrecoverable by the minister of that period.

in Europe ; and a French frigate had been dispatched from Pondicherry for that purpose, in which Mr. Staunton, private Secretary to Lord Macartney, had been permitted to take his passage for the explanation of what had passed on the side of the Government of Madras in relation to this contest. We decided, (deeming ourselves, as the superior and controlling power on the part of the British nation in India, competent to decide) that the Marquis de Bussy should cause the cession to be immediately made by his own agents, whom in that case we authorised to act as ours, to those of the Dutch Government of Columbo ; and we required him in return, to restore the town of Cuddalore to the Government of Fort St. George, which had been withheld by this unprofitable delay ; the treaties having expressly stipulated, that the restitution of all places taken in the course of the war, which were to be restored, should take effect at the same period of time. Period !—an unhappy word, the grammatical construction of which occupied a large portion of the correspondence which passed between the Select Committee of Fort St. George and the Marquis de Bussy, and yet remains unresolved.

If superstition may be admitted to suggest the sources of those untoward series of political events which the common sense of mankind cannot reconcile to any intelligible causes, that which I have been relating seems to be under the government of a peculiar kind of fatality ; for to a plain understanding, there appears to be no reason which could have hindered the effect of the treaties on their first promulgation, but many to promote it ; yet, after the professed endeavours of all parties ; and the expiration of many months, it was more distant than ever ; and when a peremptory measure was adopted which seemed

to ensure its easy success, the death of the Marquis de Bussy, of which we were apprised a few days preceding my departure, will most probably have defeated the end of that also. In the mean time, the Dutch lose the benefit of their confessed right of possession; the French have the charge of it without any dependant advantage; and keep the possession of our Fort and territory of Cuddalore, probably with as little advantage, though to our certain loss and injury*.

My report of the negotiations, which I performed at the injunction of the Board, for obtaining the return of the Prince Mirza Jehander Shaw to his father's court, contains all that is necessary for information on that detached subject, and it has already been published. As an object of mere curiosity, I shall however add, in an Appendix, a narrative written by the Prince himself of his flight, which will perhaps afford more entertainment to most readers of these numerous sheets, than the contents of all the rest.

Some time preceding, the Select Committee of Fort St. George had, by different ships, sent round many of the King's officers and soldiers to Calcutta. Their motive for this act was probably to free themselves from the expence of their subsistence, for we had no official information of the purpose of it, nor indeed were we at all apprised by what authority many of these consignments were made. This laid the Board under some difficulties. The senior officer, Colonel Gordon, had received orders from the Provincial Commander in Chief upon the coast, concerning the disposition of these men, and for recruiting the corps to which they

* The Cessions were mutually made in conformity to the orders of the Governor General and Council here alluded to, as appears by letters received from Bengal since Mr. Hastings's arrival in England.

belonged ; and he in virtue of this commission assumed the exercise of an authority which the Board (having no regular knowledge of him) could not admit. The personal merits and ingenuous manners of Colonel Gordon exacted from the Board a degree of respect, in the observance of which, something too much was yielded of a power of which he was either entitled to the complete exercise, or of which he should have been denied the right altogether.

It is needless to enumerate all the little subjects of altercation which arose out of this equivocal state. It is sufficient to say, that the Board finally decided, as the proper and only judges in such a contest, by ordering all the men whose time of service was expired, and were willing and fit to enter into the Company's service, to be entertained, and the remainder to be embarked for England. To the officers, who were more than a hundred in number, and who would have been subjected to great inconvenience, nor the commanders to less, by being crowded as passengers in the Company's chartered ships, were allowed, to those who chose it, fixed sums as passage-money, to provide their own means of conveyance. An ill-judged claim, asserted by Colonel Gordon, to supersede the authority of the Board in appointing general courts-martial, afforded an occasion for addressing the Court of Directors upon the general subject of the contradictory and ill-defined powers of the Board and the King's military Commanders-in-chief in India, as they at this time stood in relation to each other, and to treat it with a large and free discussion.

I now come to the chief object of this recapitulation ; namely, my separation from the service. Although I considered this as an event already determined, having myself long since fixed the necessity and obligation of

it by declarations which left no option to my discretion, and little chance of their being rendered null by the reservations* which a due respect for authority had impelled me to annex to them ; yet as the possibility at least of these reservations being verified by the event was implied in my having made them, and as I knew that the Parliament of Great Britain was, at the time of the last advices from thence, employed in the consideration of such points as necessarily led to those, which, in one determination of them, might prove the pledged grounds of my continuance in office, I resolved to wait the arrival of the next dispatches, which I was given to expect, by those of the *Surprise*, would soon follow in the *Fox* packet, or in the *Cygnets* sloop of war. But so near was my sense of this suspension to certainty, that I was exceedingly anxious to give early notice to the Court of Directors of my determination in this state of it ; nor was it less necessary to repeat the advice of the loss which the constitutional administration had already received by the death of Mr. Wheler, of which no information had yet been sent, except an express dispatched by myself in November from Benares, and intended for a conveyance by land from Bombay. The *Surprise* having approved herself the fittest vessel that we could procure for a voyage of expedition, the Board agreed to hire her for this occasion for a freight estimated by the inverted proportion of the time in which she performed her passage. She was taken up on the 19th of November, and left her pilot on the 16th of December.

* The reservation here alluded to was contained in Mr. Hastings's letter to the Court of Directors of the 20th March 1783. In that letter he desired they would appoint a successor to the Government of Bengal, and notified his determination to resign it the following year, unless he was furnished with those powers which have lately been conferred upon Lord Cornwallis.

In this letter, I expressed my intention of waiting the arrival of the next regular dispatches from England; but on the 20th of the same month, I received a packet by the way of Bussorah, which put an instant period to all my hesitation. It brought me letters dated in London as late as the 3d of August, and information of a bill for the regulation of all the various branches of the British possessions in India, on an entirely new and permanent system, which had actually passed the House of Commons, and had been received with so little opposition in the House of Lords, as to denounce its passage, with no essential change, through that channel of the legislature also. The parts of it which bore a relation to my office, and to those points which I had fixed as ultimately decisive of my resolution, were the clauses which declared the constitution of the Government of Bengal to reside in a Governor General and a limited number of counsellors, with the same equality of powers as that of the existing constitution; and which, though it confirmed the present members in their places, left their removal at the discretion of the King's Minister.

The first of these clauses was a determinate removal of the supposition, in the eventual verification of which, I had declared that I would still continue to retain the service and my office, and by a consonant and necessary inference imposed on me the indispensable obligation of resigning both; for I had repeatedly, in addresses to the highest authority to which I was permitted to address myself, declared, that I would do it. As to the latter, it had no other effect upon my mind, in respect to my determination already confirmed, than to divest it of all concern for the consequence, since the grounds assigned for the construction of the new bill, as I gathered them from printed

extracts, and from the concurrent information of private letters, written to others as well as to myself, were such as indicated my dismissal as the necessary conclusion from them ; nor could I descend to so humble a sense of my own unimportance as to suppose that the declarations which I had made and repeated of my intention would pass totally unnoticed, when they related to an effect of such magnitude, as the transfer of the first efficient authority by which the new system was to be conducted, into hands not expressly selected for it. I therefore concluded, that either my destined successor was already on the way, or such orders as were to prescribe the intended succession, in whatever mode it was to take place in virtue of the new act. It is true that no public or official notice had been received of the act, nor were we informed yet by any authority that it had actually passed ; but my private conviction of both was complete ; nor was this a consideration determinable by the grounds of prescribed authority. My resignation of the service was left by the power which had conferred it to my own free option ; and I had therefore no other rule for determining it than my own private sense of public obligation, and consistency of character. I knew that the Company's dispatches, which even in cases of the most pressing emergency had of late years been subjected to great delays, had received other causes of obstruction from the multiplication of the channels through which they were now to pass ; and it appeared as absurd to me, as it would have to others the appearance of presumption, to wait for confirmation of what I already knew sufficiently for my own use, and lose by waiting, as I most probably should, the season for my departure. But why should I expatiate on a point of so little moment to any but

myself? If I am conscious of having maintained to the last act of my public life the integrity of conduct and the consistency of those principles which I had laid down for the regulation of it; neither my constituents, whose interests even in this instance were my leading object, nor my friends, who have withheld from me their belief in my professions, nor my enemies, if I yet have such, who have laboured to effect by violence that act which I have performed upon myself, have any right to pass their censures upon me. I am accountable to myself alone; and in the approbation of my own mind, I feel a support which the world cannot move. Yet may I feel a regret, to see that hope which I had too fondly indulged, and which I had sustained during thirteen laboured years with a perseverance against a succession of difficulties which might have overcome the constancy of an abler mind, of being in some period of time, however remote, allowed to possess and exercise the full powers of my station, of which I had hitherto held little more than the name and responsibility; and to see with it the belief which I had as fondly indulged, that I should become the instrument of raising the British name, and the substantial worth of its possessions in India, to a degree of prosperity proportioned to such a trust; both vanish in an instant, like the illusions of a dream; with the poor and only consolation left me of the conscious knowledge of what I could have effected, had my destiny ordained that I should attain the situation to which I aspired, and that I have left no allowable means untried, by which I might have attained it.—But enough of this.

I have already said, that I had protracted the time of my departure, as I had originally fixed it, on account of the appeal made to me by the Nabob

Vizir. The same cause might yet detain me. It was therefore the first provision which I had to secure in forming my resolution; and before I formed it. I accordingly delivered to the Board a minute in which I mentioned the probability of my early departure, and required, as one previous ground of my determination, the positive declaration of their intentions with respect of my late arrangements with the Nabob Vizir, to whom I had pledged my word that I should, before my resignation of the service, exact such an explanation from the members of the Board, and that I would not resign it unless I received from them an absolute and unqualified promise on record, and confirmed by letter from my eventual successor to him, that no resident should be sent, nor any deviation made from my engagements, whilst he and his ministers performed theirs in the punctual discharge of the monthly payments of the year. My minute was communicated to the other members of the Board on the 4th of January, and answered on the 14th, by a joint and liberal assurance on their part, expressive both of their resolution to abide by my engagement, and of their sense of it as an obligation independent of the actual occasion. Of one part only they made an exception, which was the continuance of the detachment at Futtygur, which subject had already been discussed at large, and concluded. Indeed it made no essential part of my engagement with the Nabob Vizir; and the Nabob himself had seasonably furnished me with a recent plea for suspending the execution of this measure, by the alarm which he had taken at the events which had followed the death of Affrasiyah Cawn, the King's Minister, of which I may have occasion to speak hereafter, and by his apprehension of troubles on that frontier; an apprehension which I

thought, and still think, to have had no just warrant, but which, as he entertained it, afforded an idea of better security to him from the continuance of the detachment, and to the public eye, the appearance of its being dictated by a regard to his interests. Yet as the expence of this corps had no provision made for it in the Kistbundee after the end of December ; and the Nabob's resources, of which a large portion had been derived from credit and the contributions of his nearest relations*, were barely equal to the sum already pledged ; to have demanded this subsidy in addition, and made it payable in the current year, would have been equivalent to a dissolution of his agreement, by annexing to it a demand which it was not possible for him to answer. I therefore on the same day stated the farther necessity of receiving the clear determination of the Board on this subject, and received it in the most satisfactory and unequivocal terms.

Knowing how rapid the report of a change so interesting to many would prove in its progress and extention as soon as I had notified it, though my first notification of it was private and confidential, and withheld from the consultations, I had early prepared the Nabob and his ministers for it, and repeated the assurance which I had before made them of providing for the security and duration of my engagements with them.

As soon as the Board had passed their last resolutions above mentioned, letters were immediately written and dispatched to them by Mr. Macpherson

* It is something remarkable, that these loans were made in Oude, upon the faith of Mr. Hastings's declarations, and from a confidence in his personal character, precisely at the time that the people of England were told he had lost the confidence of the Nabob Vizir, and of every person in his dominions.

and myself, to apprise them of the substance of them. These minutes and letters, with others which comprise the connected progress of this transaction, have already been published.

I had now another point to attend to, which was to guard against the effects to which the impending change in the administration might be liable, without some precautions taken to prevent it. The length of time in which I had held the first office of the government, although with no efficient powers derived from its constitution, had invested me with many peculiar or personal advantages. My character was known ; or (which was equivalent in its consequences) the general opinion of it was fixed : the invariable train of success with which all the measures, which were known to be of my own formation, were attended ; the apparent magnitude and temerity attributed to some of these, which proved most fortunate in their termination ; and the wonderful support and gradual elevation which my personal character had derived during a long and progressive series of contingencies, such as have rarely fallen to the lot of an unconnected and unpatronized individual, from the coincidence of events appertaining to remote and foreign causes, or to the course of nature, with the crisis of my own fortune ; and above all, from the virtuous and indignant spirit of my immediate employers, and the voice of my country, fortuitously combining my fate with other objects of infinitely higher consideration* ; had altogether contributed to excite a degree of superstitious belief, in the minds of almost all men who were situated within the sphere of my authority or influence, that

* This will not appear an extraordinary reflection, to those who recollect, that the mismanagement of Mr. Hastings, and the desolation of the Company's provinces under his government, were originally stated as the grounds of Mr. Fox's India Bill.

the same success would crown all my future endeavours; nor let it be a matter of wonder that such a prepossession should gain credit with men to whose religious principles it is familiar: I myself avow the same belief so long as my actions shall be directed by the sole impulse of duty unbiassed and unmixed with regards of personal interest, and even of personal reputation.

My correspondence with the chiefs and rulers of Hindostan and Decan had been improved to a style and state of more intimate connection than is usual in such distant communications, by frequent opportunities of reciprocal kindness and co-operation of interests. All the defects of our government, and the consequent divisions and instability of our counsels, were known to all the states around us. From all the preceding causes it was to be apprehended, that my departure from office, and the succession of another whose character was yet unfixed, and whose political opinions had hitherto appeared very different from mine, would be attended with many consequences of distrust and uncertain expectation.

To prevent this, I wrote early letters to all our political friends, apprising them of the probability of the impending change even before it was finally determined, and preparing them to receive Mr. Macpherson as a connection bequeathed to them with the same ties of sentiment and attachment, and united with me in the same plan of supporting the faith of alliances abroad, while I availed myself of what influence I might be allowed to possess at home, to render them more stable and permanent, by endeavouring to obtain for them the sanction of higher authorities for their security and lasting duration.

These sentiments and designs were declared more

formally and explicitly in my last letters*, and con-

* Nizam Ally Cawn has accompanied his reply to Mr. Hastings's letter with a letter to His Majesty, and a small box, or bulse, which in his letter to Mr. Hastings the Nizam informed him contained a diamond, to be delivered by Mr. Hastings to the King. To Mr. Hastings, to Major Scott, and to Lord Sidney, there could appear neither mystery nor doubt in this transaction, because Major Scott delivered to his Lordship the Nizam's letter to His Majesty, and the bulse, with the Persian seals of his Highness upon them, quite perfect; and with these he also delivered to Lord Sidney a translation of the Nizam's letter to Mr. Hastings, and also of his letter to the King, in the handwriting of Mr. Johnson, the British minister at the Nizam's court, to whom his Highness had communicated the contents of both letters previous to their being dispatched from his palace at Hyderabad, and both mentioned having sent a diamond to the King.—That the malice of a defeated party, or their desire of vengeance should induce them to excite suspicions against Mr. Hastings in the minds of the people of England, is not at all extraordinary—besides, it will be recollected, that the same party have accused him of forfeiting the confidence of the native princes of India; and Mr. Burke, in his memorable speech of the 1st of December 1783, *published by himself*, has had the folly to say, that Mr. Hastings was “loaded “with the execrations of the natives.”—Such a mark of confidence and regard as the Nizam placed in Mr. Hastings, on hearing of his departure from Bengal, as to make him the channel of conveyance for the high opinion he entertained of His Majesty and the British nation, was certainly a very strong contradiction to Mr. Burke's favourite doctrine, when added to all the circumstances that attended Mr. Hastings's departure from Bengal, where the regret felt by the natives of all ranks, and his own countrymen, was too palpable for concealment, and could not be explained away. A new and a most extraordinary battery was therefore opened—Insinuations of the most abandoned nature were made, which, while confined to the newspapers, were too contemptible for notice; but when the libels daily published were alluded to in a place where nought but truth should be uttered; when it was asserted, that an extraordinary fine diamond had been presented to the King by Mr. Hastings at an extraordinary time—the affair became indeed serious: for if the insinuation meant any thing, it meant this, that Mr. Hastings had pretended to receive from the hands of Mr. Blaer, of Portland Place, a diamond, which he desired Major Scott to deliver publicly to Lord Sidney, one of His Majesty's Secretaries of State, to be by him the following day delivered to the King, as coming from Nizam Ally Cawn, the Soubah of Decan, when in fact it was a present from himself, to answer some corrupt motive, not hitherto explained. The same body of men, who would insinuate that Mr. Hastings is capable of a conduct so mean and despicable, have at other times attacked him for his boldness, and the perfect indifference which he has shewn for the

firmed by declarations consonant to them from Mr. Macpherson, whose conduct towards the Nabob of Owde, which was to be less seasonable in its operation than liberal in its principle, would serve as a yet stronger assurance of the continuation of the same spirit influencing our government to all who had the opportunities of viewing our transactions with that state, and who were acquainted with the differences which had formerly subsisted between us respecting it. Nor was it in letters only that I strove to inculcate and proclaim this expectation, I enforced it by verbal assurances to the foreign agents and ministers resident in Calcutta, some of whom had for many years been my constant attendants, and by suitable instructions to our own.

In a word, I considered it as a duty indispensable with the act which I was about to perform, to guard it by all possible means against all possible ill consequences ; not by the ostensible forms and cold language of official notification, but by the use of every honest practice that could be suggested by a zeal determined on accomplishing its purpose. What remains for the part of my successor is easy, and I have no doubt of the effect being such as to expose me to abundant

event of the present prosecution.—They have said that he has come forward to his accusers in a tone and stile of defiance ; that he has told those, who are sitting in judgement upon him, that they have (many of them at least) brought disgrace and ruin upon this country, whereas an invariable train of success has attended his measures, and that he has preserved an empire to Great Britain ; and, to use Mr. Burke's elegant phrase, he had vomited forth the proffered pardon in their faces, had talked to them rather in the style of their master, than as a culprit before them, and boldly and loudly demanded reparation for his injured honour—that he had not pleaded parliamentary re-appointments against their proceedings, but, on the contrary, appeared indignant, and proudly angry at what had passed ; had disclaimed even the doctrine of a set-off, and desired that every act of his government should be determined by its merits and success.

ridicule, if ever these sheets shall become public, for attributing to myself so much importance as to apprehend any consequence whatever from my being in or out of an office, in which I possessed so little real influence. If the reverse should happen, I may be as much censured for not having foreseen it as unavoidable.

I shall now endeavour to describe, in as minute a manner as possible, the state of affairs as they stood at the time of my departure in every department of the Government, and close it with such necessary observations as shall occur to me respecting it.

The political state of Bengal claims the first place in this description, not so much from its conceived as from its real and intrinsic consequence. I make this distinction, because I know that every sentiment of my own on this subject will be repugnant to the opinions of many, and liable to the cavils of every man who looks only for an occasion of cavil.

This head may be divided into two parts; the first its relation to foreign European states; the second, its relation to those of India.

FIRST, The states of Europe, which I rank in the following order, as best agreeing with their respective consequence in India: the French, the Dutch, the Danes, and Portuguese. When I left Bengal, the French had not yet reclaimed the possession of their factories; and the old inhabitants of Chandanagore still drew their subsistence from the bounty of the Company. I apprehend no difficulty from their return, as they are intitled to no greater privileges by the treaty of peace, than those which they possessed before the war. But if the agents, who are commissioned to receive their possessions, are of captious characters, or are instructed to make unreasonable demands, they may give trouble; which, however, may be easily avoided

by a refusal on our part to argue with them, referring every point of dispute to the letter of the treaty, for which a provision is made in it; and leaving them to appeal to Europe for any other pretensions.

The Dutch were replaced in their settlements, the form of displaying their colours being singly denied them, until they were intitled to complete possession by the execution of those stipulations of the treaties with France and Holland, which prescribe that the restitution of all conquests, made by each nation on either of the others, should take place at the same period of time; the French still retaining Cuddaloor. The Dutch received this concession without thanks, and complained, in coarse and indignant terms, of the national distinction being withheld from them.

The Danish settlement of Fredericknagore was become a great resort of trade, and the chief, Mr. Bie, whose behaviour, as well as that of his predecessors, had been invariably humble and unassuming, had lately adopted a tone of independence, and laid claim to immunities in virtue of a pretended firmaun, of which he refused to produce a copy.

The exclusion of the French and Dutch during the past years of war, and the security with which their ships navigated the India seas, while ours were subjected to great risques and high rates of insurance, had thrown almost the whole trade of Bengal into their hands. To this effect two other causes contributed; one, the exemption claimed by the Danes, and in part obtained, though disputed, from the rigour of our offices of custom; and the other, the assistance afforded them (as I have always understood and believe) by British subjects under the Company's protection, in providing their investments. The former of these causes is likely to operate with a more extensive

mischief when the French and Dutch are completely restored to their factories, and resume the privileges of their trade. Nor can I devise any better expedient for obviating it, although I have given it much and frequent consideration, than a total abolition of all duties whatever; for in what way soever they may be modified, the foreign settlements will dispute our right to search their ships, or levy the duties of their trade by detail; and they will of course pay much less than the merchants of our own dependance.

It is true that the British government, having the power, might with ease repress every opposition to its rights, and to the rules which it has prescribed to the navigation of the river Ganges, which is its proper dominion: but if a brutal commander shall refuse to admit the visits of our officers, and ill-treat them, I am not sure that it will be always prudent for the members of government to punish the outrage, although it would certainly be their duty to do it; since it would, without fail, become a subject of passionate and exaggerated appeal from the suffering party to its constituent state; and if it should not suit the situation of our own at the time to hazard an open rupture with it, an easy sacrifice might be made of the devoted offenders, and that conduct, which in a better supported member of the British dominion would be applauded and rewarded, would in this instance be reprobated with the aid and influence of that fashionable prejudice which ascribes every act of the government of Bengal to improper motives, and brands the authors with criminality.

One example may be quoted to contradict this reflection, which, therefore, I shall state to justify it.

A little before the beginning of the late war a French ship did refuse to admit an officer from the fort of Budge Budgea, though his orders were no more

than to require the name of the ship, and the nation it belonged to. The Governor General and Council, after much temperate consideration of the case, deemed the insult offered to their authority, connected with the peculiar time of its commission, a proper ground for checking it as a first attempt to infringe their privileges. An order was issued to prevent the ship from passing the batteries of Fort William, for it had been suffered, by the delay, to pass those of Budge Budgea, until it had complied with the law of the port; and the commander persisting, some blood was unhappily spilt, in consequence of which he submitted. Vehement remonstrances and protests were issued against us by Mr. Chevalier, who was never slack upon such occasions: and there is no doubt that his representation of the affair was not less violent to the court of France: but the war in the mean time breaking out, sunk this, with other similar grievances in oblivion. It must be acknowledged, that our behaviour in this instance passed with impunity; but on the other hand it received no approbation from home; and I humbly conceive that such an act ought in the first instance to have been either expressly condemned, and the repetition of it prohibited under severe penalties, if wrong; or, if right, not barely approved, but liberally commended.

Besides the difference arising from the resistance which I have described, there is another, occasioned by the adherence to an ancient right which the Company possesses, to collect a duty on all goods imported into the town of Calcutta, or exported from it. During the long indecision of the question of territorial right, an obvious policy will keep up the exercise of every acknowledged right which the Company possessed before they had acquired more

than their ancient commercial territory, and the Custom House of Calcutta is one of them. Were this question determined, and the commercial and territorial property adjudged to the same primary charge, it would certainly be advisable to abolish this duty, since it subsists to the great injury of the trade of the Presidency, which is subjected to a double payment and the vexations of two offices, while the dependants of the foreign settlements pay but to one, and that but partially.

A total abolition of all the customs, with a due reservation of the Company's ancient right, and of course the removal of all the chokies, or places established for levying them, which no regulations or vigilance of Government have been able to restrain from being an intolerable oppression on the native traders, would abundantly diffuse the trade of the provinces, and, by the natural effect of multiplied competition, increase both their wealth and resources of revenue. This measure is liable to one strong objection: its effects, though demonstrable, would be secret and constructive; but the sacrifice made to obtain them would be immediate and visible, in the loss of eight or ten lacks which are now annually brought to account from the collections of the customs, and in the enhanced prices of the Company's investment.

The Board had taken some steps in the investigation of this subject, but without any satisfactory result; nor is it likely that they will have proceeded in it in the present state of their authority.

The other cause to which I have attributed the growth of the Danish trade, namely, the collusion of British influence, will subsist with other evils of much greater magnitude, in defiance of all the orders from home, while those consist in simple prohibitions and

denunciations of severe penalties, without co-operative means taken to enforce them, and a generous allowance for the interests, feelings, and natural claims of individuals ; without which, all laws will be but the instruments of tyranny, or prove abortive.

For proof of what I have said concerning the actual state of the Danish trade in Bengal, and it may be offered as a collateral proof of the protection bestowed on it by our Government, I shall merely observe, that the ships which have imported at Fredericknagore during the last nine months, amount to no less than twenty-two vessels of all dimensions, but mostly of three masts, and many of those from Europe, and their burthen altogether to 10,830 tons.

The Portuguese import annually three or more vessels from China, besides others which come directly from Europe. They claim no privileges, receive the protection of the port, and seem to merit encouragement.

I have not mentioned the Americans among the foreign importers ; but as their ships have already found their way to China, other adventures may come to Bengal. No orders have been written from England concerning their reception in such case ; and I do therefore conclude, that they will meet with encouragement on the general principle, that every accession of national commerce must prove an accession of national wealth. Objections may be suggested to the application of this maxim to the case supposed, but none that will not originate from the equivocal state of the Company's property, which is in a thousand instances hurtful to the general interest ; and in this particular case, it may be a sufficient answer to the objection, to say, that if the Americans are denied the direct privilege of the trade of Bengal, they may obtain it indirectly, and to our great loss, through other channels.

SECONDLY ; of the political state of Bengal, with relation to the states of India, and, first, of the

Marattahs. The peace concluded with the Peshwa through the intervention, and with the guarantee of Mahdajee Sindia*, had received every coincident accession of general interest and particular policy which could ensure its long duration ; for the general state had recovered by the treaty all the places which had been taken from it by the war ; it had no object in view which it could claim from us, or with which our power stood in competition ; and it had more of evil to dread from the ambition and rapacity of its neighbours, who would not fail to take the advantage of their being again engaged in war with us, than they could hope of good from any success against us. A trivial dispute had arisen between the Government of Bombay and the administration of Poonah, concerning a petty chief of the Marattah dependency, who had drawn on himself the resentment of his superiors by repeated and avowed acts of hostility, and the Presidency of Bombay, in consequence of a treaty of defensive alliance subsisting between them, had interposed with some angry letters to save him. The matter having been referred to us by that Presidency, in this state of it, we clearly decided, that their engagement with him could in no case operate against that recently made with the state of which he was a vassal, much less in that of acts in which he was confessedly the aggressor ; and we peremptorily directed them to withdraw their interference.

The minority of the Peshwa, and the degree of independency, confirmed by long prescription, which the principal Jagheerdars, or Feudal Members of the

* In the month of May 1762 ; ratified in the following December.

Marattah state, have acquired, and maintain by various adventitious advantages, still liable to be overthrown by the superior pretensions of the sovereign authority whenever it shall be in a capacity to assert them, have created an opposition of inferior policy amongst them, which is more likely to concern our interests in the event of a war, were any other cause to produce a war, than to produce one.

The power of Nanna Furneess, the dewan or minister of the Peshwa, is derived solely from his office, and the feeble and variable support of some of the other Chiefs; that of Moodajee, the acting representative of the Booslah family, from his high rank and right of territory acquired by the sanction of written treaties; and that of Mahdajee Sindia from his military strength and personal ability. The rest deserve no notice.

Nanna Furneess showed an early disposition to connect himself with the French, and still maintains a friendly intercourse with them. To this policy he seems to have been impelled more by his dread of the ascendancy of Mahdajee Sindia, as it affected his own influence, than by any consideration of the general state: and Mahdajee Sindia appears to have formed as early a view to an alliance with our nation, which soon manifested itself in effects incapable of being attributed to any other cause, and has produced its substantial accomplishment in two treaties, one concluded separately with himself, and the other with the Peshwa, investing him, under the character of guarantee, with a power constructively superior even to that of his own sovereign in all cases which relate to our nation.

The Booslah family possessing a constitutional claim to the sovereignty, a more ascertained right of separate

dominion, and but a scanty revenue, stands in continual awe of the superior state, and of every member of it around them, occasionally uniting their interest with each, but principally with Nizam Ally Cawn, whose territory lies intermixed with theirs, and who is no less an object of their apprehensions. Their connection with the Government of Bengal, which originated in advances made by Shabajee Booslah in the year 1773, was continued with his successor Moodajee, and has subsisted undisturbed to this time. The interest which they felt in it was manifested by many substantial and uncommon instances of kindness, and though the man who planned this policy is no longer living, there is no doubt that this, as well as every other general measure of his formation, is still followed by the present administration. The person to whom I allude is Dewagur Pundit, who was successively dewan, or minister of Janoojee, Shabajee, and Moodajee, and the ruler of all their councils.

What was his object in soliciting our alliance with so much ardour as he evidently shewed to attain it, cannot with certainty be affirmed, though many obvious motives may be assigned for it; and as obvious are the causes, though too long to enumerate, and unnecessary to the present discussion, which have hitherto restrained him and the administration which succeeded, from endeavouring to draw any direct advantages from it: there is no present cause to apprehend any alteration in this disposition of the family, and it will be always the interest of our Government to cultivate it.

It may be proper to mention as a circumstance perhaps not universally known, that the dominion of the Booslah family, commonly known by the general name of Berar, spreads over a great extent of country

adjoining, or intermixed with those of the Peshwa, Nizam Ally Cawn, Mahdajee Sindia, and Bengal; and that Nagpore, its capital, is the central point of all Hindostan and Decan.

Having mentioned the different interests which seem to divide the present members of the Marattah state, I should leave the subject imperfect, were I not to add, that the Marattahs possess alone, of all the people of Hindostan and Decan, a principle of national attachment, which is strongly impressed on the minds of all individuals of the nation, and would probably unite their chiefs, as in one common cause, if any great danger were to threaten the general state.

Tippoo Saheb is the next power in consequence. The peace concluded with him has every appearance of duration, though ill kept on his part, many of our soldiers and sepoy being still detained in his hands, and many officers missing of whom no account has been obtained: and for them his plea may be, that they fell the victims of his barbarity before we obtained a right by treaty to their deliverance. Some other symptoms of hostility were said to have appeared near the frontier of the Carnatic, but may have arisen from the mutual suspicions of the contiguous garrisons, and at any rate could not have been of much importance, since, as I recollect, two or three companies of sepoy had been sent to repel them. It is not likely that Tippoo should so soon chuse to involve himself in a new war with us, deprived of all his confederates, and these become his rivals; nor that, whenever he shall have formed such a design, he will suffer it to break out in petty broils with our borderers. Strong indications of approaching hostilities had appeared both between Tippoo Saheb and the Marattahs, and between him and Nizam Ally Cawn; the Marattahs, wishing

to regain their former territory wrested from them by Hyder, and Tippoo making encroachments on the possessions of Nizam Ally Cawn.

Nizam Ally Cawn, the Subadar of Decan, is more respectable from his rank and descent than from any other cause. His dominions are of small extent and scanty revenue ; his military strength is represented to be most contemptible ; nor was he at any period of his life distinguished for personal courage, or the spirit of enterprise. On the contrary, it seems to have been his constant and ruling maxim to foment the incentives of war among his neighbours, to profit by their weakness and embarrassments, but to avoid being a party himself in any of their contests, and to submit even to humiliating sacrifices rather than subject himself to the chances of war. Yet, if we may judge by events, he may be supposed to possess, with an abundance of the pride of illustrious blood, a sound and discerning judgement. Our nation has no cause to hold him in contempt ; for it is indebted to his policy both for the first design and execution of the confederacy formed by himself, the Marattahs, and Hyder, which, in its consequences, had nearly caused our deprivation of the Carnatic, and has left it an incumbrance upon us which no time can retrieve.

Nizam Ally Cawn both avowed himself the instrument of this fatal measure, and justified it on the principles of self-defence against the acts and declarations of the presidency of Fort St. George. The early redress afforded him against both, by the Governor General and Council, either withdrew him from the confederacy, or yielded him a specious pretext for declining the part which he had engaged to take in it; and from that period we may date his connection with the superior government of Bengal, with which he has

ever since maintained a friendly intercourse and allowed the residence of a minister of theirs at his court: allowed; for his fears, not causelessly excited, opposed the reception of a successor to Mr. Holland, our first minister, on any other ground than that of an occasional commission durable at his pleasure.

Mr. Richard Johnson, the present resident, has recently communicated to the Board the plan of a new and lasting alliance which had been the result of many conferences with the Nabob and his ministers, and consisted, in abridgement, of the following propositions.

First, The restitution of all the Sircars or Northern Districts, obtained from him by the treaty of 1768, for an equivalent in price; explained to be the sircar of Guntoor in exchange for all the arrears of the Peshcush; and the others for one crore and half of rupees.

Secondly, An alliance offensive and defensive.

Thirdly, A stipulated number of regiments, of native troops, to be stationed with him for a subsidy of 25,000 rupees per month for each regiment; the Nabob in like manner to supply the Company on demand with 5000 cavalry; I forget at what rate of pay; nor is it material, as the condition is not likely to be ever exacted.

Fourthly, The Peshwa to be included as his ally.

Fifthly, That we should acknowledge him the only lawful Subadar of Decan.

Sixthly, That all other Europeans should be excluded from Decan and Balagaut.

Seventhly, Confirmation of all former treaties in such articles as were not revoked or altered by this.

Eighthly, That the treaty should be ratified by the King of Great Britain.

To understand the quality of the first article, which is the most essential, it is proper to mention the following circumstances :

1st, That the sircar of Guntoor, estimated to yield a rent of 2,07,500 pagodas, or 7,26,250 rupees, became our right of property by the death of Bissalut Jung, the brother of Nizam Ally Cawn, in whose possession it had been allowed to remain, and our claim to it suspended, during his life. He died on the 25th of September 1782; but the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn retained the possession of it, the circumstances of our affairs not admitting of our then reclaiming it.

2dly, The arrears of the Peshcush for the sircars in our possession, which was five lacks of rupees per annum, stood on the 1st of March 1784 at 31,32,666:5:4; to which that of Guntoor to the same time was nearly 1,50,000 rupees, making together 32,82,666 rupees.

And 3dly, The rent of Guntoor, estimated by the lease granted by the presidency of Fort St. George to the Nabob Wala Jah in 1779, at the sum above mentioned, afforded us a claim of above ten lacks of rupees on the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn.

Of the value of the sircars I avoid to speak. My private opinion furtively obtained stands on the records of the Court of Directors; and has been severely reprobated. But as I do not form my opinions in haste, and what has since past has rather added to the weight of the arguments on which that was founded than diminished it, I need scarcely add, that if I were the sovereign disposer of the Company's actual property and interests, I would most eagerly accept the terms offered for the release of the sircars with some qualification of the inferior stipulations, where they might appear to clash with other existing engagements.

This transaction has been referred by the present

dispatch to the Court of Directors, and Mr. Johnson directed to keep the negotiation upon it suspended till their instructions regarding it may be received.

It seems to have been the fixed policy of our nation in India to enfeeble every power in connection with it; and I shall not be surprised to see the above proposal combated on that ground, with others more defensible. As a general maxim, I affirm it to be a most dangerous one; for in every application of it, we inflict a wound on the credit of our faith, and expose those who have trusted to it to the danger of falling a sacrifice to their more powerful and independent neighbours. The Sovereign of Hyderabad can never be an object of apprehension to the Company from any advantage which he derives from his dominions, were they of twice their present extent; but if any intestine or other cause of disorder in the Marattah state, should leave Tippoo Saheb at liberty to prosecute and accomplish his designs against them, their accession to his present strength would prove more fatal to the British interests, than any other external event that in the probable course of fortune could befall them.

The King *Shah Allum* can scarcely be with propriety mentioned among the powers of India. Yet his name and family subsist, with all the latent rights inherent in them; and these are respected in a degree proportioned to their distance from observation, though but little, even by those who most profess to acknowledge their obligation. The wretched apathy and indolence of the Shah himself, render him incapable of availing himself of any support, however powerful, to retrieve his affairs, or even to assume the direction of them in any state. These have been successively administered by Nudjiff Cawn, Mirza Shuffy Cawn, and Affrasiab Cawn. The two last perished by assas-

sination; that of the latter happened on the 2d of November last. Mahdajee Sindia having casually arrived in the neighbourhood of the royal camp, which was at Agra, at the time of this event, assumed the charge of the King's administration in the name of the peshwa, for whom he obtained the royal grant of the office of Wakeel Muttaluk, a dignity of special appointment, and rarely known in the annals of the house of Timur.

What consequences this new-assumed policy of the Marattahs may produce, I cannot foresee; but think it more likely to embarrass Sindia himself by the burden of a ruined country and an exhausted revenue, than to add to his own power, or to yield more than a title of faded splendor to his master. I regret it only as it must compel him to adopt a system of caution, which will disable him from affording that support which he had promised to the Prince Jehandar Shah; but in no respect can it prove hurtful to our interests, or weaken his connection with us.

The *Sics*, who may be considered rather as a sect of schismatics than as a nation, have for some years past taken advantage of the weakness of the King's administration to invade and possess all his northern dominions. For what relates to them, to the King, to the Prince Jehandar Shah, and to the actual state of the Marattah power in that quarter, I refer to my minutes on those subjects already before the public; in which perhaps more will be found to gratify curiosity, than to afford useful information to those who do not carry their views far into futurity.

Of the Nabobs Assof o' Dowlah and Walah Jah, I forbear now to speak. Their condition is not to be explained in the limits of a summary description, and has been brought to the full view of the Court of

Directors, and possibly of the public, in volumes which have been written upon both.

I shall add some reflections upon the general subject of the political interests of the Company, or of the British nation in India, which I deem connected with the scope and design of this review, as they arise out of the past occurrences, or are connected with the actual state of our affairs; and if in these also I shall appear to speak too much of myself, let it be remembered, that the whole of this composition is in effect a portion of the history of my own life, in those events of it which were blended with the public. Besides, I am not sure that the Company possessed a political character, or can be said to have conducted their intercourse with other nations on any system of established policy, before the period in which I was appointed to the principal administration of their affairs.

I know how readily many will both allow the position, and reprobate the system, and admit me for its author, for the sake of reprobating me also for it. I am not its author. The seed of this wonderful production was sown by the hand of calamity. It was nourished by fortune, and cultivated, and shaped (if I may venture to change the figure) by necessity. Its first existence was commercial: it obtained, in its growth, the sudden accession of military strength and territorial dominion, to which its political adjunct was inevitable. It is useless to inquire whether the Company, or the nation, has derived any substantial benefit from the change, since it is impossible to retrace the perilous and wonderful paths by which they have attained their present elevation, and to re-descend to the humble and undreaded character of trading adventurers. Perhaps the term of the national existence in India may have become susceptible of a shorter

duration by it; but it is that state which it must henceforth maintain, and it must therefore adopt those principles which are necessary to its preservation in that state. To explain those principles, and to shew the necessity of their construction to the duration of the British dominion in India, is foreign from the present design, as it is perhaps too late to attempt it with any chance of its application to any purpose of utility. Yet so much as I have said, was necessary to obviate the common objection, to which every measure and every maxim are liable, which are built on a different ground from that which exists only in the idea of those who look upon the East-India Company still as a body of merchants, and consider commerce as their only object.

I have been represented to the public as a man of ambition, and as too apt to be misled by projects of conquest. Though the only two facts* on which this

* Since Mr. Hastings printed the first impression of this work, the Rohilla and the Marattah wars have been so much the subject of conversation, both in and out of parliament, that I am induced to bring to one point of view, a few circumstances, which I think will effectually clear Mr. Hastings from the suspicion of having acted improperly either in the Rohilla or the Marattah war.—Lord North was pleased to observe, very lately, that the Rohilla war was not sufficiently known in England, till the Secret Committee published their Reports. His Lordship, however, as the Minister of this country, either did or ought to have known every particular of the rise, progress, and conclusion of the war, so early as June 1775. It was commenced in April, and concluded in October 1774. But in order that every fair and impartial man may have an opportunity of determining upon the justice of the war, I insert the following particulars, which I have taken from the Appendix to the Fifth Report of the Secret Committee. Early in the year 1772, before Mr. Hastings became Governor of Bengal, negociations were entered into between Sujah Dowlah and the Rohillas; and on the 17th of June 1772, a treaty was finally concluded between them, and reciprocally interchanged in the presence of Sir Robert Barker, and authenticated by his signature. On the 24th of March 1773, Sir Robert Barker made a proposition from Sujah Dowlah, that if the Rohillas break their treaty, he will pay the Company 50 lacks

imputation has originated, have been refuted on the clearest conviction, and this in the principal instance

of rupees, if they assist him in getting possession of their country. On the 6th of May 1773, Sir Robert Barker writes to Mr. Hastings and the Select Committee, "It is well known, neither promises nor oaths have been able to bind this treacherous sect of people to their engagements: their own interests, or their own fears, are the only springs by which they can be moved." On the 15th of May 1773, Sir Robert Barker writes, that Hafez Rhamet still declines answering the payment of the treaty; that his excuse appears more to delay time, that he may discover how the affairs of his quarter are likely to turn out: and the General adds in the same letter, "I beg leave to send you the copy of the Rohilla treaty, by which you will perceive how literally it has been executed and performed, notwithstanding the evasion of their chiefs." When Mr. Hastings, and the Select Committee, in the latter end of 1773, determined to join their forces to Sujah Dowlah, in the prosecution of the Rohilla war, they stated very fully the breach of the treaty of June 1772, as the strong argument for the justice of the war. We were parties to that treaty; and Sir Robert Barker bears testimony to the Vizir's performance of all his conditions, as well as to the part the English took.

With respect to the Marattah war, it has been so clearly detailed, that not a doubt remains, I imagine, upon the mind of any man on that subject. It originated in Bombay. It was disapproved of in Bengal. It was concluded, by a minister from the Governor General and Council. The peace was not approved of at home; and a discretionary power was given to the Governor General and Council, to renew the engagements with Ragoba, if the conditions of the peace were not strictly fulfilled. The Governor General and Council took every step in their power to carry into effect the stipulations in Colonel Upton's treaty. Not a single article was performed, when, on the 26th of January 1778, Mr. Hastings entered that minute, which, in a resolution of the House of Commons, is allowed to have been grounded on the Orders of the Court of Directors; but though Mr. Hastings laid so much stress upon the important intelligence he received from Mr. Elliott, and it is published in the Sixth Report of the Secret Committee, this circumstance seems to have escaped the attention of many. Colonel Leslie's detachment was formed, and began its march in June 1778. The Court of Directors approved the measure. They approved, with the knowledge of His Majesty's Ministers, the plan formed by Mr. Hastings for defeating the views of the French in the West of India. They never accused him of breaking the treaty of Poorunda. From the month of June 1779, and not before, the responsibility of the Marattah war unquestionably rested with the Governor General and Council. The Marattah Ministers required, as preliminaries to a

is universally acknowledged; the imputation still remains; and I much fear that it has served, with others equally opposite to truth, for the ground of a recent and great national measure, most unfortunate in its construction, if such were the causes of it.

I can affirm, that the charge, so far as it respects myself, and I fear that I stand too conspicuous a mark before my fellow-servants to be missed, or not to have been the aim of its intended direction, is wholly and absolutely false, as it is inconsistent with any motive to which it could be ascribed of pride, avarice, or thirst of power; for what profit or advantage could I have acquired, or hoped to acquire, for instance, in a Marattah war; or what reputation in any war, the operations of which must necessarily depend on another, and him either taken in his turn from the roster, or with a choice divided at the most between two or three officers standing at the head of the list of the army? The first acts of the government of Bengal, when I presided over it, were well known at the time to have been of my formation, or formed on principles which I was allowed to dictate. These consisted of a variety of regulation, which included every department of the service, and composed a system as complete as a mind incompetent like my own, though possessed of very superior aids, could form, of military, political, productive, oeconomical, and judicial connection. I found the Treasury empty, the revenue declining, the expences unchecked, and the whole nation yet languishing under the recent effects of a mortal famine. Neither was this a season for war, nor, occupied as I was in it,

treaty, the surrender of Ragoba, and the cession of Salfette. I do not find that the Directors, or His Majesty's Ministers, have at any time censured Mr. Hastings, or his Council, for not acceding to those preliminary articles.

would candor impute to me even a possible disposition to war. The land required years of quiet to restore its population and culture; and all my acts were acts of peace. I was busied in raising a great and weighty fabric, of which all the parts were yet loose and destitute of the superior weight which was to give them their mutual support; and (if I may so express myself) their collateral strength. A tempest, or an earthquake could not be more fatal to a builder whose walls were uncovered, and his unfinished columns trembling in the breeze, than the ravages or terrors of war would have been to me and to all my hopes.

I laid my plans before the Court of Directors, and called upon them to give me the powers which were requisite for their accomplishment and duration. These were silently denied me, and those which I before possessed, feeble as they were, were taken from me. Had I been allowed the means which I required, I will inform my readers of the use to which I intended to apply them. I should have sought no accession of territory. I should have rejected the offer of any which would have enlarged our line of defence, without a more than proportionate augmentation of defensive strength and revenue. I should have encouraged, but not solicited, new alliances; and should have rendered that of our government an object of solicitation, by the example of those which already existed. To these I should have observed, as my religion, every principle of good faith; and where they were deficient in the conditions of mutual and equal dependance, I should have endeavoured to render them complete; and this rule I did actually apply to practice in the treaty which I formed with the Nabob Shujah o' Dowlah in the year 1773.

With respect to the provinces of the Company's

dominion under my government, I should have studied to augment both their value and strength by an augmentation of their inhabitants and cultivation. This is not a mere phantasy of speculation. The means were most easy, if the power and trust were allowed to use them. Every region of Hindostan, even at that time groaned under different degrees of oppression, desolation, and insecurity. The famine which had wasted the provinces of Bengal had raged with equal severity in other parts, and in some with greater, and the remembrance of it yet dwelt on the minds of the inhabitants with every impression of horror and apprehension. I would have afforded an asylum in Bengal, with lands and stock, to all the emigrants of other countries: I would have employed emissaries for their first encouragement; and I would have provided a perpetual and proclaimed incentive to them in the security of the community from foreign molestation, and of the individual members from mutual wrong; to which purpose, the regulations already established were sufficient, with a power only competent to enforce them. And for the same purpose and with a professed view to it, I early recommended, even so early as the year 1773, the erection of public granaries on the plan since happily commenced.

Those who have been in the long habits of familiar communication with me, whether by letter or by discourse, will know that the sentiments which I have been describing are of as old a date as that of my late office in the first appointment and state of it: and to every candid reader I appeal for his conviction of their effect, if I had been permitted to follow their direction: for what man is there so immovably attached to his native soil, as to prefer it, under the scourge of oppression, the miseries of want, and the desolation of

war, embittering or destroying every natural affection, and ultimately invading the source of life itself, to a state of peace, of external tranquillity, and internal protection, of assured plenty, and all the blessings of domestic increase ?

Those who have seen, as I did, in a time of profound peace, the wretched inhabitants of the Carnatic, of every age, sex, and condition, tumultuously thronging round the walls of Fort St. George, and lying for many successive days and nights on the burning soil, without covering or food, on a casual rumour, falsely excited, of an approaching enemy, will feelingly attest the truth of the contrast which I have exhibited in one part of it, and will readily draw the conclusion which I have drawn from it, even without attending to the rest. That such a state as I have described would have been attained without imperfection or alloy, I do not pretend to suppose ; but I confidently maintain, that under an equal, vigorous, and fixed administration, determined on the execution of such a plan to its accomplishment, it would have been attainable, even with common talents prosecuting it, to a degree as nearly approaching to perfection as human life is capable of receiving. The submissive character of the people ; the fewness of their wants ; the facility with which the soil and climate, unaided by exertions of labour, can supply them ; the abundant resources of subsistence and trafficable wealth which may be drawn from the natural productions, and from the manufactures, both of established usage and of new introduction, to which no men upon earth can bend their minds with a readier accommodation ; and above all, the defences with which nature has armed the land, in its mountainous and hilly borders, its bay, its innumerable intersections of rivers, and inoffensive or unpower-

ful neighbours ; are advantages which no united state upon earth possesses in an equal degree ; and which leave little to the duty of the magistrate ; in effect, nothing but attention, protection, and forbearance.

But though I profess the doctrine of peace, I by no means pretend to have followed it with so implicit a devotion as to make sacrifices to it. I have never yielded a substantial right which I could assert, or submitted to a wrong which I could repel, with a moral assurance of success proportioned to the magnitude of either ; and I can allude to instances in which I should have deemed it criminal not to have hazarded both the public safety and my own, in a crisis of uncommon and adequate emergency, or in an occasion of dangerous example.

I have ever deemed it even more unsafe than dishonourable to sue for peace ; and more consistent with the love of peace to be the aggressor, in certain cases, than to see preparations of intended hostility, and wait for their maturity, and for their open effect to repel it. The faith of treaties I have ever held inviolate. Of this I have given the most ample and public testimonies in my conduct to the Nabob Shujah o' Dowlah, to the Nabob Assof o' Dowlah, the Nabob Walla Jah, to the Rana of Gohid, to the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn, Raja Futty Sing, and Mahdajee Sindia ; and I have had the satisfaction of seeing the policy, as well as the moral rectitude, of this practice justified by the exemplary sufferings of all who have deviated from it, in acts of perfidy to myself, or to the government over which I presided during the time that I have had charge of it.

If in this display of my own character, I shall appear to have transgressed the bounds of modesty, I shall not decline the charge, nor fear to aggravate it by

adding, that I have never yet planned or authorised any military operation, or series of operations, which has not been attended with complete success, in the attainment of its professed objects ; and that I have never, in any period of my life, engaged in a negotiation which I did not see terminate as I wished and expected : and let this conclusion be offered as an undeniable proof of the propriety and efficacy of the principles on which I have regulated my conduct in both.

It would not be either an unpleasing or an unprofitable employment to turn from the survey of our neighbours, and from the contemplation of their views, interests, powers, and resources, and to look back on our own ; mixing with the reflections obvious to our habits of thinking, those which would occur to the people with whom we have been engaged in past hostility, or who may expect to be eventually concerned with us, whether as friends or foes, in future operations. Very different would be the observations made by a spectator in such a point of view, from those which pass in the mind of a mere individual, through the clouded medium of his own wants and feelings, and with the terrors and discontents of his fellow-citizens aggravating his own : and such, perhaps, as the following would be his reflections, as the different objects of his contemplation passed in succession before him.

No state can carry on extensive military operations for any length of time, without imposing some burdens upon its subjects, or subjecting them to consequent inconveniencies ; and those that suffer will complain, and condemn measures which create partial exigency, without considering their object and tendency. To the complaints of individuals, the adherents of party

will superadd their accusations, exaggerate the temporary evil that exists, and darken, by despondency, the bright expectations of a future period. Such particularly has been the case in Bengal; and murmurs, suspicions, and despair, have been transmitted from India to England.

In proportion as our distresses have been, or have appeared to be, pressing, the power, resources, and advantages of our enemies have been supposed to accumulate; and an idea is adopted without reflection, that the cause which diminishes our resources, operates on one side only, without producing a similar effect on the strength of our enemies; as if it were in their power to marshal armies, and undertake military expeditions, without any augmentation of expence or distress to individuals. With as limited a judgement men are apt to draw conclusions from the errors and deficiencies of government, and the mismanagement of military operations, not reflecting that our adversaries have also their difficulties to surmount, which arise out of the imperfection of human policy and the depravations of self-interest: and that the fortune of contending states, as of simple individuals, as often turns on the different effects of their mutual blunders and misconduct, as on the superiority of skill and exertion.

But widely different is the estimate formed by those whom necessity has led us to oppose or attack, of our strength and resources. They behold with astonishment the exertions that have been made from the banks of the Ganges; and reasoning as we have done from their own distresses, lament the necessity that has engaged them in wars with a power capable of making such exertions, and whose resources, instead of being diminished, must appear to them to augment. Instead of being able to extend their incursions to the

capital of our dominions, which at a period little remote from the establishment of the Company's authority they did with success; they find themselves attacked in the center of their own territories, and all their exertions required for the defence of them. They find, notwithstanding the temporary success they have derived from accident or mismanagement, that we have fresh armies ready to take the field, and that whilst our spirit is unabated, our strength is sufficient to give efficacy to its resolutions.

The conclusion I would draw from these premises is, that the vigorous exertions which we have made for the defence and security of our own possessions, have impressed an idea of our strength and resources among the powers of India, which will, more than any other motive, contribute to establish the present peace on a firm foundation; to shew that if our resources have suffered a diminution, those of the states with which we have been engaged in war, have felt, in probably a greater degree, the same inconvenience; and finally, to evince the propriety of those exertions, notwithstanding the expence with which they have been made, by the event itself, which has evidently proved to all the powers of Hindostan and Deccan, that their combined strength and politics, assisted by our great European enemy the French, have not been able to destroy the solid fabric of the English power in the East, nor even to deprive it of any portion of the territories over which its control extends.

Revenues. — The three principal sources of the revenues enjoyed by the Company in Bengal, are, the land-rents, salt, and opium.

The system established in February 1781, for the management and collection of the land-rents, has continued to the present period, without any material

variation ; and the complete information which has been laid before the Company upon this subject, renders particular explanations superfluous. I shall therefore content myself with inserting a few general remarks.

The establishment of the present Committee of Revenue, or some other founded on the same principles, appears to me the properest mode of agency that can be adopted for the control of the revenue department.

The system of government in Bengal is so complicated, and embraces so many and distinct objects, that it would be difficult for any set of men, who may become members of the supreme administration, to enter into the detail attending the revenues ; and this difficulty will amount to an impossibility, if those who possess the supreme control should be appointed members of it without any previous local knowledge and experience.

It will be observed, that the amount of the settlement annually varies, and that it has never been completely realized without some balance. I may venture to affirm, that this has been the case for the last century, and that our predecessors the Mahomedans, though possessed of advantages which a fluctuating European administration can scarce ever hope to attain, cannot boast of ever having collected the entire annual assessment. It may perhaps, in time, be possible to prevent nearly any diminution either in the amount of the settlement or collections ; but whilst the government requires so large a proportion of the produce of the country, causes beyond the reach of human control will occasionally operate, to render some indulgence in favour of its subjects indispensable ; and the formality of agreements will but ill justify the rigour of exaction.

With respect to the amount of the present settlement, I am so far from deeming it too heavy, that I am clearly of opinion it may, by prudent management, formed upon local experience, admit of an increase. I speak generally; for the particular distribution will in many instances be found unequal; a defect in the system, which can never be remedied by any permanent rule, but must be corrected by temporary application according to the exigency of particular circumstances.

The public in England have of late years adopted very high ideas of the rights of the Zemindars in Hindostan; and the prevailing prejudice has considered every occasional dispossession of a Zemindar from the management of his lands, as an act of oppression. I mean not here to enter into any discussion of their rights, or to distinguish between right, fact, and form, as applied to their situation. Our Government, on grounds which more minute scrutiny may, perhaps, find at variance with facts, has admitted the opinion of their rightful proprietorship of the lands. I do not mean to contest their right of inheritance to the lands, whilst I assert the right of Government to the produce thereof. The Mahommedan rulers continually exercised, with a severity unknown to the British administration in Bengal, the power of dispossessing the Zemindars on any failure in the payment of their rents, not only *pro tempore* but in perpetuity. The fact is notorious; but lest proof of it should be required, I shall select one instance out of many that might be produced; and only mention that the Zemindary of Rajeshahy, the second in rank in Bengal, and yielding an annual revenue of about twenty-five lacks of rupees, has risen to its present magnitude during the course of the last eighty years, by accumu-

lating the property of a great number of dispossessed Zemindars, although the ancestors of the present possessor had not by inheritance a right to the property of a single village within the whole Zemindary.

I shall only farther observe on the proposed* plan of restoring the Zemindars to the possession of their lands, and the management of their revenues; that unless care should be taken at the same time to establish some mode of guardianship, with a view to remedy the defects of minority, profusion, and incapacity of the Zemindars; their restoration, which carries with it the appearance of justice, will often terminate in acts of the greatest severity; in the total dispossession of the Zemindars, or in concessions on the part of Government in their demands for the revenues.

It may not be improper to take notice of the assiduity exercised in establishing a belief in Europe, that the collection of the revenues in Bengal is enforced by repeated acts of personal severity. No proof has yet been exhibited to the public of this assertion; and I might content myself with this observation, without adding that the fact is incapable of proof, since it does not exist. During the last four years, a proportion, exceeding one half of the whole revenue of Bengal, has been received at the Khalsa in Calcutta from the different renters, without any intermediate agency; and I am authorised in affirming, that during this period, a single instance cannot be produced of any renter having been beat there, for the

* The plan of a general restoration of Zemindars to the possession of their lands, as originally proposed by Mr. Fox, and as afterwards inserted in Mr. Pitt's bill, underwent very considerable alterations before the latter bill passed into a law, and a discretionary power is now left in the Governor General and Council.

purpose of compelling the payment of his stipulated rent.

I shall close this subject with a reflection, that appears to me too important to be omitted. In recommending the institution of the Committee of Revenue, I mean it with a reserve, that the express objects designed by it should be carried into execution. The candour and sincerity which I have ever professed in giving my opinion to the Company on matters of importance to their interests, or of even personal concern to myself, call upon me to make a confession, which other motives should induce me to conceal. I acknowledge that some parts of this institution, which depended upon the supreme administration in Bengal for their completion, still remain unaccomplished; that even its professed and fundamental object of making Calcutta the place of receipt of all the revenues, without passing through the subordinate treasuries, has been defeated by causes which my situation did not allow me to control. This object comprehended the gradual removal of the different collectors, as fast as their services could be dispensed with, and on this account only was unattainable. If the same act of the legislature which confirmed me in my station of President over the Company's settlements in Bengal, had invested me with a control as extensive as the new denomination I received by it indicated; if it had compelled the assistance of my associates in power, instead of giving me opponents; if, instead of creating new expectations which were to be accomplished by my dismissal from office, it had imposed silence on the interested clamours of faction, and taught the servants of the Company to place their dependence upon me, where it constitutionally rested; if, when it transferred the real control over the Company's affairs from the

Direction to the Ministers, instead of extending, it had limited the claims of patronage, which every man possessing influence himself, or connected with those who possessed it, thought he had a right to exert; and if it had made my continuance in office to depend upon the rectitude of my intentions, and the vigour with which they were exerted, instead of annexing it to a compliance with those claims, I should have had little occasion, at this period, to claim the public indulgence for an avowal of duties undischarged. But the reverse took place in every instance. I mean to apply these reflections, those suggested by one circumstance only, to my situation in general.

If the interests of the nation are truly consulted, a total change in the system must take place: for whilst private interests are allowed to stand in competition with, or in opposition to, arrangements founded on the public good; whilst those who censure the concessions made to them, in all instances which have not a reference to themselves or to their connections, still persist in recommending them; and whilst the official existence, public reputation, and private fame, of the members of the government of Bengal are maintained or sacrificed in proportion to the concessions made, or withheld, the interests of the British nation in it must verge to a decline.

Enough has been said to shew the pernicious consequences of this system, which is publicly proscribed, and privately supported; which no man dares avow, yet many combine to maintain. To discuss it more minutely would be invidious, and perhaps entail upon me resentments, which, though I do not fear, I would wish to avoid. I have made a sufficient sacrifice to truth; my successors in office may perhaps benefit by this concession. The duties and functions of the

supreme government in India will never be well discharged, unless it meets with the consideration due to it.

But to return from this digression to the two remaining sources of the revenues, the salt and the opium. My observations on both will be short.

The plan for the management of the salt was of my formation. The minuteness of investigation employed to fix the stamp of demerit on my plans in general, will justify the seeming vanity of asserting my claim to approbation for the success of one institution at least, which in its outset was opposed, and condemned universally. The intricate, desultory series of management, which was formerly applied to this department, has given place to one uniform system of control ; the perplexity of the former accounts of the salt no longer exists, and the advances for the manufacture of the quantity produced, and the amount gained, are made to appear in clear, concise statements ; an uncertain collection has been gradually improved into a permanent and increasing revenue ; and as long as Mr. Vansittart, or some other person of qualifications equal to his, shall preside over the office, and be allowed to conduct it according to the rules of its institution, I may venture to assure the Company of an annual revenue of fifty lacks of rupees* from this department, being the clear and neat amount of a new and simple appropriation of a natural source of revenue to the public stock, without tax or exaction ; substituted in the place of an old system of artificial intricacy, by which, in the process of the last three years of its existence, the Company had sustained a loss instead of deriving a benefit from it.

* By a clause of the regulating or remedial bill brought in by Mr. Fox, in the late House of Commons, this source of revenue would have been entirely given up.

The conquest of a foreign principality, which had added half a million of pounds sterling to the national income ; a splendid extention of dominion ; and a large store of lucrative offices to ministerial patronage, though purchased with the blood of thousands, maintained with an enormous expence of fortresses and military garrisons, and the hazard of national disgrace, with the loss of it ; would have crowned the warrior, by whose fortunate valour it was won, with deathless glory ; and votes of parliamentary thanks, bonfires, and illuminations, would have proclaimed his praise and the public triumph. A bloodless accession of public income, gained by the silent operation of official arrangement, perpetuated in its duration, and fixed in its value by its inherence to the essence of the state itself, unincumbered with military establishments and frontier defences, and ministering subsistence to a whole people both in its immediate distribution as a necessary of life, and by the returns of a foreign commerce, is allowed to sink unnoticed in the blended accounts of the general treasury, because it was not produced by any of those efforts of the mind to which human pride has affixed the claim of renown, and in which every man appropriates to himself a share of the national glory.

It is well known to those few who have access to the records of the government of Bengal, or rather to the fewer who may have imposed on themselves the heavy labour of perusing them, that the measure which produced this fund was not only of my formation, but undertaken against the judgement of all my colleagues, and barely suffered to pass with the responsibility of it at my own re-iterated instance thrown exclusively on myself for its success. Surely then I may be allowed to make this display of its acknowledged

merits, since its failure would have entailed on me endless disgrace, with the aggravated reproach of presumption, ignorance, and warned temerity.

It has also been urged as a reproach against me, that in providing the opium by contract, I have consulted the interests of my friends in preference to those of the Company. This charge, like many others, has often been repeated, and as often refuted; I shall therefore only briefly remark, that whilst the manufacture of opium was managed by the Company's servants in the Behar province, the profit upon the sales was too inconsiderable to be deemed an article of revenue; that the Company, in consequence of contracting for the provision of opium, have in fact derived a certain annual income from an article which scarcely yielded any before, by appropriating to themselves those profits which were diverted into other channels; and that I know no law, either moral or municipal, that should preclude my friends from taking upon themselves the charge of an engagement, the profits of which were to arise from their skill, industry, and exactness in the performance of it. It must be remembered that this remark, as well as the reproach, applies to a single instance only.

I have already spoken of the population of the country, and shall conclude the subject of the revenues with some observations on the state of cultivation: I am authorised by my own experience to assert, what every man who has resided long in Bengal, and has had opportunities of visiting the countries beyond the Company's jurisdiction, is qualified to confirm, that the territorial possessions of the English in Bengal and Behar are not only better cultivated than the lands of any other state of Hindostan, but infinitely superior to what they were at the time the Company received the

grant of the Dewanny, or for many years preceding that period. It is also a fact, that the produce of the lands in common years, so much exceeds the quantity required for the consumption of the people, or for the purposes of exportation, that the difficulty of converting it into specie considerably affects the collection of the revenues in many parts of the country, and in some degree distresses the Ryots to furnish their stipulated quotas of rent ; that there is no country in the world, where the inhabitants in general procure a subsistence with the same ease and cheapness as in Bengal ; and that, if by any sudden exertion of industry, the quantity of land in cultivation could be greatly increased, the Company would derive no advantage from it, nor the labourers receive any compensation for their toil.

I have often with pleasure expatiated on the peculiar talents of the late Mr. Cleveland, in civilizing the inhabitants of the mountainous districts of the Jungleterry, or wild and hilly lands of Rajemehal, by a system of conciliation which will long endear his memory to those who have felt the benefits of it ; and I cannot deny myself the gratification arising from the reflection, that the exertion of those talents was in a great measure owing to the public support and private encouragement which he received from me. In the honours bestowed upon his memory, the Board have consulted the interests of the Company, by holding forth for imitation a character so worthy of it. The immediate advantages of his labours are seen in the security which the inhabitants of the adjacent lands possess ; no longer apprehensive of being plundered of the produce of their labour by a lawless banditti, they have extended their cultivation over large tracts of land, till lately impassable ; and the country at the

bottom of the Rajemehal hills, which I myself have seen in a state of nature, has assumed an appearance of universal fertility. The remote advantages will be more considerable, should the continuance of the same plan of civilization increase the intercourse which has so lately been established between the inhabitants of the hills, and those of the low lands. At all events, the Company have acquired a large accession of new subjects, who are not only peaceable in themselves, but have been successfully employed in maintaining the peace of the country, and who, being warmly attached to us, by the superior benefits they have received from their civilization, may, in case of public exigency, be usefully employed in the defence of our territories against foreign invasion.

Of the business of the commercial department I shall speak but little. It is a subject of too great extent, and involves too many nice and important questions to be fully comprised in the narrow limits which I have prescribed to myself in this summary review ; yet I cannot pass it over without a few reflections.

The instructions which the Court of Directors framed, in consequence of the act of the 13th, and transmitted to Bengal, marked the first limits of the respective powers of the general and commercial departments ; and in fact constituted the latter independent on the former. The provision of the investment was left to the sole management of the latter ; the salaries of its members were fixed ; and it was expressly declared, that they should not be liable to be suspended, or dismissed by the authority of the general government. The only power which was given to the Governor General and Council relative to the Board of Trade, was that of supplying the necessary funds : but this power afforded them no means of control over the

conduct of that Board in the provision of the investment, or the application of the money ; since in the exercise of it they must be regulated by other considerations than the conduct of the Board of Trade ; for whatever that might be, the supplies must be the same, and could not be either withheld or diminished without a material injury to the Company's affairs : yet this was the only power that the Governor General and Council possessed. Men whose salaries were fixed, and who neither held their appointments, nor could be removed from them by the authority of the Governor General and Council, naturally felt themselves independent ; and the consequence has been, that the Governor General and Council, instead of attempting to control the management of the Board of Trade, have been even unable to impose on their correspondence those restraints of decency and respect which are due from one public body to another. In one instance only has it been in the power of the Superior Government to interfere with the management of the Board of Trade, and in that their interference was attended with an immediate and acknowledged advantage to the Company.

I allude to the provision of the investment in the years 1781, 1782, and 1783, by means of the subscription loan, when the members of the Board of Trade resident in Calcutta, to whom the charge of it was entrusted, acted rather as the factors of the Superior Board than as agents for the Company in their official and collective character.

But the power of interference, which the Board exercised in this instance, was grounded on very peculiar circumstances, which may never again occur ; and it is not therefore to be considered as an exception tending to invalidate the general position which I

have asserted, that the Board of Trade, in the provision of the investment, are constituted independent of the Governor General and Council.

Yet in all the late correspondence from Europe, the Court of Directors seem to consider the responsibility as primarily vested in the Governor General and Council. Whether applause or censure result from the management of the business of providing the investment, it is to the Governor General and Council that the strictures of the Court of Directors are expressly directed and applied. They are afterwards, indeed, communicated by them to the Board of Trade; but applause and censure equally lose their force when they are not openly and pointedly applied, and when they pass through the medium of others, who may diminish their efficacy by participation, but, possessing no authority themselves, cannot increase it in the conveyance.

From these premises I have demonstrated, that the management, direction, and execution, of all matters relative to the Company's commerce, are wholly and independently vested in the Board of Trade, whilst the responsibility virtually rests with the Governor General and Council. This is so absurd a contradiction of principles, that it is sufficient to have proved its existence without tracing its consequences. In a former part of this review, I have avowed my opinion that the attention of the superior government of Bengal should not be perplexed with the intricacies of commercial detail; but it is clearly expedient, that either some degree of efficient control should be vested in the Governor General or Council, or the responsibility wholly withdrawn from them, and transferred to the Board of Trade. These are questions for the

Company to determine. I do not offer any opinion on them at present.

The next defect which I have to point out in the constitution of the Board of Trade proceeds from the rule established by the Company, that all their servants, according to their seniority of rank in the general list, shall succeed to the seats becoming vacant at the Board of Trade. This is founded on principles of justice towards their servants ; but it is productive of essential injury to their own affairs.

The general government, and the commercial department in Bengal, which might otherwise be considered as two separate and distinct lines, are so blended in this respect, that the persons who fill the inferior stations of either, are all chosen from the general list of servants under the authority of the Governor General and Council. The business, however, of each requires very different talents, and to excel in either, habitual practice and long applications are necessary : so that although removals are not positively prohibited, few ever change the line in which they have once engaged, until they arrive at a certain rank in the service ; when *all*, whatever their talents may be, and whether they desire it or not, must rise into the Board of Trade ; by which means often the services of those who have made the revenues or other branches of the general department the objects of their study and attention, are lost to the Company ; and they are thrown into a line where all their former knowledge becomes totally useless, and they are destitute of that which they ought to possess ; probably too late in life to study a new profession ; their minds are therefore disgusted at the change ; and their thoughts are bent on returning to their native country.

If the servants of the commercial department were

completely separated from those of the general government, it might perhaps be proper, when no particular objection existed, that the former should rise according to their seniority of rank to fill the vacant seats of the Board of Trade. But whilst the servants of both departments continue to rank in one general list, seniority should be set aside, or only allowed the preference where equal talents and knowledge come into competition. I do not pretend to say whether the right of choice should rest in the Court of Directors at home, or in the superior government in India.

Another defect in the present constitution of the Board of Trade consists in the number of its members. Four members have been thought sufficient by the legislature of Great Britain, for the general government of India ; and the Company have thought fit to continue the original number of members in the Board of Trade, which is no less than eleven. For what purpose is there so great a difference ? It will never be alledged, that the objects of deliberation of the latter are more important or numerous than those of the former. It will perhaps then be said, that they have a greater detail of executive transactions. This is not true ; and if it were admitted, I would require no other grounds for reducing the number ; for I affirm, and every man who has been conversant in the practice of Boards must be sensible, that the detail of minute executive transactions is more correctly and expeditiously conducted by a few, or even by a single man, than by many. The Company's investment was never, I believe, at any time, better managed than in the year 1773, when it was left to the sole superintendency of Mr. Aldersey.

Possibly it will be observed, that although the Board of Trade consists of eleven, yet there is never

that number assembled at the Presidency, it being an established rule that four of the commercial chiefships shall be filled by the members in rotation. This also I affirm to be one of the defects of their constitution. The charge of the subordinate stations should never be given to persons possessed of a right to vote at the Board ; for under such circumstances their merits will seldom be impartially scanned ; either their faults will be overlooked, or, if party disputes should unhappily prevail, their exertions will be disturbed and checked by unnecessary cavils.

In these observations which I have made on the defects of the present system, I do not allude to any particular instances. I speak only of general principles, which must always invariably produce the same consequences. I shall now offer a few remarks on the general subject of the Company's commerce in Bengal.

Although we have so long been in possession of the sovereignty of Bengal, and have provided our investments, not as the returns of commerce, but as the means of remitting the surplus of the revenues of the country ; yet we have not been able so far to change our ideas with our situation, as to quit the contracted views of monopolists for objects tending to promote the prosperity of those territories, from which we derive so valuable a tribute.

Hence it is that in all the correspondence of the Board of Trade we find constant complaints of private merchants making advances to the Company's weavers ; of their giving greater prices than have hitherto been given by the Company ; of their debasing the quality of the manufactures, by taking off goods which the Company refuse ; and, in short, of their injuring the provision of the Company's investment by their competition and interference. Let all this be. It is of

less consequence, considered as a national concern, that the investment should be procured cheap, than that the commerce of the country should flourish ; and I insist upon it, as a fixed and uncontrovertible principle, that commerce can only flourish when it is equal and free : nor in truth do I think that the Company, considered merely in their mercantile capacity, would much suffer from the operation of such a principle. When commerce is left to itself, it will correct its own evils. The private merchant, ever quicksighted to his interest, will only maintain a competition whilst a profit is to be derived from the trade ; and so long as he derives a profit, the Company ought to derive one also. But if in the course of this competition the prices paid to the manufacturers should rise beyond their just proportion, compared with the sales, or if the market in Europe should become overstocked, the private merchant will soon desist, prices will fall in India to their former rate, or even lower, and the stock in the market, from not being supplied as usual, will again be reduced to a quantity more proportionate to the demand. This must inevitably be the consequence, whilst the consumption continues, and cannot be supplied (which I believe is the case with most of the articles of the Company's trade) from the productions of any other quarter of the world.

If, however, the Company's investment should now be productive of less profit on the invoice than formerly, the cause is less to be traced in the increase of the prime cost of the goods paid to the manufacturers in India, than in the great growth of the trade of foreign nations, which has raised a competition against the Company in the sale of Indian commodities in all the markets of Europe.

This suggests an idea of monopoly to which I am not averse ; because if it be pursued, it will affect only our European rivals, without prejudicing the commerce of our territories. But it must be pursued not by restrictions, but by counteraction. To find what means are in our power for this purpose, let us return to those circumstances which I have in another place enumerated as the causes of the growth of the trade of the Danes, and I might have added the Portuguese. These I have said are, first, the advantage they possessed during the late war, of navigating their ships in safety, whilst our own and those of the French and Dutch were exposed to great risk. Secondly, the facility with which they procured credit in India, even from the subjects of Great Britain.

The former of these causes ceased with the war : the latter still exists ; and it is there that we must apply our means of counteraction. The Danish and Portuguese vessels that have lately come to India are mostly fitted out by private adventurers : no great capital is necessary, and little credit is required in Europe for their outfit, as their cargoes outward bound consist only of provisions and bulky articles, which are procured at a small cost. When they arrive in Bengal, the avidity with which individuals embrace every opportunity of remitting their fortunes to Europe, enables them easily to procure money or credit for the purchase of a valuable investment. They grant bills or bonds payable in Europe at a distant period. They then carry home their cargoes, and convert them into money in time to discharge their bills or bonds when they become due. All this operation, therefore, is chiefly carried on by means of the money or credit which they meet with in Bengal. But the profit on the voyage is their own ; and their

nation gains in the increase of its navigation and wealth.

Let us now suppose that the English Company were to open their treasury, and extend their investment in proportion to the sums which they could procure in India for bills on Europe. I believe it is certain, that if such a measure had the sanction of the Company at home, and the terms were equal, few British subjects would hesitate to lend them their money in preference to foreigners. The consequence would be, that the Danes, Portuguese, and others, would be obliged to bring from Europe the amount necessary to purchase an Indian investment, which would require a capital that few private adventurers are possessed of, and would occasion a long outlay of money, and consequently a heavy loss of interest. With these disadvantages entirely on their side, they would have to enter into competition with the English Company, who, from having established factories under the direction of servants accustomed to deal with the manufacturers, and from being able to make their advances long before the season for receiving and shipping the goods (without availing themselves of the influence which they might derive from their being in possession of the government of the country) ought to have a decided advantage over all foreigners, and particularly over private adventurers, whose stay is limited to a few months, in providing their investments both of the best quality and at the cheapest rates.

If, nevertheless, foreign nations should still find it for their advantage to pursue this commerce, they must then be obliged to carry it on by means of gold and silver brought from Europe; for there is scarcely any thing else which would answer; the consumption

of European articles in Bengal being confined chiefly to the European inhabitants, and of a very limited extent; and such an important addition to the circulation of money would be attended with the most beneficial effects in enriching the provinces under the Company's government. Nor need the Company grudge the high prices which a competition under such circumstances might occasion in the first cost of their goods. They would still receive the greatest part of their investment virtually for nothing; not as the return of commerce, but as a tribute. The sources from which this tribute flow would increase with the prosperity of their territories; the tribute itself would be rendered more valuable; and their profits on that part of their investment, which they procured for bills on Europe, would at least be equal to those which induce foreign nations to persist in the competition.

It appears plain, therefore, from what I have said, that if the Company were to open their cash for bills on Europe, one of these consequences would ensue: either their provinces would be enriched by the bullion and specie imported by foreigners, or the foreigners must desist from the trade, and leave to the Company not only a *national* but an *universal* monopoly; from which the nation, not less than the Company, would be gainers in proportion as England would become the emporium for supplying all the other countries of Europe with the productions and manufactures of India.

I shall now hasten to bring this, perhaps already too tedious, performance to its close, having lengthened it greatly beyond my first expectation, and with much apparent deviation from its professed object. As the labour of perusal will be increased by both these causes, the readers of it, whoever they may be,

for I have written it without any knowledge of its destination, will have a right to be informed of the purposes for which this trouble was exacted from them ; and this satisfaction I hope they will receive in the following apology.

My original design, as I have stated it in the commencement, was, first, to assign the motive for my resignation of the service ; secondly, to detail the means which I took to surrender my place in it unencumbered to my successor, and unsusceptible of any ill consequence to the joint administration ; and thirdly, to deliver a summary review of the actual state in which I left the government of Bengal in its distinct departments at the time of my separation from it.

The three subjects, though thus discriminated, will be found on examination to bear so close a relation to each other, that it was not well practicable to treat of the first without entering into as large a discussion of the other two, both successively and necessarily following it. It is in effect the recapitulation of the transactions of three months winding up an administration of thirteen years. In the former, it was not more my study to clear off the weight of incumbent business, than to fix the direction of it by the principles to which I had invariably, from the commencement of my office, endeavoured to conform it. It was not possible to explain the circumstances to which this rule was applied, without assuming a yet wider circumference, including both the application of recent measures to the construction of those which were connected with them in a remote period of time ; the vindication of the latter from the imputation of error, inconsistency, or misconduct ; and even the declaration of what I would have preferably done, if

left to the free exercise of my judgement in cases in which no present option but the choice of proffered evils.

Indeed the nature of my subject, considered as a vindication, required a larger and more elaborate detail than similar recitals of facts and events which pass nearer the sphere of common observation. At such a distance, any charge may be successfully hazarded against the devoted victim of a party, and more especially of one possessing the reverence of names which stand too high for imputation, and holding the trust of compiling materials for the formation of opinions and acts of the first national authority. Against such antagonists the voice of truth itself, so remote, will scarce be heard; and if heard, will make no impression on minds under the influence of prejudice, or determined by worse motives against the acknowledgement of conviction. I should not have been surprised if to the accusations of rapacity, corruption, oppression, thirst of blood and other enormities with which the clamour of privileged calumny has assailed my character, it had borrowed the aid of contempt to swell the foul catalogue with gambling, drunkenness, and every species of profligacy that could debase the human mind. Equal credit would have been given to the aspersion by those who on no better grounds have given it, or have affected to give it, to other tales of equal falsehood and malignity; and probably such would have been my lot, had I not possessed, in the incomparable vigilance and ability of my declared agent in England, and other powerful and well-informed minds, such instruments of repulsion as might discourage the attempt by the certainty of its recoiling with shame on the assailants.

But however diffuse these sheets may be beyond the limits which candour may be willing to allow me, I yet hope and believe that they will be found to contain both new and useful information. I know not whether I may ascribe these qualities to the following reflections, which I have purposely reserved for the close.

From the vehemence and perseverance with which my immediate superiors laboured during the course of ten years to weaken my authority, to destroy my influence, and to embarrass all my measures, at a time when their affairs required the most powerful exertions to sustain them, which I alone by my office could direct; and from the great importance which they have ascribed to points, some of which had no relation to their interests, and others were even repugnant to them; I much fear, that it is not understood as it ought to be, how near the Company's existence has on many occasions vibrated to the edge of perdition, and that it has been at all times suspended by a thread so fine, that the touch of chance might break, or the breath of opinion dissolve it: and instantaneous will be its fall whenever it shall happen. May God in His mercy long avert it!

To say why a dominion held by a delegated and fettered power over a region exceeding the dimensions of the parent state, and removed from it a distance equal in its circuit to two thirds of the earth's circumference, is at all times liable to be wrested from it, would be a waste of argument, nor would it be prudent to aggravate the portrait by displaying all the artificial evils by which a fabric, so irregular even in its best construction, is loosened and debilitated.

It is true, that it has hitherto stood unimpaired,

because it has met with no domestic stroke of fortune to agitate and try its texture, one late instance perhaps excepted, which was too suddenly repelled to produce the effect which might have attended a longer duration of it. And it may yet stand for some years to come, though still liable to the same insecurity. The remedy is easy and simple; but I fear it will be vain to propose it; because, if it is not (as I believe it is not) contrary to the principles of our national constitution, it will at least meet with very formidable obstacles in the prejudices which arise out of it.

I affirm, as a point incontestable, that the administration of the British Government in Bengal, distant as it is from the reach of more than general instruction from the source of its authority, and liable to daily contingencies, which require both instant decision, and a consistency of system, cannot be ruled by a body of men variable in their succession, discordant in opinion, each jealous of his colleagues, and all united in common interest against their ostensible leader. Its powers are such, that if directed by a firm and steady hand, they may be rendered equal to any given plan of operation; but may prove the very instruments of its destruction, if they are left in the loose charge of unconnected individuals, whose interests, passions, or caprices, may employ them in mutual contests, and a scramble for superiority.

It has been my lot to derive, from long possession and casual influence, advantages which have overcome the worst effects of my own deficiencies; and it has been one maxim of my conduct (may I be pardoned for the apparent boast, but necessary allusion) to do what I knew was requisite to the public safety, though I should doom my life to legal forfeiture, or my name to

infamy. I could verify this by instances in which by an implicit submission to positive duty and express orders, the Company's possessions might have been devoted to desolation, and even its existence annihilated. I hazarded an opposite conduct; and whatever may have been its effects, I have at least had the happiness to see one portion of the British dominion in India rise from the lowest state of degradation; another rescued from imminent subjection; and that which gives life to the whole, enjoying the blessings of peace and internal security, while every other part of the general empire was oppressed by war, or the calamities of intestine discord.

I may not expatiate on such a discussion. I mention it only to shew, that if the British power in India yet holds a reprieve from ruin, it derives its preservation from causes which are independent of its constitution; and that it might have been lost if left to that alone for its protection.

The inference to be drawn from these premises is, that whatever form of government may yet be established for these provinces, whether its control be extended to the other presidencies, or confined to its own demesnes; it is necessary that the Governor, or first executive member, should possess a power absolute and complete within himself, and independent of actual control.* His character, which requires little more than two qualifications, an inflexible integrity and a judgement unsusceptible of the bias of foreign suggestion, should be previously ascertained, and its consistency assured by the pledge of his life for the faithful discharge of so great a trust.

I have said that this is an unpopular doctrine, and

* The legislature has now adopted the system recommended by Mr. Hastings for the government of India.

liable to be rejected as opposite to our domestic constitution; but it derives its source even from the constitution itself, which requires, in every remote member of the general state, a construction of government not merely different from its own, but that from which its own nature is most abhorrent. The negligences, vices, and crimes, of a political agent, are all totally foreign in their qualities from those offences in common life which the law defines, and against which it has made a provision in the degrees of punishment denounced against the commission of them. The factious or corrupt member of a council, may weaken every useful spring of government; may embarrass, obstruct, and thwart, all its measures; may stop the execution of its daily official business; may occasionally employ its powers for the most pernicious purposes, and still keep clear of legal condemnation. He may even avail himself of the letter of prescribed orders in such a manner, either by a strained or ill-timed obedience, as to defeat their intention, or pervert them to effects the most opposite to it.

The real character of such a man will not escape the observation of those who live within the sphere of his agency; and to them the motives of all his actions will be known on grounds of the strongest internal conviction, though incapable of direct and positive evidence. Yet it is on positive evidence only that his offences can be proved; nor even when proved can they operate to his punishment, unless they fall within the prohibition of some positive law; although the lives of multitudes may have been destroyed, and the safety and honour of the state itself endangered, by the perpetration of them. But it is only by a process of law, and by a breach of some written statute, or known law of the land, that the subject of a free

state can be condemned. A constitution formed of a governor, with limited powers, and a council, may subsist under an arbitrary monarch directing it, and be better conducted than that of a governor alone; but it cannot be too simple and unrestrained for the rule of a province so remote from a free state like that of Great Britain.

To obviate misconceptions, I think it proper to mention that I allude only to such powers as appertain to the nature of government; not to such as might affect the lives, persons, or property of individuals living within its authority, but under the protection of the law of England. In all cases which do not necessarily fall within the cognizance of those who have the immediate charge of the state, the jurisdiction of the governor ought to be no more than that of any other civil magistrate, or justice of the peace. It is unnecessary in this place to treat of the mode of succession, or the other dependant arrangements of the general system.

Though the state of kingdoms is liable to dissolution from causes as mortal as those which intercept the course of human life; and though my opinion of the distempers which threaten that of the British empire in Bengal, may obtain credit from all who read it, yet I fear that few will yield to its impression. Like the stroke of death, which every man knows will come, but no man acts as if he felt the conviction which he avows and thinks he feels, the very magnitude of the catastrophe may in this case blunt the sense of those to whom it is visibly apparent.

I expect this effect, and foresee that I may expose myself to much obloquy by recommending so new and unpopular a system. Yet these considerations have not deterred me from endeavouring to render *this last*

service to my country, and to my ever-respected constituents ; being assured, if successful, of *my reward in the conscious applause of my own mind brightening the decline of my existence* ; and of this consolation in the dreaded reverse, that no means within the compass of my ability had been left untried to prevent it.

APPENDIX

A NARRATIVE, WRITTEN BY THE PRINCE
JEHÂNDÂR SHÂH.

FROM the first arrival of His Majesty at Dehly* to the end of the life of the Nabob † Zoolfeccâr u'Dowlah, there was, in some sort, a cheapness of provisions, a proper cultivation and policy in the royal domains, a punishment of rebellious and wicked men, a respect to the dignity of the sovereign, and an observation of obedience and duty. On the ‡ 23d of Rubbee u'Sānee, A. H. 1196, the above-mentioned Nabob departed from this vain mansion, after a complicated illness of four months, and the troops became distressed and anxious for their arrears of pay : for as he left no son, who, in the succession of his dignities and honours, would consider their rights as his own, Mudjid u'Dowlah, who had formerly been a minister of the empire, having been confined since the administration of the late Nabob, Mahommed Yaccoob Khawn,§ Khowass, who enjoyed His Majesty's confidence, procured letters to be written to the chiefs present and

* In December, 1771.

† Nudjiff Khawn.

‡ April 7, 1782. This is probably an error, the lunar computation being always uncertain. From more accurate authority it appears, that Nudjiff Khawn died on the 6th of April.

§ A servant constantly attendant on the King's person.

absent, assuring some of continuance in their offices, and others of higher dignities from the royal favour.

The morning after the Nabob's death I saw that the attendants on His Majesty were consulting to send some persons to the house of the deceased, in order to calm disturbances ; and at last,* the wisdom enlightening the world, and all the courtiers resolved on deputing me to effect that object. This faithful servant,† agreeably to the commands of His Majesty (whose empire may God perpetuate !) having departed with all speed, and given assurances to the afflicted, the friends of the departed had leisure to wash and dress the body, and the disturbances and clamour began to cease. After necessary preparation, I attended the corpse to the Musjid Jehân-nummah ; and the dues of Islaum,‡ as prayers and blessings, being paid, sent it to the place of interment under the care of Afrasiâb Khawn, who was the cherished in the bosom of the bounty of the noble deceased, whose sister also regarded him as her adopted son ; after which I returned to the imperial palace.

As it was the wish and choice of the Begum§ that Afrasiâb Khawn should succeed her brother, he became ambitious of the dignities and possessions of the deceased ; and the Begum petitioned His Majesty in his favour with earnest entreaty ; but this proved disagreeable in the far-extending sight of the royal wisdom, as Mirzah Shuffeh Khawn, who had a great army and considerable resources, looked to the succession, and would never agree to such a supercession in the administration ; so that contentions would of necessity ensue. Through the instigation of female obstinacy the Begum would not withdraw her request ;

* The King.

† Religion.

‡ The Prince.

§ Nudjiff Khawn's sister.

and regard and compassion for the situation of a widow in affliction, like her, worthy of the royal indulgence, at length operated, and her petition was, though reluctantly, favoured with compliance. The honours of the splendid *khelāat** of Ameer ul Omrah, and acting minister, were conferred on Afrasiāb Khawn by His Majesty, who directed this household servant (sensible of the ill consequences of the measure, and the royal doubts) to write to Mirzah Shuffeh to hasten to the presence, so that no suspicions might remain with him of partiality in the rejection of his rights on the part of the King.

Afrasiāb Khawn, alarmed at the knowledge of the royal favour to Mirzah Shuffeh, and esteeming Mudjid u'Dowlah of great influence with His Majesty, made a treaty with that Ameer, released him from confinement, and having brought him to court, procured him the imperial kindness and favour. Mirzah Shuffeh Khawn arriving soon after with his army at Dehly, and connecting himself with the Begum, who was nearly related to him, and who had promised him in marriage the daughter of the late Nabob, encamped near the Turkomaan gate, so called from the tomb of Shah Turkomaan. He appointed his brother Zein-ul-Aub-u'Deen, and his vakeel Râow Munny Khawn, to negotiate for him in the presence. On this account disputes arose at Court, and dissensions in the city ; so that open war was on the point of occurring. At length Afrasiāb Khawn, seeing the inclination of his Majesty tend towards Mirzah Shuffeh, thought it best for the preservation of his own honour to obtain dismissal from court ; and leaving Mudjid u'Dowlah and Nudjiff Kooly Khawn on his part in the presence, to retire to his foudedarry, Ajjheer. Mudjid

* Garments of investiture.

u'Dowlah and Nudjiff Kooly Kawn having contrived to indispose his Majesty towards Mirzah Shuffeh, that chief, highly enraged, and seeing them without forces, surrounded them in their houses,* took them prisoners, and confined them both in the palace of the Begum, where he himself resided. After being guilty of this presumption, he studied to bring His Majesty into his own power, and his influence and authority became supreme.

His Majesty, in this situation of affairs, directed me to negotiate with Mirzah Shuffeh; and I, obedient to the royal will, having obviated the alarms of that chief, obtained for him the *khelāat* of Ameer-ul-Omra, and manager of the imperial affairs. Much time had not elapsed when Mahommed Yaccoob Khawn, who favoured the views of Afrasiāb Khawn, and by his insinuating representations had procured the approbation of His Majesty, secretly gained to his purpose Monsieur Pauly, who commanded Sumroo's battalions, and the Eunuch Luttāfut Ally Khawn† persuading them to enrol themselves among His Majesty's servants. He instructed them to desert suddenly from their master, and repair to the gate of the palace royal; which they did accordingly, and drew over with them most of the Mirzah's other battalions.‡ Mirzah Shuffeh Khawn, finding it unsafe to remain in the city, made his escape, and His Majesty heading the troops repaired to the Musjid Jehan-nummah. Upon intelligence of this event I alone of His Majesty's sons repaired without delay to the presence, and represented that it was most advisable for His Majesty to pursue the Mirzah,

* 11th and 12th September 1782. Mudjid u'Dowlah was arrested on the 11th, and Nudjiff Kooly Khawn the following day.

† The commander of six battalions of sepoys in the service of the Nabob Vizier, attendant on the King.

‡ October 1782.

secure his adherents and the Begum in the royal palace, and take possession of his effects and artillery for the royal use. The courtiers regarding the expulsion of the Mirzah as sufficient success, were satisfied with their march to the Musjid, and soon after returned with His Majesty to the palace.

Mirzah Shuffeh with great alarms being arrived at Kôsee, and seeing that he was not pursued by an army, halted there, and resolved on putting to death Mudjid u'Dowlah, whom he had brought a prisoner along with him; but was withheld by his promising, if he would spare his life, to soften the resentment of His Majesty, and procure for him his highest favour, and a restoration to office. Moved by his arguments he set him at liberty, and also prevailed on Mahommed Beg Khawn Hamadaneë to join him by a promise of the office of Vakaalut Mutulluck.*

Monsieur Pauly and Latafat Khawn, upon intelligence of this junction, prevailed on His Majesty to encamp at Khizzerabad near which † Mirzah Shuffeh Khawn and Mahommed Beg shortly after arrived, and through Mahommed Yaccoob Khawn began negotiations and proposed a meeting with Pauly and Latafat; who, satisfied by assurances, accepted the offers, and begged leave of His Majesty to make peace. At this time I from loyalty observed, that in such quarrels there was no room for peace; that the force with His Majesty was equal to crush more powerful rebels than the present, who were only a rabble, and dared not to face the royal standard, but would mostly join it, or in the space of a few days separate of themselves; that if at all events peace was resolved upon, they should

* An office superior in dignity to the Vizier, and seldom granted but in great emergencies.

† November 1782.

be called to the presence, instead of being visited ; but that if at any rate the latter was resolved on, prudence demanded that only one chief should be sent, and the other remain with His Majesty.

As the designs of Providence had weakened the ears of their understandings, and the eyes of their perception with the mist of ill-fortune, an interview appeared to them most advisable ; and mutual suspicion rendered each unwilling that one should go and the other remain in camp, lest he who went should make his own terms without the other. In short both went, and at the instant of meeting, fell, together with* Mahommed Yaccoob Khawn, into the snare of imprisonment and ruin. Upon this event, perturbation seized the imperial camp, and dread of the treachery of the rebels wholly occupied in the mind of His Majesty. The important services performed by me, though without power, on this occasion for His Majesty in appeasing the passions of Mirzah Shuffeh and Mahommed Beg Khawn, are fully known and celebrated. Afrasiâb Khawn, who had marched on pretence of reconciling divisions, seeing Pauly and Latafat ruined, joined the successful party. I brought all the three chiefs to make their submissions in the royal presence, and they, assisted by Mujid u'Dowlah, took up the throne upon their shoulders, as an acknowledgement of their obedience ; after which they were permitted to mount their horses, and attended His Majesty to the palace, where they were distinguished by the gift of splendid khellâats. Mirzah Shuffeh Khawn was restored to the office of Ameer-ul-Omrah, and Mudjid u'Dowlah to that of Dewan to the Khalsah Shereefah ; but the promise of the former to Mahommed Beg of the Vakaalut Muttulluck was not performed.

* 20th and 21st November 1782.

Soon after this Mirzah Shuffeh Khawn, with the Begum, his women, and all the dependants of the late Nabob, marched for Agra, and requested me to go with him ; but seeing the confusion of affairs, the evil disposition and treachery of the Mirzah, also the disinclination of His Majesty, I would not comply with his petition. Being without remedy, he obtained leave from His Majesty for my dear brother Soleymān Shekôh to command him, and began his march.

It was at this period that much anxiety and melancholy intruding on the sacred mind of His Majesty, asylum of the world, and also on the breast of his loyal servant, Mahommed Akbar Khawass was dispatched to the English government by me, in order to prove the faith and attachment of the English Chiefs to His Majesty. It was my design to go myself, as without that step the accomplishment of such important business appeared difficult, if not impossible. It had frequently fallen from the revelation-explaining speech of His Majesty, that no confidential and faithful person occurred to him, who was capable of expressing the sentiments of his heart, and the wickedness and ill-behaviour of the followers of error, to his royal chiefs ; or of delivering to them in a proper manner his commands, and satisfying their doubts, or of bringing their answers. At last he expressed his wishes equal to commands, to this servant, in such a manner, that I resolved on moving to the Eastward ; but with the firm hope of important services from the English, in the punishment of the rebels already mentioned. Various commotions prevented me ; till at length the assassination* of Mirzah Shuffeh—the succession to his office by Afrasiâb—his

* Mirzah Shuffeh was assassinated by Mahommed Beg Hammandanee on the 23d of September 1783.

chusing for his patron my dear brother Mirzah Soleymān Shekôh, that he might remain master of the imperial affairs, and continue the mode of error—came to pass. These various quarrels of the usurpers had occasioned the greatest confusion in the public affairs, and numerous distresses and injuries were felt by His Majesty ; and on account of my known regard to the English for their virtues and loyalty, various instances of their hatred and dislike were shown to myself ; and as far as they could, they neglected no insult to me, bound in the same difficulties with my sovereign.

Driven by necessity, for the restoration of affairs, and in obedience to the commands of the glorious presence, I laid my plan for escaping from the palace, and confided it to Moâzem u'Dowlah, the governor.* This Ameer, who is nearly related to His Majesty, was from his infancy cherished in the bosom of my favour, and the confidant of this devoted to the royal pleasure. I had ever esteemed him my firm friend and trusty counsellor, and depended upon his loyalty to His Majesty ; for several times, when secrets were agitated in the presence, in the Assud Bastion, he was fully informed of His Majesty's desires. I requested that he might convey me out of the palace, or into Noorghur, which joins to it, and was under his care ; from whence I could prosecute my journey to the English Chiefs. He from his base mind, and regard to the relation which he bore to Koottub-'u-deen Khawn, the son-in-law of Mudjid-u'Dowlah, communicated my secret to that minister ; who questioned the news-writer of the Nabob Vizier, if I had set on foot any negociations with his master, which he denied. He then informed His Majesty, who guessed that his own inclination had proved the incitement of this

* Of the palace, or citadel.

design ; but to prevent suspicions of himself, he went with Mudjid u'Dowlah to view the state of the Fort, under pretence of the numerous robberies of the Goojers, and other thieves. I seeing that my secret was betrayed, in order to remove farther suspicions of my designs, pointed out to His Majesty many unknown breaches in the walls, and used great activity in ordering their repair ; so that for the following eight months such a degree of incaution possessed every one, that all suspicion of my design was done away from their minds, and they even accused my betrayer of falsehood.

At length, having certain accounts of the Governor General's arrival at Lucnow,* I was convinced that no better opportunity could ever occur for my going to him, to disclose the wishes of His Majesty, and for bringing about the recovery of the royal affairs, because the wisdom and loyalty of the Governor exceed those of every other subject.

I did not think it adviseable to entrust my design to any person, but the faithful Mukkurrim u'Dowlah, brother to my most honoured parent of the Begum Tâaje Mâhal, who by the assistance of Abdul Rhamân Khowass, Ummuldar of my Jágheer at Pakul, the residence of some Goojer Chiefs, collected a number of horse and foot of that tribe to attend me, and my departure was fixed for the night of the 23d† of Jemmâd-ul-Awel. The place of my residence was composed of various courts, at each of which were stationed porters and guards of His Majesty, who watched constantly the proceedings of my family, and used even to come several times in the night while I slept to inquire about my motions ; so that with such spies upon me it was very difficult to effect my purpose.

* 27th March, 1784.

† 14th April, 1784.

Thus situated, I desired the retired in the concealment of chastity and purity, Kuttulluk Sultan Begum, who had been for twelve months privy to my design, and had sacredly promised to keep it secret, that no one might enter my chamber, and that she would say, I was indisposed. When four Gurries* of the night were past, the sky grew cloudy, and it became so dark, that the hand could not be perceived. I arose, and in the room of long drawers put on jungehs† and girded my waist with a turban and silk loongeh,‡ given me by the head of holy teachers, and chiefs of the pious Mólwee Fukher u'deen, who is the chosen of God, and a blessing to the age. Upon my head I put a linen cap, over which I tied a shawl handkerchief under my chin : over all I wore two black shawls in the manner of a koit. About five Gurries of the night being past, I ascended to the terrace of my house, and from thence passed from terrace to terrace to the Fyez Nahar,§ which runs over the wall of the garden Hyaut-Buksh. Here not finding those whom I expected to wait for me|| agreeably to appointment, I began to search about, but in vain. At length despairing, I returned towards my own terrace, that I might, should they from dread of danger have deserted me, be informed of it; or if I should find them on the way, bring them back with me. When I had advanced near the terrace, I perceived a man, and thinking he might be a centinel led by the sound of my feet to follow me, I ran and seized him violently by the throat, when he

* About eight o'clock.

† Short and tight breeches reaching but half way down the thigh.

‡ A cloth passed round the loins.

§ Aqueduct.

|| Mirza Imaum Buksk, Abdul Rhamân, Sabit Rhamân, Meer Ayum, Shek Fyezulla, and Bukshy Allah Beg.

exclaimed I am Abdul Rhamân, your servant. Taking him along with me, I returned. Such was the darkness of the night, and the violence of the wind, that Abdul Rhamân stumbled on the roof of a bath, and fell in. I helped him out with difficulty, and then went to the Fyez Naher. When I had passed half way through it, I perceived another figure cloathed in black, and seizing him by the throat, asked who he was. By his voice I knew him to be Sâbit Khawn, and desired him to follow me. In the Fyez Naher there was a wall at the place fixed for my going out, which I had three days before broke through, and made a window large enough to admit me, from which I now descended on a spot adjoining to my armory. Here, under the rampart of the Fort facing the Jumna,* I found the four remaining persons appointed to meet me. Imaum Buksh Khawn before my arrival had made a rope ladder, and fixed it to the battlements of the Fort wall, which is twenty-two dirrhes† in height, and I hastened to descend. First I commanded Bukshy Allah Beg to descend, and after him Sâbit Khawn. Next I began to descend myself, and had got half way, when one twist of the rope broke. I then recommended myself to God, and making myself light by the science of Hittubbass (holding the breath) slipped safely by the blessing of God to the end of the rope to the ground. Imaum Buksh then repairing the rope, came down, and after him Séhkh Abdul Rhamân, and Meer Aazim. Shekh Fyezullah I commanded to stay behind and efface every trace of my escape, then to retire to his house by the way he had come, and to follow me at leisure.

It had been settled that some Goojers, to shew me

* The river Jumna.

† Sixty feet and a half. One dirreh is 33 inches.

the road, should attend me near Neelah Chuttery, which is under Noorghur, and that Mukkurrim u'Dowlah should wait for me at Putter Gunge Ghaut with five hundred men ; also that Abdul Rhamân should be ready with my own horse at about an arrow's flight from the place of my descent. Mukkurrim u'Dowlah, as agreed upon, had left his house with the Goojers at about four Gurries of the night, and reached the Sand near the Neelah Bastion, which is at the extremity of the city wall ; when rain, lightning, and clouds of dust, prevented their proceeding, and the Goojers, unable to stand the storm, would not advance, though earnestly entreated by Mukkurrim u'Dowlah, but instead of listening to him, began to insult and threaten him. Unmoved by threats, he stood his ground with only two horsemen. From the decrees of Providence, against which human reason has no remedy, Abdul Rhamân, with some things belonging to me, fled with that wretched band. Mukkurrim u'Dowlah, who had now with him only two persons, consulted with them how to act ; and it being determined to go back, he returned to his own house with a regretful and sad heart. I had about this time entered the ditch of the Fort with my five attendants : at about twenty paces from the place of my descent was the guard of the private watch on one side, and on the other a guard of His Majesty's red battalion stationed with Ahmed Ally Khawn. At the sound of our feet a centinel cried out, "Take care, and attend "to every noise." They answered, "We are watchful." I was between both guards, and relying on the protection of the Divine Being, picked my way, step by step, under the wall of the Fort, towards the bridge of Noorghur ; but though I endeavoured to prevent the noise of my feet, it was impossible, as the ditch was full of

dried leaves ; so that at last I drew my sword, and rushing between the two guards, resolved, if any one, should challenge me, to kill him ; but by God's blessing, notwithstanding the sound of so many steps, no alarm was given, so that probably they were frightened, and thought it best to be silent. I reached the place appointed for Abdul Rhamân to wait for me, and made signals and noises ; but received no answer : after which I went to the bridge of Noorghur, and called out, but no reply was given. As the river flowed under the bridge, I waded through it up to my middle, and arrived at Neelah Chutterree, the last expected place of meeting any one ; but not a person could I find. I stood here some time to wait for the Goojers ; but seeing no sign of them, and at last despairing, with much labour and difficulty I proceeded through Melon Beds, and three inlets of the Jumna, to the Neelah Bastion, which was near three cose,* but saw no one. My mind became now very uneasy, and each of my attendants offered advice agreeable to his ability ; that I should go to Mudjid u'Dowlah or Afrasiâb Khawn, who would procure from His Majesty forgiveness of my faults, and my life would be safe, though those of my servants might be sacrificed ; or that I should repair to Ahmed Ally Khawn, who would convey me privately into the Fort ; for independently of the danger of enemies, and the beasts of the desert, there was in remaining longer cause of dread from robbers and murderers. I answered them all, that nothing remained in my view but death ; that I could never submit to the insults of my enemies, to which I preferred death ; that if I had strength in my feet, I would walk to Tughlimabad, a settlement of Goojers, seven cose distant, and trust for the rest to the

* Six miles.

graciousness of God. Giving not fortitude from my hands, I remained in this dangerous spot, and sent Meer Azim to inquire after Mukkurrim u'Dowlah, and if he was at his own house, to bring him to me ; after which I uncovered my head, and prostrated myself in prayer to God, with much earnestness and sincerity of heart. After three Gurries, by permission of the Almighty, a man's voice struck my ear ; when I lifted myself from the ground, and tried those who were approaching by a particular call, which they answered, and approached ; but the night was so dark, and the wind so violent, that till they came close to me, I could not distinguish who they were. One was Mahommed Azim, and the other Ahmud Khawn, from whom I learnt that Mukkurrim u'Dowlah was following them with seven attendants, and such horses as he could bring from his house. Soon after this he arrived with Goojer Khawn, whom I requested to show me a ford of the river from Patter Ghaut. He informed me, that he was ignorant of that road, but could lead me a way by Raaj Ghaut, towards which I proceeded. On the road the watch of the night cried, "Who are passing?" And my companion answered, "We are Afrasiâb's "soldiers, and go against the Sics."—At length, with a thousand difficulties, we got over four inlets of the Jumna full of mud ; and in our search for the ford, which we could not find from the darkness of the night, passed through several cultivated fields, in one of which we found a husbandman watching his crop, and by his guidance crossed the river.* I once resolved to

* This passage seems so repugnant to the feelings of humanity, and so contrary to the real character of the illustrious writer, that I should have been tempted to suppress it, if I could reconcile the suppression to my regard for truth, although even this principle may suffer by impressing the reader with an opinion which I know to be foreign from the temper and disposition of the Prince, which

kill the guide, lest he should inform the enemy of my route ; but on reflection spared him, relying on the

has in its composition as much of the milk of human kindness as any character that I have ever known. I was myself so much hurt by it, that I took the liberty to ask the Prince, with that tenderness requisite to the censure implied by the question, what were his motives, and especially whether the guide performed this service freely or by force. The Prince answered, that the man was pressed, but did not provoke violence by resistance.—He said coolly, “I believe that I ought to have put the man to death, as by the forbearance of this caution I left it in the power of an individual to defeat my purpose, by betraying me, and with it to expose my life to the most desperate extremity, having resolved to sacrifice it if any attempt was made to stop me, and I could no other way escape the ignominy of being carried back a prisoner ; but I did not approve it, and preferred to recommend myself to the care of Providence, and suffered him to escape. In effect,” added he, “the man justified my suspicion, for he instantly went to the nearest guard, and gave information of my route, as I learnt soon after ; but I made such speed that my pursuers could not overtake me.” It should be observed, that the Prince considered himself as embarked in a design, on the event of which the fortunes of his house, and even of a great empire, depended, with which the life of an individual was not to be placed in competition, and no doubt this sentiment was strongly urged by his less feeling attendants ; for his reply indicated a misconception of the drift of my question, and was not so much intended to justify his first impulse, as to palliate the supposed weakness of having opposed to it the dictates of his own clemency.

I cannot more strongly illustrate this inference than by the following extract of a letter written to me by Mr. Fowke, the resident at Benaris, who certainly did not write for the purpose of furnishing me with such an evidence, and which exhibits a trait of character totally foreign from that which might be deduced from the passage which I have thus explained, had it passed without a comment.

W. H.

“I attended him (the Prince) to the Eidgah, for there is one here, on the day of the Eid, with all the principal people, both Europeans and natives. It is, you know, a part of the ceremony that he should kill the goats and the camel with his own hand. From a reflection he made, after it was over, of the injustice of depriving any animal of life, I imagine he was struck with this scene. Indeed the convulsions of an animal of a camel's size, expiring by the opening of a single artery, and the livid appearance of the tongue and blubber, which at that time it throws out of its mouth, present the idea of death in as shocking colours as the destruction of any thing not human can well suggest.”

protection of God, the divine preserver : and went on to Lissoundah, the Jagheer of my mother, five cose from Dehly ; where I put on my proper apparel, as Goojer Khawn requested I would halt a little, and he would procure some horsemen to attend me. He accordingly soon brought Jissoo Sing, who was his brother by exchange of turbans, and conducted me to Serrora, ten cose from Dehly. Jissoo Sing here brought to me Oudah Kirrum, and other Goodjir Zemindars of the place, who were related to him. Here I performed my ablutions, and my morning devotions. Oudah Kirrum represented that it would be better for me to repose here all day, and that at night he and his people would attend my stirrup, and conduct me to a Ghaut of the Ganges, to see me safely over that river. I observed, "How could I halt, since a detachment of "my enemies would certainly come after me in "pursuit?" He replied, "We are two hundred horse-
"men. Fifty of us will engage the pursuers, and the
"rest will remain with your Highness while you take
"repose." In compliance with their requests, I rested the whole day ; and mounting about half an hour before sun-set, travelled all night, and at dawn of morning arrived at Aurungabad, forty cose from Sorrôra, where I said morning prayers. Oudah Kirrum here sent to me his son, with Nunsing Goojer, who had lately become a Sic* : and they having paid their respects, requested I would enter the fort of Sirrabad ; to which I replied, that it was not agreeable to me, but I would go from regard to their desires. Accordingly I went, and there the son desired that I would go to Perrechut Ghur, and make one or two halts ; to which I replied, it was not agreeable, and that I would cross the Ganges that day.—As they continued their

* A religious sect inhabiting the province of Punjaub.

importunities, I put my hand upon my sword, and, relying on God, declared, that any one who should oppose my departure would give away his life to the winds of annihilation. The Divine Being so impressed their minds with dread, that they now came to me with the utmost humility, and declared, with solemn oaths, that they meant nothing but dutiful attention. Upon this I complied with their wishes to remain till mid-day, and proceeded on after prayer. At length, by the divine blessing, I reached the Ganges, which is about twenty cose from the Fort of Sirrabad, and crossed the river at the Ghaut of Kummir-u-deen-Nuggur, said my evening prayers, and returned thanks to God for his mercies. As from fatigue, sustained both day and night, together with the excessive heat of the sun, a feverish symptom shewed itself on my person, and I had been seized while crossing the river with a fainting fit, from which I soon recovered, I waited till one Gurry of the night, and then proceeded to Suddamunnah, about four cose from the Ghaut. The next morning Jemmaut Sing Goojer, Foudejar of the place, came to pay his respects, and presented me with a mare. Having reposed here all day, I set off about five o'clock, and came to Putchra-noo, in the country of the Vizier, about eight at night. In the morning I marched to the town of Omeroo, about twelve cose; and the chief inhabitants of the place presented Nuzzirs agreeable to their conditions. After spending the night in repose, I moved at dawn to Morâdabâd, about thirteen cose, and upon the arrival of my suite near the house of the late Dundee Khawn,* his son, the worthy of favour, engaged to the utmost of his ability in providing for my entertainment; and I took up my lodging in the house of the Dewan Kâeen

* A Rohilla chief.

Mull, a stately edifice, where I remained one day. I then proceeded ten cose to Rampoor,* the chief of which place, Fyezullah Khawn, had set out to meet me, but from the mistake of the guides, my suite going a wrong road, I came suddenly into the house of Fyezulla Khawn; and as I had no acquaintance with any one, all were astonished at seeing a single horseman enter freely the palace of their chief. By accident there happened to be present Moâtîmud-u'Dowlah, the son of the late nobleman of that title, Yâcoob Ally Khawn, an ancient servant of the royal household. He knew me at a distance, and running up, kissed my feet, pointing me out to Fyezulla Khawn, who immediately advanced, kissed my stirrup, and conducting me into his Dewân†, seated me on a rich musnud; after which he offered me a nuzzir of one and twenty mohurs, and his sons and followers made their offerings according to their ranks. While I remained at Rampoor, Fyezullah Khawn, shewing the proper respect and submission, regarded my approbation as his chief blessing. He presented me with two thousand rupees, two elephants, and several horses and tents, with proper carriage. After two days I marched to Tukkia, three cose from Rampoor, and from thence to Ameer Gunge. On Friday, the 2d‡ of Jemmaud-u'Sani, I pitched my tents at Bareilly, and took up my residence for two days in the house of Mânroy. Roy Roopnarain, and Roy Sadooram, relations of Rajah Soorut Sing, who governs the country on the part of the Vizier, came and attended me. The next day the Rajah himself came to pay his respects, and presented a female elephant, with the sum of five thousand rupees,

* The capital of the district of that name, the only remaining territory of the Rohillas lying North of the Ganges.

† Hall of audience.

‡ 23d April.

and I honoured him with a doputta* worn by myself. Rajah Jagganaut, his relation, was also favoured with a pair of shawls. On this day also arrived Sheikh Fyezulla, whom I had left behind to remove the rope ladder, and destroy every trace of my escape. The 3d† day, being the 5th of the month, I marched from Bareilly, and encamped at Ferreedpore, the chief inhabitants of which paid their respects. On the 6th I moved ten cose to Kuttereh, and on the 7th proceeded to the house of the late Moâtimud-u'Dowlah, in the town of Shahjehanpore. Here arrived addresses from my brothers, dear as life, the chief of nobles of high rank, the pillar of the pillars of state, the support of the empire, the Nabob Vizier ul Momâlic, and the noblest of nobles, Ameer ul Momâlic; Mr. Hastings, with the copy of an imperial shookeh.‡ The alarms of both, occasioned by the contents of the shookeh, concerning my march, appeared fully, and I immediately answered their addresses, by disclosing the real wishes of His Majesty, and shewing that he had written contrary to them, merely to please the minds of his refractory servants, that both might be relieved from their anxiety. On the 8th I marched thirteen cose, and encamped near Serromunnagur, and on the 9th§ to Dirga Gunge, which was a very long stage. From thence I moved to Bugwantnugger, where I halted two days out of tenderness for my followers, who were all much wearied with successive marches. What is extraordinary, the road on this day's march is much infested with banditti, who plunder and murder caravans, yet not a man molested my followers or baggage, though straggling and without guards; yet

* A cloth of two folds, used as a sash.

† A letter from the King under the privy seal.

§ 30th April.

† 28th April.

just in their rear they robbed a caravan coming from the westward. On the 12th* I moved to Tukkia, and the next day, at the distance of six cose, Captain Scott, sent by my brother, dear as life, Ameer ul Momâlic, Mr. Hastings, and Rajah Gobin Ram, on the part of my brother the Vizier ul Momâlic, had the honour of paying their respects on the road. The former presented three elephants, with an ambâree fayedâr†, and a silver howdah, and a standard and flags, according to the royal ceremonial, from the governor, with addresses from him and the Nabob Vizier, expressive of their loyalty and attachment. As the Vizier had pitched tents near Almass Gunge‡ for my reception, I halted there for the day, and the next morning encamped near the town of Mahawn§, where letters came from my dear brothers, requesting me to halt, that they might come to wait upon me in the morning. I complied with their request, and the next day, upon intelligence of their approach, sent Mukkurrim u'Dowlah, Syed Akber Ally Khawn to meet and conduct them to me. At about four ghurries of the day they arrived in the presence, when the Vizier and Governor, and also all the English gentlemen with them, presented nuzzirs according to their ranks. The Vizier laid before me a peshcush|| of four elephants, with a silver ambarree, five horses, and a standard of drums. I honoured each of my brothers with a khelâat of a turban, a goshebund¶, and jeggah and serpeisk** of jewels, with a neem-asteen, a string of pearls, a shield

* 3d May. † A covered seat or canopy on an elephant.

‡ About 24 miles from the city of Lucnow.

§ Ten miles from the city.

|| Offerings to the royal line are so called.

¶ A band of embroidery tied round the head.

** Jewels tied to the turban; the first in the form of a feather, the other fixed horizontally.

and sword, also an elephant and horse. After some ghurries I dismissed them with the favours of the Betel and Otter. On the 17th I marched to the Bowley, about a cose from Lucnow, attended by the Vizier in the Khawass, who, on my alighting, returned to the city. On the 18th* the Vizier and the Governor, coming to meet me, conducted me to Lucnow in great pomp, and the inhabitants were filled with such joy and satisfaction at my arrival, that they adorned the streets and shops to express their gladness. The Vizier, having conducted me to his own palace, performed the necessary ceremonials of respect, and having offered a peshcush of two elephants, two horses, and a silver pallekee, together with trays of jewels, cloths, and arms, attended me to the house prepared for my reception in the English cantonments.

* 8th May.

END OF PRINCE JEHÂNDÂR SHÂH'S NARRATIVE.

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A NARRATIVE
OF
THE INSURRECTION
WHICH HAPPENED IN THE
ZEMEEDARY OF BANARIS
IN THE MONTH OF AUGUST, 1781
AND OF THE
TRANSACTIONS OF THE GOVERNOR-
GENERAL IN THAT DISTRICT

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THE following sheets were written to guard the minds of my superiors against the suspicions to which all great political movements are liable, especially such as pass at a distance from observation, and are attended with violent convulsions, or revolutions in any of the great dependencies or relations of Government, and to which from their conformity to that description my late transactions in Banaris were particularly exposed. On the same grounds they are now made public for the purpose of effacing the like unfavorable impressions from the breasts of my countrymen, if I, or my actions, shall have been deemed of so much consequence as to have drawn on me that effect of their attention. Had I been prompted by the vain ambition of displaying my own importance, a levity of which I have never displayed any symptoms, I should certainly have selected other passages of my public life for the gratification of such a disposition. I claim no merit in having surmounted, by the successful zeal and exertions of others, the troubles, of which, though long before conceived, my own acts had accelerated the birth ; unless I may be allowed a small portion of applause, that I never suffered them to embarrass the hands in which I had left the care of the superior Government, nor myself to despair of the public safety.

WARREN HASTINGS.

TO EDWARD WHEELER AND JOHN M'PHERSON ESQUIRES
MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF FORT WILLIAM.

GENTLEMEN,

I HAVE now the honor to send you the Narrative which I promised in my letter of the 18th of October, of the transactions and events which passed during the course of the late Insurrection of this Province.

I had begun it at the time of the date which is prefixed to it; but the busy scenes which followed, both while I was at Chunar and after my return to Banaris, hindered me from prosecuting it till a few days before the date which I have subjoined to it. I did not chuse to alter the introduction, although written at such a distance of time from that in which the body of the work was executed, and even from the existence of the events which are recorded in the latter; because I found it not easy to give it a new form, without a total omission of what had been already produced, while my mind was animated by the recent and actual scenes in which it was engaged, to an anxious and most feeling solicitude, not more for the issue of the impending contest, than for its consequences on my own reputation. In the consciousness of the rectitude of my intentions, I had allowed myself to use an appeal the most solemn and most sacred that could bind my relation to truth, or impress the conviction of it on the

hearts of others ; nor could I consistently with my own sense of its obligation withdraw it, or coldly place it after the Narrative already written, and written under the check which I had imposed upon it. I know not whether I shall be clearly understood : If I am not, yet let this endeavour to explain a seeming impropriety in the construction of this performance be accepted for its apology.

I have only to add my hope, that as I have received the most cordial support in the past events from you, my respectable and most respected Associates in the administration, and as it has been my unvaried study to prevent your suffering any embarrassment from them ; my conduct in them may also receive its first reward in the testimony of your approbation.

I have the honor to be, Gentlemen,

Your most obedient, and most faithful servant,

WARREN HASTINGS.

BANARIS,

31st December 1781.

A NARRATIVE OF THE INSURRECTION, &c.

CHUNAR

1st September 1781.

I N whatever manner the scene may close in which I am now engaged, the calamities with which it opened will not fail, in their first impression, to influence in some degree the minds of all men in forming their judgment of it. In the following narrative, if I can trust to my own sentiments ; or if those who shall read it will credit this declaration of them, I shall less study to efface that impression, than seek to divest my mind of all partial bias, and to deliver all the past transactions and occurrences with the strictest and most faithful regard to truth ; in which if I fail, I fail unknowingly : And may the God of Truth so judge me, as my own conscience shall condemn or acquit me of intentional deception.

The motives and objects of my journey were various. With these the design of my transactions at Banaris had but a remote and secondary connection. I left Calcutta on the 7th of July. At Buxar Rajah Cheit Sing paid me the customary duty of respect, by advancing to that place, which lay the nearest to the boundary-line of his Zemeedary. He brought with him a great fleet of boats, which, as I afterwards

learned, were crouded with two thousand armed and chosen men. This circumstance was noticed by many of the gentlemen who accompanied me, and was certainly a deviation from the established rules of decorum; not only such as are observed from vassals to their superiors, but even such as pass between equals. An instance of this will be remembered by many to have happened at Banaris in the year 1773, in the meeting which took place there between the late Vizeer Shujah-ud-Dowlah and myself. He had left his Capital with a large retinue; but hearing that I came unattended, he dismissed his followers, and met me with a state as humble as mine.

I received the Rajah with civility, and without any expression of displeasure. I left Buxar the next morning, and received a second visit from the Rajah in my boat. After a short space he desired to speak to me in private. The particulars of our conversation I do not exactly remember: I can only relate the substance of it. He professed much concern to hear that I was displeased with him, and contrition for having given cause for it; assuring me that his Zemeedary, and all that he possessed were at my devotion; he expressed his fears for Owsan Sing, who had been some days in my suite, and of the intrigues of his relations; and he accompanied his words by an action either strongly expressive of the agitation of his mind, or his desire to impress on mine a conviction of his sincerity, by laying his turband on my lap. I replied, that I had not seen Owsan Sing, nor concerned myself about him, nor should I descend to be a party in his family disagreements; that my business was with him, and with him only; that what he had heard, or might have conjectured, of my displeasure was true, and I entered into a full discussion of the

causes of it ; that I had been already once deceived by his oaths and protestations, and should not suffer my purpose to be changed, or my duty to be over-ruled, by any verbal concessions or declarations, which were made with little cost, and for the observance of which I had no pledge, nor warrant to credit them. He pleaded his inability to answer my charges against him ; admitted that he was in every respect faulty ; but desired that I would forget the past, and form my opinion of him on his future behavior. I declined any further conversation upon the subject, and he took his leave.

As the preceding conversation was accidental, and made no part of the plan which I had concerted in my own mind for my conduct with the Rajah, I kept no minutes of it, nor should have thought it deserving of a place in this narrative, but for the weight which he has since given to it, and that it might not be imputed to me as a designed suppression, if I made no mention of it. I shall proceed to relate the subjects to which it alluded, and add the purposes which I had in contemplation concerning them.

On the first intelligence of the war with France, in July, 1778, it was resolved in Council that Rajah Cheit Sing should be required to contribute an extraordinary subsidy, for the expence which this new exigency had imposed on our Government ; and the sum was limited to five Lacks of Rupees for the current year. After many excuses and protestations of inability, he at length consented, with a very ill grace, to the payment, and with a much worse discharged it. The next year the same demand was repeated, and he attempted in like manner to elude it, affecting to borrow money in small sums, and to sell his plate and jewels to raise it ; nor was it paid at last

till he had reduced the board to the extremity of ordering two battalions of Seepoys to the neighbourhood of Ramnagur, and quartering them upon him with their pay charged to his account, until the whole payment was completed.

Early in the following year, about the month of May, he deputed Lalla Suddanund, who was his Buxey, and the confidential manager of his affairs, on a private commission to me to solicit my forgiveness of his past conduct, and to give me assurances, confirmed by oath, of his future submission to the orders of my government, and compliance with my advice. I accepted his excuses, and promised him an oblivion of all that had passed of exceptionable in his conduct, and my future protection and every good office in my power, so long as he adhered to his professions; requiring only as the pledge of their sincerity, that he would immediately notify his ready and unreserved consent to the demand which would be made upon him, this being the period for it, of the subsidy for the current year, and that he would use no delay in discharging it. I at the same time explained to Suddanund the nature of the demand, its conformity to the customs of all states in times of extraordinary emergency, and assured him that though he must expect a repetition of it every year so long as the war lasted, yet it could not be justly drawn into a precedent for exacting an increase on his regular and stipulated rent; and so far as it could depend upon me, I gave him the strongest assurances, and, I believe, very solemn asseverations, that it should not. Suddanund vowed the fullest obedience on the part of his master; the demand was accordingly made; and the Rajah answered it with a liberal and unreserved declaration of his acquiescence. I expected the

immediate payment of the whole sum according to his promise, and I placed a reliance upon it so far, as to destine the appropriation of it to the support of the detachment, which was then acting in the province of Malva, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Camac, not apprehending any policy which could warp him from the strong obligation of such an engagement, and from the evident interest which he had in fulfilling it. I was mistaken. The first payment was made in different periods in the course of a month, amounting to about a Lack of Rupees ; and there, as I recollect, he stopped, and even descended to the meanness of writing to solicit the forbearance of the remainder, that it might be included in the regular payments of the ensuing year which was then approaching. I am not possessed at this time of the materials for ascertaining the dates of the demand and of his letter written in acquiescence of it, nor the dates and correspondent sums of the subsequent payments ; but I desire that these may be inserted by the Secretary as a note to this page of the narrative.* It is sufficient to say that the demand was made, and the whole payment consequently due in July ; that it was not until the month of October, nor until the

* NOTE BY THE SECRETARY.—Demand, Secret Consultation 22d June 1780. Acquiescence expressed in a letter from the Resident dated 21st July Public Consultation 7th September 1780.

Dates of payment viz.

30 July 1780	-	-	-	-	-	37,000
31st Do.	-	-	-	-	-	20,000
3d August	-	-	-	-	-	27,500
5th Do.	-	-	-	-	-	15,500
20th September	-	-	-	-	-	1,00,000
24th Do.	-	-	-	-	-	47,000
18th October	-	-	-	-	-	3,000
20th Do.	-	-	-	-	-	2,50,000

Rs. 5,00,000

same constraint was practised to compel his obedience as had been used in the preceding year, by an order for the advance of two battalions of Seepoys for that purpose, that the balance of the subsidy, which was two lacks and a half of Rupees, was discharged. In the meantime the resident received an order from the board to remit the money, as he received it, by bills to the Paymaster of Lieutenant-Colonel Camac's detachment; but these from the lateness of the receipts were not sent until the detachment had suffered the extremity of distress from the want of money, and very great desertions, all which calamities I charge to Rajah Cheit Sing's account, as it is certain that my reliance on his faith, and his breach of it, were the principal causes that no other provision had been made for the detachment, and that it suffered such want in consequence.

It is with the greatest tenderness that I recur to the past dissensions in our government; but I am compelled to it on this occasion for the elucidation of the conduct of this man, which had the appearance of being invariably guided by the reports which were made to him of the state of my influence. When he deputed his Buxey Suddanund to me in the manner which I have mentioned, an apparent harmony had taken place in our Councils, with the general expectation of its being permanent. The powers of our government whenever united, and, if I may use the term, consolidated, by such an event, will ever recover the respect which is due to them, especially from those who have rendered themselves obnoxious to its terrors. The subject which produced the subsequent contest between Mr. Francis and myself originated a little before the departure of Suddanund from the Presidency, but was not perhaps either generally known, or known to have

grown into a decided breach, till the latter end of July. A reference to the proceedings of that period will prove the grounds of this supposition. It was the prescribed duty of Cheit Sing's Vakeels in Calcutta to furnish him with every little anecdote which bore any relation to the state of our government. I believe that the deliberate manner in which he made the first payment of the subsidy of that year was dictated by the doubts suggested of the firmness of my authority ; and I am morally certain that his subsequent excuses and delays in the payment of the residue of the subsidy were caused by the belief that I was no longer able to enforce it ; and possibly, for such was the report, that a few months would close the period of my administration altogether. That I had his solemn promise in the manner which I have recited to pay the subsidy, I as solemnly affirm ; and his letter assenting to the payment, which is recorded on our consultations, is a strong presumptive evidence of it ; and that he evaded the performance of his promise, that he attempted to the utmost of his power to elude it altogether, is also proved by the record of the dates of the different payments, the minutes of the board relating to them, and the order of the board for the march of a detachment for the purpose of compelling him to perform it. That this order had a principal effect in bringing him to a compliance I believe ; but I also attribute a share of it to the approaching departure of Mr. Francis, which was published and generally expected.

I owe it in candor to the gentleman whose name I have reluctantly repeated in this digression, to obviate an inference which might otherwise be unwarily drawn from it, by declaring that I mean not by the most distant hint to impute any part of this policy to him,

and in my heart do totally and deliberately acquit him of any concern in it; however in the resentment of instant disappointment I may have suffered my mind to catch such a suspicion; although I believe that, if I have, it has been sacredly confined to my own breast.

This was the first direct charge which I had to prefer against the Rajah. The second was similar in its quality and principle. On the 2d of the month of November 1780, a resolution passed the board, that a letter should be written to the Nabob Vizeer, advising him to require from the Nabob Fyz-Oolla Khan the number of troops stipulated by treaty, expressed, as it was then understood to be, 5,000 horse; and that the like demand should be made on Rajah Cheit Sing for all the cavalry in his pay which he could spare for our service. At that time we stood in need of every aid that could be devised to repel the multiplied dangers which surrounded us. The Rajah was supposed to maintain a very large and expensive standing force, and the strength of his cavalry alone was estimated at two thousand. I had formerly experienced their utility in the war with the Senassees, in which they were successfully employed, and liberally rewarded. The demand was formally made both in a letter from myself, and in person by the Resident, Mr. Fowke, in the easy and indefinite terms mentioned above. His answers were evasive, pleading (as I recollect, for I am not in possession of them) the scantiness of the establishment, its employment in enforcing the collections, and the danger of these failing, if the detachment were withdrawn. At length a more peremptory order was sent to him, and repeated by the present Resident, Mr. Markham. The number required was 2,000, and afterwards reduced to the

demand of 1,500, and lastly to 1,000, but with no more success. He offered 250, but furnished none.

These instances of contumacy and disobedience, criminal as they were in themselves, and aggravated by the extreme and known distresses and dangers of the superior state, to which he owed not only personal fealty, but every voluntary aid which all the resources of his Zemeedary could contribute, appeared to me of less consideration as such, than as they were evidences of a deliberate and systematic conduct, aiming at the total subversion of the authority of the Company, and the erection of his own independency on its ruins. This had been long and generally imputed to him. It was reported that he had inherited a vast mass of wealth from his father, Bulwant Sing, which he had secured in the two strong fortresses of Bidjeygur and Lutteefpoor, and made yearly additions to it; that he kept up a large military establishment both of cavalry, of disciplined and irregular infantry, and of artillery; that he had the above, and many other fortresses of strong construction, and in good repair, and constantly well stored and garrisoned; that his Aumils and Tenants were encouraged and habituated to treat English passengers with inhospitality, and with enmity; that he maintained a correspondence with the Marattahs, and other Powers who either were, or might eventually become, the enemies of our state; and if the disaffected Zemeedars of Fyzabad and Behar were not included in the report, which I do not recollect, we have had woful proof that there was equal room to have suspected the like intercourse between them; and lastly, that he was collecting, or had prepared, every provision for open revolt, waiting only for a proper season to declare it, which was

supposed to depend either on the arrival of a French armament, or on a Marattah invasion.

This design had been greatly favoured by the unhappy divisions of our government, in which he presumed to take an open part. It is a fact that when these had proceeded to an extremity bordering on civil violence by the attempt to wrest from me my authority in the month of June 1777, he had deputed a man, named Sumboonaut, with an express commission to my opponent; and the man had proceeded as far as Moorshedabad, when hearing of the change of affairs which had taken place at the Presidency, he stopped, and the Rajah recalled him.

It may perhaps be urged in favour of Rajah Cheit Sing, that he was justifiable by the principle of good policy in seeking a state of independency; that we had no natural right to his vassalage, having acquired it, with all our other rights of dominion, by no other charter than the successful spirit of enterprize. Were this truly the case, it would reduce the relation between us to the primitive law of nature; and it would be equally incumbent on us on that ground alone, to use every means to confirm and perpetuate his subjection, as it would be allowable in him to emancipate himself from it. But something more, I apprehend, was due both as a political, and even moral obligation from him. His father Bulwant Sing derived the degree of independency which he possessed, during the latter period of his life, from the protection and intervention of our government. His Son Cheit Sing obtained from our influence exerted by myself the first legal title that his family ever possessed of property in the land of which he till then was only the Aumil, and of which he became the acknowledged Zemeedar, by a Sunnud granted to him by the Nabob Shujah-ud-

Dowlah at my instance in the month of September 1773. On the succession of the Nabob Assof-ud-Dowlah the rights of sovereignty which were held by him over the Zemeedary were transferred by treaty to the Company. Those rights were indisputably his, and became by his alienation of them as indisputably the Company's; and every obligation of fidelity and obedience which is due from a Zemeedar to the superior Magistrate by the constitution of Hindostan became as much the right of the Company from Cheit Sing, as it had been due to his former sovereign, with the additional ties of gratitude for the superior advantages which he was allowed to possess with his new relation. The unexampled lenity of our government in relinquishing to him the free and uncontrouled rule of his Zemeedary subject to a limited annual fine, and the royalties of the mint, administration of justice, and police, ought to have operated as an additional claim on his fidelity; but evidently served to stimulate his ambition, and perhaps to excite in his mind an opinion that he possessed an inherent right of self-dependency.

I considered Cheit Sing as culpable in a very high degree towards our state, and his punishment, of which I had given him frequent warnings if he did not amend his conduct, as an example which justice and policy required equally for the reparation of the wrongs which its dignity had sustained, and for the future preservation of its authority. I was resolved to draw from his guilt the means of relief to the Company's distresses, and to exact a penalty which I was convinced he was able to bear, from a fund which I was also convinced he had destined for purposes of the most dangerous tendency to the Company's dominion. In a word, I had determined to make him pay largely

for his pardon, or to exact a severe vengeance for his past delinquency.

Those who have been accustomed to regard Cheit Sing as a vassal or tributary Prince may revolt at the idea of treating him with such indignity, and call it an oppression. They will suppose nothing due from him to the Company but the payment of his stipulated tribute, and that the pledge of his exemption from every other claim. I suspect too that the deeds which passed between him and the Board on the transfer of the Zemeedary to the Company in 1775 are by many understood to bear the quality and force of a treaty of optional conditions between equal states. To such I reply, that such an opinion is itself criminal to the state of which he was a subject, and that he was himself amenable to its justice, if he gave countenance to the belief. He paid no tribute to the Company ; but a fixed annual rent. The deeds by which he held his Zemeedary, and the Company their claim to their portion of its revenue, were a Sunnud or grant, and a Potta or lease, executed on the part of the Company ; and a Cobooleeat or agreement, and Kistbundy or account of payments to be made by instalments, on his part. These, excepting the special privileges allowed to the Rajah, of the Mint, the Cutwallees of Banaris and Jowanpoor, the Fowjdary and Aumeeny ; that is so far as they relate to the Zemeedary alone, are drawn precisely in the same forms as instruments of the same denominations interchanged with the Zemeedars of Bengal. I refer to the instruments themselves, which will make a number in the Appendix to this narrative, in which it will be seen on how different a tenure, and how infinitely below independency, he really held his Zemeedary. The Sunnud and Cobooleeat are counter-parts of each other. The

former prescribes the revenue which was to be paid and the duties which were to be performed, as the conditions on which the Rajah was confirmed in the possession of his Zemeedary; and of these conditions the Cobooleeat is a pledge or engagement for the performance. In the first the *Government and Sovereignty* of the Zemeedary transferred by the Nabob Assof-ud-Dowlah to the Company, are stated as the basis of it: The Zemeedary is confirmed to him: *A strict observation and execution of the duties incumbent on him;—to behave with moderation and kindness to the Reyots and People; to promote the cultivation and increase of the inhabitants and produce of the lands;—to preserve the peace and punish the disturbers of it; and to pay a yearly rent of twenty-three lacks, forty thousand, two hundred and forty-nine Mahidar rupees in monthly payments agreeable to the Kistbundy; are most strictly and positively commanded and enjoined: And the officers of the Zemeedary are commanded to regard him as the Zemeedar, and to acknowledge his authority in the several acts appertaining thereunto.* I must observe that in the translation of the Sunnud the yearly revenue is in one place through the negligence of the translator expressed by the word *tribute*; but it is not on the translation, nor on the will of the translator, that the rights of the Company depend. I affirm the word to be false, as it is inconsistent with the proper term *revenue* immediately following in the same translation, and with the same term *revenue* occurring in the translation of the Cobooleeat or agreement.

The Cobooleeat also sets off with stating the Company's sovereignty as the basis of the agreement, and acknowledges the grant made by the Company to Rajah Cheit Sing of the Zemeedary, and other privi-

ledges recited in the Sunnud: And it proceeds to express, that *it shall be his duty to do everything that may be needful and usual for the interest of the country; to provide for the welfare of the inhabitants; to be attentive to the increase and security of cultivation and improvement of the revenues; to use his endeavours—to expel robbers, &c., and pay the annual revenue of Government in the manner prescribed by the Sunnud.*

To obviate misapprehensions I think it proper to remark, that in the above recitals I have abridged the text where it was too prolix and involved for literal quotation, and given the substance in the closest sense of it; but where I have used the original words of the translations I have distinguished them by Italic letters as such. The copies in the appendix will shew with what fidelity I have conformed to the text in both instances.

I have dwelt with a greater stress, and with a more minute exactness, on the foregoing subject, because it is on this point that the justice and propriety of my conduct must wholly turn. If Rajah Cheit Sing possessed the Zemeedary of Banaris in his own right, and with an inherent and exclusive authority; if he owed no allegiance to the Company, nor obedience beyond the payments of a stipulated tribute; I am liable to condemnation for exacting other duties from him, and for all the consequences of that exaction; and he is guiltless; but if the Company possessing the acknowledged rights of his former sovereign held an absolute authority over him; if in the known relation of Zemeedar to the sovereign authority, or the power delegated by it, he owed a personal allegiance and an implicit and unreserved obedience to that authority, at the forfeiture of his Zemeedary, and even of his life and property, at the discretion of those who held or fully represented the sovereign authority; if in

corroboration of the general and implied obligation, he was bound to it by written engagements and specific conditions ; I am warranted in my assertion of the rights of government which were fully and wholly delegated to me ; and he alone is responsible for his opposition to them, and for all the consequences which have attended that opposition.

Whether I have exercised the power vested in me with justice and with moderation, will appear from the preceding relation, and the following parts of this narrative.

Before I quit this digression, I must further trespass on the patience of the board, and of those for whose judgement it is ultimately written, by a more pointed application of the above to my own personal conduct and character.

I will suppose for a moment, that I have erred ; that I have acted with an unwarranted rigor towards Cheit Sing, and even with injustice. Let my motive be consulted. I left Calcutta impressed with the belief that extraordinary means were necessary, and those exerted with a strong hand, to preserve the Company's interests from sinking under the accumulated weight which oppressed them. I saw a political necessity for curbing the over-grown power of a great member of their dominion, and making it contribute to the relief of their pressing exigencies. If I erred, my error was prompted by an excess of zeal for their interests operating with too strong a bias on my judgment. But rare are the instances in which the judgment suffers the bias of such an operation ; and much stronger is the presumption, that acts prompted by an unmixed attention to the public interests are founded on just principles, than that they are the result of a misguided judgment.

Possibly it may be suspected,—and may God forgive those who know me, and countenance the suspicion ; I have no title to an exemption from it with others :—that I was influenced by a secret and mercenary interest. I have heard of the practice of holding out the terrors of authority, and the denunciations of disgrace, dismissal, and war, as the instruments of private rapacity. Though the charge if true, is capable of positive conviction, yet I know of no direct evidence which could refute it, where it were false ; for no one can be conscious of the recesses of another's mind. I can therefore only offer such presumptive proofs of my intention as the nature of it will admit, and accident has provided. These are my early and confidential declarations, and the attestations of those to whom they were made. In a point of such public moment, independently of the near interest which I have in establishing the truth of it, Mr. Wheler will pardon my appeal to him, although in one light it may tend to involve him in a participation of the reproach of those who may regard every severity shewn to Cheit Sing as criminal, however founded. He will doubtless recollect the conversation which I had with him on the subject, on the eve of my departure from Calcutta ; our mutual opinion of Cheit Sing's past conduct ; mine of the justice and policy of exacting an exemplary punishment for it by a large pecuniary mulct ; the sum to which I then declared my resolution to extend it ; my conviction of his ability to pay it ; and the two alternatives on which I had resolved, if he refused to submit to it. He will also remember, that I bespoke his confidence in the means which I should use for this end, and his support in the issue of them. I entreat him to give me his formal and circumstantial attestation of these facts, and that he will permit it to be

inserted in this part of my narrative.* After such an appeal it would be as superfluous as indelicate to call in the aid of other testimonies, if all that were required were no more than to ascertain that I did hold such a conversation as that which I allude to with him. The conclusion will be much strengthened by its agreement with declarations made by me on the same subject, and nearly at the same point of time, to others. I shall therefore require similar attestations† from Major Palmer my military Secretary, and from Mr. Anderson my appointed Assistant on this deputation. With these references and their result, I shall make my last and solemn appeal to the breast of every man who shall read this; whether it is likely, or morally possible, that I should have tied down my own future conduct to so decided a process and series of acts, if I had secretly intended to threaten, or to use a degree of violence, for no other purpose than to draw from

* Mr. WHEELER,

I have the pleasure to comply with the Governor General's request; and will cheerfully record in this place what I at present recollect to have passed between us at the time, and on the circumstances which he mentions.

I well remember that on the eve of the Governor General's departure from Calcutta, the conduct of Cheit Sing late Rajah of Banaris was a principal subject of a confidential discourse between us, and that he bespoke my support of the measures which he intended to pursue towards him. I recollect that the Governor General thought the Rajah's offences were such as to require early punishment; and as his wealth was great, and the Company's exigencies pressing, it was thought a measure of policy and justice to exact from him a large pecuniary mulct for their relief. The sum to which the Governor declared his resolution to extend the fine was forty or fifty Lacks. His ability to pay it was stated as a fact that could not admit of a doubt; and the two alternatives on which the Governor declared himself to have resolved, if Cheit Sing refused to comply with the requisition, were to the best of my recollection, either a removal from his Zemeedary entirely, or by taking immediate possession of all his forts, to obtain out of the treasure deposited in them the above sum for the Company.

† V. Appendix.

the object of it a mercenary atonement for my own private emolument, and suffer all this tumult to terminate in an ostensible and unsubstantial submission to the authority which I represented : Whether it is likely, or morally possible, that I should have chosen to irritate the feelings of my colleague in office, and expose myself to all the effects of his indignation, by so wanton and unnecessary a deception ; or lower my own dignity and character, and afford so base an example to my inferiors, by pretending to make them privy to acts which I never meant to perform, and from which I could not depart with any possible shew of reason, but the manifest sacrifice of my integrity. A man actuated by such a motive, and possessing the trust which I held, would have used a cover to his venality : He would not have compromised himself by positive declarations of what he would do, much less by detailing his intentions in a series of trials, as they might successively fail ; but would have been contented with distant and indefinite intimations and suggestions, which obviously left his actions open to inquiry and variation ; which could not subject him to the imputation of inconsistency, if they were productive of no effect ; and which he might use as justifications, if his artifices should chance to operate with the effect ostensibly portended by them.

I now return to my narrative.

I arrived at Banaris on the morning of the 14th of August ; the Rajah some hours later. I forbade his coming that evening to my quarters, as he had intended ; and required him to defer his future visits until he should receive my permission, as I had some previous matters to settle with him, of which he would be informed by the Resident, whom I should depute to him the next morning for that purpose.

My narrative will be best continued, nor will the thread of it be broken, by the following copy of my report of my proceedings, and of the consequences which attended them, to Mr. Wheler, then the only effective member of the Board.

“ TO EDWARD WHEELER ESQ ;

“ SIR,

“ I arrived at Banaris on the 14th instant. My transactions with the Rajah being of a most important nature to the present and future interests of the Company, I have determined to inform you of them without delay, in the order in which they have occurred.

“ The first step which I judged it necessary to take, as the ground on which my future proceedings with the Rajah were to be conducted, was to recapitulate in writing the several instances of his conduct which for some time past have repeatedly drawn upon him the severe reprehensions of the board, and to demand a clear and satisfactory explanation.

“ This paper I sent to the Rajah by the hands of Mr. Markham, who was directed to require an immediate answer. Late in the evening his answer arrived.

“ The following are copies of both.”

“ NO. I. TO RAJAH CHEIT SING.

“ It is about 16 months since Lallah Suddanund, your Buxey and confidential servant, came to Calcutta charged with an express commission and authority, to make excuses for your past conduct, and to give me assurances, confirmed by oath, of your future submission to my advice and the orders of my

“government. As a test of your sincerity I required
“an immediate and unreserved acquiescence in the
“demand, which at the same time was made to you
“in the name of the Governor-General and Council, of
“a subsidy of 5 Lacks of Rupees for the expences of
“the war. With this demand you ostensibly complied
“in your answer to my letter ; and the Buxey promised
“me verbally in your name, and in terms so strong as
“amounted to the fullest assurance, that there should
“be no delay in the payment. Relying on this agree-
“ment and promise, I gave orders to Mr. Fowke, who
“was then Resident at this place, to receive the
“Money, and remit it to Colonel Camac for the pay
“of the army which had been ordered to march towards
“the province of Malva, and I made no other provision
“for it : Such was my confidence in your faith. But
“you deceived me ; and after having made the first
“payment of a few Rupees, either consulting the
“temper of the times, or conforming to a premedi-
“tated design, you by shifts and pretexts withheld
“the remainder, until the army, for whose use it
“was intended, was reduced to the last state of
“distress. Many hundreds deserted, and had an
“enemy at that time appeared against them, their
“total destruction had been inevitable. In all this
“time daily application was made to you by the
“Resident, and I wrote repeated letters to you ; but
“you paid no regard to either. Besides this I required
“in the name of the Governor General and Council by
“letter, and ordered Mr. Fowke to repeat the re-
“quisition in person, that you should furnish a body
“of horse to assist and act with the armies of the
“Company ; and when Mr. Markham succeeded Mr.
“Fowke, I gave him an order to repeat the demand,
“which he did accordingly with frequent and almost

“daily importunity, limiting the number to 1,500, and
“afterwards to 1,000. To this demand you returned
“evasive answers, nor to this hour have you contri-
“buted a single horseman.

“I pass over other instances of your conduct, in
“which, through the means of your secret agents, you
“have endeavoured to excite disorders in the govern-
“ment on which you depend; and your neglect of the
“duty which you owe to it, and to the subjects of this
“Zemeedary, by suffering the daily perpetration of
“robberies and murders, even in the streets of the city
“of Banaris itself, to the great and public scandal of
“the English name, and in violation of one of the con-
“ditions on which you received the confirmation of
“this Zemeedary. But as the two foregoing instances
“amount to a direct charge of disaffection and infidelity
“to the government on which you depend, and
“happened at a time in which it was your duty more
“especially to have exerted yourself in the support of
“its interests, I have therefore judged it proper to
“state them to you thus fully in writing, and to
“require your answer to them; and this I expect
“immediately.”

“No. II. FROM RAJAH CHEIT SING TO THE HON’BLE
THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

“I received your letter delivered to me by Mr.
“Markham, and I have understood every particular of
“its contents. Sir, after the arrival of Sheakh Ally
“Nucky, I observed all the orders which you sent me;
“and I received the letter which the deceased Sheakh
“brought me, informing me that every suspicion was
“now completely removed from your mind, and that
“I must consider you, as formerly, attentive to me.

“But I have not experienced from you the same
“generosities as formerly. I sent you repeatedly
“letters representing to your consideration my un-
“happy circumstances; but you never honoured
“me with any reply. For this reason I sent my
“Buxey Suddanund to your presence, enjoining
“him to represent to you the firmness of my obedience
“and attachment; to lay before you the particulars
“of my situation; and to learn the disposition of your
“mind towards me. He arrived accordingly in your
“presence, and represented everything in a proper
“manner. I have never deviated in the smallest
“degree from these professions; and the benefits and
“civilities with which you have honored me have
“given me the greatest satisfaction; and I have con-
“sidered you as the source from which I derived the
“fulfilment of all my wishes and desires. It is my
“firm hope that I may be always favoured with your
“directions. In this manner I complied, with the
“utmost readiness, with the order you sent me for the
“payment of 5 Lacks of Rupees on account of the
“expences of the war. I sent first one Lack of Rupees
“with an answer to your letter. Afterwards, having
“paid to Mr. Fowke the sum of one Lack and seventy
“thousand Rupees, I sent a letter requesting a further
“allowance of time to enable me to make some pre-
“parations. To this I received no reply, it being no
“time for delay. Notwithstanding this, I was not
“a moment inattentive to this concern, and as soon
“as my Buxey arrived, I paid immediately the remain-
“ing part of the sum. The remitting of this to the
“army did not depend on me: If any delay happened
“on this head, I could not help it. If besides the
“payment of the money, the remittance of it also to
“the army had rested with me, a delay of this kind

“should not have happened. I have enclosed in this
“Letter a paper specifying the particular sums which
“have been advanced, with their dates.

“With respect to the horse, you desired me in your
“letter to inform you of what number I could afford to
“station with you, and I sent you a particular account
“of all that were in my service, amounting to 1,300
“horse, of which several were stationed at distant
“places; but I received no answer to this. Mr.
“Markham delivered me an order to prepare 1,000
“horse. In compliance with your wishes I collected
“500 horse, and as a substitute for the remainder 500
“Burkandazes, of which I sent you information; and I
“told Mr. Markham they were ready to go to whatever
“place they should be sent. No answer however
“came from you on this head, and I remained
“astonished at the cause of it. Repeatedly I asked
“Mr. Markham about an answer to my letter about
“the horse, but he told me he did not know the
“reasons of no answer having been sent. I remained
“astonished. With respect to the Sepoys I received
“first an order to station two of my companies,
“which I did. I was then desired to give a Tunkaw
“for the payment of the Sepoys, and likewise to
“pay the Captain; which has been done every
“month.

“Excepting Abdullah Beg and his attendants none
“of my people, either dependants or servants, or
“others in any shape connected with me, have ever
“gone to Calcutta. My enemies, with a view to my
“ruin, have made false representations to you. Now
“that, happily for me, you have yourself arrived at
“this place you will be able to ascertain all the
“circumstances relative to the horse, to my people
“going to Calcutta, and the dates of the receipts of

“the particular sums above-mentioned. You will
 “then know whether I have amused you with a false
 “representation, or made a just report to you. I have
 “given my Aumils most particular injunctions, and
 “have taken a penalty-bond from them, that they
 “shall keep no thieves in their district. What power
 “have they to act otherwise? But if ever a murder
 “or robbery is committed in the country, I have been
 “careful to impale, or otherwise punish the culprit.
 “If a person having committed a delinquency should
 “escape to some other place so as to elude all dis-
 “covery, in that case I am helpless; but to the utmost
 “of my power I endeavour to fulfil your orders. I
 “have never swerved in the smallest degree from my
 “duty to you. It remains with you to decide on all
 “these matters. I am in every case your slave.
 “What is just I have represented to you. May your
 “prosperity increase!

“ACCOUNT OF FIVE LACKS OF RUPEES ADVANCED FOR THE
 EXPENCES OF THE WAR.

1st Shaabaun	-	-	-	-	1,00,000 Rs.
29th Ramzan	-	-	-	-	1,70,000
7th Shewal	-	-	-	-	1,30,000
18th Shewal	-	-	-	-	1,00,000

5,00,000 Rupees.

“This answer you will perceive to be not only un-
 “satisfactory in substance, but offensive in stile; and
 “less a vindication of himself, than a recrimination on
 “me. It expresses no concern for the causes of
 “complaint contained in my letter, or desire to atone
 “for them; nor the smallest intention to pursue a
 “different line of conduct. An answer couched nearly
 “in terms of defiance to requisitions of so serious a

“nature, I could not but consider as a strong indication of that spirit of independency which the Rajah has for some years past assumed; and of which indeed I had early observed other manifest symptoms both before, and from the instant of, my arrival.

“Under these alarming appearances of the Rajah’s conduct and disposition, I conceived myself indispensably obliged to form some immediate and decisive plan for obviating their consequences, and for the preservation of the Company’s rights and interests in this Zemeedary. To have left him in the full exercise of powers he had notoriously abused, and which it was to be apprehended he would employ to the most dangerous purposes, was totally inconsistent with the maxims of justice and prudence. To divest him entirely of the Zemeedary, though justifiable on the grounds stated above, would have been attended with an appearance of severity, and might have furnished ground for constructions unfavorable to the credit of our Government, and to my own reputation, from the natural influence which every act of rigor exercised on the persons of men who stand in elevated stations, is apt to impress on the minds of those who are too remote from the scene of action to judge by any evidence, but of the direct facts themselves, of their motives or propriety.

“Thus circumstanced, and attentive to these opposite considerations, I laid down the following plan for my future proceedings.

“I first directed the Resident to repair to the Rajah, who resided at his house situated on this side of the river, at the distance of about two miles, and gave him the following instructions.”

“No III. MR. WILLIAM MARKHAM,
“Resident at BANARIS.

“SIR,

“It is my order that you proceed early to
“morrow morning to the house of Rajah Cheit Sing
“with your usual guard, and put him in arrest. You
“will require his immediate submission, informing him
“that you act under orders given you by me ; and in
“case of his refusal, you will wait the arrival of two
“companies of Sepoys belonging to Major Popham’s
“detachment, who are directed to follow and assist you
“in the execution of this service. Having secured
“the Rajah, you will keep him in your custody until
“further orders.”

“I am, &c.”

“‘BANARIS, 15th August 1781.

“‘10 at night.

“On the next morning Mr. Markham went accord-
“ing to his foregoing instructions, and was followed
“by two Companies of Grenadier Sepoys belonging to
“Major Popham’s detachment. The Rajah quietly
“submitted to the arrest ; and Mr. Markham returned
“to me with the following letter from the Rajah,
“leaving him under the charge of Lieutenants Stalker,
“Scott, and Simes. For the particulars which passed
“at this interview I refer you to the following report
“which Mr. Markham delivered to me on his return.”

“No. IV. LETTER FROM RAJAH CHEIT SING.

“At this time Mr. William Markham being come to
“me, has informed me that your Highness’s orders are,
“that I should remain under a guard. My protector.
“I before represented to you on board your pinnace,
“that I was the servant of the Honorable Company,

“and was ready from my heart and soul. Whatever
“may be your pleasure, do it with your own hands :
“I am your slave. What occasion can there be for a
“guard ?”

“No. V. REPORT OF MR. MARKHAM.

“TO THE HON'BLE WARREN HASTINGS ESQ. ; GOVERNOR
GENERAL &C. &C.

“HON'BLE SIR,

“I this morning, in obedience to your orders of
“last night, proceeded with a few of my Orderlies,
“accompanied by Lieutenant Stalker, to Shewallah
“Ghaut, the present residence of Rajah Cheit Sing,
“and acquainted him it was your pleasure he should
“consider himself in arrest ; that he should order his
“people to behave in a quiet, orderly manner, for that
“any attempt to rescue him would be attended with
“his own destruction. The Rajah submitted quietly
“to the arrest, and assured me, that whatever were
“your orders he was ready implicitly to obey : He
“hoped that you would allow him a subsistence ; but
“as for his Zemeedary, his forts, and his treasure, he
“was ready to lay them at your feet, and his life if
“required. He expressed himself much hurt at the
“ignominy which he affirmed must be the consequence
“of his confinement, and entreated me to return to
“you with the foregoing submission, hoping that you
“would make allowances for his youth and inexperience,
“and in consideration of his father's name,
“release him from his confinement, as soon as he
“should prove the sincerity of his offers, and himself
“deserving of your compassion and forgiveness.

“Nearly a quarter of an hour after this conversation
“Lieutenant Scott arrived with the two Grenadier

“Companies of Major Popham’s detachment, to whose
 “and Lieutenant Stalker’s care I left the Rajah, having
 “given them the following instructions; that they
 “should disarm every servant of the Rajah’s; that they
 “should allow him any such eight or ten Kismutgars
 “for the attendance of his person as he should approve
 “of; that these men should be shewn to the Sepoys
 “lest any deceit should be practised; but that they
 “might indulge him in any request consistent with the
 “security of his person.

“I am now returned to acquaint you with my
 “proceedings, and to receive any further instructions
 “which you may think necessary.

“I have the honor to be,

“Hon’ble Sir,

“Your most obedient humble servant

“(Signed) WILLIAM MARKHAM.”

“‘BANARIS,

“‘16th August 1781.

“As the Rajah in the above letter had desired that
 “Mr. Markham might be sent back to him, I was
 “preparing instructions for that purpose, when I
 “received another letter from the Rajah, of which the
 “following is a translation.”

“NO. VI. LETTER FROM THE RAJAH.

“I am the servant of the Sirkar, and am ready from
 “my heart and soul in the performance of your orders.
 “My honor was bestowed on me by your highness: It
 “depends on you alone to take away, or not to take
 “away the country out of my hands. In case my
 “honor is not left me, how shall I be equal to the
 “business of the Sirkar? Whoever with his hands in
 “a supplicating posture is ready with his life and

“property, what necessity, can there be for him to be
“dealt with in this way?”

“From the apparent despondency in which these
“letters were written, I thought it necessary to give
“the Rajah some encouragement, and accordingly
“wrote him the following answer.”

“No. VII. LETTER FROM THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

“I have received your two Arzees from the hands
“of Mr. Markham, and understand their contents.
“That Gentleman will wait on you in the afternoon,
“and explain particulars. Set your mind at rest, and
“do not conceive any terror or apprehension.”

“To this I received the following reply.”

“No. VIII. LETTER FROM THE RAJAH.

“Your gracious letter has been received, and has
“made me acquainted with your commands. You
“order that in the afternoon Mr. William Markham
“will come to me, that I must not suffer any apprehension to disturb me, but remain at ease in my
“mind. My Protector! Wherever you spread your
“shadow over my head, I am entirely free from
“concern and apprehension; and whatever you, who
“are my master, shall as such determine, will be
“right.”

“At this time I had prepared Mr. Markham’s second
“instructions; but before he could set out with them,
“intelligence came that large bodies of armed men
“had crossed the river from Ramnagur, and had
“proceeded to the Rajah’s house. What follows is a

“scene of such horror, that it is with the greatest
“reluctance I submit to the painful duty of relating
“it. The guard placed over the Rajah consisted of
“two companies of Grenadier Sepoys, as above men-
“tioned, from Major Popham’s detachment, commanded
“by the officers already named ; who were stationed
“in an enclosed square which surrounded the apart-
“ment where the Rajah was. The Resident’s guard
“had returned with him. It now appeared that these
“troops had taken no ammunition with them. Major
“Popham sent another company of Sepoys under an
“officer, with ammunition, to reinforce and support
“the first party. When the latter arrived at the
“Rajah’s house they found it surrounded, and all the
“avenues blockaded, by a multitude of armed men
“who opposed their passage. The minds of this
“tumultuous assembly becoming soon inflamed, some
“of them began to fire upon the Sepoys within the
“square ; and immediately, as if this had been the
“concerted signal, made an instantaneous and fierce
“attack on the Sepoys ; who wanting their accustomed
“means of defence, were capable of making but a
“feeble resistance, and fell an easy sacrifice to the
“superior numbers of their assailants, who cut almost
“every man of this unfortunate party to pieces. The
“officers, it is supposed. were the first victims to their
“fury ; but not until they had by astonishing efforts
“of bravery, and undismayed amidst the imminent
“dangers which surrounded them, involved a much
“superior number of their enemies in their fate. In
“this general report of them all accounts concur,
“though varying in circumstances. I yield to my
“own feelings in bestowing this just but unavailing
“tribute to these unhappy gentlemen.

“In the midst of this confusion the Rajah found

“means to escape through a wicket which opened to the river, and the banks being exceedingly steep in that place, he let himself down by Turbands tied together into a boat which was waiting for him, and conveyed him to the opposite shore. Those who had effected his escape followed him across the river in the same tumultuous manner in which they had assembled, leaving the party of our Sepoys which had last arrived, in possession of the house. On the first intelligence of this commotion I had directed Major Popham to repair immediately to his camp, which was about two miles from the Resident’s, and at the same distance from the Rajah’s house, and to march instantly with the remainder of his detachment to the support of the party.

“This order was executed with all possible expedition; but Major Popham arrived too late, and had the mortification to be a spectator of the effects of a massacre, which he could neither prevent nor revenge. He returned to me immediately, and made the following report.”

“No. IX. MAJOR POPHAM’S REPORT.

“Consequent to an order for the detachment under my command to proceed to the support of the Grenadier Companies under the order of Lieutenant Stalker, I carried it with as much expedition as possible to Cheit Sing’s palace, which I found to be entirely evacuated by the Rajah’s people who were already landed on the opposite side of the river.

“Of the two companies commanded by Lieutenant Stalker very few remained alive, and the majority of those appeared to be severely wounded. The bodies of Lieutenants Stalker, Scott, and Simes were lying

“within a small distance of each other, shockingly
“mangled, and without any signs of life.

“It may be necessary to observe that Lieutenant
“Birrell was despatched with one company of Sepoys
“upon the first rumour of the Rajah’s coercive in-
“tentions; but the fate of the companies which pre-
“ceded him was decided prior to his being able to
“enter the palace: There were however some of the
“Rajah’s people, whom he effectually cleared it of. In
“his attack he met with some loss. My utmost
“endeavors have hitherto proved insufficient to procure
“an exact detail of the killed and wounded in this
“unfortunate transaction. I thought it necessary to
“leave a company with a Subaltern in the palace.

“(Signed) WILLIAM POPHAM,

“Major.”

“BANARIS,

“16th August 1781.

“I cannot learn with certainty what is become of
“the Rajah, but the prevailing report is that he fled
“from Ramnagur, his usual residence on the other side
“of the river, in the middle of the night, and proceeded
“with his Zenanna and effects to Lutteefpoor, a strong
“fort of his situated about ten miles from Chunar.
“He was accompanied by Sujan Sing, his brother, and
“Munnihar Sing a relation and son by adoption of
“Rajah Bulwant Sing. He has also had the pre-
“caution to take with him Ranny Goolaub Kooer, the
“widow of Rajah Bulwant Sing his father, her son-in-
“law Doorghijey Sing, and his two sons, her grandsons.
“In them he possesses every member of his family
“who can have any plea to dispute with him the right
“of inheritance from his father Rajah Bulwant Sing,
“if that were ever a question, his right to the
“Zemeedary being derived exclusively from Sunnuds

“ which his father never possessed, but which were first
“ granted to Cheit Sing by the late Vizeer Shujah-ud-
“ Dowlah through the influence of our government in
“ 1773, and since repeated by similar grants from our
“ government, when the sovereignty was ceded to the
“ Company by the present Nabob Assof-ud-Dowlah.

“ I have made choice of Bauboo Owsan Sing who
“ held the office of Dewan during several years of the
“ life of Rajah Bulwant Sing, and for a considerable
“ period since the accession of the present Rajah, to
“ administer the revenues and government of this
“ country in the quality of Naib, until it can be deter-
“ mined to whom the Zemeedary may legally belong,
“ and who may be in a capacity to receive it.

“ To this effect I have caused a proclamation to be
“ made through the city of Banaris, and have notified
“ it by circular Perwannahs to all the Zemeedars and
“ Aumils of the Zemeedary.

“ To enforce the execution of these acts, to maintain
“ tranquillity and order in the country, and protect
“ the inhabitants, I have ordered one battalion of
“ Sepoys from Chunar-gur, the remainder of Major
“ Popham’s detachment from Mirzapoor, and one
“ regiment of Sepoys from Dinapoor, to march imme-
“ diately to Banaris.

“ The detail of these proceedings shall be transmitted
“ to you in a subsequent letter. I do not expect they
“ will detain me here much beyond the time I had
“ prescribed to myself, which was about seven or eight
“ days.

“ I have the honor to be with the greatest esteem,

“ Sir,

“ Your most obedient humble servant

(Signed) “ WARREN HASTINGS.”

“ P.S. The delay occasioned in copying this letter
“ from its great length has afforded me an opportunity
“ of contradicting the latter part of it, and I have now
“ the satisfaction to add, that Ranny Goolaub Kooer,
“ together with her son-in-law, Doorgbijey Sing, and
“ his two sons, are safe at Banaris. I have this morn-
“ ing received a visit from Doorgbijey Sing, and his
“ eldest son, Mehipnarain.”

I have read over the preceding letter with great attention, but can find nothing in it, with the advantage of recent and better means of information, to correct ; nor do I know that it requires a comment. That which I am now about to make may appear trivial ; but I make it as it impels me by its present impression. The Rajah in his reply to the charges which I had preferred against him insists much on the many letters which he wrote to me praying to be dispensed from his obedience to the orders of government, and my neglect to answer them ; and this charge against me he repeats in a manner not the most respectful. I do not know but it may be true. He had received positive orders, and those had been repeated. It was his duty to obey them, not to waste my time with letters of excuse, to cavil with my answers for evasions, or with my silence for delays. His Vakeel was in daily attendance on me, and knew my mind sufficiently upon these subjects ; and what he knew I am sure he wrote to his master. As to his plea of inability to pay the residue of the subsidy *without preparation*, that is, without contriving the means to raise the money, after having sacredly promised the full and instant discharge of it, it was as insolent as we now know too surely that it was most egregiously false.

It was truly reported that Cheit Sing after his

escape from Shewallah Ghaut immediately fled to Lutteefpoor, taking his family, and his whole force, with him, except the ordinary guard which had been early appropriated in the time of his father Bulwant Sing, under the command of Gudgerauge Sing, who had the title of Kelladar, to the charge of Ramnagur. This was a vast pile of irregular but massy buildings constructed of stone on the river-side, and within the bed of the river. To its original strength Cheit Sing had added two or three small bastions of stone and earth : A large town had grown round it, which rendered the approach to it suspicious ; and the intricacy of the apartments and passages of the palace was such, that a cautious officer would hesitate under almost any encouragement to enter it. I had early information that it was in effect evacuated, and I believed it ; but not being certain, I did not chuse to hazard a repulse, nor had I a force equal to any operation of doubtful success, much less of enterprize. My whole strength had consisted originally of six companies of Major Popham's regiment, about sixty Sepoys which I had taken from the garrison of Buxar for the protection of my boats, and a few men who had been newly recruited for the Resident's guard, who had yet neither arms nor discipline. Of Major Popham's regiment 82 men had fallen in the massacre of Shewallah Ghaut, and 92 were wounded. The whole number of killed and wounded of every corps and denomination was 205.

Every circumstance of an event and time so critical to the present existence, and to the permanency of the British interests in India, will merit notice in a relation of this kind. If Cheit Sing's people, after they had effected his rescue had proceeded to my quarters at Mahadew Dass's garden, instead of crouding after him

in a tumultuous manner, as they did, in his passage over the river, it is most probable that my blood, and that of about thirty English gentlemen of my party, would have been added to the recent carnage ; for they were above 2,000 in number, furious and daring from the easy success of their last attempt, nor could I assemble more than 50 regular and armed Sepoys for my whole defence. Let it not be thought that I attribute too much consequence to my own person when I suppose the fate of the British Empire in India connected with it. Mean as its substance may be, its accidental properties were aequivalent to those which, like the magical characters of a Talisman in the Arabian mythology, formed the essence of the state itself ; representation, title, and the estimate of public opinion. Such a stroke as that which I have supposed would have been universally considered as decisive of the national fate ; every state around it would have started into arms against it ; and every subject of its own dominion would according to their several abilities have become its enemy. What really passed approaching to such an effect from the sole apprehension of such a cause more than warrants the conclusion of what would have followed the cause itself, had it existed.

The effects of the first consternation having subsided, a number of men, reputed 2,000, returned to Ramnagur on the 18th under the command of Ramjeeawun, a confidential and domestic Chief of the family.

The remainder of Major Popham's detachment, consisting of four companies of Sepoys, one company of Artillery, and the company of French Rangers, lay at Mirzapoor.

These were ordered to march immediately to Ramnagur. Lieutenant-Colonel Blair was ordered to detach a battalion of Sepoys from the garrison of Chunar on

the same destination. It was intended that as soon as these corps had joined, and were properly equipped for service, Major Popham should take the command, and proceed against the forces quartered in Ramnagur. I wrote an order express to Captain Blair who commanded the battalion from Chunar, commanding him to halt at a secure distance from Ramnagur, and wait for further orders ; and Major Popham, whom I had afterwards vested with the command in form, wrote a similar order to Captain Mayaffre, the officer commanding the residue of his detachment, with an additional caution to avoid hostilities and attend to the safety of the whole party, of which being the senior officer he would have the command till Major Popham assumed it. To ensure the success of his operations on that side, he had chosen a convenient and open plain on the shore opposite to Ramnagur for a battery of two mortars which were expected from Chunar ; nor can there be a doubt that a place so peculiarly ill formed for such a mode of attack, and in no state of defence against a wary assailant, would have proved an easy conquest. Unhappily the ill-timed ambition of a rash individual defeated this plan, and had nearly caused the destruction of the whole party. Captain Mayaffre unwilling, as it appears, for no other possible motive can be ascribed to so precipitate and irregular a conduct, to lose the opportunity which his present and casual command afforded him of acquiring a military reputation, without plan, without enquiry, against the advice of his officers, and against order, ordered the detachment to march into the narrow lanes of the town, where they were opposed by the fire of an enemy surrounding them unseen ; and the party which entered was in an instant annihilated rather than defeated. Twenty-three men of the corps

of Rangers, with their commander Captain Doxat who led the attack, were killed, and ten wounded. The 1st battalion of the 6th regiment of Sepoys commanded by Captain Blair which followed lost 57 killed and 41 wounded. The whole loss sustained in all the corps was 107 killed, and 72 wounded. Captain Mayaffre was killed. The detachment instantly retreated. The retreat appears to have been conducted by Captain Blair, and in a manner that did him much credit. The enemy pursued with little effect, their numbers gradually lessening till the detachment arrived within four miles of Chunar, which it regained the same evening.

This unfortunate affair happened on the morning of the 20th of August.

I considered myself now as plunged in a decided war, and made every provision both for its speedy termination, and for its confinement to the scene in which it had opened.

Orders were written and dispatched in multiplied copies to the different military stations for assistance; to the Resident of the Vizeer's Court for a supply of treasure, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Blair for an instant reinforcement. The detail of these orders will be found in the Appendix. Very few reached their destination, the communication with every quarter being intercepted, and all the country in arms against us, and our emissaries, unused to this dangerous service, either made prisoners, or not daring to execute it, and secreting their despatches. Two of my letters reached Colonel Blair, who ordered Captain M'Dougal with the 2nd battalion of the 6th regiment to march on the next day, which was the 21st, to Banaris. I now passed an interval like that of a dead calm preceding a violent storm, and fraught with all the

symptoms of its certain approach. Successive notices were brought to me by various channels of preparations making at Ramnagur for an assault on my quarters, which stood in the midst of the suburbs of Banaris, and consisted of many detached buildings within one large enclosure, surrounded by houses and trees, which intercepted every other prospect. The whole force which I had left amounted to about 450 men. The reports of an intended assault, which was fixed for that night, grew stronger as the day advanced; the boats on the other side of the river were seen to be in motion; and besides the moral certainty of the real existence of such a design, the obvious advantages which it presented to the enemy who had nothing left to fear, and nothing else to do, precluded all hesitation but on the choice of expedients for defeating it. There were but two, which were, to wait the danger and try the chance of repelling it, or to retreat to a place of greater security or of equal advantage for the encounter. The confined state of the place, of which any description will be insufficient to convey an adequate idea, rendered the first plan impracticable. We had not a force sufficient to guard all the defences of that place, nor a store for the provisions of a day, even for that small number. The only arguments for it were the disgrace of a flight, and the consideration of our wounded Sepoys whom it might leave at the discretion of a merciless enemy. The former consideration yielded to the superior weight of necessity: The latter to the impossibility of protecting the wounded men in either case, as they were quartered at the distance of near a mile from Mahadew Dass's garden; nor would it have been possible in their condition, and in the multiplicity of pressing exigencies which the resolution to remain would have created, to remove

them. Yet these considerations held me suspended during the whole course of the day. In the evening it became necessary to come to a final determination, as the delay of a few hours might now preclude every option. I consulted Major Popham. He declared the defence of that place impossible and advised a retreat to Chunar. There were other Field-officers with me. I asked for their opinion separately. They clearly and unhesitatingly agreed in the same advice. My opinion had been determined from the instant that I received the certain information of Captain Mayaffre's defeat. I had not yet received the news of Captain M'Dougal's march, nor any answer to the letters which I had written to Lieutenant-Colonel Blair for a reinforcement; nor could I know whether these had reached him. I yielded to the reluctance of a few minutes. My resolution was taken, and declared, and orders given to form our little corps, that we might have time to gain the open country before the enemy having notice of the design could cross and attack us at the disadvantage of the streets, lanes and broken ground which we had to pass before we could reach it. These orders were issued between seven and eight o'clock, and by eight the line was in motion, having been much retarded and impeded by an incredible tumult of servants, Palankeens and baggage of every denomination, which for a time threatened a total obstruction to our march. Fortunately this enormous mass took the wrong road, which left the right with a free and undisturbed passage for the Sepoys. On the way we passed Captain M'Dougal's battalion about nine o'clock. We sent him timely notice of our movement: He turned and joined us. Early the next morning we arrived at Chunar.

It is proper to mention that as soon as I had formed

my resolution to leave Banaris, I sent my Moonshy to the Nabob Saadut Ally Khan to inform him of it, and to recommend the wounded Sepoys to his care, believing that the Rajah from a consideration of policy would not chuse to molest them, especially as he could have no motive or object to it but revenge, if he would shew a determined resolution to protect them. The same request I made to him in writing after my arrival at Chunar. I owe him the justice to attest that he faithfully and liberally complied with my request. He visited them himself, and furnished them with provisions and with money, and appointed native surgeons to attend them, and as they were able to bear it he caused them all to be removed to his own quarters.

Many reports and suspicions have prevailed of his being concerned in some of the designs which were formed against us. I can neither credit nor refute them. The evil imputed to him is at best doubtful: The good which he did is certain, and he is entitled to the entire merit of it.

I avail myself of this repose in my narrative to relate another instance of private merit in Beneram Pundit the Vakeel or minister of the Rajah of Berar, and his brother Bissummer Pundit. These persons had come to pay their customary attendance at my quarters about the time that the line was already on the march. They immediately joined it. Some time after I saw, and spoke to them, expressing some concern to find them in that situation. They were on foot without a single servant or attendant. I suffered them to accompany me till we came to the plain and halted. I then thanked them for the proof which they had shewn of their attachment, with which I was satisfied, and desired them to return, as they had a large family in Banaris which would be exposed by their continuance

with me to the resentment of Chiet Sing, and perhaps to the worst effects of it ; nor could by their presence afford me any service which could repay what I myself should feel of compunction for suffering them to be exposed to such hazards. They refused me in a peremptory manner, without compliment, or the ostentation of performing meritorious service ; and persisted, although I as peremptorily insisted on their return. I then desired that the elder brother who was corpulent, and of a constitution less equal to fatigue, would return, and the younger only remain ; but could not prevail. A few days after my arrival at Chunar I casually mentioned to them my distress for provisions, which was occasioned principally by the want of money ; for such was our total loss of credit that we could not raise a sufficiency even for the ordinary wants of our small detachment ; and it was with great difficulty, and a degree of violence that Lieutenant-Colonel Blair extorted from the Shroffs of Chunar, who had lived and grown opulent under the protection of the garrison, the small sum of 2,500 Rupees, which was distributed among all the Sepoys, and afforded a satisfactory relief. Beneram Pundit immediately, and with an eagerness which belonged to his character, told me that he had a Lack of Rupees in ready-money lying in his house at Banaris, which I might take, if I could find any means to receive and convey it to Chunar ; and the younger brother advised, as the simplest expedient, to send a battalion of Sepoys for that purpose, which could easily go and return without interruption, as there were no troops stationed near the town on that side of the river, offering to accompany it himself, and to bring away the money. I rejected this proposal for an obvious reason, and preferred the trial of the means which the Shroffs are supposed to practise for the

conveyance of money on such occasions. I accepted a draught on their family for the sum, payable to Contoo Bauboo, my Dewan, who had been left in Banaris, and sent it inclosed in a letter to him, with directions to concert with Gopaul Dass the means of conveying it to Chunar. This proved ineffectual. Contoo Bauboo could not be found. Gopaul Dass was seized, I forget at what exact period of time, and sent a prisoner to Lutteefpoor ; and in a short time after Contoo Bauboo was also taken, and conveyed to the same place of confinement. I was obliged therefore to wait for a more favorable opportunity, which never happened while I remained at Chunar. After my return to Banaris, Beneram again repeated the offer. I accepted it, and received the whole amount on the instant, giving him a note in the Company's name and in the usual form for the same.

Examples of fidelity and national attachment merit the first reward of being recorded. In me it is a duty both of public and private obligation to relate what I have related. Their merit is national ; for under whatever impressions their assistance was offered, its object was the national service ; nor can my person in such an instance be separated from my public character.

On the 20th or 21st, I forget which, I received a letter from Rajah Cheit Sing, filled with expressions of slight concern for what had passed, and professions, but indefinite and unapplied, of fidelity. I did not think it becoming to make any reply to it, and I think I ordered the bearer of the letter to be told that it required none.

On the morning of the 21st a person came to Mr. R. Johnson, who was one of my party, and desired his interposition with me to receive a letter and messenger

from the Rajah in the evening with proposals for an accommodation. The like application was made by Myrza Abdullah Beg, the Rajah's Vakeel, to my Dewan Contoo Bauboo; and with my permission Contoo Bauboo returned to his own house in the evening to meet the Vakeel by appointment for that purpose; by which means he missed the opportunity of going off with me, the intelligence of my intention reaching him too late for him to join me, or his infirm state of body not admitting of his taking so hasty a resolution. The substance of the message, as it has been since delivered to me by Abdullah Beg in writing, was to exculpate himself from any concern in what had passed, which he charged to the insolent behavior of a servant of the Resident who was present, and the resentment of his own people; and to profess his obedience and submission to my will in whatever way I should dictate.

I regarded this as an artifice to gain time, since the message, whatever were the substance of it, might as easily have been delivered in the morning as in the evening, and the messenger might have obtained an easy access to me without the intrigue and mystery of secret and indirect applications.

I have been since confirmed in this opinion by the two following anecdotes, and their exact coincidence with the design to which I attribute that just recited.

On the morning of the 21st, while preparations were making to cross Captain M'Dougal's battalion, three men, two strangers, and all volunteers, went successively to Captain Blair with intelligence that a design was formed to escalate the fort of Chunar with a numerous force on that night, and an earnest caution that he should not diminish the strength of his garrison.

The intelligence and advice delivered by each were expressed nearly in the same words. When M'Dougal's battalion was on the road, three men, strangers and volunteers like the former, came to him successively with intelligence that a large body of armed men lay wait to intercept him at a village called Beeteeburr, and warned him not to proceed. He proceeded, but did not meet a man. Lieutenant-Colonel Blair caused a more than ordinary watch to be kept on that night in the fort, but not a man appeared to attack it. Not one of these emissaries has ever been seen since.

As it had been my original intention to make but a short stay at Banaris, the Nabob Vizeer in the expectation of my visit had already left his capital, and advanced to a short distance to meet me. I considered that his presence would prove of much service by its influence on our credit; and his troops, rabble as they were, might serve to keep the country in awe, and to divide the attention of the enemy. But these advantages would invert the relation of our alliance, and give him a superiority in our meeting which would defeat the purposes of it: Besides that I did not think it consistent with the dignity of our government to employ a foreign aid for the suppression of a rebellion of its own subjects. I therefore wrote a letter to the Nabob requesting him to return to Lucknow, and remain there until I should have leisure from the actual disturbances to prosecute my original journey. The Nabob refused to comply with this injunction, and on the first intimation of my difficulties resolved to join me; and he executed this purpose with such apparent earnestness, that he made his first stages with no other attendance than about 100 horse, and about four companies of his body-guard, with his usual domestic attendants. As soon as I was informed of

this, to remove any unfavorable impression of my former letter under the construction of distrust, I wrote another to the Nabob expressing the warmest sense of such a testimony of his attention, apologizing for what I had before written from an unwillingness to involve him in a scene of trouble, and expressing my desire to see him at Chunar according to his own wishes.

In the mean time I had received several intimations imputing evil designs to the Nabob, and warning me to guard myself against them; and especially to be careful that I did not expose myself to the effects of concealed treachery by visiting him without a strong guard. Many circumstances favored this suspicion. No sooner had the rebellion of this Zemeedary manifested itself, than its contagion instantly flew to Fyzabad and the extensive territory lying on the north of the river Dewa, and known by the names of Gooruckpoor and Bareech. In the city of Fyzabad Nawaub Allea and Jenauby Allea, the mother and grand-mother of the Nabob, openly espoused the party of Cheit Sing, encouraging and inviting people to enlist for his service; and their servants took up arms against the English. Two battalions of regular Sepoys in the Vizeer's service under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hannay, who had been entrusted with the charge of that district, were attacked and surrounded in various places; many of them cut to pieces, and Colonel Hannay himself encompassed by multitudes narrowly escaped the same fate. The Nabob Vizeer was charged with being privy to the intrigues which had produced and fomented these disturbances, and the little account that he seemed to make of them served to countenance the suspicion. I can truly say for myself, that I never afforded it the slightest degree

of credit, neither his character, the tenor of his past conduct, the expectations which I knew he entertained of assistance and relief from myself, nor his inability to support himself without the protection of our government, allowing me for a moment to entertain a thought so injurious to his fidelity, and so contrary to probability. Yet I was not perfectly free from apprehensions similar to such a suggestion. The Nabob was surrounded by men base in their characters, and improvident in their understandings, his favourites, and the companions of his looser hours. These had every cause to dread the effect of my influence on theirs; and both these, and the relations of the family, whose views of consequence and power were intercepted by our participation in the administration of his affairs, entertained a mortal hatred to our nation, and openly avowed it. These all joined in prescribing the most pernicious and fatal counsels to the Nabob, representing this as the time to deliver himself from what they described as the yoke of servitude. Although he firmly rejected all their persuasions, and I was assured of it, yet he himself was at their mercy; and it was in their power to use both his authority and his person for the perpetration of their own designs; nor could I use any precaution to avoid them, which would not appear to proceed from a distrust of the Nabob himself. I never communicated my apprehensions, nor acted from them; and had the satisfaction of receiving the Nabob, of maintaining an intercourse with him with every mark of the most secure and mutual confidence, and of parting with him with every demonstration of mutual satisfaction.

I had before written to Colonel Morgan for assistance. I now repeated the order; and as the issue of a war begun with such disadvantages on our side, and

with the total loss of the country, was doubtful, I added an order to follow with his whole force, with another to Colonel Sir John Cumming, who commanded at Futtehgur, to supply his place at Khaunpoor. I considered that if we were successful with a less exertion, it would be easy to countermand these orders before the troops could have advanced far in the execution of them ; but if we failed of success, and such orders were not sent, it might be too late to issue them with any hope of effect from them, or even of their being received, since the communication which was now very difficult and uncertain, might then be absolutely precluded. None of my letters reached Colonel Morgan till he had taken his resolution. Reports were conveyed to him of my situation, and past misadventures. The sudden failure of intelligence convinced him of the truth of what he heard ; and justly concluding that orders had been sent which had been stopped in their way to him, he at once resolved to execute their supposed and obvious purport, and detached a force superior to that which I had required, to my assistance. It consisted of two regiments of Sepoys, thirty European Artillery-men, and two companies of the European regiment, with four six-pounders, one howitz, tumbrils, ammunition, draft and carriage cattle. For the greater expedition he ordered this detachment to proceed by water. The zeal of the officers so well seconded that of their commander, that although it appears that the resolution was taken on the 29th, the whole were embarked, and in movement on the 31st of the month. Major Crabb commanded the detachment.

A long interval of time, which acquired its full measure from the magnitude of the events which were expected to grow out of it, and their uncertain pro-

duction, passed in total ignorance of the success of the various orders which had been dispatched, and of the succors which might be preparing for us. One half of the province of Owd was in a state of as complete rebellion as that of Banaris. Futteh Shah had invaded Sirkar Saurun in our own province, Bahar, supported by supplies of money, and encouraged with promises of more, from Chiet Sing; many of the Zemeedars of Bahar had discovered symptoms of disaffection; and reports were made to me of levies of men openly entertained for the enemy from our own subjects in that province; even the wretched subjects of Napaul dared to seize by force some villages to which they had a claim, and had sometime before supplicated the attention of our government to it. In my impatience for advices I dreaded that every packet would bring a fresh accumulation to our distresses, and the news of commotions in every quarter. At this period a letter found its way to me from Colonel Muir, who commanded the army employed against Mahdajee Sindia, informing me of overtures made by that Chief for a separate peace. This had been one of the objects of my journey to this quarter; but eagerly as I had sought such an event, I was proportionably mortified to learn with what facility it might have been accomplished, and how unseasonably our domestic misfortunes had happened to defeat so fair a prospect of it. I had no money, nor credit equal to the supply of 3,000 Rupees; and by an unfortunate train of official perplexities, which had happened some time preceding this, both Major Popham's regiment, the Rangers, and all the corps of the garrison of Chunar, were four months in arrears. This was our situation.

What force could be spared from the garrison of Chunar, added to Major Popham's regiment, was formed

into a detachment under his command, and encamped on a plain about a mile to the eastward of Chunar. The greatest strength of the enemy was collected at Pateeta, about seven miles from Chunar in the same direction.

On the 27th of August Lieutenant Polhill arrived with six companies of Sepoys belonging to the Nabob Vizeer's body-guard stationed at Illahabad. He was ordered to encamp on the opposite bank of the river for the purpose of keeping our communication open with that shore. On the 29th he attacked and defeated a considerable body of troops under the command of a principal chief, named Shehaub Khan, who was stationed at a small fort and town called Seeker, within sight of Chunar. The advantages gained by this success were the removal of that part of the enemy, and the acquisition of a considerable booty in grain, which had been the object of the enterprise.

On the 3d of September Major Popham despatched Captain Blair with his battalion and two companies of his own grenadiers to surprise the camp at Pateeta. They marched at three in the morning, and arrived at the ground by daylight; but found it abandoned, and the enemy waiting for them in complete order at about a mile beyond it. A bloody action ensued; in which the enemy, as might be expected from men flushed with recent successes, fought with a desperate intrepidity. Our Sepoys began to break into disorder, when by a well-timed and successful attack of the enemy's guns by two companies of grenadiers headed by Lieutenants Fallon and Birrell, the fortune of the day turned in our favor, and the field was left to our possession, with four guns and four tumbrils. One of the guns, its carriage being broken, was spiked and left. The other three, with one of the tumbrils loaded

with as much ammunition as it could carry, were brought away. The other three tumbrils, with 200 maunds of loose powder, were blown up. About 1,500 round shot of different weights, and mostly hammered, were found and left in a village adjacent.

Our loss in this action was very great. We had 48 men killed, and 85 wounded. That of the enemy was unknown, but must have been considerable. Their guns were well served, and it was from their execution that we principally suffered. It was remarkable that they had all the apparatus of our artillery, such as port-fires, tubes, chain and quilted grape shot, &c. equal, or nearly equal, to the production of an European laboratory. Samples of each kind will be sent to the board. Their artillery did not answer to the quality of the stores. One gun was of modern cast, and with its carriage, which was not bad, said to have been made at Ramnagur. The others were of a very old cast and construction, and their carriages bad and much worn. This was the general character of all the ordnance taken in the course of the war.

Dearly as this victory was purchased, with the expenditure of one fourth of the party, it was yet a victory, ascertained and acknowledged; and had its due effect of impressing the enemy with discouragement, and our own men with confidence; and it was an earnest of our future success in the public opinion, which at all times of high importance to our political influence, was especially so at this, in which the minds of all men were suspended for the decision of the part which they were to take, either in the immediate contest, or in their own conduct as dependant on it.

I must not omit in this place an instance of vengeance which marks the sanguinary character of Cheit Sing, and too strongly proves, that if the other

excesses committed by his people were not authorized by his express order, they were perpetrated under the influence of his example, and the knowledge of his inclination.

Fourteen men of the corps of Rangers had been left sick at Mirzapoor when the remainder of Major Popham's detachment marched under the command of Captain Mayaffre to Ramnagur. They were made prisoners, and sent to Lutteefpoor. They arrived there on the 3d of September, about the same time that news was received of Captain Blair's action at Pateeta, which happened on that morning. What provocation they gave, or whether any, is not known. It is surmised, but I know not the authority, that one of these unhappy men expressed a joy on hearing that our arms had been successful. They were all butchered on the spot, and almost in the immediate presence of the Rajah ; except one man who made a shift to crawl with a mangled body to the neighbouring woods, where he subsisted for a few days, returned to the fort, received mercy, and is still living, and in our camp.*

On the 10th of September at about 7 in the morning Major Crabb's detachment appeared on the opposite shore. It consisted of the corps already related. It had proceeded as far as Illahabad by water, but much retarded in its course by strong and adverse winds ; on which account, the course of the river also winding very much between Illahabad and Chunar, Major Crabb had prudently disembarked the men and stores, and marched them by the high road, remanding the boats to Khaunpoor, whither indeed their return would have been impracticable, had they passed the boundary of this Zemeedary.

* The particulars of this massacre have been since verified with some unessential variations from my relation of it, in an affidavit of the survivor, which will be annexed.

Major Roberts with his regiment, and a Lack of Rupees in silver, arrived on the 13th of September from Lucknow, to which place, as I have before related, he had been ordered to repair for the guard of my person in my intended visit to that capital. A further supply of 50,000 Rupees was a few days after received from the Nabob's Aumil of Illahabad.

The money was immediately distributed among all the troops in equal proportions, and by satisfying their wants facilitated Major Popham's preparatives for the commencement of active operations.

I have a pleasure in testifying that, distressed as the Sepoys had been for the want of money, they had never manifested the least symptom of discontent. I had frequently visited the camp, and passed the lines each time in review. Once, and only once, I heard one or two voices of complaint, but neither clamorous nor disrespectful.

On the 11th, the Nabob Vizeer arrived at his encampment, which had been formed on the opposite shore. I chose to make him the first visit, which was performed on the same morning, and was returned by him on the next.

Hyder Beg, the Nabob's second minister, arrived at the same time. He had been deputed early to meet me at Banaris, and had arrived there about two days after my departure from it. Instead of following me to Chunar, he had suffered himself to be detained by Lalla Bucherauge, the Shroff, who had promised to accompany him with a supply of money. In the mean time a sudden and great swell of the river rendered the Burna Nulla, behind which he was encamped, impassable. The Rajah's people at the same time carried away all the boats; and after a long and fruitless negociation with them for an unmolested passage, which he did not think it prudent to attempt at the

hazard of an opposition, he at length did attempt it, and met none. His indecision on this occasion furnished ground for various suspicions ; but I know, and had assurances from a person in my suite who had taken refuge with him, and acquired his confidence, and on whose authority I could implicitly rely, that they were wholly devoid of foundation. I had a pleasing and incontrovertible evidence of his fidelity soon after the conclusion of our troubles, in a letter which Captain Blair picked up at Lutteefpoor, and which I shall add to the appendix ; not merely as a justification of the minister, but as a relief to the dry and unentertaining materials with which it is associated, if it shall convey the same opinion of the good sense of the writer to other minds as it has done to mine.

On the 15th Lieutenant Polhill crossed and joined Major Popham's camp. The whole detachment now consisted of the following strength. Viz.

- 1 company of European Grenadiers commanded by Captain Grant.
- 1 company of European Light Infantry commanded by Captain Harrison.
- 1 company of French Rangers commanded by Lieutenant Wade.
- 30 European Artillery-men commanded by Captain Hill.
- 1 Regiment of Sepoys, the 7th, commanded by Major Crabb.
- 1 do. do. the 19th, do. Major Balfour.
- 1 do. do. the 30th, do. Major Roberts.
- 1 do. do. the 35th, do. Major Popham.
- 1 Battalion, the 1st of 6th Regiment, commanded by Captain Blair.
- 6 Companies of the Nabob's Body-guard commanded by Lieutenant Polhill.

The following is a catalogue of Cheit Sing's whole force which has been since delivered to me by one of his principal officers ; and as it made a part of a sworn affidavit, I admit and credit it as genuine. It is certainly not exaggerated.

“LIST OF THE ESTABLISHED FORCES IN THE SERVICE OF CHEIT SING, CAVALRY, SEPOYS, MATCHLOCK-MEN, &C.

“Cavalry - - - - -	1700
Select troops, or Body-guard, Horse and Foot -	700
Sepoys - - - - -	1150
Matchlock-men - - - - -	1800
Attached to Bullum Dass, Horse 300, Foot 500 -	800
With Soojaun Sing, Cavalry and Infantry 500, with two guns, Sepoys and Artillery-men, 340 -	840
With Munnear Sing, Cavalry and Infantry - -	700
	<hr/>
Total established Troops - -	7690

TROOPS ENTERTAINED AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF CHEIT SING AT LUTTEEFPOOR.

First, entertained at Lutteefpoor Matchlock and Sword-men - - - - -	2000
Second, Nujjeeb Sword-men from Lucknow - -	1000
	<hr/>
Total - - - - -	3000

TROOPS ASSEMBLED FROM DIFFERENT PLACES.

Horse and Foot with Juggur Dew Sing - -	500
Matchlockmen arrived with Bukht Sing by order from the Rajah - - - - -	1200
With Gomaun Sing, sent for by the Rajah, Match- lockmen - - - - -	500
From the Fougedar of Biddevvee arrived, Matchlock- men - - - - -	1000
Rajepoots of the tribe of Rugbunfee from Kurraukut Arrived with Dillun Sing Fougedar of Mukurun Badshapoor, Matchlock-men - - - - -	1500
Cavalry & Infantry arrived with Rezza Cooli Khan from Mirzapoor - - - - -	300
Rajepoots collected from Agoree and Purwah by Dia Lutchoo - - - - -	500
Of the tribe or cast of Khummaur collected by Soojaun Sing - - - - -	1000
Sword and Matchlock-men with Ramjeeawun -	2000
	<hr/>
	11500

Total Troops in the Service of Cheit Sing - 22190
 “To which are to be added husband-men and adventurers who
 took up arms voluntarily, making the foregoing number
 amount to near forty thousand.”

These forces were divided between Lutteefpoor, Pateeta, and Ramnagur. The best reputed of them were at Pateeta, and the great mass composing the last corps, with a part of the others, at Lutteefpoor with the Rajah, who had fixed his residence at that place since his flight from Shewallah Ghaut.

Before I proceed it may not be improper to state the other resources on which he, not very unreasonably depended for lengthening the war, if not for success in the course of it.

First, his fortresses, of which there are many, and some of considerable extent and strength, erected in various parts of the Zemeedary. Of these the two principal are Bidjeygur and Lutteefpoor. Ramnagur scarcely deserves to be named with them, and Pateeta has been rendered considerable only by its having been a capital scene of his opposition, and of our victories.

Bidjeygur is a fort erected on the solid rock of a hill rising to the height of 745 perpendicular feet from the level ground. It lies about fifty miles in a south-east direction from Chunar. It was the depository of all his and his father's treasures.

Lutteefpoor is a large fort built with stone, and surrounded by hills, and either from neglect or design obstructed from distant view by trees and thick shrubs surrounding it. It lies about 14 miles eastward from Chunar.

Pateeta is a very large town surrounded by a rampart of earth extending to a great distance beyond it to the hills adjoining. The fort itself is a small square house of stone, itself fortified with four round towers, and enclosed with a high rampart, and a ditch, which is in most parts broad and deep. Its greatest advantage against an enemy to whom delay was defeat, was that it was invisible to its assailants.

Ramnagur has been described already. The other forts, whatever their consequence under a different train of successes might have been, are of none to the events of this narrative.

His next great resource was his wealth, on which he looked, and thought himself invincible ; an expression which I borrow from one of the meanest of his dependants. It is credibly affirmed that he inherited from his father, Bulwant Sing, a complete Crore of Rupees, to which it is believed that he made considerable additions.

The distresses of our government, and the power and number of its enemies, may also be reckoned, though negative, yet amongst his resources. The rest were delusory, which the false and violent counsels of his brother, Soojaun Sing, and his Buxey, Suddanund, imposed on his inexperience, and the pliancy and aptitude of his disposition.

It would break the attention, and perplex the thread of the narrative, to relate every distinct event in its exact order of time : I have therefore in the minuter points endeavoured rather to arrange them according to their relation to the greater, or to find a place for them in the vacant intervals and pauses of it. It may be proper in this place to mention, that during the time of inaction which succeeded to my arrival at Chunar, I received several letters from Cheit Sing, besides letters from Mr. Barnet, and one from Contoo Bauboo, who were both his prisoners at Lutteefpoor, which were written by his order. These were all alike in substance, containing acknowledgments and professions of submission to my authority ; assertions of his own innocence, charging the massacre at Shewallah to the Chubdar whose insults provoked the resentment of his servants whom he could not restrain, and

claiming a merit from his having in the three past actions been the suffering party, though successful, and in none the aggressor ; adding general offers of accommodation, and in the letters written by his order a pompous display of his inexhaustible wealth, the multitude and bravery of his forces, and the devoted affection and fidelity of all his subjects. I refused to answer them, letting him know that they were written with too much presumption, in the style of equality, and with inapplicable professions, which were no better than none. Some of these letters will appear in the appendix : The rest were lost.

It had been intended to begin our operations with the attack of Ramnagur ; partly because it had been the scene of our first disgrace, and principally because the repossession of the capital, which would follow the capture of Ramnagur, would, it was thought, redeem our credit with the public, and be deemed equivalent, in the distant reports of it, to the complete recovery of our authority over the country ; as the existence of a fugitive chief in the wilds and mountains would be little regarded, when he was expelled from the capital of his government and the seat of his collections. For this purpose battering cannon and mortars were ordered to Major Popham's Camp, and every other preparative made for a siege. This caused the delay of some days. In the mean time a man, named Bundoo Khan, a native and inhabitant of the town of Chunar, gave information, that as the Rajah's force was principally collected at Lutteefpoor and Pateeta, and was daily accumulating, it would become exceedingly difficult to dislodge him, if he was allowed to gain too great strength there by a process of detailed and consecutive operations ; that the approaches both to Pateeta and Lutteefpoor were strongly guarded, and especially

those of Lutteefpoor, which he described as unassailable, but with a great and certain loss, on this side, the only road to it lying through Pateeta ; and even if carried, untenable from the strength of the pass behind it, of which the enemy would keep possession in defiance of all our efforts, and against any superiority of numbers. This pass takes its name from the adjacent village of Suckroot. He advised a divided plan of attack, to be executed at the same point of time ; one on the fort of Pateeta, the other on the pass of Suckroot ; of which, our forces coming on it by surprize, it being unguarded and easier of access from above, might easily obtain possession, and by that means gain the same advantage over the garrison of Lutteefpoor, as that would have over us if we first took possession of the fort ; with the command of every road of communication, if, which he did not doubt, we succeeded against Pateeta. He offered to conduct the party which should be destined on the service against the pass of Suckroot, by a road unfrequented, and unknown, which he described with a minute, and as it has since appeared, correct detail. The confidence with which he spoke, and the consistency of his assertions and reasonings upon them, acquired a great additional strength from his former recent conduct. He had accompanied Captain Blair in both actions of Ramnagur and Pateeta, and had been very serviceable to that officer by his knowledge of the ground, and by his advice in the application of it. His service on both occasions had been gratuitous, nor did he profess any motive for that which he now offered, but the interest and safety of a large family, which depended on our success.

Major Popham at once saw the propriety of his advice, and adopted it. The evening of the 15th was appointed for the first execution of the plan. In the

mean time it was concealed with the most profound secrecy. As a security for the fidelity and steadiness of Bundoo Khan he had a promise of a Jagheer in perpetuity for himself and his family, if the enterprize succeeded. This engagement has been since amply performed. Major Popham formed his army into two divisions, one destined for the more distant enterprize and commanded by Major Crabb. It consisted of the 7th regiment Major Crabb's, the 1st battalion of the 6th regiment, Lieutenant Polhill's 6 companies of the Nabob's bodyguard, four six-pounders and a 5½ inch howitz. These corps were told off, and began their march about 11 that night. Major Popham began his march with the other division at about 3 o'clock in the morning to Pateeta.

On his arrival there he found the works much stronger, and the approach more hazardous, than he had expected from the description which had been given of the place. He applied for the two battering cannon, and the mortars which had been originally intended for the attack of Ramnagur, and remanded on the change of plan. They were sent, but made no impression; and he resolved on the encouragement of a five-days experience, and from the fear of a delay operating against the other part of his plan, to attempt a storm. This was ordered and executed on the morning of the 20th with an instant and complete success. Major Roberts commanded the storming party. The enemy made a slight stand at the outer entrenchment, and fled through the fort, our men following without opposition. A slight attack was made at this time on our camp, but repelled with some loss on the part of the enemy, and none on ours. We lost during the siege eleven men killed, besides ten wounded.

On the same morning Major Crabb having conducted

his division through almost impracticable ways arrived at a village called Lora, which lies about two miles from the pass. Here he found a body of men with three guns posted to oppose him. They made a firm stand, but were defeated with a considerable loss. Ours was twelve men of every denomination killed, and twenty-two wounded. The enemy fled through the pass to Lutteefpoor. Our detachment followed to the head of the pass, and there encamped for the remainder of the day.

The news of these concurrent successes being conveyed to the Rajah at the same instant of time alarmed him exceedingly for his own personal safety. His fears were excited with a more forcible impression by the surprize of the advance of so great a force from a quarter where he had not expected any. With his face turned towards Chunar, and his whole attention and that of his people directed to the movements which were made on that side, they had no suspicion of any design being formed behind them. The first intelligence which was received of Major Crabb's party described it as consisting of the followers of Owsan Sing, and only three companies of our Sepoys; the Hircarrahs who conveyed the news possibly mistaking the advanced-guard for the whole force, and reporting it accordingly; nor was the real strength of the party known even by that which was detached to oppose it, until the instant of the action. This circumstance was related at the time, and has been since confirmed to me by an officer named Myher, who commanded a small body of the Rajah's Sepoys and the guns in the action. No design could be more judiciously planned, or more happily executed. Even the impediments and disappointments which attended it served but to promote the coincidence of the final movements of its

operation, with so well-timed an effect, that the difference of time which passed between the engagement at Lora and the conquest at Pateeta, was little more than that which would be required by the difference of the distances of each from Lutteefpoor, for the news of each success to reach Lutteefpoor at the same instant.

Cheit Sing instantly prepared for flight. His road to Bidjeygur, which was his last refuge, lay through the pass, which he durst not attempt. He left Lutteefpoor about three or four in the afternoon; and making a circuit over the hills gained the high road at the distance of some miles beyond the pass, and proceeded with a few followers to the neighbourhood of Bidjeygur. Some others followed and rejoined him. The rest left without orders stayed but to plunder the place, and evacuated it. The Gaung-wallahs, or Militia composed of the husbandmen, who had been summoned to attend him, all fled to their own homes. So rapid was the report of this event in its communication, and so decisive in its effect, that the fort of Sutteefgur, which lies about seven or eight miles to the northward of Lutteefpoor, and the palace of Ramnagur, were evacuated on the same evening; and the allegiance of the whole country restored as completely in the course of a few hours from a state of universal revolt to its proper channel, as if it had never departed from it.

On the next morning, the 21st, Major Crabb marched through the pass to Lutteefpoor, and found it abandoned.

On the same day Major Moses Crawford, with the 28th regiment of Sepoys, arrived from Dinapoor, and joined the detachment.

Major Balfour was detached on the morning of the

22d to Ramnagur, of which he took quiet possession. No one remained to oppose him.

Being desirous of returning without loss of time to Banaris, and the presence of the Nabob Vizeer being more urgently required for the quiet of his country, we parted on the 25th with every expression of mutual and real satisfaction. The annexed copy of my letter to the Board dated the 29th of November contains the detail of my transactions with him.*

On the next morning I arrived at Ramnagur, and on the 28th returned to my old quarters at Mahadew Dass's garden at Banaris.

To quiet the minds of the people proclamations were issued, offering pardon to all who should peaceably return to their obedience, excepting the persons of Cheit Sing, and his brother Soojaun Sing, whom their late rebellious conduct, and their rancour manifested to our nation in the deliberate murder of our soldiers, and even defenceless passengers, who had the misfortune to fall into their hands, had precluded from every title to lenity. Among the unhappy sufferers to whom the above exception alluded was a person of the name of Hooker, who had followed the occupation of a dealer in European wares to our camps, and had ventured to pass in his Budgerow, a little after the unhappy affair of Shewallah, near Ramnagur, where he was seized, and unarmed as he was, and pleading the innocence of his profession, murdered in cold blood. Soojaun Sing had the command at that time in Ramnagur. Two soldiers also of Major Crabb's detachment having wandered from the line were taken and murdered at Gopee Gunge. For this reason that town was excepted in the proclamation, and has since been destroyed.

* See Appendix, Part I. No. 1.

My first care after my return to Banaris was to determine the succession to the Zemeedary and Rauje vacated by the forfeiture of Cheit Sing. The right of Company to the disposal of it certainly had not suffered by the past events. The territory had been wholly lost to their dominion, and wholly conquered by their arms: Yet the rest of the family who formerly possessed it had not merited by any act of theirs to be involved in the punishment of a man who had been equally their enemy, and whom they had regarded as the usurper of their more legal rights; nor perhaps would it have been prudent to have put the submission of the people to the test of a new species of dominion. I therefore resolved, in virtue of the full powers which I possessed from the board for that purpose, to bestow it on the next lineal heir. This was Bauboo Mehipnarain. He was the grandson of Rajah Bulwant Sing by a daughter married to Bauboo Doorgbijey Sing. The widow of Bulwant Sing, named Ranny Goolaub Kooer, was still living and in an extreme old age. By the Hindoo law she might claim the inheritance. Her daughter also, the wife of Doorgbijey Sing, might assert the like pretension. Had it become a matter of contest, I had resolved to leave it to the decision of the whole body of the Pundits of Banaris. But this reference was unnecessary. Doorgbijey Sing yielded up the pretension of his wife, and the old Ranny her own by a writing, sealed with her name, and acknowledged in the presence of a confidential person whom I deputed to her for that purpose, declaring it to be her wish and request, that the Rauje might be conferred on her grandson Mehipnarain. He was accordingly invested and proclaimed on the 30th of September. His father Bauboo Doorgbijey Sing was at the same time invested with the office of Naib, and is in effect

the sole acting manager. He is about thirty-five years of age, his son nineteen.

I have thought it proper to establish a distinct and independant magistracy for the town of Banaris. The reasons for this act, the description of the office, and of the officers subordinate to it, are detailed in the subjoined letter to the board dated the 1st of November.* Allee Ibrahim Khan, the person chosen for this charge, was duly invested with it on the 20th of October.

On the 5th of November I concluded the settlement of the revenue which was to be paid by Rajah Mehipnarain, being Rs. 33,33,333-5-8 for the current year, and a perpetual rent of 40,00,000 Rs. for the future.

The particulars of this transaction are contained in my letter to the board dated the 21st of November.†

It has been already mentioned that soon after my flight to Chunar Colonel Muir advised of overtures by Mahdajee Sindia for a separate peace. I sent to Colonel Muir credentials and instructions; and on the 13th October a treaty was concluded with Mahdajee Sindia. To confirm and improve the advantages obtained by it, I deputed Mr. Anderson to Mahdajee Sindia, and at the same time sent Mr. Chapman, with Bissumber Pundit, on a similar commission to Moodajee Booslah, the Rajah of Berar. The particulars of these transactions, and of my views relating to them, are contained in the annexed copies of my instructions to Colonel Muir, and of my letter to the board adjoined, dated the 25th November.‡

The annexed letter to the board dated 22d November contains also the circumstances of some new arrangements made in the customs.§ ¶

* See Appendix, Part I., No. 2.

† *Ibid.*, Part I., No. 4.

‡ *Ibid.*, Part I., No. 3.

§ *Ibid.*, Part I., No. 5.

On the 8th October Major Naylor with the 23d regiment having been detached to the relief of Lieutenant-Colonel Hannay, arrived on the northern banks of the Dewa, defeated a large force which had assembled round Colonel Hannay, and entirely dispersed them. The return of the Nabob soon after effectually restored the quiet of the country.

About the same time a regiment of Sepoys under the command of Major Lucas, defeated and drove Futteh Shah from the district of Sirkar Saurun.

After having gained possession of Lutteefpoor, Major Popham lost no time in prosecuting his march to Bidjeygur. Cheit Sing did not wait his approach, but fled, taking with him as much treasure as his elephants and camels could carry, which has been reported to me to have consisted of one Lack of Mohrs, and fifteen or sixteen of silver*, besides jewels to an unknown amount. His wife, a woman of an amiable character, his mother Pauna, and all the other women of his family, and the survivors of the family of his father Bulwant Sing who were connected with his, were left in the fort of Bidjeygur. He took the route of Rewa, and from thence proceeded to Panna, the capital of Boondelcund, paying and plundered as he passed. He was by the last advices in that country, the Rajah professing in his letters to me a resolution to withdraw his protection from him, and secretly favoring him.

The fortress of Bidjeygur surrendered by capitulation on the 10th of November, yielding to Major Popham the peculiar credit of having surmounted all the obstacles which nature and art had opposed to the conquest of two of the fortresses of Hindostan

* Amounting to about 400,000 Pounds Sterling, exclusive of the Jewels.

which had been before universally deemed impregnable.

I have now brought my narrative to its proper conclusion, at that point in which all the movements which form the subject of it, and all their objects, appear to have attained their full and complete termination. I regret the length to which it has been drawn; and fear that it will appear unreasonable to those who may consider it a point of duty to give it a thorough perusal, and who will scarce fail to reflect, that it contains in effect the history of but one month. To myself the reflection affords a different sensation, when applied to the multitude of events, and their magnitude, comprized within so short an interval of my public life. I have aimed at brevity, both in the selection of facts, and in the narration of them; having omitted every circumstance which, though engaging a portion of my attention at the time, had no connection with the general train of events, or influence on the character by which they are discriminated from the ordinary course of affairs. For the satisfaction of such as shall have more patience or leisure to look into them, I have added as an appendix copies of all the material papers which have a relation to the narrative, but which would have encreased the bulk of it, and disturbed the attention, if inserted in the body of it.

I have also added attestations of all the principal facts and events, sworn before the Chief Justice, to whose advice I am obliged for having suggested it. It did not strike my mind, that matters of such notoriety here would require some more authentic verification of them at home, than the recital of the man whose reputation is so immediately concerned, as mine is, in the judgment which my superiors, and which the public at large will have a right to form upon it. I

am sensible of the wisdom of the precaution, and sorry that it was not earlier intimated, that I might have had time to have collected a larger fund of evidence ; although I have reason to be satisfied with the weight of that which I have obtained. Let it be also remembered that this relation itself has been written under the force of an obligation as binding as that of an oath administered and taken in all its legal forms.

Whatever judgment may be passed on my particular conduct, I am yet happy that it has proved the means of calling forth the inherent virtue of my countrymen, and displaying to all the powers and people of India both the national character, and the national constitution, by such effects as have been unrecorded in their histories, and are scarce conceivable by their habits of thinking.

The suddenness of our calamities ; the distance of assistance ; the privation of every present resource ; the manifest interest which animated and impelled every corps and every individual to the support of the common cause ; and the rapidity with which they rushed to repel the common danger ; are facts of universal observation ; and will contribute more effectually to the permanency of the British influence and dominion, than the most splendid victories obtained over adversaries of the highest reputation ; because they shew the harmony which unites all the parts of our government, and their augmented strength under the compression of external violence ; and will be remembered as a most striking example, which every man concerned in its operations will apply to his own interests and feelings, that its greatest and most successful exertions have arisen out of the most desperate emergencies, and have fallen in every such

instance with the most dreadful vengeance on the heads of its aggressors.

For the sense which I have entertained of the particular conduct of the officers who have distinguished themselves in the late service, I cannot express myself in stronger terms than those of the following extract of my letter to the board, dated the 29th of September, and copy of one dated the 7th of October.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM THE GOVERNOR GENERAL
TO THE BOARD DATED THE 29TH OF SEPTEMBER
1781.

“I have forborne any particular comments in this place, reserving them, where they will be more properly introduced, for my detailed narrative. Yet I cannot suppress without a violence to my own feelings the testimony which is due, especially from me, to the unexampled zeal and public spirit of all our officers, and the wonderful activity with which these qualities were displayed on the late occasion. I have already acknowledged the early exertions which were made by Colonel Blair during my former short and calamitous residence at Banaris. Of Major Popham I cannot say sufficient to express my sense of his services. Though my letters were everywhere intercepted, Colonel Morgan, with a decision and solicitude that reflect equal credit upon his character, detached Major Crabb with his party to my assistance on the first and instant rumour of my situation. Colonel Sir John Cumming, with the like alacrity obeyed the order for his march to Kaunpoor; as did Colonel Ahmuty in the immediate dispatch of Major Crawford and the troop of cavalry. The same spirit animated every officer of every corps, and infused

“itself into the men under their command with an effect so far exceeding the common occurrences of human affairs, that in the complete space of one month this great and valuable Province, which had been suddenly and wholly lost, was in substance wholly recovered, to the British Empire.

“I am Sir &c.”

COPY OF A LETTER FROM THE GOVERNOR GENERAL
TO THE BOARD DATED 7TH OF OCTOBER.

“I have had frequent occasion to express in public orders the highest approbation of the zeal, spirit, and good conduct exerted by all the officers and troops in all the late operations for reducing this rebellious Zemeedary to obedience. Several of the officers have merited and received particular thanks by name; and it would give the greatest satisfaction to distinguish and reward each individual in proportion to his station and services. But as no government is possessed of the means of such diffusive recompense, it must be unavoidably confined to those whose elevated rank, or peculiar situation, affords them opportunities of laying immediate claim to the more honorary or beneficial testimonies of public gratitude. But such testimonies, whilst they are in possession of persons in superior rank, give hopes to, and excite the emulation of those also who are in the inferior; and thus by well timed and judicious rewards the prosperity of the state and the interests of its servants are united.

“It is on this principle that I request permission to solicit the consideration of the board for an honorable recompense to the two officers who have been first in

“rank, and most conspicuous in services, during the
“commotions in this district.

“Lieutenant-Colonel Blair who commanded at
“Chunar-gur, from the day of the fatal catastrophe in
“this town, manifested a general zeal for the public
“interests, and for my safety above all considerations
“for his own. Every requisition which I made to him
“was instantly complied with, and he sent me a rein-
“forcement of a battalion of Sepoys at a time when he
“had the strongest grounds to believe that an attack
“would be made on his own garrison, which it was
“incapable of sustaining.

“It is perhaps scarce less meritorious in Colonel
“Blair to have not only submitted without repining to
“the preference of an inferior officer to a command of
“such importance within the limits of his own, but to
“have assisted and co-operated with that officer with
“as much alacrity, as if the success was to have
“redounded to his own honor.

“This is not the first occasion on which the attention
“of the board has been called to the distinguished
“merit and services of Major Popham. They have
“been again most happily exerted in his present
“command for the safety and interests of the Company
“in a very perilous situation. I have been in a manner
“an eye-witness of them. I wish to express and to
“shew my sense of them, but I want language for the
“first, and means for the latter.

“As from the knowledge which I have of the char-
“acters of Lieutenant-Colonel Blair and Major Popham,
“I am certain that the most honorable reward will be
“to them the most acceptable, I beg leave to propose
“that they be promoted by brevet to the ranks imme-
“diately above those which they at present respec-
“tively hold; that is, Lieutenant-Colonel Blair to the

“rank of Colonel, and Major Popham to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.

“This preferment, whilst it is an honorable distinction to these officers, cannot be deemed an injury to their seniors, as their promotion will not be thereby retarded : They may be always employed on separate service and their rank will not be affected, when they rise in the regular course of succession.

“The company owe so much to the eminent services of Major Popham, that I may think it incumbent upon me at a future period to recommend him to their further consideration.

“Whilst I bestow the just tribute of praise due to those officers who acted upon the spot, I should be guilty of an unpardonable neglect, and even injustice, if I omitted to express my sense of equal approbation of the conduct of others more remote.

“Colonel Morgan on the first intelligence which reached him of my situation, and without waiting for official information or authority, in the true spirit of an able and zealous officer, detached a very considerable portion of his brigade, and all the supplies of provisions which he could procure.

“Colonel Sir John Cumming likewise moved with the utmost diligence and alacrity, on receiving an order to occupy the station of Kaunpoor in the room of the second brigade. He marched with his whole force in fifteen hours after receiving the orders, and reached Kaunpoor in four days, himself, officers, and troops cheerfully making their utmost efforts in the common cause.

“Such have been the spirited and judicious exertions of your officers and troops in support of the Company’s most valuable rights and possessions, of the dignity of their government, and of the honor and safety of

“their chief magistrate: A conduct which manifests
“the strongest attachment and affection on their parts
“and implies an observance of justice and regard to
“the prosperity and happiness of those who are placed
“under our authority, on ours. These are circumstances
“which will always afford me the most pleasing re-
“flections, notwithstanding the calamities which have
“produced them.

“I have the honor to be &c.”

WARREN HASTINGS.

“CHUNAR,

“*the 1st of December 1781.*

MR. HASTINGS'S DESPATCH ON THE NEGOCIATIONS OF 1781.

FORT WILLIAM,
30th April 1781.

IN our General Letter to the Hon'ble Court of Directors, bearing date the 27th Instant, we have acquainted them with our Intention of transmitting to you in a separate Address an Account, or Narrative, of our Proceedings with Respect to the Berar Government and the army of the Berar Rajah stationed for a long Time in the Province of Orissa, which contained Matter of too secret a Nature to appear on the Face of our Records, and we have now the Honor of communicating the same to you.

To render the subject of the Narrative clear and intelligible it will be necessary to revert to some Circumstances which happened a few Months ago, and to unfold the Dispositions and Views of some of the principal powers of Hindostan.

In the Month of September 1780 Advices were received here from the Governor and Council of Madras of the Melancholy Fate of Colonel Baillie's Detachment, the retreat of the Army under General Munro, and the Desperate State of our Affairs on the Coast of Coromandel. It was immediately resolved that the most Vigorous Measures should be taken to assist the Presidency of Madras with Men and Money from

Bengal. Accordingly, Transports were fitted out with all Expedition, and General Sir Eyre Coote was sent round by Sea with a supply of 15 Lacks of Rupees and a strong Detachment of European Infantry and Artillery, the Flower of our Army, and it was agreed that a further Reinforcement of Five thousand Sepoys should be Assembled at Midnapore, and sent afterwards by Land under the Command of Colonel Pearse.

At this important Period we were engaged in a War with the Maratta Government at Poonah, which had lasted for some Years ; Much Expence had already been incurred, and notwithstanding a constant Train of successes which had attended all the operations of our Army under the Command of General Goddard, We had still no immediate Prospect of Terminating the War.

It was at this Time known that Moodajee Bhosila, the Rajah of the Maratta State of Berar, and Nizam Ally Cawn, the Soubah of the Deccan, had united in a Plan of Confederacy against the English with Hyder Ally, the Nabob of Mysore, and the Ministers of the Peshwa's Government at Poonah. Moodajee was to invade Bengal, and the Nizam was to enter the Company's Circars of Cicacole, whilst Hyder was to pass the Gauts and lay waste the Carnatic. The Government of Poonah, pressed in their own Territories, could only contribute to this Plan of offensive War by Grants of Lands to its Allies.

The Rajah of Berar had nevertheless on many Occasions given the most evincing Proofs of his pacific Disposition towards the English, and had even given us early intimation of this Confederacy, alledging that he had been compelled to enter into it from a Dread of the Resentment of his Associates, and assuring us that, whatever Appearances he might be constrained to

Assume, he would not involve the Berar Government in a decided Enmity with the English. In conformity to this Plan of Policy Moodajee had sent from 30 to 40,000 Horse under the Command of his Second Son, Chimnaje Baboo; they received their Dismission on the Day of the Dusserah, or the 11th of August 1779. The plan of Operations prescribed to them by the Confederates was to march into Behar, which they might have reached in two Months; but instead of following this plan they took a different Road, and by studied Delays had only reached Cuttack in the Month of May following, being about the Time when the periodical Rains usually set in in that Province, which of Course served them as a pretext for deferring the prosecution of their professed Design; and they were at this Time still laying at Cuttack.

The Nizam had committed no open Hostilities against us, though there is every Reason to suppose (and he has even himself avowed it) that he was the Projector of the Confederacy, and had Secretly supplied the other Powers with Money to carry on their Operations Against Us.

The Advices from Madras proved but too fully the Activity and Spirit with which Hyder had begun to perform his Part in this Alarming Confederacy.

Such was the posture in which we stood with respect to the Powers of this Country. Our Advices regarding our European Enemies were uncertain: It was, however, firmly believed that an Expedition would be attempted by the French in the course of the season against some of the Company's Settlements in India, though it was impossible to foresee whether it would fall on Bengal, Madras, or Bombay, tho' the latter was most probable.

Under these Circumstances, it became expedient to

contract as much as possible the Sphere of our Military Operations, so that, without endangering the safety of our own Possessions in Bengal, We might be able to Act with more Force and Efficacy in our Endeavors to recover the Carnatic and to revenge the Injury which the English had sustained from Hyder Ally Cawn. The Government at Poonah had long borne an inveterate and avowed Enmity against Hyder, and though temporary Policy had now united them in one Cause, Yet his great and unexpected Successes might naturally revive their former Jealousy and Alarm the Ministers of Poonah with Apprehensions for the future safety of their own Territories. The Opportunity, therefore, seemed favorable for proposing to them Terms of Reconciliation from this Government, and as Moodajee Bhosila had always professed the strongest Desire of effecting a pacification betwixt us and the Maratta States, it was thought necessary to engage him as a Mediator in the intended Negotiation. With these Views a Treaty was drawn out by us and sent to Naugpore, and Moodajee was desired to get it executed by the Peshwa and his Ministers, and to sign it himself as the Guarantee for the punctual Observance of it on both Sides.

Whilst this Negotiation was in suspense it was agreed to postpone the March of the Detachment destined by Land for Madras, because its Route lay through the Territories of Moodajee Bhosila, and it must necessarily pass by that part of his Army which was laying at Cuttack under the Command of Chimnajee,—Circumstances which, without having obtained the previous Concurrence of Moodajee, might, in the unsettled state of our Connection with that Prince, not only expose the Detachment to Difficulties and Opposition in its March, but lead it into Opera-

tions very Different from the Intention of its Equipment, and draw on us the Decided Enmity of Moodajee, whose Power when exerted against us would prove an important Acquisition to the Strength of Hyder and the Ministers of Poonah. The great Exertions which had already been made by this Government required also some Time before the necessary Arrangements could be made for fitting out a new Detachment which was to perform so long a March and be employed in Service of so much Importance.

On the 9th January 1781 Answers were at length received from the Rajah of Berar and his Ministers, which contained, however, so many Objections to the proposed Treaty that little Room was left to hope for an immediate Accommodation with the Government of Poonah; And besides the Points which came into Discussion from their immediate Connection with the Treaty, these Letters contained a Variety of Claims and propositions Asserted by Moodajee on his own Account, which, though they were not wholly new, were recapitulated in a Style that impressed us with Doubts regarding the sincerity of Moodajee's former Professions and Assurances.

The Season for Action was now far advanced, Colonel Pearse's Detachment was almost ready, and the State of our Affairs on the Coast would not admit of longer Delay; it was evident also from the Answers which had been received from Moodajee that he conceived that our Affairs were reduced to a state more Desperate than they really were. To remove, therefore, this Impression, as well as to afford the most speedy Assistance to the Presidency of Madras, it was resolved that the Detachment should immediately proceed and make its way through the Province of Orissa against all Opposition. To reconcile Moodajee, however, to this

Measure by every Mark of Attention in our Power, and to prevent, if possible, a rupture from the meeting of the two Armies, it was agreed to depute a Gentleman from this Government to Chimnaje Baboo at Cuttack. Mr. Anderson was selected for this Service, and the following Instructions were given to him :—

FORT WILLIAM,
14th January 1781.

SIR,—We hereby appoint you our Special Minister to Rajah Chimnaje Bhosila, the Commander of the Army of the Government of Berar, now in the Province of Cuttack, and we direct you to proceed thither with all possible Expedition for the following Purposes :—

First.—You will produce to the Rajah your Credentials, and deliver to him and to the Dewan Bowanny Punt Appa the introductory Letters which you will receive from the Governor General.

Secondly.—You will Notify to them in Form that Orders have been given to Lieutenant-Colonel Pearse, the Commander of the Army lately formed at Midnapore, to March into the Carnatic by the way of Cuttack, its only practicable Route, apprizing them that this information is given them in consideration of the Ancient Friendship which has Subsisted between our Forces in the Carnatic and the Government of Naugpore, and for the prevention of any Cause which might eventually Disturb it. For this reason We have instructed you to request them in our Name to cause such of their Troops as may yet be in the Road through which our Army must pass to remove at such a distance from it as may prevent the Individuals on either side, and particularly the Followers of the Camps, whose Licentiousness is the most difficult to be restrained, from engaging in Mutual Broils, which might

imperceptibly lead to serious and alarming Consequences Affecting the Union of the two States, and to acquaint them that the strictest Orders have from the Same Motives been issued to the Commander of the English Army, who is a Man of Understanding and Prudence, to observe all the Duties of Friendship with the Rajah and his People, and to avoid whatever may tend to create a Misunderstanding with either; that the Force has been some time since assembled and ready to March, but Letters having been before sent to Naugpore containing the Substance of a Treaty proposed for the Guarantee of Rajah Moodajee Bhosila and the Acceptance and Ratification of the Ministers of the Peshwa, with other subjects tending to draw the two Governments of Berar and Bengal into a closer and firmer Connection of Friendship and Interest, the March of the Army was therefore withheld till an Answer should be received from Naugpore; that an Answer has been received, but not Conclusive, many Points remaining for Adjustment, which may be the work of Time; that we are Assured of the inflexible determination of the Rajah to Maintain the Ancient Friendship of the Bhosila Family with this Government, and to unite with it in one Common Cause whenever the Terms and Objects of it can be settled to our Mutual Satisfaction, but that we cannot suffer the necessary Plans and Measures of Government to remain Suspended in the Expectation of this Conclusion, nor our Armies to lose the Season of Action, while those of our Enemies are employing it against us; and that, having acquitted Ourselves of the Obligation imposed upon us by our Sense of the Relation subsisting between the two Governments, the rest remains with them, and they must be Answerable for the Consequences if they do not conform to our Example. You

will be careful to make them understand that the Orders to Colonel Pearse are positive to prosecute his March and make his way against all Opposition.

Thirdly.—If you find the Rajah and his Dewan disposed to take a more decided part in our Favor, of which, indeed, We have no Expectation, We desire that you will Solicit the Aid of 2,000 effective and Chosen Horse, or any less Number which they may be willing to contribute, to accompany Colonel Pearse and to act under his Command, and receive their Pay from the Company through their Paymaster, the Mode and rate of which We empower you to settle by written Stipulation.

Fourthly.—We expect that this application will draw from them other demands; but these We direct you to transmit to us, and wait our Answers to them, not judging it either necessary or expedient to give you more positive Orders upon other points.

It is our Order that you Correspond with Lieutenant-Colonel Pearse, transmitting to him Speedy and regular Information of all Matters proper for his knowledge.—We are, &c.

Mr. Anderson having received these Instructions proceeded on his Journey towards Cuttack. On his arrival at Ballasore he found that Chimnajee had Marched with his Army against the Fort of Dheckanall, which is situated among the Hills, and that it would be impossible at that Time to penetrate through the Passes which were in the Possession of the Mountaineers. Mr. Anderson communicated this Difficulty to the Governor General in the following Letters :—

BALLASORE,
22nd January 1781.

HON'BLE SIR,—I arrived here this Morning. The Maratta Army is, I find, engaged in the Siege of Dheckanall, which lays amongst the Hills a considerable distance to the Westward of the Cuttack Road. The communication is, I am told, almost entirely stopped, as there is a thick Jungle of near 17 Coss in length betwixt the Road and Dheckanall, which is so much infested by the People of the rebellious Rajahs, that some days ago a considerable Body of Horse which Attempted to penetrate to the Army with some supplies from Cuttack were obliged to return.

I foresee, therefore, a great Difficulty in reaching Chimnajee's Camp in Time to carry on any Negotiation before the Arrival of Colonel Pearse's Detachment; and what will, I fear, considerably Augment it is the Absence of the Phousdar of this Place, for whom I brought a letter from Beny Ram Pundit. I have delivered the Letter to his Naib, but having no previous Notice, he seems undetermined how to act untill he shall receive Directions from the Subahdar at Cuttack. This would require a delay of four or five days, but you may be assured I shall endeavor to find means of proceeding sooner.

Whilst I regret extreamly this delay, it is with Some Pleasure that I remark that the same Circumstance which is the cause of it renders the object of my Deputation less important than it would have been had the Army of the Marattas been unemployed and on the high Road to Cuttack.

If I can get the Naib Phousdar's Permission and a few of his Servants for my Protection, which, I find from Experience, is absolutely necessary, I shall set

out to-morrow for Cuttack, and there wait until I can hear from Chimnaje, or until I can get an Escort to conduct me through the Hills.—I have, &c.

BALLASORE,
23rd January 1781.

HON'BLE SIR,—I had the Honor to write you Yesterday. I have now determined to set out for Cuttack to-morrow Morning at all Events. The Naib Phousdar has promised to send two or three of his Sepoys along with me, which will, I hope, prevent any Delay from my being stopped by the Chowkedars on the Road. Bissumber Pundit, is, I find, with Rajah Ram Pundit at Cuttack ; I shall consult with him about my future Operations, and if the Road to Chimnaje's Camp is impracticable, I shall wait at Cuttack until I shall receive your Orders, or until I can find Means to convey a Letter and receive an Answer from Chimnaje. I do not understand that there are many Troops in this part of the Country ; they are mostly gone with Chimnaje into the Dheckanall Country. The few that are left are, I believe, under the Command of Rajah Ram Pundit, who is a Man of High Rank and much respected Amongst the Marattas. I think it is probable that the Chief Object of my Deputation may be answered by an Interview with him ; I mean the Declaration which you have enjoined me to make with Respect to the March of Colonel Pearse. But if you should think it at all Events necessary that I should find means of waiting on Chimnaje to pursue the remaining Object of my Commission, *viz.*, to persuade him to take an Active Part and join us, or to enter into some Engagement to remain passive, it will be necessary to send me more particular Instructions, because these Propositions will, as you have observed,

lead to Demands on his Part that I shall be unable to Answer until I can write to the Board and receive their Orders, which (hemmed in as Chimnajee is at present by the rebellious Rajahs) would be very difficult, and if effected, would be attended with so much Delay as to render my Negotiations with the Marattas, either regarding a Junction or remaining passive, of no use. With Respect to Colonel Pearse's Detachment, I beg leave to submit these Circumstances to your Consideration, and to request your Orders, which, as far as I can Judge at present, may reach me before it will be in my Power to leave Cuttack.—I have, &c.

The Governor General laid these Letters before the Board, and as there appeared so little probability of Mr. Anderson's being able to effect an Interview with Chimnajee, and that Gentleman's Presence was wanted at the Presidency for the duties of a very important Station to which we had lately appointed him, We Agreed to direct him to return to the Presidency and to leave the subject of his Commission with Rajah Ram Pundit, the Naib of Cuttack. The following Letter was accordingly written to him by the Secretary :—

FORT WILLIAM, COUNCIL CHAMBER,
29th January 1781.

SIR,—I am Directed to convey to you the Orders of the Hon'ble Governor General and Council that you immediately return to the Presidency, Delivering the subject of your Commission to Rajah Ram Pundit, the Naib of Cuttack, to be by him communicated to Chimnajee Baboo.—I have, &c.

Mr. Anderson in the mean Time proceeded on to Cuttack, and during his stay there wrote the following Letters to the Board :—

CUTTACK,
31st January 1781.

HON'BLE SIR AND SIRs,—On my Arrival here three Days ago I was informed that Rajah Chimnajeë was encamped with his whole Army amongst the Hills about 24 Coss from this place; that the Mountaineers were in general up in Arms against the Maratta Government; that they had for some time entirely cut off the Communication betwixt this place and the Rajah's Camp; but that it was then again in some Measure opened by the Reduction of the Rajah of Dheckanall, who had been one of the principal and most active Leaders in the Rebellion. I immediately Dispatched Letters to Rajah Chimnajeë and his Dewan, Bhowanny Pundit, informing them of my Deputation from you and of my Arrival here, and requesting to know if it would be agreeable to them that I should wait upon them in Camp. It is with concern I am obliged to acquaint you that the Hircarrahs who carried the Letters have now returned, and inform me that it is utterly impossible to pass through the Hills, even Considerable Bodies of Horse who have attempted to join the Main Army being obliged to return. This Information is confirmed by the Voice of all those with whom I have had an Opportunity of Conversing.

As there has been no Intercourse whatever betwixt this Place and the Camp for some Days, it is impossible to say where the Army is at Present. All the Inhabitants here conclude from a Variety of Circumstances that it is in Motion. But different Opinions and reports prevail regarding its Destination; some alledge that it was Chimnajeë's Intention to March against the Rajah of Sumbelpore, who had refused to submit to the heavy Exactions imposed by the

Marattah Government, whilst others conjecture that He is now actually on his March towards the Western Passes of Bengal. Though this is merely conjecture, yet the well-known Distresses and Importunities of Chimnajee's Army, and the Impossibility of finding any further Resources in this exhausted Country, give it an Appearance of Probability that will not allow me wholly to reject it.

I think it necessary to inform you that there are few or no Troops at present in this part of the Country.

I am this Evening to have a Conference with Manojee, the Dewan of Rajah Chimnajee's Duftur, and Hurdy Ram, the Dewan of Cuttack, which will probably determine me regarding the Measures which are now left for me to pursue.—I am, &c.

5th February 1781.

HON'BLE SIR AND SIRS,—I had Yesterday Evening the Honor to receive your Secretary's Letter of the 29th Ultimo.

Rajah Ram Pundit being at present with Chimnajee Baboo, and it appearing the Intention of your Order that I should communicate the subject of my Commission to the Persons who for the Time being might be considered as the Representatives of the Mahratta Government at Cuttack, I this Morning waited on Manoojee Pundit and Hurdy Ram, the former of whom as Phurnoveesse possesses great weight in the Councils of the Berar State, and the latter as Dewan of Cuttack holds the executive Authority of this Soubah in the absence of Rajah Ram Pundit. I had at a former Interview opened to them the Intention of my Deputation, and I this Morning entered on the Subject more fully, explaining it to them nearly in the words of my

Instructions. During the Course of our Conversation Manoojee and Hurdy Ram at first expressed some Apprehensions from the Resentment which the Peshwa and his Ministers would entertain at their Master's suffering Colonel Pearse's Detachment to pass. They enlarged much on the steady Attachment shewn by Moodajee to the English, even whilst all the other Nations were at Enmity with us, and observed that he had sent his Son to command the Troops, who, notwithstanding the pressing Instances of the Peshwa and his Ministers, had thus long avoided an Invasion of our Territories, and had even now, under pretence of reducing some petty Rajahs, removed his Army to a considerable Distance on purpose that our Troops might the more easily pass. This was a proof of Friendship which had not occurred to them at our first Interview. I was pleased, however, to find it adduced, and readily admitted it: I pursued the favorable Disposition which it discovered, and I have the pleasure to inform you that Manoojee and Hurdy Ram promised that Orders should be sent to all the Tanadars and Officers on the Road, not only to avoid doing anything which might be productive of disputes, but to assist as far as possible in supplying the Detachment with Provisions in their Route. The performance of this promise must, however, I am sensible, depend on the Intentions of the Maratta Government and the Orders which may be received from Chimnajee. At the request of Manoojee and Hurdy Ram I delivered to them the Letters of Introduction, which I received from the Governor-General for Chimnajee, and some Dispatches which I had brought from Beny Ram Pundit to his Brother, and they promised that they would immediately forward them to Camp under a strong Escort, together with a Letter from themselves to Rajah

Chimnajee informing him of the Subject of my Commission.

I learned from Manoojee and Hurdy Ram that Chimnajee, with almost the whole of his Army, was at a Place called Khond, on the Boundaries of the Cunjer Country, about 35 Coss from hence. It lays, I am informed, nearly N.W. from Cuttack, and no Inference can be drawn regarding Chimnajee's Intentions from the supposed situation of the Army, as it is said to be Almost equally convenient for Marching to any of the places for which Report variously destines it—to Sumbulpore, to Great Naugpore, or to the Western Frontiers of Bengal.

In Obedience to your Orders of the 29th Ultimo I shall set out To-morrow on my return to Bengal.—I am, &c.

Mr. Anderson afterwards left Cuttack and set out on his Return to the Presidency; on his Arrival at Ballasore he Overtook Bissummer Pundit, a Vakeel whom Chimnajee Baboo had sent through the Hills under a strong Escort with Dispatches to the Governor General. Mr. Anderson agreed to Travel in Company with Bissummer Pundit to Calcutta; but before he left Balasore he heard that Chimnajee, with all his Army, was come down into the open Country, which was confirmed by a Letter which he received from Chimnajee's Minister, Bowanny Pundit, expressing a great desire to see him, and requesting him to return from Balasore to Chimnajee's Camp, which was then in the Neighborhood of Jaagepore. But as the Order of the Board of the 29th January was positive, and Mr. Anderson knew not on what Grounds it was issued, he thought he could not take upon himself to deviate from it; he excused himself, therefore, to Bowanny Pundit in the best manner he could, and having written all the

Circumstances to the Governor General, he proceeded by slow Journies towards Calcutta, expecting to receive on the Road further Orders for his Conduct. The Governor General accordingly did write to him three Letters directing him to comply with Bowanny Pundit's Desire; but as they were sent by one Road and Mr. Anderson proceeded by another, they did not reach him till after his Arrival at Calcutta.

In the mean time Colonel Pearse's Detachment entered the Maratta Territories, and Chimnajee Baboo, whose Army was now within a few Miles of the Road, not only suffered him to pass without opposition, but directed one of his principal Officers to attend the Colonel and supply the Detachment with whatever they might want. The Colonel's Letters afforded daily Testimonies of the care with which the Officer executed his Instructions, and the Detachment during the whole of the March through Orissa had the most plentiful supplies of Grain and every kind of Provisions.

Repeated Dispatches were about this Time received from Chimnajee and his Ministers (*vide* Appendix Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9) professing their Friendly Disposition towards the English, and declaring their resolution to afford Colonel Pearse every assistance during his March through Orissa, but all of them complaining at the Same Time of the Hardships which their Friendship for the English had brought upon them, and the Difficulty which they found in pacifying their Troops, who complained of their want of Pay, and loudly called out to be led to plunder. A Letter was likewise about this Time received from Bowanny Pundit, the Moon-shee of Rajah Moodajee Bhosila, addressed to Benyram Pundit, the Berar Vakeel at Calcutta, which throws some light on the Views and Policy of the Court of Berar.

The Message which Bissummer Pundit conveyed from Rajah Chimnaje Baboo contained several propositions of great Importance, and as the Rajah had expressed some chagrin at not seeing Mr. Anderson on his first Deputation, We agreed to send that Gentleman back to him ; the Governor General also Sent Bissummer Pundit back at the Same Time with Answers to the Rajah's Propositions. As it became necessary to inform Mr. Anderson of the Propositions conveyed by Bissummer Pundit, and to direct him to sound the Dispositions of the Rajah and his Ministers regarding several Objects of a secret Nature, it was thought advisable to issue his Instructions from the Governor General only, without Minuting the particulars of them on the usual Records of the Council. The following is a Copy of the Letter which, being agreed on by the Board, was Written to him :—

FORT WILLIAM,
28th February 1781.

SIR,—For the better Accomplishment of the Views of this Government in the general Commission with which you have been charged, I think it proper to furnish you with the following Materials of Information and Instructions for their occasional Application :—

The immediate and professed design of your Deputation is, as it originally was, to reconcile the Government of Naugpore to the Passage of Colonel Pearse's Detachment through the Province of Orissa, and to afford it the most public Mark of Attention and Respect. It may, however, be productive of other Consequences, and these I proceed to explain.

The Cause assigned by the Government of Naugpore for sending so large a Force to our Frontier is the Necessity in which it found itself of complying ostensibly with

the sudden Requisitions which were made to it by the ruling Administration of Poonah and the Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn, and the danger to which a Refusal would have exposed it from the Power of the Confederacy in which they had recently engaged. This Intention was early notified to us with solemn Professions of Friendship and a fixed Resolution to maintain it. Hitherto I have no reason to doubt these Assurances, for they have been verified by Facts. Chimnajee received his dismissal, and is said to have began his March on the Dussera, or the 11th of August of the year 1779 ; he proceeded by studied Deviations and delays, and instead of entering Bahar, which was the prescribed scene of his Operations, he kept the Road of Cuttack, where he arrived in May last, and has Confined himself to that Province, though greatly distressed ever since. In the Month of October I secretly furnished him with three Lacks of Rupees to relieve the pressing Wants of his Army, and gave him Expectations of a larger supply if the Answer to the Letters then despatched to Naugpore were such as I required, that is, if Moodajee accepted the Guarantee of our Treaty offered to the Peishwa, and issued Orders either for the junction of the Army under Chimnajee with ours, or its Recall. He has done neither, but captiously objected to every Article of the Treaty, proposing such Amendments and Additions as he must have known would be rejected, and declined to send the Orders required to his son, but still professing an inviolable Attachment. It is possible that these declarations were made only to save appearances, as the barren Expedition against Dakkanaul at the precise Instant in which Colonel Pearce was preparing to March into Orissa can only be reconciled with any Principle of rational Policy by the supposition that it was calcu-

lated to remove it from the Line of his Route. He has been permitted to pass without Interruption, an Officer of that Government appointed to conduct him, and he has to this Time been plentifully supplied with Provisions either by the Command or the connivance of the Rajah. You will be yourself a competent Judge whether the consequent Conduct of the Rajah is answerable to the Conclusion which I have stated of the Authority which has prescribed it.

It can only be ascribed to two Motives—one, that which I have supposed; the other to profit by the departure of so considerable a part of our Force, and to invade the Province of Bahar with less Hazard of Resistance. I have no suspicion of the latter, because it is inconsistent with my Belief of the Policy of that State, and with the season of the year, which is already too far spent for such an Undertaking.

The Object of this temporizing system is to obtain the Acknowledgment of the claim of the Government of Berar to the Chout of Bengal, and I have no doubt that this concession alone would instantly Purchase their alliance and their decided and open declaration in our Favor. I know that this is their Object, although it has never yet been declared in Form: possibly you will be questioned upon the subject. If Chimnajee has authority to treat upon this or any other Subject, receive his Proposals and transmit them to the Board; if he has not, you will with propriety refer him back to his Principal, with whom it ought to originate, since he must ratify whatever is concluded respecting it. Profess yourself unqualified to talk upon any point not included in your Instructions, but hear and report whatever the Rajah or his Minister may say to you, and rather encourage than Check any Hope which they may entertain of our Compliance

with their Pretensions, endeavouring to learn from them what Advantage they are disposed to offer for so important a Concession, whether they will engage to unite with Us in the Prosecution of the War against Hyder to his final Extirpation, whether they will accept an Equivalent, or even more than an Equivalent, in any other Quarter for the Chout, either the Portion acquired by General Goddard of Guzeraut and Cocan, or such Conquests as may be made by Colonel Carnac in Malva or Khandish, or any other which they may suggest. Be careful not to put Questions to them directly, by which they may Construe a yielding Disposition in this Government, or an Eagerness to court their Friendship by too great Sacrifices ; but rather endeavour to lead them to the Information which you may Want by Questions of Explanation, and by such Observations, and even Misapprehensions, as may be most likely to produce the discovery of their real Sentiments and Expectations.

In the mean Time it is possible that some Advantage may be made of the particular and personal Views of the young Rajah himself. As the immediate Heir of his Father, he has Pretensions to the Succession of the Sovereign Authority of the Maratta State, and it seems to be the only Provision which can be made for him to secure his future Independency. Without this his Father's death will leave him at the Mercy of his Brother and without a Resource, for it is not likely that his Brother should expend the Wealth or hazard the Power of his own State to promote his Interest and raise him to a dignity superior to his own ; neither is it improbable that Moodahjee would be glad to see the Accomplishment of such an Establishment for both his Sons. The Policy of the Dewan is, as I am told, more directed to the Elevation of the Family and

Government than to the Establishment of any individual Interest in it, except, perhaps, that of Ragoojee, the eldest Son by Blood of Moodajee, but the Son and Successor of Janoojee by Adoption. Beneram and Bissumber Pundit are properly his Servants, and strongly attached to him; Bowanny Pundit is in the same Interest, and was chosen to his present Trust by Dewagur Pundit. These three Persons would take Alarm at any suggestion of a separate Interest of Chimnajee, and on this account you will cautiously avoid touching on any Subject tending to it with them. But I recommend that you seek an Opportunity to sound Chimnajee himself upon it: I am told that, though young and unexperienced, he does not want Understanding; that he is Ambitious, Spirited, and impatient of Controul. Seek an Opportunity of conversing with him alone; he will, perhaps, afford you one without any Contrivance on your Part, and this will be better. Avail yourself of it to inspire him with Hopes of the Rauje. Ask him, what is his present Object in the Command assigned him? Is it the Attainment of any Settlement in Bengal? This, if accomplished, whatever it be, will become the Portion of his Brother and his own dependance more confirmed by it, and to effect it he may lose the Friendship of the English, by which it may be in his Power to raise himself to a Condition of higher State and Splendor than any that his Family have yet known. There is no Power in the Maratta State which can oppose his Pretensions if immediately asserted; if deferred beyond the present Crisis, it may be too late. His own precarious Situation and future Vassalage and the Prudence of endeavouring to obtain some Provision during his Father's Life are Arguments which may likewise be suggested with Effect. The Subject is delicate;

break it to him warily : first try his disposition ; proceed as you find him affected by what you have said, but do not go beyond the Encouragement which he may give you. The Effect will at least be to gain Time, and to render him less solicitous for the Prosecution of any Measures which may involve him in a decided Enmity with the English ; and if you should be able to make such an Impression on his Mind as to induce him to become a Party with his Father for our Cause, it is as much as I can expect from it, unless he should at once resolve to anticipate his Father's Concurrence and join a Part of his Forces to Colonel Pearse's Detachment.

Bissumber Pundit has received his dismissal from me, and will immediately return with answers to the four Propositions which he brought from Chimnaje Baboo. These you already know. I shall therefore only State them in short Heads, which will be sufficient to mark the Relation of my Answers to each.

PRELIMINARY. *Moonsefee*.—This Word, which Bissumber Pundit has constantly repeated by itself as comprizing the whole of the Rajah's Meaning, I do not very satisfactorily Understand. But supposing it to require my Advice for his future Conduct, I have given it in the following Terms :—The Government of Berar has already afforded so many and so public Instances of its disposition to favour Ours, that it can no longer answer any useful Purpose to temporize ; and why should it temporize ? The reply to this Question is, for their Imaun, that is, for the Credit of their Faith. To this I have answered that the Faith of the Confederacy, if ever binding on them, having been originally imposed by Violence, has been long since dissolved by every other Party composing it—1st, by Hyder Ally Cawn, in soliciting and obtaining from the King

a Firmaun for the Subadarry of Deccan to the total Exclusion of the Rights of the Nazim, and to the Injury of the Peishwa himself, who Possesses a Part of the Territory which is included in the Grant ; nor is the guilt of the Act extenuated by the Inefficacy of the Patent, the disposition being equally manifested by it : *2ndly*, by Nizam Ally Cawn, who promised to support the projected Invasion of Bengal by a similar attempt on the Circars of Seecacole, &c., as soon as Chinnajee's Army was on its March, which Promise he has neither performed, nor has ever made the least Movement towards it : *3rdly* and *4thly*, by the Peishwa himself, or the Minister Acting for him, *first*, in ordering Beessajee to take Possession of the district of Gurrah Mundelah, which but a few Months before had been granted in Jagheer to Moodajee as one of the Conditions for his engaging in the Confederacy ; and *secondly*, in failing to send the stipulated supplies of Money for the Expences of the detachment destined for the Service in Bengal. A Breach of Faith in any one of the confederated Powers in any One of the Instances which I have enumerated, except the last, which may be justified, is a virtual dissolution of the original Engagement with the offending Party, if not with the whole ; but in these the Forfeiture is complete on all sides except that of Moodajee, who is, therefore, to chuse what Line of Policy or Connection may henceforth best suit his own Interests. As to his personal Attachment to the Peishwa, let him retain it. We bear no personal Enmity to the Peishwa, nor seek for any Object in the War with him but the Means of bringing it to an honorable Conclusion. Our Wish is to establish a firm and lasting Friendship with the Maratta State, and to Unite with it in destroying our common Enemy, Hyder Ally ; he is equally the Enemy,

and should he (which God forbid) prove successful in the War with the English, would become a fatal One to all his present Associates. Let the Government of Berar declare itself in our Favor ; its Influence will not fail to draw after it the Peshwa's Administration, which subsists only by the Powers of its Allies and nominal Dependants, for it has neither Wealth nor Resources left, having yielded a Territory of eighty Lacks to Hyder, the Province of Candish to Sindia, Aurungabad (if I mistake not) to Nizam Ally, and lost both Guzerat and Cocan to the English. Moodajee has frequently declared that he will not suffer the Range, which is his Patrimony, to be ruined. Let him now stand forth to save it, and assert his own Right to the Possession of it. He has no Competitor, for even the Title is vacant, nor is he likely to meet with an opponent. He may command our Assistance, and in his Name and under the Sanction of his Family the Maratta State and the British Nation may be united for ever. On these Grounds my Advice is, that Chimnajee look only to such a Conclusion as I have described, and either wait the Issue of it, if his Orders restrain him from Acting Openly in our Cause, or, if he may do it, join our detachment against Hyder Ally. The Interest which I have in offering this Advice does not lessen the Propriety of it if it is reasonable in itself, and for that let him estimate it by the Truth of the Facts and Reasonings on which I ground it.

I proceed to the Propositions :—

1st. *Expence of the Troops.*—You may engage to supply them with twelve Lacks. of Rupees, the sum which I formerly promised my Interest with this Government to grant to them in the Event of the Rajah's Compliance with the Requisition made to him in October last, and which, added to the former supply,

will make fifteen Lacks. He must not expect more, and for this he must solemnly promise either to return with his Army to Naugpore, or not to employ it against us. The Money shall be either paid to his Orders, or sent to Balasore by Sea.

2nd. Ragonaut Row.—This question can only be properly treated with his Father; but as such a reference might imply a Hesitation which would be dishonourable, I have plainly told Bissummer Pundit that in no state of our Affairs will I ever consent to surrender Ragonaut Row to any Power or Person upon Earth, although I should think it allowable to break off all connection with him, if that should be required as the Condition of any future Engagement whether with the Government of Berar or Poonah.

3rd. To retreat by the way of Gya, and burn a few villages for a Pretext, or shew of Hostility in the Way.—This I have treated as a subject of Ridicule, not of Argument; besides, I have said that it is too late to temporize. The Line once passed, it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to stop or retreat; and the Road to Bahar is at this Time impracticable, unless he would force the Passes of which our Troops have Possession, and I will never disgrace our Arms by ordering them to give Way to him.

4th. Chout.—This is a subject upon which I can make no reply but to his Principal, if he shall ever exact it. Beneram urges it with uncommon Earnestness as the Point which must decide the Union of the Boosla Family with Bengal, and proposes that it be granted as the condition of their alliance and Fealty under any Title that may express the Tenure by which it is to be so held and efface the Odium of the present Name. I have rather discouraged than countenanced this Idea, but not so as wholly to preclude it from

future discussion, and I now mention it that connecting it with what I have before written upon the general subject, you may accommodate your Language to mine upon it.

I recollect nothing further to add. You will regulate the Time of your Continuance with Chimnaje by your own discretion, provided he shall solicit it; but should he not, or should you see no good Reason for staying, I shall wish you to return early, as your Presence will be much wanted for the Business of the approaching Settlement.—I am, &c.

LETTER FROM THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

BARASSET,
1st March, 1781.

DEAR SIR,—I now send you my private Instructions; they are such as could not properly or prudently be given in public orders: and exposed, as, of course, these would be, to our official Records, Mr. Wheeler approves them and authorizes me to declare his approbation of them. They appear rather longer than the matter of mere Conversation needs to be; but I should have made them still longer had they been addressed to a person less informed or less capable of drawing the probable Conclusions from known or supposed Facts than you are; for I think much will depend on the Temper and Inclinations of the young Rajah, and therefore I have been so particular in stating the Points which are most likely to influence his mind, and even to prescribe the manner in which you may most successfully urge them.

I recommend to you to take Minutes of every Conversation with him; they will be useful not only for Reference, but, by connecting the sentiments of the

Rajah expressed at different Times, they will afford you a better Clue to his real views and Intentions.

Respecting the Connexion of the Government of Berar with Nizam Ally Cawn, I would rather refer you to Bissummer Pundit, who can give you the fullest Information concerning it. I will only say in a few words that I consider them as natural Enemies, although they are on Terms of outward Friendship. I can perceive that Moodajee (or rather his Dewan, whose Dictates the Rajah implicitly follows in all political Measures,) stands in some Awe of Nizam Ally, and I have sometimes intimated the possibility of our being driven to the necessity of Courting his Alliance in the manner in which I have hitherto sought that of the Government of Berar if the Latter should continue to procrastinate. He was the projector of the present Confederacy, and is said to be at this Time detached from it by the Report of Hyder's having obtained a Grant from the King of his Dominions. The Report is certainly true.

Do not fail to make my acknowledgements to Chimnajee for the liberal manner in which he has acted to Colonel Pearse, of which the Colonel writes his daily Testimony. He has a claim to a grateful Return, and on that Footing I would Yield him Advantages which should be withheld from him for ever if he employed the means of hostility or Menace to obtain them.

Rajah Ram Pundit has been very useful to us by his Influence and Counsels. Let him know that I know it, and am sensible of it. If you shall judge it necessary to ensure either his or Bowanny Pundit's Friendship by Gifts of Money, or to make similar Presents to others, you have my Authority to draw on

me for any Sums, and to Distribute them according to your Discretion.

If anything that I have said should require further Explanation, and such as can only be conveyed effectually by conversation, as I shall of course return to Town for a day in a day or two hence, let me know, and I will go earlier to see you.—I am, &c.”

Mr. Anderson having expressed some doubts regarding the Intention of some parts of the preceding Instructions, the Governor General thought it necessary to explain them more fully in the following Letter :—

BARRASUT,
2nd March 1781.

“ To remove every Ambiguity in the construction of the Paragraph concerning which you have expressed your Doubts, I desire you will read it with the following correction :—

“ You may engage to supply them with twelve Lacks of Rupees. This is the sum which I formerly promised my Interest with this Government to grant them in the Event of the Rajah’s (that is, Moodajee’s,) Compliance with the Requisition made to him in October last.”

This Requisition was that he should execute the Treaty which was proposed to him, and Order his Troops at Cuttack either to return or to join us : the Requisition has not been complied with. I now offer the same sum to Chimna Baboo, with the condition only that he will return, or solemnly promise not to employ the Forces under his command against us. I limit the condition to no Time, but to the Forces which are actually under the command of Chimna Baboo. These must never be employed against us.

Here I think it necessary to distinguish between

the Motive of this Bounty or the condition *for* which it is granted, and the condition *on* which it is granted, and I desire that you will mark the Distinction in all your Discourses upon the subject. It is this: I consider the Government of Berar as a sufferer by the many Instances which it has given of its Attachment to ours, and therefore entitled to some Retribution from us. To the World the appearance of its Forces, so near to our Borders, and their professed Destination against our provinces, will be construed an Hostility. To me, who know the compulsion under which this Measure was undertaken, and the pretexts which have been used to elude the purpose for which it was professedly formed, to whom both its professed Destination and the intended Evasion of it were early notified, and the latter verified by the slow progress of the Army, its Inactivity, its distresses, and, above all, by its Forbearance with an English Army passing in their Route and through their own Territory, it is an Evidence of the pacific disposition of the Government of Berar, and its Attachment to ours equal even to the Hospitality shewn by it to General Goddard's Detachment. We cannot repay the Expence which they have incurred by so long an employment of so large a Body of Cavalry in Inaction and in a remote and destitute Country, but I deem it incumbent upon our Government to relieve its present Wants and to afford it the means of a Retreat. It is a Debt of Honor, Justice, and even of Policy, for I doubt whether the Rajah could return with them unless he could either discharge a part of their Arrears, or lead them to plunder. It is therefore as a compensation for Losses sustained on our Account, as an Acknowledgement and Return for past kindness, not the purchase of future Forbearance, that we consent to grant them the Aid which you are in-

trusted to tender to them. At the same Time We have thought it proper to give it with the obvious precaution that it be not employed to our own Hurt, nor the Right forfeited on which it was granted by future Hostilities.

You must not exceed the Sum of Two Lacks in private Distributions: even that you will doubtless consider an Excess, unless some very substantial Benefit can be purchased by it.—I am, &c.

P.S.—I am not satisfied with the preceding Explanations, complete as they may appear; they want their direct and positive application, which I now add. If Chimnajee, in his Acceptance of the sum proffered to him, shall insist on any Reservation of the Right to employ his Forces against us in the next Season, or at any Period before their return to Naugpore, you must declare to him that his Claim to this supply will become forfeit by such a Reservation, and that it will put it out of our power to grant it; in a Word that we will not grant it."

With these Instructions Mr. Anderson proceeded to the Maratta Camp, where he held several long Conferences with the Rajah and his Ministers. The subject of these Conferences will best appear from the following Papers, which were sent by Mr. Anderson to the Governor General; they were originally intended by that Gentleman to have been considered only as private Information previous to his finding leisure to deliver in a regular Report of his proceedings to the Board; but as these papers were written almost at the moment in which the general Conferences related in them actually passed, they will afford the best Insight into the Views of the parties, and probably be more acceptable than a Relation more leisurely and methodically digested:—

CAMP,
13th March 1781.

ON my arrival Yesterday Evening I was received in Camp with every Mark of Attention and Respect. I was introduced to the Rajah and all his principal Officers Assembled; I delivered to him and his Dewan, Bhowanny Pundit, the Letters which I received from you. I took occasion at this Interview to inform the Rajah that you had sent him some Presents of Silks, which, together with all my own Baggage, had been left at Beercool, the Coolies who carried them having run away terrified at the Reports of the Depredations committed by a Body of Maratta Horse which had entered the Province of Jellasore. The Rajah assured me that these Outrages on our Territories were committed in Opposition to his Orders, and that the Moment he had heard of them he had sent to recall the plundering Party and to Punish the Persons who composed it. I deemed it necessary to obtain this Assurance before I entered on the Subject of my Commission.

This Morning I again waited on the Rajah by Appointment, and had a very long Conference with him, or rather with the Dewan, Bhowanny Pundit, in his Presence. Having produced my Credentials, I explained the professed objects of my former and of my present Deputation. Our Conversation afterwards turned on the Propositions which had been made to you through Bissummer Pundit. I was called on for the Answers, as Bissummer Pundit had referred them to me, and had affected an Ignorance of your Sentiments, even on those Points which you have replied to in the clearest Terms. The Dewan, in discussing the preliminary Article of these Propositions, endeavored to involve under it the Nature of our Situation with

Respect to the Peshwah, and it was with some difficulty that I could confine the Question to the Point of View in which you had considered it, and which at the Time of stating it was certainly the Point of View in which it was intended you should consider it, being an Appeal from the Rajah to your Justice. I went through all the Arguments which you have so fully laid down in my Instructions, and as the Dewan seemed inclined to Combat every one of them, the Conversation was carried on to a great length. The Dewan at last in some Measure concurred in the propriety of the advice which you had given to the Rajah, but he rested everything on your Compliance with his Expectations respecting the first Article of the Propositions, namely, the Expence of the Troops. I then proceeded to inform the Rajah of the Offer which you had empowered me to make him, of the Motives which induced you to grant him that supply, and of the Promise which you had directed me to exact from him. The Rajah, his Dewan, Rajah Ram Pundit, One or Two of the Ministers who were present, and even Bissumber Pundit, Affected much Surprize at the Smallness of the Sum; they observed that near Two Crores of Rupees had been expended on Account of their Attachment to the English; they expatiated on their present distresses, and remarked that the sum which you had tendered was scarcely adequate to discharge the Arrears of a single Jemmautdar, and insinuated the Consequences to which they might be driven by Hunger, Disappointment, and despair. I acknowledged in the fullest degree the sense you entertained of their Attachment, and admitted the Reality of their Distresses. I requested, however, that they would consider also the situation of our Government; that We were engaged in Wars with several powerful States; that although

We had, indeed, latterly been successful, yet that these successes had been obtained at a vast Expence of Treasure, and that much more might still be necessary; that as these Troops had not come thus far at our Request, nor even been employed in our Service, it was not to be expected that We could defray the whole of their Expence: all that could be looked for was, that We should assist in relieving them from their present distresses, of which their Attachment to our Government had partly been the Occasion; and this, I assured them, you had attended to in as full a degree as our own situation could possibly admit. In short, much Argument passed on the subject; and as the Dewan seemed to reject the Offer with a kind of slight which I deemed inconsistent with the Connection which has subsisted betwixt the Two Governments of Berar and Bengal, I thought it my duty to turn to the Rajah and Ask whether this was a positive and final Answer, or whether it would be agreeable to him before he gave me my dismissal to take some days to weigh all that I had said in his own Mind, and then give me an Answer.

I proceeded to communicate your Answers regarding the remaining three Propositions. I was permitted to go through those which relate to Rogonaut Row and the Passage of the Troops through Goyah without being interrupted or receiving a Reply. When I came to the last Article, and when I questioned whether the Rajah was Authorized to treat upon it, the Dewan informed me that he was; and on my telling him that I should in that Case hear and transmit to you whatever he might say, he replied that too much delay had taken Place on that subject already. He ran through the whole story of the Manner in which the Chout had been acquired, said that the Exaction of it had been

suspended on Account of the troubles which had happened in the Berar State, but that the Right still remained, and that the Troops who had acquired it were still the same. I satisfied myself with replying that the Troops of Aliverdy Cawn and those of the English were different; and We soon afterwards imperceptibly passed from this Article without my having an Opportunity of fully sounding their Disposition in the Manner which you have enjoined. The Article of the Expences seemed to engross the whole of their thoughts. They said they were willing to engage hereafter in any of Our Views, particularly to unite with us against Hyder Ally if he had actually solicited Sunnuds for the Deckan, but the Arrears of their Troops must first be paid, without which it was impossible for them to do anything; that it was with the utmost difficulty they could now prevent them from Mutinying by buoying up their Hopes with Promises of relief from Bengal; and that if a Mutiny should happen, it might prove very fatal to the Rajah and them all; that their Distresses and Apprehensions were now such that if I went away without fulfilling the Expectations of the Troops, the Rajah must go also from necessity and throw himself upon you for Relief at Calcutta. On the whole, you will not imagine that I had much Reason to be satisfied with the Expectations shewn by the Dewan in this day's conversation. I am not, however, entirely discouraged, as I ascribe it chiefly to the Idea with which Bissumber Pundit has impressed them of my being possessed with full Powers to settle any Sum which I may think fit, and it is natural for them to try every Method of raising it as high as possible. I am endeavoring to remove this Idea, and I would fain hope that when this is effected the Dewan will change his opinion regarding the Offer which you have made

to the Rajah. You will observe from the Manner in which this conversation has been carried on that I have little to expect from an Attention to the particular disposition of the Young Rajah. He showed a kind of complacent Indifference during the whole Time, and it was in Vain that I endeavored to engage him in the discussion by frequent Appeals to him on Points where the Dewan and I differed. I am again to visit him to-morrow Evening to deliver your Presents, which I understand are arrived at Balasore; I shall then confine Our Conversation to subjects of less Importance, and endeavor to obtain a more thorough Insight into his Temper and Character, and to acquire his good Will and favorable Opinion. I shall be in no haste to leave his Camp whilst there remains the smallest Hope of my stay being productive of any good. Rajah Ram Pundit, who has frequently visited me since my Arrival, has particularly implored me to represent to you their distresses, and entreat you to prevent them by a more considerable supply. It is in vain that I have repeated to him, and, indeed, to all the rest who have spoken to me, that you have fixed a Sum, and that I was certain that you would on no Account exceed it. Under the present Appearances I have thought it would be to no Purpose and premature to try the Mode which you have Authorized of private distributions. Notwithstanding the length of this Letter I have been obliged to Omit many things which I could wish to have mentioned. I must make an Apology for the hasty and inaccurate Manner in which I have written, and request that you will consider it as a private Letter addressed to yourself only.—I am, &c.

POSTSCRIPT, 14th, *in the Morning*.—Bissumber Pundit has just now been with me with a Message from the Rajah; he has shewn me your Letters to him to evince

that I have a discretional Power to encrease the sum tendered as I may think fit. I have explained to him that although you have referred the Rajah to me, yet you have communicated to me your utmost Intentions, and I must abide by them. He desired in the Rajah's Name to know whether he should March forwards to-day, and whether he should give me my dismissal. I have told him that I wish him to weigh well the Views which I had suggested yesterday and to act accordingly; that it is not my desire to leave him so soon; that, on the contrary, it is my Wish to stay some Time with him that I may obtain acknowledge of all his Sentiments and Wishes, so that on my Return I may be enabled to explain them to you; but that on both the above Points it must rest with him to determine that I could not give him any Expectations whatever of a larger Sum. I do not imagine he will give me my dismissal, though possibly he may make a shew of Marching. I am to Visit Bhowanny Pundit this Morning.

On a further consideration of my Instructions some doubts arise in my Mind, which, as they may still have their application, I beg leave to state in short Questions.

1st.—Shall the Rajah's Promise to return or not employ his Troops against us be in *Writing*, or will a Verbal Promise be enough?

2nd.—Shall it, either in *Writing* or *Verbally*, be required to be *on Oath*?

3rd.—Shall the Word *never* be positively expressed, or will it be enough if the general Tenor of the Rajah's discourse shews no Inclination *ever* to employ his Troops against us, and in his formal Promise will the Word *not* instead of *never* be in such case sufficient?

If you think any of these Points of consequence, I beg you will be pleased to send me answers to them, as they are not particularly expressed in my Instructions, and I wish to adhere closely to your Inclinations in everything.

Minutes of several Conferences on the 14th and 15th March.

14th.—I received several cursory Visits in the course of the Day from Bissumber Pundit and Rajah Ram Pundit, but as little passed excepting Expressions of the apprehensions which they entertained of the consequences which would accrue to both parties from our not being able to come to an agreement on the present Occasion, I forbear to Minute at full length the Particulars of our Conversation.

In the Evening I went with them to pay a Visit to the Dewan. The Conversation was begun by his Asking me if I had considered the Particulars of Yesterday's Conference, and what advice I had to offer. I replied, that my advice in conformity to that of the Governor was for them to accept of the Sum which in regard to their Attachment had been proffered for the relief of their present Distresses, and either resolve to join us when circumstances would admit in carrying on the War against Hyder, or in prosecuting the Object which I had pointed out to them of acquiring the Rauje of the Marattah State for the Bhosilah Family. The Dewan replied that Supplies were necessary. To this I answered, that when they should resolve to join in the former Object the Terms of our Union would necessarily be settled; but that, if they should embrace the latter proposal, the object would be more for their Benefit than for Ours, and that

I imagined it could be effected without their incurring much Expence ; that our Troops alone had already reduced the Government of Poonah to the greatest Extremity, but that when joined with theirs, or supported with the Sanction of their Name, they could not fail of success ; that the Rauje was now vacant, insomuch that even the Name of it was scarcely preserved ; that (as they themselves must be sensible) it was their known hereditary Right ; that there was probably no Power who would be inclined, and none, I was certain, would be capable, to oppose their Pretensions ; and that, on the whole, therefore, I thought the acquisition would be easy and infallible. The Dewan replied, that their engaging in this Object was a matter which must depend on the Councils at Naugpore ; that this, therefore, would require some delay, and that in the meantime what were they to do to relieve the distresses of their Troops which had come thus far, and which had for Sixteen Months depended on their expectations from our Government ? I replied, that for this Purpose the Sum was now tendered them. He answered, that the Sum tendered was scarcely a Mouthful ; that the Rajah had remarked to him that the Governor had stiled him in his Letters Yeazaz-az-jaan, dearer than Life. Was this a proof of it ? Was this all that he would do for one who was so dear to him ? It would appear that he regarded Money as more dear. I informed him that I had not had an Opportunity of knowing the subject of all the Conferences which had passed betwixt the Governor and Beny Ram Pundit and Bissummer Pundit, or of all the Letters which had been written to and from Naugpore, but that I never had understood that any more than what was now proffered had ever been required or promised ; that I had seen one Letter from Dewagur

Pundit, which though it mentioned high Expectations in case of a junction against Hyder Ally, yet it implied no higher Expectations for the Relief of the Troops sent to Cuttack. I asked him if any higher Promise had ever been made; he acknowledged that no express Promise had ever been made of a larger Sum, but that the Governor had always Promised his Friendship, and in Promising *that* had given them reason to expect a Supply adequate to their Necessity. Rajah Ram Pundit observed that the Letter to which I alluded from Dewagur Pundit related to a particular occasion when the supply wanted was only for One or two Months. I think it here necessary to remark that Rajah Ram Pundit yesterday observed at the Conference held in Presence of the Rajah that the Sum now tendered was only equal to what was in Agitation at the end of the Rains, when the Treaty was first offered to the Poonah Government, and that eight Months' Expences had since been incurred. I then replied that the subsequent delay could not be ascribed to us, but to their own Government, which had returned the Treaty with Propositions which could not easily be acceded to. To return to the Conference of to-day, The Dewan Asked what mighty Matter it would have been if the Governor, considering their hereditary Claims on Bengal, and from a regard to his Friendship to Chimnajee, as well as to prevent the consequences which may arise to our own Territories from their distress and dispair, had made each of the Zemindars contribute to raise a sum to relieve Chimnajee and enable him to return to Naugpore. He laid so much stress upon this method of raising a supply that I thought it necessary to inform him that Money paid by a Contribution by our Zemindars, or Money paid from our own Treasury, was to us much the same

thing, or if there was any difference, the latter was preferable.

Bissumber Pundit having declared to them that he knew not the extent of the Governor's Intentions; that he had only told him that he would assist them with a supply in Proportion to his Abilities; and that he had deputed Me with full Powers for this Purpose, I thought it necessary to repeat to them again and again that the Intention of my Deputation was chiefly to afford a Public Testimony of the acknowledgements of our Government for the Friendship shewn by Chimnajee in regard to Colonel Pearse's Detachment; that the Governor had, however, for my Information communicated to me the Answers which he had delivered to Bissumber Pundit to the Propositions conveyed to him from the Rajah, and had Instructed Me in conformity to his Answer regarding the expences to engage to supply the particular sum which he had expressed; that it was not in my Power to deviate from it; that, however, if they chose, I should certainly write to the Governor and communicate to him all that had passed; but that I could give them no Hopes that this would be productive of a larger Supply. They did not require me to Write, but left it to me to do as I pleased. We afterwards mutually Regretted the Interruption which from present Appearances was likely to take Place in the Friendship which had subsisted betwixt the English and Berar Government, and which, if preserved, We agreed might have tended to the mutual Benefit of both States. This is almost Word for Word all that passed at this Interview. I studiously avoided Argument, because I had observed a Captiousness in the Dewan, which, notwithstanding frequent Professions of Friendship gave our Yesterday's Conference more the appearance of dispute than I thought consistent

with Calm and friendly discussion. Nothing, however, of this Nature passed at this Interview : everything was said in a cool and deliberate Tone, and due attention was paid by each to whatever was said by the other. I afterwards went and paid a Visit to the Rajah and Delivered to him the Governor's Presents, which he accepted with much seeming Complacency. Nothing passed at this Interview relating to Business. I endeavored to engage the Rajah in ordinary Topics of Conversation, but, either owing to a natural Shyness of disposition, or to the diffidence of a young Man unaccustomed to converse with Strangers, or, perhaps, to the restraint imposed upon him by his Ministers, he shewed little Inclination to enter into any discourse. His answers were always short, and his Questions very few, but his Silence shewed no want of affability. Bissumber Pundit came to me afterwards and informed me that Rajah Ram Pundit would shortly come to me with a Message from the Rajah to ask me whether he should March on to-morrow. The effect of his March, We both agreed, would be the letting loose all those plundering Parties who had hitherto with so much difficulty been restrained, and Bissumber Pundit acknowledged that when a Fire was once kindled it was not easy afterwards to extinguish it. Bissumber Pundit said that the Rajah's expectations were about Fifty Lacks ; he has since talked of Thirty or Twenty-five. About Ten at Night Bissumber Pundit came again, and informed me that Rajah Ram Pundit was coming to ask me about the March of the Troops. I desired he would tell Rajah Ram Pundit beforehand that I had no right to object to the Rajah's Marching to any part of his Territories, but the Manner in which this March was proposed immediately after our Conferences would to all the World carry the appearance

of a threat, as it really was; and that as I was Instructed to offer a supply from motives of Gratitude and not from motives of Fear, I should not, if the Rajah Marched, think myself authorized to repeat the offer which I had made to him; that I had now done everything in a public Capacity that lay in my power to prevent a Rupture, but that there was, indeed, one thing of a private Nature which I could take upon myself to do, and that was to make Presents to the amount of a Lack or one and a half, or thereabout, to Bowanny Pundit, Rajahram Pundit, or any of the Rajah's Ministers; and this he might mention to Rajah Ram Pundit.

The same Night, about half-past 11, Bissummer and Rajah Ram Pundit came to me. Rajah Ram Pundit said that Bissummer Pundit had mentioned to him all that I had told him; he observed that in settling Forms of Purgunnahs or Business of such a Nature, Presents to the Mutsuddies employed were usual and proper, but that this was a Matter in which the Lives and Happiness of thousands were eventually concerned, and that in such a Negociation such Presents could have no Place. I excused myself to him; I reminded him that the Idea had been suggested by himself the Evening before, when he had insinuated to me that, if my object was to obtain anything for myself, the House of Bhosilah could easily give it. I repeated to him what I had said to Bissummer Pundit about the March of the Troops, and the impossibility of my continuing after it the Governor's offer. He then drew so strong a Picture of the distresses which the English would thus entail on their Provinces, that, considering it as a kind of Menace, I begged he would desist from such discourse; that it was, perhaps, improper for me to answer it, as I was sent only on the Idea of their

pacific disposition ; but that I would once for all repeat to them that Fear for our own Territories had no part in the Governor's Intention in sending me ; that our Troops were in possession of all the Gauts, and that We had a Body in the Field which the whole of the Maratta Army could not Face ; that all that could happen to us (independent of the loss of distant political Views) would be the spreading Terror amongst the Inhabitants of Midnapore, Jellasure, and, perhaps, part of Burdwan. Rajah Ram Pundit then told me that, as I could not be brought to alter my offer, a thought had occurred to him, which was for the Army to go on to Ramchunderpore, and for him and Bissumber Pundit and me to go to the Governor at Calcutta to see and prevail on him to give a larger Supply, but that I must promise to use my Endeavors in persuading the Governor, and that We should in the mean Time leave Mr. Redfearn with the Rajah.

I objected to leave Mr. Redfearn after I should go myself, but I said that I would send Mr. Redfearn with them and stay with the Rajah myself ; that their going, however, would, I was certain, be to no Purpose if the Army moved any nearer our Provinces after what had passed, as the Governor would not afterwards confer on the subject ; that as to my persuading the Governor, Bissumber Pundit could tell him that the Governor did everything from himself ; that his reason and Judgement were much superior to mine ; that it was my duty to regulate mine by his, and not to attempt to influence his ; that I could not even promise to advise ; that I wished to preserve Peace, and had a regard for the Rajah ; but all that I could engage was to represent all that I had seen and heard, and concluded with telling him that I could give him no further assurances or Expectations of better success with you.

It was agreed by Rajah Ram Pundit and Bissumber Pundit to represent what had passed to the Rajah.

15th.—Early in the Morning Bissumber Pundit came to me and told me that the Rajah had approved of Rajah Ram Pundit's going with Bissumber Pundit, Mr. Redfearn, and me to the Governor, and that the Rajah had desired him to apologize to me for any want of Affability which he might have shewn yesterday; that I must make allowance for his feelings as a Soldier hurt at being stopped in his March from what I had said in the Morning. Rajah Ram Pundit said that he was hurt at something that Passed betwixt him and Some of his Jemmautdars.

Received the following Letter from the Governor General :—

FORT WILLIAM,
11th March 1781.

SIR,—A Letter is received from Major McPherson, which reports that on the 7th Instant a large party of Marattas crossed the Soobanreeka and came so near to Fort Knox that the Officer stationed there Fired upon them, and that they moved off, As he supposed, in search of plunder. He adds that Dumdareea with a considerable Force was expected in the Same Quarter on that Evening or the next Morning.

I desire that you will remonstrate with Chimnaje Baboo on the Impropriety of this Conduct, and require his instant orders for the Retreat of his Troops from our neighbourhood, declaring that We shall consider their passing our frontier Line, and even their continuance near it, as a decided Hostility, since neither can be attributed to any other Design. It is also my order that you forbear to make the Tender to Chimnaje Baboo directed in my Instructions, or if you ha

made it, that you formally retract it until he shall have recalled all his Forces of every Denomination to a Man to the Southward of Ballasore.

Mr. Wheler authorizes me to Notify his Concurrence in these Orders, which you will therefore regard as equivalent to those of the Board delivered in the Customary Form.—I am, &c.

P.S.—A Letter since received from Mr. Pearce confirms the Intelligence of Major McPherson. I herewith send you a Copy of it, by which you will see the Consequences which this indiscrete Act, if it hath not received the Authority of the Rajah, is likely to produce.

I visited afterwards the Rajah and communicated to him the purport of the Governor's Letter. He desired me to assure the Governor that he had already issued the Orders which the Governor required. I shall Minute the particulars of this Interview hereafter; suffice it for the present to say that the Rajah dismissed me pleased with the Marks of Attention which he shewed to me, and with the good Inclinations which he discovered towards our Government.

MARATTA CAMP NEAR BALASORE,
15th March 1781.

As I have not Leisure to send you a regular detail of my Proceedings in the Form of an Address, I have taken the liberty to send you enclosed a Copy of the Minutes which I have taken agreeable to your direction of everything that has passed since my last Letter; they are incorrect, but will, perhaps, communicate to you a more clear Idea of the State of Opinions here than I could possibly convey to you in a Studied and regular Address.

It is now settled that Rajah Ram Pundit, Bissummer

Pundit, and I and Mr. Redfearn are immediately to proceed to Calcutta, and that in the mean Time the Army is not to move from this Place. I am sensible that Rajah Ram Pundit's visit and the Representation which he will make to you of the distresses of this Army will put your Feelings as an Individual to a severe Trial; But considered in a political Light, Rajah Ram Pundit's proposal of Visiting you seemed so much to our Advantage that I could not possibly Object to it. It will transfer the Appearance of a submissive disposition from Us to them. It will prevent an immediate Rupture, if there was any danger of it, and will so long protract Negotiation that you will have the Power to dictate Terms without regard to any other Considerations but those of present Compassion or Gratitude, and a View to future Advantages from an Alliance between the Two States. This Army will then depend almost entirely on your Mercy; for the Season will be too far spent for them Afterwards to be able to do any Mischief, a Consideration which I doubt not must have its Weight with you, tho' I have constantly and invariably in all my Conferences maintained the contrary. It is probable, I think, that Rajah Ram Pundit will be instructed to converse with you on the more important Views which I have suggested of a junction against Hyder, or the Acquisition of the Rauje. Their Faith towards the Peshwa or their Connection with Hyder has scarcely been mentioned, and I have no doubt but something of importance would be struck out betwixt you and Rajah Ram Pundit if the present Emergency could be got over.

I am thoroughly convinced that Nothing but distress will ever induce the Rajah or his Ministers to break with the English. Whatever has passed of a different

Tendency since my Arrival here has proceeded from the Mistaken Notion that it might work on me to Augment the Supply that I had proffered. The Young Rajah, who received me to-day without Restraint, has desired me to implore you to take him and his Army under your Protection, to consider them as much your Own as General Goddard's detachment, to enable them to return to Naugpore, and to command their Services Afterwards as you may think fit. We shall travel by daily Journies to Naraingur, and from thence I have desired Mr. Pearce to relay Bearers to Oolbareah. I have written to my Correspondent at Calcutta to send down a sufficient number of Boats and Budgerows to Oolbareah, so that there will be no occasion for you to take any trouble about our Journey; but I beg leave to suggest to you the Propriety of sending down some Gentleman of your Family to meet Rajah Ram Pundit: this will be a mark of Respect to which his Rank, and still more his Attachment to the English, entitles him, and it will be only a Return for a Similar mark of Respect which was shewn to me.—I am, &c.

I expect to be at Oolbareah in five days.

P.S.—The Rajah has expressed so much Anxiety for my Speedy Return to you, that I have been obliged to receive my dismissal without finding the Opportunity I wished for of speaking to him in private. It would have given much suspicion if I had desired that his Ministers and Bissumber Pundit should withdraw, and he has always been surrounded by them.

On receiving the two first of these Letters the Governor General wrote the following Answer to Mr. Anderson:—

FORT WILLIAM,
18th March 1781.

SIR,—I have received your Letters of the 10th and 11th.

Inform the Rajah that the Offer which you have been Authorized to make him was purely gratuitous, not intended for Negociation, but acceptance, and decline any further discourse upon it as improper.

The Rajah's promise to return or not to employ his Troops against us may be expressed either in writing or Verbally, but the Requisition must be Verbal and not in Writing.

It is indifferent whether the word "*not*" be used or "*never*."

I am perfectly satisfied with the Care which the Rajah has taken to repress the licentious Spirit of his People, and to publish his Disapprobation of the late Instance of it, of which I desire you will give him an Assurance.—I am, &c.

Whilst Mr. Anderson was at Ballasore Letters were received from Dewagur Pundit, the Minister of Moodajee Bhosilah, repeating the Circumstances of the Embarrassments under which his Connection with the English had drawn him, and strongly urging the Necessity of our supplying the Troops under Chimnaje with Money.

Mr. Anderson on his Return delivered to the Governor General the following Letter:—

FORT WILLIAM,
26th March 1781.

HON'BLE SIR,—In the Minutes which I had the Honor to send you from Ballasore I had only Leisure to mention in a few words my last Interview with Rajah Chimnaje ; I shall now beg leave to mention it

more circumstancially. The Rajah early in the Morning sent me a Message that he wished Mr. Redfearn and I would come and dine in his Tent before our Departure ; we accordingly went, and found the Rajah sitting with little Ceremony amongst a few of his officers. He received us with a frank and chearful Air ; all that cold Reserve, that affected Indifference, which I had remarked at our former Meetings was now changed into an open and animated Behavior. We talked of indifferent subjects, such as the Customs of Europe and Asia, with much good Humor ; and his Officers, who had at our former Interviews preserved a formal and respectful silence, now mixed in our Conversation with easy Familiarity. At length our Discourse turned on my Departure for Calcutta ; the Rajah then changed his Mien ; his Distresses rushed full into his mind, and he discribed them with a Degree of Energy that excited Compassion ; then, taking hold of my Hand, he in a Tone of supplication begged that, as I had been an Eye Witness of his Distresses, I would represent them to you in their real Colors ; that I would put you in Mind that they were drawn upon him by his desire of preserving a Friendship with the English ; and that I would in his Name implore you to take himself and his Army under your protection, to consider them as much your own as Colonel Goddard's Army, to make as great Exertions for their Relief, and to enable them only to return to Naugpore, and afterwards Command them as you please. He insisted more than once on my promising to represent all those Matters in the strongest manner, and earnestly entreated me to become his Advocate with you. I could only repeat to him that I should faithfully report everything to you.

When the Servants informed us that the Dinner

which the Rajah had Ordered to be prepared for Mr. Redfearn and me was ready, we retired to a separate Tent; the Rajah, however, soon afterwards followed, and, standing at a distance, pressed us to eat in a manner that shewed the strongest desire of pleasing. I mention this Circumstance, though apparently trivial, because it was a kind of Condescension, which to me marked the disposition of the Rajah's Mind more strongly than the most exaggerated professions.

We afterwards returned to the Rajah's Tent, and passed more than an Hour with him before he would consent to give us our Dismission; Bowanny Pundit in the meantime joined us, but he took little part in the conversation, being chiefly employed in dictating to the Moonshee answers to the Letters which I had brought from you.

Before we received our Dismission the Rajah insisted on our accepting of a Horse, a Turban, and a few Pieces of Cloth, and then, having repeated his Request that I would join Rajah Ram Pundit and intercede in his Behalf with you, he took leave of us with a degree of Warmth and Emotion that shewed both how much he was desirous of my representing his Conduct in a favourable Light and how much he considered his future Welfare as dependant on your Determination.—I am, &c.

FORT WILLIAM,
30th April 1781.

RAJAH RAM PUNDIT arrived at Calcutta on the 25th March, and the next day waited on the Governor General.

During the first two visits Rajah Ram Pundit drew a Strong picture of the Distresses of Chimnajee's Army; and to prove how incumbent it was on us to relieve them, he expatiated on the Friendship which had been

shewn by the Berar Government towards the English. He enumerated a variety of Instances ; their Conduct towards General Goddard's Detachment at Hoshungabad ; their delivering up Monsieur Chevalier, who had taken refuge in their Country ; their forbearing to invade our Territories, notwithstanding the Remonstrances of all their Allies ; and lastly, the Assistance which they had afforded to Colonel Pearse on his March thro' Orissa. He discussed with great ability the Interests of the Maratta States, and shewed that he was very sensible how much it would be for the Mutual Advantage of the English and Moodajee Bhosila to unite Cordially in a close Alliance ; still, however, his Observations were general, and he seemed to avoid any clear or particular propositions : it was agreed therefore, for the purpose of bringing the Negotiation to a Speedy Conclusion, that the following Propositions should be stated in Writing and communicated to Rajah Ram Pundit by Mr. Anderson :—

“That as a Return for the proofs of Attachment shewn by the Berar Government to the English, and to relieve the Troops from the Distresses which they at present suffered, and which were in some Measure Occasioned by their Amicable Inclinations towards this Government, We would give them 12 Lakhs to Complete the Sum which we had formerly promised to them.

“That we desired to know what was afterwards necessary to be done to effect the Desired Union of the two States. Would Chimnajee resolve immediately to send 3,000 or even 1,500 of his best Horse to join Colonel Pearse and act with him against Hyder ? Would he return with the rest of his Army to Naugpore ? And would he promise to Interest himself with

his Father to engage in Alliance with us, and to Send a Person from Naugpore to settle finally the Terms of a Treaty? That the following might be the Grounds of the Plan: That we should engage to Assist them with a Part of our Troops in taking Possession of the Forts of Burhanpore and Assur, and the Country of Khandeish which had been lately Assigned by the Peshwa as an annexation to the Jagheer already possessed by Madajee Scindia; that if it should be advisable to pursue further Conquests, We would Assist on a Plan of Participation; and that they on their parts should engage to Unite with us in effecting the total Extirpation of Hyder Ally Cawn. But that, if such a Plan could not be settled, We desired to know clearly what they would do on their Parts to Merit any further Assistance from us."

The next Day Rajah Ram Pundit returned an Answer to the following purport:—"The Demands of Chimnajee's Army Amount to two Crores of Rupees; in part thereof Fifty Laaks have already been paid; let the English pay fifty Laaks more: the Troops will then have received one half of their Pay, with which it will be in Chimnajee's Power in some Measure to satisfy them; and in this case He will Send 3,000 Men along with Colonel Pearse, and will March the rest to Naugpore. If it is desired that a more close connection should take place, let a trusty Person be sent from hence to Naugpore, and a Treaty may there be concerted and settled for the Establishment of a permanent Alliance betwixt the English and the Marattas and the Extirpation of Hyder Naig, or let Mr. Anderson be sent immediately with 50 Laaks to Chimnajee to satisfy the Troops, and bring Bowanny Pundit to meet the Governor at the Subunreeka, or in either of the English Camps at Dantoon or Narraingur,

to settle with him a Treaty containing the Terms of an Alliance. If this is approved, the sum of 50 Laaks must be sent immediately, because it will not be in Chimnaje's power to leave the Troops until he has satisfied them. If the Governor will give some Assurances that these propositions will be shortly taken into Consideration, Rajah Ram Pundit will accept of the Twelve Laaks tendered for the present as a part of the Fifty, and will Cause the Army immediately to March to a greater Distance from Bengal. But unless some Assurances of the kind are given he must decline receiving the Twelve Laaks, will repay the sum of three Laaks which was formerly sent to Chimnaje, and desires to receive his Dismission immediately."

These propositions seemed so highly unreasonable that the Governor General immediately sent Mr. Anderson to Rajah Ram Pundit with a Message, the substance of which was as follows:—"That he would send the 12 Laaks if Rajah Ram Pundit would accept of that sum in the Name of Chimnaje; that no more would be given; that the Rajah on the acceptance of this sum must return to Naugpore and not stay any longer at Cuttack; that if he would send 2,000 Horse with Colonel Pearse, their Charge should be defrayed by us; that the Governor General must decline a meeting with the Rajah, unless the Grounds on which they are to meet are previously settled, as he cannot possibly think of meeting to treat about Money; that Rajah Ram Pundit may stay here if he pleases, but that he need not stay in Expectation of more Money, as that subject must now be dropped."

This Message being accordingly communicated to Rajah Ram Pundit, he desired Mr. Anderson would return to the Governor General with the following

Answer :—" He consents to send 2,000 Horse with Colonel Pearse, who may receive the pay which shall be Agreed on ; he accepts the supply now Offered as a Return of kindness ; but, to prevent a Mutiny of the Troops, requests that a Loan of a further sum of 25 Laaks may be given, so that he may be enabled to quiet them : it does not signify although a delay of 12 or 15 days should take place in procuring the Loan : if it is only Agreed to by the Governor, he will immediately send off the Twelve Laaks and cause the Troops to remove towards Naugpore. He proposes that the Loan should be obtained either in his Name or in that of Syna Behader (Chimnaje) from Merchants, and that the Company should be security ; it may afterwards be repaid by means of Conquests of Countries on a plan which may be settled : it is requested from necessity, because Syna Bahader has no means of satisfying his Troops. He desires that this may be accepted as an Apology for his repeating with so much Importunity the subject of Money ; he begs that the Governor General will take Syna Bahader under his protection and relieve him in his present distress. If this loan is not Acceded to, Rajah Ram Pundit wishes to be dismissed as soon as the Governor General pleases ; And in that case nothing can be settled, as the sum Tendered cannot be accepted, and a Mutiny must be the Consequence amongst the Troops in Orissa."

The above propositions being laid before the Board the following Resolution was passed:—"It is necessary to bring this Negotiation to a Conclusion : We cannot comply with either of the propositions made by Rajah Ram Pundit. We cannot advance the Money required ; We cannot give our Security to the Loan, because we know it to be impracticable at the Rate of Interest allowed by our Bonds, and to allow a higher

rate will destroy our own Credit, besides that such a security will be construed, and will be in effect a payment. If the Government of Naugpore is willing to concur with our Views for its Aggrandizement, and a connection of Interests in the Manner which has been held out to it, We are ready to assist them with our Forces; We will endeavor to give them the possession of Burhanpore and of Assur, which will Yield a Revenue of 80 Laaks, and of Gurrah Mundela, of which the amount is unknown, but Valuable. If the Government of Naugpore looks only to the acquisition of ready Money, We have it not to give, nor will their Friendship be an object to us on such a Footing. Let this be understood to be our final Answer."

Rajah Ram Pundit, on being informed of the above Resolution, returned a New Sett of Propositions, the Substance of which was as follows:—

"That the Sum formerly tendered to the Government of Naugpore was 16 Laaks, and that only three have yet been paid; That he will accept of the remaining thirteen Laaks, which he will dispatch to Syna Bauder for the relief of his Army; That he will cause the Army to March immediately to Dhekanaul on the way to Gurrah Mandelah; That he himself will stay here for some time longer on this Government's giving him Assurances that they will afterwards Assist him in procuring a Loan of Ten or fifteen Laaks, to be repaid in two Years from the Money to be acquired from the Conquest of Gurrah Mundelah, and for which he as Naib of Cuttack will be Security. That he will for the present engage to send 2,000 Horse to join Colonel Pearse, and to assist in the War against Hyder Ally, and that Dewagur Pundit will afterwards come from Naugpore and settle more fully the Terms of an Alliance betwixt the two States."

These Propositions were declared to be final. The point on which our Negotiations hinged was now reduced to an Object which appeared of little Magnitude when compared with the vast Importance of turning the Scale of the powers of Hindostan by detaching the Berar Government from the Confederacy formed against Us, and engaging it on our side. When the propositions, therefore, were laid before the Board, it was immediately resolved to Accede to them. Accordingly, the Sum of 13 Laaks was advanced to Rajah Ram Pundit, and on the Second of April he attended us in Council and laid before us the following Articles of Agreement, which he desired to be considered as preliminary to a definitive Treaty betwixt the English and Berar Government :—

ACCOUNT OF THE MONTHLY EXPENCE OF THE TROOPS
TO BE SENT ALONG WITH COLONEL PEARSE.

2,000 Suars or Horse, at 50,000 Rupees per Month for each 1,000, making altogether One Laak of Rupees per Month.

Dated 8th Rebbec-ul-Sanee in the 22nd Year of the Reign.

The said allowance shall commence from the Time of the Troops leaving Cuttack, and when they shall have finished the Service, and (having received their Dismission from the Commander of the English Troops) they shall return to their own Country, their Pay shall be continued according to the Number of *Munzels*, or Days' Journies, which there may be from the place of their Dismission to the City of Cuttack.

Whereas a Friendship is firmly established betwixt

Maha Rajah Moodajee Bhosila and the English, the following Articles are Accordingly settled by Syna Behader through Rajah Ram Pundit :—

1st.—That Rajah Syna Bheader shall send 2,000 Good and effective Horse along with Colonel Pearse to Assist the English in the War against Hyder Naig ; that the Officer Commanding them shall act under the Orders of the said Colonel, or the Officer who shall Command the Bengal Troops in the Carnatic ; And that they shall receive from the Officer who shall Command the Bengal Troops in the Carnatic an Allowance for their support at the rate which hath been settled in a Separate Paper by the Governor General and Council and Rajah Ram Pundit Month by Month, in the same proportion as the English Troops shall receive their pay.

2nd.—That the Army of Rajah Syna Behader will immediately leave Orissa and March on an Expedition against Gurrah Mundelah ; Let the Governor General and Council of the English, from a Regard to the Friendship which subsists betwixt the Family of Bhosilah and the English, give Orders that an English Officer, with a Body of the Troops now Stationed in Hindostan, may March from that Quarter to Assist the Rajah in the above-mentioned Expedition, and having reduced Gurrah Mundelah establish immediately the Rajah's Garrisons there.

3rd.—That in Order that the Friendship betwixt the Family of Maha Rajah Moodajee Bhosilah and the English may daily be strengthened and Augmented, let the Governor General and Council for the present send a Trusty person to Naugpore, and hereafter the Dewan, Dewagur Pundit, will come from that place and have an Interview with the Governor General, when, with their Mutual advice and Approbation, the

Desires and Demands of both parties will be adjusted and Settled.

4th.—That if it should happen from particular Circumstances that an Interview betwixt Dewagur Pundit and the Governor General cannot take place, In that case the Desires and Demand of both parties may be settled at Naugpore by the Intervention of a Trusty Person, and the Bounds of Friendship shall be so firmly established betwixt the Family of Bhosilah and the English, that no Infraction or Injury can ever by any Means happen to them.

These Papers being signed by us and Rajah Ram Pundit with the Testimony of Beny Ram Pundit, the Vakeel of Moodajee Bhosilah, Copies of them were mutually interchanged. An Order has since been issued by us to the Sub-Treasurer to advance such Sums on Account of the intended Loan of Ten Laaks as the State of our Treasury will admit, and Rajah Ram Pundit has delivered to us an engagement to the following purpose :—

“Whereas the Governor General and Council of the English have promised that in order to Assist in supplying the Expences of the Troops of Maha Rajah Moodajee Bhosila, which are Arrived with the Rajah Syna Behader in Orissa, they will procure the Sum of Ten Laaks of Sicca Rupees from Merchants of the Province of Bengal and deliver it as a Loan through the Hands of Beny Ram Pundit, and accordingly an Order has been delivered to the said Pundit for the said Sum of the English Treasurer. In consideration thereof it is Stipulated and written on Behalf of the aforesaid Rajah Syna Behader by Rajah Ram Pundit, that he will Discharge the said Sum within the Term of Two Years, and will pay Interest at the rate of 8 Per Cent. Per Annum, to be calculated from the

dates of the several Payments which will be ascertained from the Receipts of Beny Ram Pundit. In case the said Loan and Interest should not be punctually repaid by Maha Rajah Moodajee Bhosilah and Rajah Syna Behader, Rajah Ram Pundit, who is Naib of the Province of Orissa, engages on his own Part that he will Pay in the Term above Limited the said Sum, with Interest at the rate above mentioned, either from his own private fortune, or from the Revenues of the Province of Orissa.

Written the 6th April 1781, or 11th of Rebbec-ul-Sannee, 1170 of the Hegyra."

Rajah Ram Pundit has since taken his leave and is gone to Chimnajee's Camp to make the necessary Arrangements for the March of the 2,000 Horse which are to join Colonel Pearse.

We have thus fully given a Narrative of this Negotiation, because We think the Issue of it may be productive of an important change in the Political State of Hindostan. We shall now beg leave to close it with a few Observations. By acceding to Rajah Ram Pundit's propositions we have effectually detached one of the most powerful States from the general Confederacy against us into which it had apparently entered. We shall by this Measure add strength to ourselves in proportion as We diminish that of the Confederacy. The Separation of the Berar Government will doubtless excite Distrust amongst the remaining Powers; and probably the Example will be followed. The Nizam, who has not yet entered into open Hostilities against Us, and the Ministers of Poonah, who already Tremble for their own Existence, Seeing the Confederacy begin to dissolve, will naturally be desirous of securing themselves by an early Peace. The mere Fame of an Alliance betwixt the English and

the Government of Berar will have a great Effect. We shall no longer be considered as sinking under the united Weight of every State in Hindostan : The Scale of Power evidently turned in our Favor ; and this is of more Importance than could be well imagined in Europe, where the Policy of Nations is regulated by principles the very reverse of those which prevail in Asia. There in Contests betwixt Nations the weaker is held up by the Support of its Neighbors, who know how much their own safety depends on the preservation of a proper Balance. But in Asia the Desire of partaking of the spoils of a falling Nation and the dread of incurring the Resentment of the Stronger party are the immediate Motives of Policy, and every State wishes to Associate itself with that Power which has a decided Superiority.

It is true the Alliance which is held out in Rajah Ram Pundit's propositions apparently relates to Objects of a very limited Nature. But it is not to be doubted that when once the Marattas of Naugpore are fairly involved with us in the Prosecution of these Objects, it will not long rest with them to set Bounds to our connection. The Assistance which is to be given to us in the War with Hyder is as full a Declaration of Hostility against that Prince as if they had sent their whole Army ; and their Employing our Forces to assist them in recovering Gurrah Mundelah from a Tributary of the Peshwah will probably lead to a Complete Junction of their strength and ours against the Government of Poonah, or reduce the latter to the Necessity of becoming a Party with them and Us.

We will now consider what would have been the Alternative if we had refused to accede to propositions which were evidently so desirable. Whatever might have been the real Inclination of Chimnaje, or the

Dictates of his Father, Moodajee Bhosila, his unpaid Troops had long been kept quiet only by the Hopes which were held out to them of acquiring Wealth from the plunder of Bengal. And if no supply had been granted to them, it is probable that Extreme Distress would have compelled them to seek for support by an Invasion of our Frontiers. It would be little Consolation to us to know that their own Destruction would be the certain Effect of such a Measure. We know that before they could have been totally Destroyed, or even expelled, much Mischief would have been done in the Provinces of Burdwan and Midnapore by their Depredations, and still more by the Alarm which they would have excited amongst the Inhabitants. The Revenues and Investments must have been put to a stop from the Desertion of the Royets and Manufacturers; the immediate Loss would have considerably exceeded the Sum now requested; and the fatal Consequences of such an Irruption would have been felt throughout these Provinces, and particularly in the Manufactures, for many succeeding Years. We can mention on the best Information that the Desertion of the Manufacturers for only 3 Days from the Aurung of Radnagur alone would have occasioned a Loss of 4 Laaks of Rupees, as the Silk Worms must have been wholly destroyed, and their Loss could not have been recovered for many Years. If the Troops of Chimnajee had been driven to this Extremity, a War must inevitably have ensued with the Government of Berar, more Dangerous to our possessions in Bengal than any in which we have ever been engaged since our Acquisition of the Dewanny.

Nor are the advantages to be derived from the present Agreement merely Speculative or Negative. The great and almost the only Defect of the Detach-

ment sent under the Command of Colonel Pearse to the relief of the Carnatic is the want of a Body of Cavalry. The present offer of 2,000 of Chimnaje's Horse will amply supply this Defect; they will be fully sufficient to prevent the Detachment from being harassed on the March, or suffering from want of Provisions, and though little can be expected in the Field of Battle from the Discipline of Maratta Horse, yet as much may be expected from them as from the Horse which will be opposed to them by Hyder Ally. The Junction of this Body will prove, therefore, of real and immediate Service.

We are aware that Men who are inclined to object will not fail to employ the most Specious Arguments to draw Censure on this Negotiation. They will avail themselves of Maxims which have already obtained the popular Opinion; they will without Hesitation ascribe our Conduct in supplying Chimnaje with Money to weakness or want of Foresight; and they will declaim that the History of all Ages, from the remotest period down to the present Century, shews that to purchase the Forbearance of invading Enemies serves only to tempt them to return with increased Numbers. It is in vain to attempt to answer every objection which Ingenuity may devise. We must rely on your Candor to impute our Conduct to more honorable and judicious Motives. It cannot escape your Attention that the Negotiation for Money began at a Time when we could have little to apprehend, though much to hope, from the Government of Naugpore; That it was held out as an Inducement to obtain their Assistance in effecting an Accommodation with the Government of Poonah; and that the professed object of it was a Retribution for the heavy Expence which they had incurred from their Desire of preserving Peace with the English.

When their Answers from Naugpore affected a higher Style and indicated a change of Disposition, Mr. Anderson was sent to Cuttack without any Authority to treat on Money; Colonel Pearse was Ordered to proceed through Orissa in Defiance of all Opposition; and an Army was Assembled under the Command of Colonel Ironside for the Defence of our Frontiers of Burdwan and Midnapore. During all this Time the Negociation for Money was dropped, nor was it renewed untill Colonel Pearse had passed without Opposition close to the Maratta Army, and untill new proofs were given us of an Amicable Disposition. The Governor General's Letter of the 2nd March to Mr. Anderson will fully explain to you that though we thought it in prudence necessary to Stipulate the Return of Chimnajee's Army as a Condition of granting the Supply, yet the Motives or the Conditions for which we were willing to grant it were different. And the Governor General's Letters of the 11th and 18th March will shew that when Motives of Gratitude ceased and Hostilities were expected, We instantly directed Mr. Anderson to retract our Offer and to decline any further Discourse on the Subject of Money. At length the Affecting manner in which the Rajah opened his Distresses to Mr. Anderson at his last Interview and threw himself on our Mercy for relief induced us to resume the subject with Rajah Ram Pundit. These Circumstances have not escaped the Attention of the Marattas themselves, and we are satisfied that they in whose Opinion the public is, perhaps, most interested have not mistaken the Motives of our Conduct; nor need we apprehend that the supply which they have received will ever tempt them to return to these Provinces: They best know the extreme Distresses which they have suffered, the

heavy Expences which they have incurred, and the Misery which they entailed by this Expedition on their province of Orissa ; and it is not to be supposed that they will ever again attempt to fit out an Army of 30,000 Horse at an unavoidable Expence of more than a crore of Rupees to March a thousand Miles through a hilly Country in the Expectation of Acquiring a supply of 12 Laaks of Rupees. On the whole, whatever the designing or uninformed part of the world may say, We flatter ourselves that you, in whose Approbation we are most particularly interested, having all these Circumstances fully before you, will be pleased, not only to approve of the Motives which have influenced us in this Negociation, but also of the favorable Issue to which we have happily brought it.

It remains only for us to Observe that Letters have lately been received from Chimnajee confirming everything that has been settled by Rajah Ram Pundit, and we have the pleasure to think that he has now engaged Sincerely and Cordially on our Side.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

BENGAL IN 1772, PORTRAYED BY WARREN HASTINGS

To the HON'BLE THE COURT OF DIRECTORS FOR AFFAIRS OF THE
HON'BLE THE UNITED COMPANY OF MERCHANTS OF
ENGLAND TRADING TO THE EAST INDIES. Dated Fort-
William, the 3d November 1772.

Revenue Department.

HON'BLE SIRs,—In our address by the Colebrooke, dated the 13th April last, we acquainted you with the state of your revenues in Bengal to that period, since which we have closed the account of the neat settlements and collections for the last Bengal year, a copy of which we now transmit a number in this packet. From it you will please to observe that the total receipts, including some deductions written off to profit and loss in the Moorsshedabad treasury, amounted for last year to sicca rupees 1,57,26,576 : 10 : 2 : 1 ; so that the Ballances for that year are now reduced to Rs. 12,40,812 : 7 : 15, a great part of which we shall hope to realise ; and we flatter ourselves that this reduction of the Ballances, and the comparative view we hope you will take of the Bengal collections for these several years past, with those of the last year, will fully satisfy you as to the favourable Success we have met with in collection of the revenues. The Moorsshedabad books, that will be transmitted to you by the next ship completely ballanced, will further elucidate the statement of the last year's revenue, which we have now the honour of enclosing.

At a meeting of your Council of the 30th August, it was unanimously resolved to adopt the plan proposed by our President and members of the Committee of Circuit at Cossimbazaar, for removing the Seat of the Revenue Business to the Presidency,

and for putting this important Branch of your affairs under the immediate management of your Governor and Council; in consequence of which we formed ourselves into a Board of Revenue the 13th ultimo. Since that time all affairs respecting the Collections or internal Government of the Provinces have been confined solely to this department, and we shall henceforth address you separately upon all matters which come under these Heads.

In order to give you a distinct Idea of this subject, and to make it the more complete, we shall begin by recapitulating the most important measures that have been lately taken, and in which you have been in part advised in our former Letters.

In one letter by the Nottingham, you were informed of our intention of letting the lands throughout the provinces in farm, upon long and well-regulated Leases; and we are happy to reflect that such a material and principal mode of conducting the Collections, should coincide so entirely with your sentiments and orders on the subject. After the most serious and mature deliberation on this point, we determined, in our proceedings of the Committee of the Revenue of the 14th May, to establish a plan for settling the several districts upon this footing, and for the future government of your Collections. This being the Constitutional Ground-work of all our subsequent measures, and of the system which we have since attempted to build upon it, we have thought it necessary, for your immediate attention, to transmit a copy of it as a Number in the Packet, with our reasons at large for adopting the Regulations therein laid down.

Before we proceed further upon this subject, it may not be improper to premise some general Remarks on the State of the Province at this Juncture.

The effects of the dreadful Famine which visited these Provinces in the Year 1770, and raged during the whole course of that Year, have been regularly made known to you by our former advices, and to the public by laboured descriptions, in which every Circumstance of Fact, and every Art of Languages, have been accumulated to raise Compassion, and to excite Indignation against your Servants, whose unhappy lot it was to be the witnesses and spectators of the sufferings of their fellow-creatures. But its influence on the Revenue has been yet unnoticed, and even unfelt, but by those from whom it is collected; for, notwithstanding the loss of at least one-third of the Inhabitants of the Province, and the consequent decrease of the Cultivation, the nett collections of the year 1771 exceeded even those of 1768, as

will appear from the following Abstract of Accounts of the Board of Revenue at Moorshedabad for the four last years :—

Bengal Year.	
1175 [1768-69].—Net Collections,	1,52,54,856 : 9 : 4 : 3
1176 [1769-70].—The year of dearth, which was productive of the Famine in the following year,	1,31,49,148 : 6 : 3 : 2
1177 [1770-71].—The year of the Famine and Mortality,	1,40,06,030 : 7 : 3 : 2
1178 [1771-72].	1,57,26,576 : 10 : 2 : 1
Deduct the amount of deficiencies occasioned in the Revenue by unavoidable losses to Government,	3,92,915 : 11 : 12 : 3
	1,53,33,660 : 14 : 9 : 2

It was naturally to be expected that the diminution of the Revenue shou'd have kept an equal pace with the other Consequences of so great a Calamity. That it did not, was owing to its being violently kept up to its former Standard. To ascertain all the means by which this was effected will not be easy. It is difficult to trace the Progress of the Collections through all its Intricate Channels, or even to comprehend all the Articles which compose the Revenue in its first operations. One Tax, however, we will endeavour to describe, as it may serve to account for the Equality which has been preserved in the past Collections, and to which it has principally contributed. It is called *Najay*, and it is an Assessment upon the actual inhabitants of every Inferior Description of the Lands, to make up for the Loss sustained in the Rents of their neighbours who are either dead or have fled the Country. This Tax, though equally impolitic in its Institution and oppressive in the mode of exacting it, was authorised by the antient and general usage of the Country. It had not the sanction of Government, but took place as a matter of course. In ordinary cases, and while the Lands were in a state of cultivation, it was scarcely felt, and never or rarely complained of. However irreconcilable to strict Justice, it afforded a preparation to the State for occasional Deficiencies; it was a kind of Security against Desertion, by making the Inhabitants thus mutually responsible for each other; and precluded the inferior Collector from availing himself of the Pretext of waste or Deserted Lands to withhold any part of his Collections. But the same Practice which at another Time and under different Circumstances would have been beneficial, became at this period an insupportable Burthen upon the Inhabitants. The Tax not being levied by any Fixed Rate or Standard, fell

heaviest upon the wretched Survivors of those Villages which had suffered the greatest Depopulation, and were of course the most entitled to the Lenity of Government. It had also the additional Evil attending it, in common with every other Variation from the regular Practice, that it afforded an opportunity to the Farmers and Shicdars to levy other Contributions on the People under color of it, and even to encrease this to whatever magnitude they pleased, since they were in course the Judges of the Loss sustained, and of the Proportion which the Inhabitants were to pay to replace it.

Complaints against this Grievance were universal throughout the Province, and it was to be feared that the continuance of it would be so great a check to the Industry of the People, as to impoverish the Revenue in the last Degree, when their former savings by which it was supported were gone.

Though 7 Years had elapsed since the Company became possessed of the Dewanny, yet no regular Process had ever been formed for conducting the Business of the Revenue. Every Zemindaree and every Taluk was left to its own peculiar Customs. These indeed were not inviolably adhered to. The Novelty of the Business to those who were appointed to superintend it, the chicanery of the people whom they were obliged to employ as their agents, the accidental Exigencies of each District, and, not unfrequently, the just Discernment of the Collector, occasioned many changes. Every change added to the confusion which involved the whole, and few were either authorised or known by the presiding Members of the Government. The Articles which composed the Revenue—the Form of keeping Accounts, the Computation of time, even the Technical Terms, which ever form the greatest part of the obscurity of every science—differed as much as the soil and productions of the Province. This Confusion had its origin in the Nature of the Former Government. The Nazims exacted what they could from the Zemindars; and great Farmers of the Revenue, whom they left at Liberty to plunder all below them, reserving to themselves the prerogative of plundering them in their Turn, when they were supposed to have enriched themselves with the spoils of the Country. The Muttisiddees who stood between the Nazim and the Zemindars, or between them and the People, had each their respective shares of the Public Wealth. These Profits were considered as illegal Embezzlements, and therefore were taken with every Precaution that cou'd ensure secrecy; and being, consequently, fixed by no Rate, depended on the

Temper, Abilities, or Power of each Individual for the Amount. It therefore became a duty in every man to take the most effectual measures to conceal the Value of his Property, and elude every Inquiry into his Conduct, while the Zemindars and other Landholders who had the Advantage of long Possession, availed themselves of it by complex Divisions of the Lands and intricate modes of Collection to perplex the Officers of the Government, and confine the knowledge of the Rents to themselves. It will easily be imagined that much of the Current Wealth stopped in its way to the public Treasury. It is rather Foreign from the purpose of this Exposition, but too apposite not to be remarked that it was fortunate such a system did prevail, since the Embezzlements which it covered preserved the Current Specie of the Country, and returned it into Circulation, while a great part of the Wealth received by the Government was expended in the Country, and but a small superfluity remained for remittances to the Court of Delhee, where it was lost for ever to this province.

To the original Defects inherent in the Constitution of these Provinces, were added the unequal and unsettled Government of them since they became our property. A part of the Lands which were before in our possession, such as Burdwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong, continued subject to the authority of the Chiefs, who were immediately accountable to the Presidency. The 24 Pergunnahs, granted by the Treaty of Plassey to the Company, were theirs on a different Tenure, being their immediate property by the Exclusion of the Zemindars, or hereditary Proprietors: their rents were received by Agents appointed to each Pergunnah, and remitted to the Collector, who resided in Calcutta.

The Rest of the Province was for some time entrusted to the joint-charge of the Naib Dwan and Resident of the Durbar, and afterwards to the Council of Revenue at Moorshedabad, and to the Supervisors who were accountable to that Council. The administration itself was totally excluded from a concern in this Branch of the Revenue.

The internal arrangement of each District varied no less than that of the whole Province. The Lands subject to the same Collector, and intermixed with each other, were some held by Farm, some superintended by Shicdars, or Agents on the part of the Collector, and some left to the Zemindars and Talucdars themselves, under various degrees of Controul. The First were racked without mercy, because the Leases were but of a Year's

standing, and the Farmer had no Interest or Check to restrain him from extracting more than the Land could bear. The Second were equally drained, and the Rents embezzled, as it was not possible for the Collector, with the greatest degree of attention on his part, to detect or prevent it. The latter, it may be supposed, were not exempted from the general corruption. If they were, the other Lands which lay near them would suffer by the migration of their inhabitants, who wou'd naturally seek Refuge from oppression in a milder and more equitable Government.

The Administration of Justice has so intimate a connection with the Revenue, that we cannot omit the mention of it, while we are treating of this subject in a general view, although we have already given our sentiments upon it at large in another place, to which we shall crave Leave to refer. The Security of private property is the greatest Encouragement to Industry, on which the wealth of every State depends. The Limitation of the Powers annexed to the Magistracy, the Suppression of every Usurpation of them by private authority, and the Facilitating of the access to Justice, were the only means by which such a Security cou'd be obtained. But this was impossible under the circumstances which had hitherto prevailed. While the Nizamut and the Dewannee were in different Hands, and all the Rights of the Former were admitted, the Courts of Justice which were the sole Province of the Nizam, though constituted for the general Relief of the Subjects, cou'd receive the Reformation. The Court and Officers of the Nizamut were continued, but their Efficacy was destroyed by the Ruling Influence of the Dewannee. The regular Course of Justice was everywhere suspended; but every man exercised it who had the Power of compelling others to submit to his Decisions. The People were oppressed; they were discouraged, and disabled from improving the Culture of their Lands; and in proportion as they had the demands of Individuals to gratify, they were prevented from discharging what was legally due to Government.

Such was the State of the Revenue, when your Commands were received by the Lapwing, and happily removed the difficulties which had hitherto opposed the Introduction of a more perfect System, by abolishing the Office of Naib Dwan, and authorising your administration to assume openly the Management of the Dewannee in your Name, without any Foreign Intervention.

In the execution of these your Intentions, the points which claimed our principal attention, as will appear from the above Description, were to render the Accounts of the Revenue simple

and intelligible, to establish Fixed Rates for the Collections, to make the Mode of them uniform in all parts of the Province, and to provide for an equal administration of Justice. In the steps which we have already taken, we have laboured to obtain these ends ; with what Success will be seen hereafter.

The Regulations which we have before mentioned being completed, and the Committee of Circuit appointed, consisting (as we mentioned in our last) of the Governor, Messrs. Middleton, Dacres, Lawrell, and Graham. We published our Intention of Farming all the Lands of the Province of Bengal, on Leases of Five Years, and invited all Persons to make Proposals.

The Committee first proceeded to Kishennaggur, and there entered on the Settlement of the District of Nuddea.¹ The Proposals which were delivered to them were expressed in so vague and uncertain a manner, and differed so widely from each other in Form, that it was impossible to make a comparison, or to ascertain the Proportional Amount of each ; and the few only that were intelligible, contained very low and disadvantageous Terms. The Committee were therefore of opinion that these Offers shou'd be rejected, and that the Lands shou'd be put up at Public Auction, tho' contrary to the original Intention.

To remove all obstacles that might present themselves, from an uncertainty in the Bidders with respect to the more Minute Articles of the Collections, and the Grounds on which the Settlement was to be established between the Farmer and Cultivator, the Committee found it indispensably necessary before the Sale began, to form an entire new Hustabood, or Explanation of the diverse and complex articles which were to compose the Collections. These consisted of the Assall or Original Ground Rent, and a variety of Taxes called Aboabs, which had been indiscriminately levied at different periods by the Government, the Zemindars, Farmers, and even by the inferior Collectors. One of these Aboabs we have explained above ; many of them are incapable of any Explanation.

After the Committee had made a thorough investigation of the above articles of the Revenue, they proposed to deduct such as appeared most oppressive to the Inhabitants, or of a late Establishment, at the same time reserving those which were of long standing, and had been chearfully submitted to by the Ryotts, these being in fact a considerable part of the Neat Rents. Among the former were the Duties arbitrarily levied by the Zemindars and Farmers upon all Goods and Necessaries of Life

¹ Proceedings of the 16th and 28th June, 1772.

passing by water thro' the interior part of the country. The Bazee Jumma, or Fines for petty crimes and misdemeanours, were also, agreeably to the humane and equitable spirit of your Orders, totally abolished, as well as the Haldarry, or Tax upon Marriage, which yielded a trifling Revenue to the Government, was very injurious to the State, and could tend only to the discouragement and decrease of Population,—an object at all times of general Importance, but more especially at this Period, from the great Loss of Inhabitants which the country has sustained by the late Famine, and the mortality which attended it. These several Deductions in favour of the Natives, altho' the immediate cause of decreasing the Rent Roll, will doubtless in time be productive of the most salutary effects, as they tend to encourage the Manufactures and Trade of the country, to retrieve the loss of Inhabitants, to free the People from vexatious prosecutions, and by promoting the general Ease of the country, virtually to support and improve its Revenue.

In order to secure the Inhabitants in the quiet Possession of the lands whilst they held them on terms of cultivation, and to prevent such Exactions as aforementioned in future, the Committee formed new Amulnamas or Leases, in which the claims upon the Ryotts were precisely and distinctly ascertained, and the Farmers restricted from making any further Demands, under the severest Penalties. To this end, and to prevent the Farmers from eluding this restriction, they were ordered to grant new Pottahs, or Deeds, to the Ryotts, the Form of which was drawn out by the Committee and made public, specifying the conditions on which they were to hold their Land, the separate Heads or Articles of the Rents; and every encouragement was contained in them to cultivate the waste ground on a moderate and increasing Rent.

Another principal Object with the Committee was to reduce the Charges of Collection as low as possible, from a conviction that the retrenchment of improper and unnecessary Expences opens a source of Increase of Revenue the most eligible, because the most consistent with the ease of the Inhabitants. For this purpose We have formed an uniform and regular Establishment, for all the necessary Charges to be incurred in the Cutcheries of the several Districts, under positive Restrictions that they shall not be exceeded without our being previously advised. This, We doubt not, will prove a great saving to the Hon'ble Company, as it will be the effectual means of preventing in future all superfluous and unnecessary Disbursements. And We think We

may venture to promise that this Article will be duly attended to, as it will be almost the only Care of the Auditor to prevent every Deviation from it, in the Accounts which are to pass his Inspection.

After these previous steps were resolved on, the Lands of Kishenangur were put up to Public Auction, and a Final Settlement was made for Five Years, on an accumulating Increase, for the Particulars of which we must beg leave to refer you to the proceedings of the Committee, which are now transmitted.

During the course of the sale at Kishennagur, the Rajah of that place gave in proposals for farming the whole District, which leads us to the following general observations on the Subject of Zemindars and Talookdars in the Province of Bengal.

Where it can be done with propriety, the entrusting the Collections of the Districts to the Hereditary Zemindars wou'd be a measure we shou'd be very willing to adopt, as we believe that the People would be treated with more tenderness, the Rents more improved, and the Cultivation more likely to be encouraged, the Zemindar less liable to failure or deficiencies than the Farmer, from the perpetual Interest which the former hath in the Country, and because his Inheritance cannot be removed, and it would be improbable he would risk the loss of it by eloping from his District, which is too frequently practised by a Farmer when he is hard pressed for the Payment of his Ballances, and is frequently predetermined when he receives his Farm.

With respect to the Talookdarrys and inconsiderable Zemin-darrys, which formed a part of the Huzzoor Zilahs or Districts which paid their rents immediately to the General Cutcherry at Moorshedabad, as well as many others of the same kind in different parts of Bengal; all Arguments have been weighed, whether in favour of the just Claim Government has upon their Lands for a Revenue adequate to their real Value, or of the Zemindars and Talookdars in support of their Rights and Privileges, grounded upon the Possession of Regular Grants, a long series of family Succession, and fair purchase. These being duly considered, there occurred to us only the two following Modes which could be pursued in making their settlement. The First was to lett (*sic*) the Lands to Farm; to put the Renters in entire Possession and Authority over them, obliging them to pay each Zemindar or Talookdar a certain allowance or percentage for the subsistence of himself and family. The Second was to settle with the Zemindars themselves on the footing of Farmers, obliging them first to enter into all the Conditions of a farmer's Lease;

Secondly, to pay the same Revenue that could be expected from Farmers ; Thirdly, to give responsible securities ; and Fourthly, to admit a reserve in favour of Government for making, during the course of their actual Lease, an exact Hustabood (Valuation from Accounts), or a Measurement of their Possessions, in order to ascertain their true Value at a future settlement, shou'd the present Accounts be found to be fallacious, or concealments suspected. We have allowed a degree of weight to the arguments of the Zemindars and Talookdars in favour of their plea of Right, which, by adopting the first mode of settlement, wou'd doubtless be exposed to Risk ; for as the Authority given to the Farmers wou'd reduce the present Incumbents to the level of mere Pensioners, and greatly weaken their claims as Proprietors, so in the course of a few long Leases, their Rights and Titles might, from the designs of the Farmers to establish themselves in their Estates, the death of the old Inheritors, and the succession of Minors, be involved in such obscurity, doubt, and controversy, as to deprive them totally of their Inheritance. To expose the Zemindars and Talookdars to this risk, is neither consistent with our Notions of Equity, nor with your orders, which direct, "that we do not by any sudden change alter the constitution, nor deprive the Zemindars, etc., of their antient priviledges and Immunities."

Another argument, drawn from the conduct naturally to be expected from the Zemindars and Talookdars, weighed strongly with us, and proves an objection to adopting the first Mode. From a long continuance of the Lands in their Families, it is to be concluded they have rivetted an authority in the District, acquired an Ascendency over the Minds of the Ryotts, and ingratiated their affections. From Causes like these, if entire Deprivation were to take place, there could not be expected less Material Effects than all the Evils of a divided Authority, prejudicial to the Revenue, and Desertion and Desolation of the Lands. Whereas, from continuing the Lands under the Management of those who have a natural and perpetual Interest in their Prosperity, provided their Value is not of too great an amount, solid Advantages may be expected to accrue. Every consideration then sways us, where it can be done with the prospect of the advantage before mentioned, to adopt the second mode in settling with the Inferior Zemindars and Talookdars. First, an equivalent Revenue may be thereby obtained, with security for its punctual Payment. Secondly, the converting them into Farmers establishes the Government's right of putting their

Lands on that Footing, whenever they shall think proper ; the Awe of which must constantly operate to secure their good behaviour and good Management. Thirdly, the Clause of Scrutiny, to which they are subjected, will also have the same Tendency, at the same time that it may be strictly put in force where there is cause to suspect Concealments, or a prospect presents of Increase to the Revenue.

Agreeably to these Ideas, the Committee at Kishennagur exempted the several Talooks in that District from the Public Sale, as the Possessors engaged to abide by such a Settlement as should be deemed equivalent and just; and an exact valuation was accordingly made of their Lands. It was, however, found that the Terms offered by the Zemindar of Kishennagur, as before mentioned, were not equivalent to the expectations the Committee had reason to Entertain from the Public Auction of the separate Farms, and the Faith of Government having already been engaged to such Farmers whose offers had been formally accepted. For these Reasons, joined with the well-known subtle and faithless character of the Zemindar, it was determined to reject his proposals, and to give the Preference to the offer of the Farmers, which were more advantageous to Government.

The Settlement of Kishennagur being concluded, a fixed Dewan was chosen by the Committee to be joined with the Collector in the Superintendancy of the Revenues, conformably to our Established Regulations before referred to; and instructions were accordingly given him for his guidance.

We have been thus explicit in relating the Transactions at Kishennagur, both as these will serve to point out the various effects of our previous Determinations, as well as the Motives which gave Occasion to those which were superadded by the Committee, from local or general Observation, and to convey an Idea of the Plan on which the settlement of the whole Province will be formed, of which that of Kishennagur may be regarded as the Model.

From Kishennagur the Committee proceeded, to Cossimbazaar, and arrived there the beginning of July. One of their first objects was the regulating the Nabob's Household and Stipend, and the appointing of the necessary Officers for the Management of his Affairs. But as these Matters will be fully discussed in our Letter from the General Department, We shall confine this Address solely to the current Business of the Revenue.

The Province of Radshahy and the Huzzoor Zilahs were taken next into Consideration, and the same Regulations estab-

lished previous to their Settlement, as at Kisennagur. Public Advertisements being made for receiving Proposals for farming the different Purgunnahs in Radshahy, and a proper time limited for their delivery, the terms given in for the whole of the Western Division were examined, and the Offers of the Farmers and Zemindar accurately compared. Those of the latter were found more advantageous to Government. A settlement for five years was accordingly concluded with the Ranny Bowanny, the Zemindar of that District, whose Substance, Credit, and Character rendered the Conditions of her Offer the more desirable, especially as she consented to the Committee's Plan of subdividing the Lands into fourteen Lots or Farms, and engaged to deposit the Farmer's Cabooleats or Agreements as a Collateral Security with her own, for the punctual Payment of her Rents. No other Proposals being given in for the Eastern Division of Radshahy, it was in like manner farmed to the zemindar, whose Knowledge of, and long-established Reputation in, the Country enabled her to make more advantageous Offers for this also than any other person; and We doubt not that We shall realise the whole of the Revenue from these important and extensive Districts, which will receive an additional Advantage, besides a Reduction of the Expence of the Collections, in being thus united under the hereditary and ancient Proprietor.

For the Particular Reasons and Arguments urged in our several Proceedings, referred to in the margin, and which will be farther treated on in our Letter from the other Department, you will observe that We have found it expedient to annex to Mr. Middleton's Appointment of Resident of the Durbar and Chief of Cossimbazar, the Superintendency of the Collections of Radshahy, in the conducting of which, the whole being put under the immediate Management of the Zemindar, his only care as Collector will be to receive the monthly Kists as they may become due, to attend to the Complaints and Representations of the Ryotts, and to see that the Regulations which have been made are duly adhered to.

The Huzzoor Zillahs, and the inferior Zemindaries and Talookdaries bordering on Moorshedabad and Rajshahy, were also settled on the same Plan, a Preference being always given to the Offers of the Hereditary Possessors as before observed. But as it would take up too much of your Time to descend to a minute Detail of these numerous Settlements, we must take the Liberty of referring you to the Proceedings of the late Committee of Circuit. You will therein notice that we have appointed five

additional Collectors to superintend the Revenue of those Districts. It was with some reluctance we found ourselves under the necessity of increasing the Number of these Appointments. They were rendered unavoidable by the Intricacy of those parts of the Huzzoor Zilahs, which have been thus distributed amongst them; but We hope that the Liberty which We have given to the Farmers, who may be so disposed, to pay their Rents immediately to the Sudder or Head Cutcherry, will in time enable us to reduce these Establishments.

In the Intervals of Public Business, the Committee were employed in deliberating on the steps referred to them, which were proper to be taken for carrying into Execution your late Orders by the Lapwing, where you declare your Intention of Standing forth as Dewan by the Agency of the Company's Servants, to assume the "entire Management of the Revenues," leaving it to us to plan and execute this important Work, "by adopting such Regulations, and pursuing such Measures, as should at once insure to the Company every possible Advantage."

The first Consideration was whether the Board of Revenue at Moorshedabad should be abolished, and the Business of the Collections in all its Branches, put under the management of the Members of your Administration at the Presidency; and after allowing due Weight to every Argument that occurred, We agreed unimously with the Committee in the Necessity of this last Measure, which has accordingly been since carried into Execution. We take the Liberty of laying before you the Grounds upon which we have ventured to make this Alteration, in the flattering hopes that it will meet with your approval.

As the Administration of Justice, and the Collection of the Revenue, are by far the most important object of Government, they certainly claim the first Attention of your President and Council, especially at a time when so many weighty matters, intimately connected with them, are entrusted by you to our Investigation and Judgment, and when the State of the Country requires timely, well-digested, and spirited Measures. While the Controuling and Executive Part of the Revenue, and the correspondence with the Collectors, was carried by a Council at Moorshedabad, the Members of your Administration had not an opportunity of acquiring that thorough and comprehensive knowledge of the Revenue, which can only result from practical Experience. But as your late orders tend to establish a new System, enjoin many new Regulations and Enquiries which could not properly be delegated to a Subordinate Council, it became

absolutely necessary that the Business of the Revenue should be conducted under our immediate Observation and Direction.

This change, We trust, will afford great Relief to the Inhabitants of the Provinces, in opening to them a more ready Access to Justice, insomuch that Appeals from the Decisions of the Inferior Courts may now be made directly to the Presidency, whereas formerly they were first transmitted to the Council at Moorshedabad, and from thence an Appeal lay to Us.

Another good Consequence will be the great Increase of Inhabitants, and of Wealth in Calcutta, which will not only add to the Consumption of our most valuable Manufactures imported from home, but will be the means of conveying to the Natives a more intimate Knowledge of our Customs and Manners, and of conciliating them to our Policy and Government.

Besides the Reasons above urged for the Dissolution of the Council at Moorshedabad, We must beg leave to add this farther Argument, in reply to the objection which may possibly be made to it as repugnant to your Commands of the 30th June 1769. We now conceive them, however, to be superseded by your later Orders and the Discretionary Power you have given us in your letter by the Lapwing. Nevertheless, we should have thought ourselves indispensably bound to have adhered to the Spirit of them, so far as they could be made to coincide with the new System of the Dewanny, but we found them totally subverted by it.

While Moorshedabad remained the Seat of your Collections, every consideration required the Establishment of a Council to Superintend them, as it was a trust every way too great for an individual. On these grounds alone we presumed your Orders for forming such Councils at Moorshedabad and Patna were framed. But when the office of Naid Dwan was abolished, and you had declared your Resolution to place the Collections under the immediate charge of your own Servants, there remained no Reason for continuing that Department of the Revenue at such a distance from the Observation of your Governor and Council; and the Removal of the Collection to the Presidency, as it left no Business for an inferior Council, of course rendered their continuance, and the charges attending such an establishment, needless. We will indulge ourselves, therefore, with another Hope, that an annual saving of some Lacks of Rupees will be derived from this alteration, altho' We are well aware of the Expence and Inconvenience which ever attends Innovations of all kinds on their first Institution.

As the Reasons for the Removal of the Khalsa are treated on very largely in the Proceedings of the Committee of Circuit of 28th July, and contain many Observations on the Nature of the Revenue in general, which are too voluminous to be inserted in the Body of this Letter, we wish to recommend these to your particular attention.

The Plan which we have formed for conducting the Business of the Khalsa, or Superior Office of the Collections, will go a Number in the Packet.

The more regular Administration of Justice was also deliberated on by the Committee of Circuit, and a Plan was formed by them which afterwards met with our Approbation. We cannot give you a better Idea of the Grounds on which this was framed, than by referring you to a Copy of it, together with a Letter from the Committee to the Board on the Occasion, both of which make Numbers in this Packet; and we earnestly recommend them to your Perusal, requesting to be assisted with such further Orders and Instructions thereon as they may require for completing the system, which we have thus endeavoured to establish on the most equitable, solid, and permanent footing. We hope they will be read with that Indulgence which We are humbly of Opinion is due to a Work of this kind, undertaken on the plain Principles of Experience and common Observation, without the advantages which an intimate Knowledge of the Theory of Law might have afforded us. We have endeavoured to adapt our Regulations to the Manners and Understanding of the People, and Exegencies of the Country, adhering, as closely as We were able, to their Antient Usages and Institutions. It will be still a Work of some Months, We fear, before they can be thoroughly established throughout the Provinces; but We shall think our Labors amply recompensed if they meet with your Approbation, and are productive of the good Effects we had in view.

Our President returned to Calcutta about the middle of September. Mr. Middleton remained at Moorshedabad to take charge of his Appointments, and the other three Members of the Committee of Circuit proceeded to Dacca, where they are now employed in making the Settlement of that Province and the adjacent Districts, after which they will continue their Tour to the remaining Divisions on the Eastern Side of Bengal; and We hope to transmit the further Particulars of their Proceedings by one of the Ships of this Season, together with a Compleat Statement of your Revenue for the following five Years.

Besides the General Plan before mentioned for regulating the New System of conducting the Revenues, and the several other Points therein referred to, the Committee of Revenue at the Presidency, composed of the remaining Members of your Council, were employed in preparing the Settlements of the Districts of Hougly, Midnapore, Beerbhoom, Jessore, and the Calcutta Lands. These, together with the Districts allotted to the Committee of Circuit, compleat the whole of Bengal, excepting Burdwan, where the Lands are already lett in Farm, on Leases of five years, which do not expire till the end of the Bengal year 1182 (A.D. 1775).

In consequence of the Public Advertisement for making the Settlement of Hougly, a number of Proposals for farming the Lands were delivered in; and after an exact scrutiny was made into them, those which appeared to be the most advantageous to Government were accepted. It was originally intended to have lett them in small Farms; but the Offers for large Lots being much higher than the others, We were tempted to prefer them. There were likewise many Talookdarries and petty Zemindarries in this District, the Possessors of which represented to us the Length of Time they had held their Lands, and the wretched condition they would be reduced to were they now to be deprived of them. As they engaged to pay to Government an increased Rent in proportion to their value, We were induced by the same Motives as actuated the Committee of Circuit in similar Instances to continue to them their hereditary Possessions. In one or two of the Pergunnas some Deductions were found necessary to be made, on account of the particular degree in which they had suffered by the late Famine; but a favourable increase being added to the other Purgannas, We have reason to be satisfied with the good success which has attended the Settlement of Houghly and its Dependancies.

The Settlement of Beerbhoom, Bissenpoor, and Pacheat has also been effected upon an increasing Revenue, on a Plan similar to the other Farmed Lands.

The Districts of Jessore and Mahomed Shahy are Settled on Terms advantageous to Government, as appears by the Accounts delivered in by Mr. Lane, a Member of our Board, who was deputed to accomplish that Business; and a full Representation of his Proceedings is recorded on (*sic*) our Consultation of the 10th of August.

By the Proceedings it appears that the Calcutta Lands have been compleatly farmed; but as some of the Farmers have flown

off from their Engagements and absconded, and the Execution of the Title Deeds with the rest is delayed, We have hitherto been prevented from finally adjusting this Business. We shall therefore defer transmitting a further Statement of these Lands till the next Ship, as well as that of Midnapoor, the settlement of which is now in great forwardness.

In pursuance of your positive Injunctions, We have been endeavouring for some time past to collect the fullest Information concerning the Salt Business in Bengal, that we may be enabled to form such Regulations as shall appear the best calculated for securing the Duties of Government upon that article, and for the general Benefit of the Trade. For our Proceedings in these Matters, so far as we have hitherto been able to effect, we refer you to the Consultations now transmitted, and particularly to that of the 7th October. And as this subject is one of the first that will fall under our Consideration, We expect in our next Advices to furnish you with a Compleat State of it.

The Hougly disputed Ballancies of Salt, which have been a Matter of Contention and Difficulty for these two years past, We have at length happily adjusted, as recorded in our Proceedings of the 1st of October.

The Bukshbunder or Customs at Hougly, as well as those of the Pachetra at Moorshedabad, have not been lett to farm, but continue to be collected by the Officers of Government, in order that no Obstacles may occur in New-modelling this Source of your Revenue agreeably to your Instructions. At present we wait for Advices and further Lights from the Committee of Circuit at Dacca concerning the Shawbunder, or Head Custom House, in that District. Being furnished with these, We shall proceed to form one general and uniform Plan for the Collection of Duties, which will be duly transmitted for your Information.

The humane Attention shown in your Commands of the 30th June 1769, and recommended in many of your Letters since that Date, to the Rights of the Zemindars who have inherited Lands from their Ancestors, encourages us to solicit your Compassion for the antient Proprietors of the Twenty-four Pergunnas, or Calcutta Lands, which became the Company's Zemindarry by the Treaty of Plassey, and from which they were consequently dispossessed. A small Part of their Lands were before that Time united with the Zemindarries of Burdwan and Nuddea, whose Zemindars are amply provided for. The other Zemindars and Taalindars (*sic*) have continued since that Time in a State of

extreme Indigence. Some of them have large families to maintain. It has been the usual Rule of the Mogul Government, when any Zemindar was divested of authority, to allow him a Substance out of the Rents of his Zemindarie proportioned to the annual Income of it. This Proportion commonly amounted to One Tenth. We would not recommend so large an Allowance for these people. We are persuaded that they will be contented with a much more moderate income, and receive it with Gratitude. As this Indulgence has been extended to all the other Zemindars in both the Provinces since they were placed under your Government, We have judged that this Representation of the Case of those who alone have been excluded from it would not be unacceptable to you.

As the Settlement of the Province of Bahar had been made for a Term of Years, and therefore did not require any immediate Alteration, We shall wait to finish the whole of our Regulations in Bengal before we attempt any Innovation in that Province. The only point on which We think We can give you any previous Intimation of our future Proceedings in those Parts is, that we deem it proper to unite the Collections with those of Bengal, and establish the same Regulations in both Provinces, as soon as We can do it with conveniency, and without adding to our present Embarrassments.

In the Proceedings of our Committee of Revenue of the 10th May is recorded the Particulars of a Dispute which subsisted between the late Council of Revenue at Moorshedabad and the Supervisor of Dinagepore, Mr. Henry Cottrell, the Consequence of which was the recalling the latter from his Appointment. The several Arguments urged against his Conduct by the Council of Revenue at Moorshedabad, as well as his Letter in Vindication of himself, appear fully in the above Proceedings; and we must beg leave to refer you to them, that you may form such a Judgment of this Affair as your Candor and Justice may point out. We are, with great Respect, Hon'ble Sirs, Your most faithful humble Servants,

(Signed) WARREN HASTINGS.
R. BARKER.
W. ALDERSEY.
THOMAS LANE.
RICHD. BARWELL.
JAMES HARRIS.
H. GOODWIN.

APPENDIX B

EXTRACT OF A LETTER FROM THE GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL AT FORT WILLIAM, Etc.

COPY OF THE FORTIETH PARAGRAPH OF THE LETTER FROM THE
GOVERNOR AND COUNCIL IN BENGAL, FOR THE DEPART-
MENT OF THE REVENUES, TO THE COURT OF DIRECTORS,
dated 3d November 1772.

THE more regular Administration of Justice was deliberated on by the Committee of Circuit, and a Plan was formed by them, which afterwards met with our Approbation: We cannot give you a better Idea of the Grounds on which this was framed, than by referring you to a Copy of it, together with a Letter from the Committee to the Board on the Occasion; both of which make Numbers in this Packet, and we earnestly recommend them to your Perusal, requesting to be assisted with such further Orders and Instructions thereon, as they may require, for completing the System which we have thus endeavoured to establish, on the most equitable, solid, and permanent Footing. We hope they will be read with that Indulgence, which, we are humbly of Opinion, is due to a Work of this Kind, undertaken on the plain Principles of Experience and common Observation, without the Advantages which an intimate Knowledge of the Theory of Law might have afforded us: We have endeavoured to adapt our Regulations to the Manners and Understandings of the People, and Exigencies of the Country, adhering, as closely as we are able, to their ancient Usages and Institutions. It will be still a Work of some Months, we fear, before they can be thoroughly established throughout the Provinces; but we shall think our Labours amply recompensed, if they meet with your Approbation, and are productive of the good Effects we had in View.

COPY OF A LETTER FROM THE COMMITTEE OF
CIRCUIT TO THE COUNCIL AT FORT WILLIAM,
DATED COSSIMBUZAR, 15TH AUGUST, 1772

In the Copy of our Proceedings, which accompanied our Letter of the 28 ultimo, we intimated our Intention of communicating to you our Sentiments in a future Address, upon the Subject of the Magistracy of this Province, which, though an Appendage of the Nizamut, we considered is not necessarily connected with the Propositions which were then recommended to your Attention, and of too much Importance to be lightly or only occasionally treated.

We now transmit to you the Result of our Deliberations on this Subject, in the enclosed Paper, intituled "A Plan for the Administration of Justice"; and if it meets with your Approbation, we wish to receive your Instructions for carrying it into immediate Execution.

For the Information of our honourable Employers, it may be necessary to premise, what you will readily perceive, that in forming the enclosed Plan, we have confined ourselves with a scrupulous Exactness to the constitutional Terms of Judicature already established in this Province; which are not only such as we think in themselves best calculated for expediting the Course of Justice, but such as are best adapted to the Understandings of the People. Where we shall appear to have deviated in any Respect from the known Forms, our Intention has been to recur to the original Principles, and to give them that Efficacy, of which they were deprived by venal and arbitrary Innovations, by partial Immunities, granted as a Relief against the general and allowed Abuse of Authority, or by some radical Defect in the Constitution of the Courts in being; and these Changes we have adopted with the less Hesitation, as they are all of such a Nature, as, we are morally certain, will prove both of general Satisfaction and general Ease to the People.

The general Principles of all despotic Governments, That every Degree of Power shall be simple and undivided, seems necessarily to have introduced itself into the Courts of Justice; this will appear from a Review of the different Officers of Justice instituted in these Provinces, which, however unwilling we are to engross your Time with such Details, we deem necessary on this Occasion, in Proof of the above Assertions, and in Justification of the Regulations which we have recommended.

First.—The Nazim, as supreme Magistrate, presides personally in the Trials of capital Offenders, and holds a Court every *Sunday*, called the Rôz Adawlut.

Second.—The Dewan is the supposed Magistrate for the Decision of such Causes as relate to real Estates, or Property in Land, but seldom exercises this Authority in Person.

Third.—The Darogo Adawlut al Aalea is properly the Deputy of the Nazim; he is the Judge of all Matters of Property, excepting Claims of Land and Inheritance; he also takes Cognizance of Quarrels, Frays, and abusive Names.

Fourth.—The Darogo Adawlut Dewannee, or Deputy of the Dewan, is the Judge of Property in Land.

Fifth.—The Phoujdar is the Officer of the Police, the Judge of all Crimes not Capital; the Proofs of these last are taken before him, and reported to the Nazim for his Judgment, and Sentence upon them.

Sixth.—The Câzee is the Judge of all Claims of Inheritance or Succession; he also performs the Ceremonies of Weddings, Circumcision, and Funerals.

Seventh.—The Mohtesib has Cognizance of Drunkenness, and of the Vending of Spirituous Liquors and intoxicating Drugs, and the Examination of False Weights and Measures.

Eighth.—The Muftee is the Expounder of the Law.

Memorandum.—The Câzee is assisted by the Muftee and Mohtesib in his Court: After hearing the Parties and Evidences, the Muftee writes the Fettwa, or the Law applicable to the Case in Question, and the Câzee pronounces Judgment accordingly. If either the Câzee or Mohtesib disapprove of the Fettwa, the Cause is referred to the Nazim, who summons the Ijlas, or General Assembly, consisting of the Câzee, Muftee, Mohtesib, the Darogos of the Adawlut, the Moulavies, and all the learned in the Law, to meet and decide upon it. Their Decision is final.

Ninth.—The Canongos are the Registers of the Lands. They have no Authority; but Causes of Land are often referred to them for Decision, by the Nazim, or Dewan, or Darogo of the Dewannee.

Tenth.—The Cootwall is the Peace Officer of the Night, dependant on the Phoujdarree.

From this List it will appear that there are properly Three Courts for the Decision of Civil Causes (the Canongos being only made Arbitrators by Reference from the other Courts) and One

for the Police and Criminal Matters, the authority of the Mohtesib in the latter being too confined to be considered as an Exception: Yet, as all defective Institutions soon degenerate, by Use, into that Form to which they are inclined, by the unequal Prevalence of their component Parts; so these Courts are never known to adhere to their prescribed Rounds, but when restrained by the Vigilance of a wiser Ruler than commonly falls to the Lot of despotic States; at all other Times, not only the Civil Courts encroach on each other's Authority, but both Civil and Criminal often take Cognizance of the same Subjects; or their Power gradually becomes weak and obsolete, through their own Abuses, and the Usurpations of Influence. For many Years past the Darogos of the Adawlut al Aalea, and of the Dewannee, have been considered as Judges of the same Causes, whether of real or personal Property; and the Parties have made their Application as Chance, Caprice, Interest, or the superior Weight and Authority of either, directed their Choice. At present, from obvious Causes, the Dewannee Adawlut is in Effect the only Tribunal: The Adawlut al Aalea, or the Court of the Nazim, existing only in Name.

It must however be remarked, in Exception to the above Assertions, that the Phoujdaree, being a single Judicature, and the Objects of it clearly defined, it is seldom known, but in Time of Anarchy, to encroach on the Civil Power, or lose much of its own Authority; this however is much the Case at present.

The Court in which the Câzee presides seems to be formed on wiser Maxims, and even on more enlarged Ideas of Justice, and Civil Liberty, than are common to despotic Notions of *Indian* Governments.

They must be unanimous in their Judgment, or the Case is referred in Course to the General Assembly; but the Intention of this Reference is defeated, by the Importance which is given to it, and the insurmountable Difficulties attending the Use of it: Few Cases of disputed Inheritance will happen, in which the Opinions of Three independent Judges shall be found to concur: There is therefore a Necessity, either that One shall over-rule the other Two, which destroys the Purpose of their appointment, or that daily Appeals must be made to the Nazim, and his Warrant issued to summon all learned in the Law, from their Homes, their Studies, and necessary Occupations, to form a tumultuous Assembly to hear and give Judgment upon them: The Consequence is, that the General Assembly is rarely held, and only on Occasions which acquire their Importance from that of the

Parties, rather than from the Nicety of the Case itself: The Cázee therefore either advises with his Colleagues in his own particular Court, and gives Judgment according to his own Opinion, or more frequently decides without their Assistance or Presence.

Another great and capital Defect in these Courts is, the Want of a Substitute or subordinate Jurisdiction, for the Distribution of Justice in such Parts of the Province as lie out of their Reach, which in Effect confines their Operations to a Circle, extending but a very small Distance beyond the Bounds of the City of *Moorsheadabad*: This indeed is not universally the Case: but perhaps it will not be difficult to prove the Exceptions to be an Accumulation of the Grievance; since it is true that the Courts of Adawlut are open to the Complaints of all Men; yet, it is only the rich, or the vagabond Part of the People, who can afford to travel so far for Justice; and if the industrious Labourer is called from the farthest Part of the Province to answer their Complaints, and wait the tedious Process of the Courts, to which they are thus made amenable, the Consequences in many Cases will be more ruinous and oppressive, than an arbitrary Decision could be, if passed against them, without any Law or Process whatever.

The Defect is not however left absolutely without a Remedy; the Zemindars, Farmers, Shiodars, and other Officers of the Revenue, assuming that Power for which no Provision is made by the Laws of the Land, but which, in whatever Manner it is exercised, is preferable to a total Anarchy: It will however be obvious, that the judicial Authority, lodged in the Hands of Men who gain their Livelihood by the Profits on the Collection of the Revenue, must unavoidably be converted to Sources of private Emolument; and, in Effect, the greatest Oppressions of the Inhabitants owe their Origin to this necessary Evil: The Cázee has also his Substitutes in the Districts, but their legal Powers are too limited to be of general Use; and the Powers which they assume, being warranted by no lawful Commission, but depending on their own Pleasure, or the Ability of the People to contest them, is also an Oppression.

From this Variety of materials we have endeavoured to form the Plan of a more complete, but more extensive, System of Judicature, by constituting Two Superior Courts at the Capital; the one composed of the United Magistracy of the Adawlut al Aalea, the Adawlut Dewannee, and the Cázee (or Cázee's Office) for the Decision of Civil Causes; the other corresponding to the

Phoujdaree, for the Trial of Criminal Cases. To prevent the Abuse of the Power vested in these Courts, and to give Authority to their Decrees, each, instead of a single Judge, is made to consist of several Members; and their Enquiries are to be conducted under the Inspection and Sanction of the Supreme Administration. To render the Distribution of Justice equal in every Part of the Province, similar, but inferior, Courts are also proposed for each separate District, and accountable to the superior. The usurped Power of the Officers of the Collections, and of the Creditor over the Persons of their Debtors, is abolished.

The Judicial Authority, which by the Tenth Regulation is still allowed to the Farmers of the Revenue, is a single Exception to the general Rule, which we have laid down, of confining such Powers to the Two Courts of Adawlut; but as this is restricted to Cases of Property, not exceeding Ten Rupees, and as they have no Power of inflicting Punishment, or levying Fines, we think an ill Use is not likely to be made of so inconsiderable a Privilege, especially as they themselves are amenable to the Courts of Justice, which will be always ready to receive Complaints against them; and some such Means of deciding the trifling Disputes of the Ryots upon the Spot is absolutely necessary, as they cannot afford, nor ought to be allowed, on every mutual Disagreement, to travel to the Sudder Cutcherry for Justice.

The detestable and authorized Exactions of the Phoujdaree Court, which had its exact Imitators in every Farmer and Aumil of the Province, under the Denomination of Bazee Jumma, have been prohibited, conformably to the wise and humane Injunctions of our honourable Masters; who, from the same Spirit of Equity, have renounced the Right hitherto exercised by the Country Government, and authorized by the *Mahometan* Law, to a Commission on the Amount of all Debts, and on the Value of all Property, recovered by the Decrees of its Courts; a Practice repugnant to every Principle of Justice, as it makes the Magistrate a Party in the Cause on which he decides, and becomes a legal Violation of the Rights of private Property, committed by that Power which should protect and secure it.

It has also been our Aim to render the Access to Justice as easy as possible.

By keeping exact Records of all judicial Proceedings, it is hoped that these Institutions, if they receive the Sanction of your Approbation, will remain free from the Neglects and Charges

to which they would be liable from a less frequent Inspection.

We have judged it necessary to propose some Exceptions to the Order of the honourable Court of Directors, for the total Abolition of Fines in the Court of Phoujdaree. All Offences are not punishable by Stripes; and to sentence Men of a certain Rank in Life, or of a superior Caste, to such a public Disgrace, would exceed the Proportion of the Offence, and extend the Punishment to all the Relations and Connections of the Delinquent; to suffer him to escape with total impunity, would be an Injustice in the other Extreme. In such Cases there is but the middle Way, which we can adopt with an equal Regard to the Spirit of our honourable Masters' Commands and the Rights of Justice, and that is, by levying the Fine upon the Offender, but converting it to a Reparation of the Injury.

Our Motives for the Abolition of the Fees of the Cázees and Muftees, will best appear in the following Extract of a Minute of our Proceedings at *Kissen Nagur*, relating to the Haldaree, or Tax on Marriages, which, for the Reasons therein assigned, we forbade to be levied any longer, and deducted from the Settlement of *Nuddea*: Convinced of the pernicious Effects of so impolitic a Tax, we propose to grant the same Exemption to the other Districts subject to our Direction; and submit to your Consideration, whether it will not be proper to make it general throughout the Province.

The same Reasons which have induced us to abolish the Haldaree, operate with equal Force against the Fees of the Cázees and Muftees, which have always proved a heavy Grievance to the Poor, and an Impediment to Marriage: We have therefore determined on a total Abolition of these, and of the other less Dues hitherto allowed to these Officers, and to put them on the Footing of Monthly Servants with fixed Salaries: We were led to this Resolution, not only by the speculative Advantages which it promised, but by the Experience which this Country has already had of its Effects, from a similar Institution of the Nabob *Meer Cossim*, about the Beginning of the Year 1763, which (as we are assured) was productive of more Marriages than had been known to take Place for Years before; and Instances have been even quoted of Men of Forty and Fifty Years of Age, who till then had led a Life of Celibacy, immediately availed themselves of this Exemption, to enter into a State, from which they had been before precluded solely by the Want of Means to support the various Expences attending it.

EXTRACT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE
AT KISSEN NAGAR, DATED THE 28TH JUNE, 1772

“ The Collector explains the Haldarree, or Custom on Marriage, “ to be a Tax levied by Government, at the variable Rate of Three “ Rupees, Three Rupees Eight Annas, and Four Rupees Four “ Annas each : Besides the Haldarree, there are Fees paid to the “ Cázees and Muftes : The former receive from the principal “ Inhabitants Two Rupees ; from the Second Class, One Rupee “ Eight Annas ; and from the lowest Class One Rupee : The Fees “ of the Muftes are received from the Musicians, and other People “ who officiate at the Festival ; so that, on the Whole, the Fees of “ Marriage may be estimated at Six Rupees for each, exclusive of “ the Dues, or voluntary Benefactions of the *Gentoos* to their “ *Brahmins*.”

“ The Committee are of Opinion, and resolve accordingly, “ that all the Fees and Taxes of this Article, which produce a “ Revenue to Government, be abolished, as tending to discourage “ Population ; an Object at all Times of Importance to Govern- “ ment, but more especially at this Time, from the great Loss of “ Inhabitants, which the Country has sustained by the late “ Famine, and the Mortality which followed it : They are further “ of Opinion, that the abolishing of the Fees to the Cázee and “ Muftes will afford a great Relief to the Inhabitants, as it will “ not only absolve them from the Fees themselves, but also from “ the Effects of the oppressive Mode in which these Dues are “ exacted : But on this Subject they judge it will be more proper “ to come to a general Resolution at the City, and therefore “ postpone the further Consideration of it until their Arrival at “ that Place.”

We have judged it necessary to add to the Regulations, with respect to the Courts of Phoujdaree, a Proposal for the Suppression and Extirpation of Decoits, which will appear to be dictated by a Spirit of Rigour and Violence, very different from the Caution and Lenity of our other Propositions, as it in some Respect involves the Innocent with the Guilty. We wish a milder Expedient could be suggested ; but we much fear, that this Evil has acquired a great Degree of its Strength from the Tenderness and Moderation which our Government has exercised towards those Banditti, since it has interfered in the internal Protection of the Provinces. We confess that the Means which we propose can in no wise be reconcileable to the Spirit of our

own Constitution ; but till that of *Bengal* shall attain the same Perfection, no Conclusion can be drawn from the English Law, that can be properly applied to the Manners or State of this Country. The Decoits of Bengal are not like the Robbers in England, Individuals driven to such desperate Courses by sudden Want: They are Robbers by Profession and even by Birth: They are formed into regular Communities, and their Families subsist by the Spoils which they bring home to them ; they are all therefore alike criminal ; Wretches who have placed themselves in a State of declared War with Government, and are therefore wholly excluded from every benefit of its Laws. We have many Instances of their meeting Death with the greatest Insensibility ; it loses therefore its Effect as an Example ; but when executed in all the Forms and Terrors of Law, in the Midst of the Neighbours and Relations of the Criminal ; when these are treated as Accessaries to his Guilt, and his Family deprived of their Liberty, and separated for ever from each other, every Passion, which before served as an Incentive to Guilt, now becomes subservient to the Purposes of Society, by turning them from a Vocation, in which all they hold dear, besides Life, becomes forfeited by their Conviction ; at the same Time, their Families, instead of being lost to the Community, are made useful Members of it, by being adopted into those of the more civilized Inhabitants. The Ideas of Slavery, borrowed from our *American* Colonies, will make every Modification of it appear, in the Eyes of our own Countrymen in *England*, a horrible Evil ; but it is far otherwise in this Country ; here Slaves are treated as the Children of the Families to which they belong, and often acquire a much happier State by their Slavery, than they could have hoped for by the Enjoyment of Liberty ; so that, in Effect, the apparent Rigour, thus exercised on the Children of convicted Robbers, will be no more than a Change of Condition, by which they will be no Sufferers ; though it will operate as a Warning on others, and is the only means, which we can imagine capable of dissipating these desperate and abandoned Societies, which subsist on the Distress of the general Community.

A true Copy.
ALEXANDER HIGGINSON,
Secretary.

REVENUE DEPARTMENT,
Fort William, 3d Nov. 1772.

A PLAN FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
EXTRACTED FROM THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
COMMITTEE OF CIRCUIT, 15TH AUGUST, 1772

I.

That in each District shall be established Two Courts of Judicature, One by the Name of Mofussul Dawannee Adawlut, or Provincial Court of Dewannee, for the Cognizance of Civil Causes; the other by the Name of Phoujdaree Adawlut, or Court of Phoujdaree, for the Trial of all Crimes and Misdemeanors.

II.

That for the better ascertaining the Jurisdiction of each Court, and to prevent Confusion, and a Perversion of Justice, the Matters cognizable by each respectively are declared to be as follows:

All Disputes concerning Property, whether real or personal; all Causes of Inheritance, Marriage, and Caste; all Claims of Debt, disputed Accounts, Contracts, Partnerships, and Demands of Rent; shall be judged by the Dewannee Adawlut.

But from this Distribution is excepted the Right of Succession to Zemindarrees and Talucdarrees, which shall be left to the Decision of the President and Council.

All Trials of Murder, Robbery, and Theft, and all other Felonies, Forgery, Perjury, and all Sorts of Frauds and Misdemeanors, Assaults, Frays, Quarrels, Adultery, and every other Breach of the Peace, or violent Invasions of Property, shall be submitted to the Phoujdaree Adawlut.

III.

That in the Provincial Court of Dewannee, the Collector of each District shall preside on the Part of the Company, in their Quality of King's Dewan, appointed by the President and Council, and the other Officers of the Cutcherry; that the Court shall be regularly held on every *Monday* and *Thursday*, and oftener if Necessity require; and that no Causes shall be heard or determined but in the open Court regularly assembled.

IV.

That in the Phoujdaree Adawlut, the Câzee and Muftee of the District, and Two Moulavies, shall sit to expound the Law, and determine how far the Delinquents shall be guilty of a

Breach thereof; but that the Collector shall also make it his Business to attend to the Proceedings of this Court, so far as to see that all necessary Evidences are summoned and examined, that due Weight is allowed to their Testimony, and that the Decision passed is fair and impartial, according to the Proofs exhibited in the Course of the Trial; and that no Causes shall be heard or determined but in the open Court regularly assembled.

V.

That in like Manner Two Superior Courts of Justice shall be established at the Chief Seat of Government, the one under the Denomination of the Dewannee Sudder Adawlut, and the other the Nizamut Sudder Adawlut.

VI.

That the Dewannee Sudder Adawlut shall receive and determine Appeals from the Provincial Dewannee Adawlut; that the President, with Two Members of the Council, shall preside therein, attended by the Dewan of the Khalfa, the Head Canon-gos, and other Officers of the Cutcherry: In Case of the Absence of the President, a Third Member of the Council to sit; that is to say, not less than Three Members to decide on an Appeal, but the whole Council may sit if they chuse it.

VII.

That a chief Officer of Justice, appointed on the Part of the Nation, shall preside in the Nizamut Adawlut, by the Title of Darogo Adawlut, assisted by the Chief Cázee, the Chief Muttee, and Three capable Moulavies; that their Duty shall be to revise all the Proceedings of the Phoujdaree Adawlut; and in capital Cases by signifying their Approbation or Disapprobation thereof, with their Reasons at large, to prepare the Sentence for the Warrant of the Nazim, which shall be returned into the Mofussul, and there carried into Execution; that with Respect to the Proceedings in this Court, a similar Controul shall be lodged in the Chief and Council, as is vested in the Collectors in the Districts; so that the Company's Administration, in Character of King's Dewan, may be satisfied that the Decrees of Justice, on which both the Welfare and Safety of the Country so materially depend, are not injured or perverted by the Effects of Partiality or Corruption.

VIII.

That, in order to preserve the Dignity and Importance of the Two Superior Courts, there shall be Two Courts of Adawlut established at the Seat of Government, exactly on the same Plan as those of the Districts: In that of the Dewannee, a Member of the Council shall preside; and in that of the Phoujdarree another Member of the Council shall exercise the Controul specified in the Fourth Regulation: These Duties to be performed by the Members in Rotation.

IX.

That, as nothing is more conducive to the Prosperity of any Country, than a free and easy Access to Justice and Redress, the Collectors shall at all Times be ready to receive the Petitions of the injured; and further, to prevent their being debarred this Access from Motives of Interest, Partiality, or Resentment, in the Officers or Servants of the Cutcherry, that a Box shall be placed at the Door of the Cutcherry, in which the Complainants may lodge their Petitions at any Time or Hour they please; that the Collector shall himself keep the Key of this Box, and each Court Day have such Arzees as he may find in it read immediately in his Presence, by the Arizbeggy of the Cutcherry.

X.

That in summoning from the Farmed Lands Persons complained against, or Evidences called on by the Parties, the Rule laid down in the Ninth Article of the Public Regulations be strictly adhered to. The Collector ought further to avoid, as studiously as possible, summoning any Persons from the Mofussul, who are any ways connected with the Revenue, during the Months of *Bhadoo*, *Assin*, *Augun*, and *Poos*, unless in Cases which call for immediate Enquiry and Example.

XI.

That in Order to facilitate the Course of Justice in trivial Causes, and relieve the Ryot from the heavy Grievance of travelling to a great Distance to seek for Redress, all Disputes of Property, not exceeding Ten Rupees, shall be decided by the Head Farmer of the Purgunnah to which the Parties belong; and his Decree shall be final.

XII.

That the Process observed for trying Causes, in the Provincial Dewannee Adawlut, shall be as follows—First, To file and

read the Petition of the Complainant. Secondly, To allot a limited Time for the Defendant to give Answer, which when received shall also be filed and read. Thirdly, To hear the Parties, *viva voce*, and if necessary examine Evidences. And lastly, To pass Decree.—That if, in adhering to this Order of Process, the Defendant shall evade or delay giving Answer within the limited Time, Judgment shall pass against him.

XIII.

That complete Records shall be kept in the Mofussul Dewannee Adawlut, in which shall be inserted the Petition of the Complainant, the Answer of the Defendant, the subsequent Process, and Examination of Evidence, and finally the Decree; that upon Decree being passed, both Parties shall be furnished with a Copy thereof, free of Expence, and that such Copies shall be authenticated under the Public Seal and the Signing of the Collector: That a Copy of the Records entire shall also be transmitted Twice a month to the Sudder Dewannee Adawlut, through the Channel of the President and Council.

XIV.

That each Collector shall also keep an Abstract Register of his Adawlut, in *English*, containing the Names of the Plaintiff and Defendant, the Substance of the Suit, the Substance of the Decree, the Date of the Cause being filed, and the Date of the Decree being passed; and this Abstract also shall be transmitted Twice a Month to the Sudder Dewannee Adawlut.

XV.

That as the Litigiousness and Perseverance of the Natives of this Country, in their Suits and Complaints, is often productive, not only of Inconvenience and Vexation to their Adversaries, but also of endless Expence and actual Oppression, it is to be observed as a standing Rule, that Complaints of so old a Date as . . . Years shall not be actionable: And further, should they be found guilty, as is often the Case, from the Principles abovementioned, of flying from the One Court to the other, to prevent and protract the Course of Justice, the Party, so transgressing, shall be considered as nonsuited, and shall, according to his Degree in Life, and the Notoriety of the Offence, be liable to Fine or Punishment.

N.B.—By the *Mahometan* Law, all Claims which have lain dormant for Twelve Years, whether for Land or Money, are invalid.—This also is the Law of the *Hindoos*, and the legal Practice of the Country.

XVI.

That the Custom of levying Chout, Dussuttra, Puchuttra, or any other Fee or Commission, on the Account of Money recovered, or Etlak on the Decision of Causes, as well as all heavy arbitrary Fines, is absolutely and for ever abolished.

XVII.

That as, however, Cases may occur, in which it will be highly necessary, for the Welfare of the Community, to curb and restrain trivial and groundless Complaints, and to deter Chicane and Intrigue, which Passions amongst these People often work to the Undoing of their Neighbours, a Discretion shall in such Cases be left to the Court, either to impose a Fine, not exceeding Five Rupees, or inflict corporal Punishment, not exceeding Twenty Lashes with a Rattan, according to the Degree of the Offence, and the Person's Station in Life.

XVIII.

That in adjusting the Claims of old Debts, it shall be observed as a Rule, that they bear no further Interest after such Adjustment, but that the Amount shall be payable by Kistbundee, according to the Circumstances of the Party: And as the Rates of Interest, hitherto authorized by Custom, have amounted to the most exorbitant Usury, the following Rates are now established to be received and paid, as well for past Debts as on future Loans of Money: viz. On Sums not exceeding One Hundred Rupees Principal, an Interest of Three rupees Two Annas *per Cent. per Mensem*, or Half an Anna in the Rupee: On Sums above One Hundred Rupees Principal, an Interest of Two Rupees *per Cent. per Mensem*, the Principal and Interest to be discharged according to the Condition of the Bond; and all Compound Interest, arising from an intermediate Adjustment of Accounts, to be deemed unlawful and prohibited: When a Debt is sued for upon a Bond which shall be formed to specify a higher Interest than the established Rates, the Interest shall be wholly forfeited to the Debtor, and the Principal only recoverable; and that all Attempts to elude this Law, by Deductions from the original Loan, under whatever Denomination, shall be punished by a Forfeiture of one Moiety of the Amount of the Bond to the Government, and the other Half to the Debtor.

XIX.

That all Bonds shall be executed in the Presence of Two Witnesses.

XX.

That whereas it has been too much the Practice in this Country for Individuals to exercise a judicial Authority over their Debtors, a Practice, which is not only in itself unlawful and oppressive, seeing a Man thereby becomes the Judge in his own Cause, but which is also a direct Infringement of the Prerogative and Powers of the regular Government; that Publications shall therefore be made, forbidding the Exercise of all such Authority, and directing all Persons to prefer their Suits to the established Court of Adawlut; and that the Collector shall particularly attend to this Regulation, which, it is apprehended, will prove a great Means of Relief to the helpless Ryot, from his merciless Creditor the Money Lender.

XXI.

That in all Cases of disputed Property, regarding Lands, Houses, Landmarks, &c., where a local Investigation is required, an Aumin shall be chosen with the mutual consent of the Parties; or, if they cannot agree in the Choice of One Person, each shall have the Privilege of nominating his own, and the Collector shall decide upon their joint Report of Circumstances. The Collector is also to attend, that the Aumins do not accumulate Expences by unnecessary Delays, but that their Scrutinies and their Wages be limited to the Time he judges sufficient for performing the Service in Question. The Expence of the Enquiry is to be defrayed by the Person who is cast.

XXII.

That in all Cases of disputed Accounts, Partnerships, Debts, doubtful or contested Bargains, Non-Performances of Contracts, and so forth, it shall be recommended to the Parties to submit the Decision of their Cause to Arbitration, the Award of which shall become a Decree of the Dewannee Adawlut; the Choice of the Arbitrators is to rest with the Parties, but they are to decide the Cause without Fee or Reward. The Collector, on the Part of Government, is to afford every Encouragement in his Power to Inhabitants of Character and Credit to become Arbitrators, but is not to employ any coercive Means for that Purpose.

XXIII.

That in all Suits regarding Inheritance, Marriage, Caste, and all other religious Usages or Institutions, the Laws of the Koran

with respect to *Mahometans*, and those of the Shaster with respect to *Gentoos*, shall be invariably adhered to: On all such Occasions, the Moulavies or Brahmins shall respectively attend and expound the Law, and they shall sign the Report, and assist in passing the Decree.

XXIV.

That the Decree of the Provincial Dewannee Adawlut, on all Causes for Sums not exceeding Five Hundred Rupees, shall be final; but that for all above that amount, an Appeal shall lie to the Sudder.

XXV.

That the Court shall have a Right of decreeing to the Party, in whose Favour Judgment is given, any specific Sum for Costs within the real Amount, or in general to decree with Costs. The Bill in both Cases to be taxed by the Court.

XXVI.

That Persons found guilty of preferring groundless, litigious, or vexatious, Appeals, shall be punished at the Discretion of the Sudder Dewannee Adawlut, by an Enhancement of the Costs, which shall be given to the Respondent, as a Compensation for the Trouble and Expence which he shall have sustained.

XXVII.

That complete Records shall be kept, and transmitted from the Provincial Phoujdaree Adawlut to the Nizamut Sudder Adawlut, Twice every Month, through the Channel of the President and Council. This exclusive of the Trials for capital Crimes, which are to be transmitted as soon as closed.

XXVIII.

That the Collector shall also keep an Abstract Register in *English*, of the proceedings of this Court, in which shall be inserted only the Names of the Prisoners, the Crimes or Offences of which they stand charged, and the Sentence or Acquittal, which shall be transmitted in like Manner, Twice every Month, to the Sudder Adawlut.

XXIX.

That the Authority of this Court shall extend to corporal Punishment, Imprisonment, sentencing to the Roads, and Fines, but not to the Life of the Criminal. In capital Cases the Opinion of the Court, with the Evidences and Defence of the Prisoner,

shall be transmitted to the Nizamut Adawlut, and having obtained their Confirmation, it shall be ultimately referred to the Nazim for Sentence, which shall be carried into immediate Execution, as directed in the Seventh Article.

XXX.

That Persons guilty of petty Misdemeanors, whose Rank, Caste, or Station in Life, shall be thought to exempt them from corporal Punishment, may be made liable to Fines; but should such Fines be laid for a larger Sum than One Hundred Rupees, they are not to be enforced or levied without the Confirmation of the Nizamut Adawlut; for which Purpose they are to be immediately reported, with a State of the Case, and the Cause of their being imposed.

XXXI.

That as the Forfeiture and Confiscation of the Property and Effects of Delinquents sentenced to the Loss of Life may often occur, it is to be observed that such Forfeiture and Confiscation is not to depend on the Provincial Phoujdaree, but upon the Nizamut Adawlut: It is to be a standing Rule, therefore, to transmit, with the Proceedings of the Trial, an Account of the Property and Effects of the Delinquent, and wait the Orders of the Sudder, whether they are to be surrendered to the Heirs, or confiscated to the State; In the latter Case a Sale is to be made, and the Amount brought to public Account.

XXXII.

That whereas the honourable Company, from Motives of Tenderness, and Solitude for the Peace and Happiness of the Ryots, have determined to abolish the Revenue which has hitherto arisen from the Collections of the Phoujdaree Bâzee Jumma, the same is accordingly to be made public; the Court is still to take Cognizance of all such Offences, but shall inflict no other Punishment for them than Stripes or Imprisonment, or Damages to the Party injured.

XXXIII.

That the same Motives of Regard for the Tranquillity and Happiness of the Ryots, having induced the Government to relinquish the Revenue arising from the Rassooms, or Fees of the Cázee and his inferior Officers, of which the inhabitants have long complained as a severe Grievance, the Cázee and Muftee are therefore introduced in the List of Adawlut Officers at a

Monthly Salary: in this Capacity they are to continue to attest all Writings, to perform all Ceremonies of Marriages, Births, and Funerals, and to discharge all their other Functions as was customary heretofore; and as they are thus to be supported at the Expence of Government, they are to exact no Fees, Dues, or Taxes whatsoever: Any Present or Gratification, made with the entire free Will of the Party, on the Occasion of a Marriage or of a Funeral, is not prohibited by this Regulation; but if upon Complaint it shall appear that Force or any other undue Influence has been used to extort such Gratifications, the Câzee or Muftée so convicted shall be *ipso facto* dismissed from his Office, with Marks of public Disgrace.

XXXIV.

That the Office of Yetasub, having become obsolete, is now totally abolished; but that the Câzee and Muftée shall be allowed each Two Deputies for performing the Duties of their Office in the Purgunnahs; these to be stationed by the Collector at such convenient Distances, as that the Ryots may not have above One Day's Journey to perform for calling in their Assistance.

XXXV.

That whereas the Peace of this Country hath for some Years past been greatly disturbed by Bands of Decoits, who not only infest the High Roads, but often plunder whole Villages, burning the Houses, and murdering the Inhabitants: And whereas these abandoned Outlaws have hitherto found Means to elude every Attempt, which the Vigilance of Government hath put in Force, for detecting and bringing such atrocious Criminals to Justice, by the Secrecy of their Haunts, and the wild State of the Districts, which are most subject to their Incursions, it becomes the indispensable Duty of Government to try the most rigorous Means, since Experience has proved every lenient and ordinary Remedy to be ineffectual: That it be therefore resolved, that every such Criminal, on Conviction, shall be carried to the Village to which he belongs, and be there executed, for a Terror and Example to others; and for the further Prevention of such abominable Practices, that the Villages of which he is an Inhabitant shall be fined, according to the Enormity of the Crime, and each Inhabitant according to his Substance, and that the Family of the Criminal shall become the Slaves of the State, and be disposed of for the general Benefit and Convenience of the People, according to the Discretion of the Government.

XXXVI.

That the Tannadars and Pikes of the Districts shall be punished by Dismission, or Fines, if they neglect the Duties of their Charge ; and as an Encouragement for them to exert themselves in the Protection of the Villages committed to their Care, and in detecting, opposing, and bringing to Justice, all Decoits and other Offenders against the Public Peace, pecuniary Rewards, Grants of Lands, or particular Privileges and Immunities, shall be granted them, proportioned to their Deserts, and the Services which they shall have rendered the State.

XXXVII.

That in addition to these general Regulations, the Collector shall form such subsidiary ones, for promoting the due Course of Justice, and the Welfare and Prosperity of the Ryots, as the local Circumstances of their respective Districts shall point out and require, and that they shall report the same to the Committee of Circuit, in order to their being communicated to the Board, for their final Sanction and Confirmation.

That they shall in particular, and without Delay, regulate and transmit for Confirmation, the Fees to be received by all Peons and Pikes, employed in the Service of the Courts of Adawlut, which can only be done with Accuracy from Information on the Spot. And that they shall further establish such Rules, with Penalties annexed, as may serve effectually to eradicate the Practice among the Officers and Servants of the Cutcherry, of exacting and receiving Bribes from the Parties who have Causes in Suit ; a Practice not only criminal in the Persons who are guilty of it, but which reflects Discredit and Reproach on the Government under which they serve.

A true Extract.

ALEXANDER HIGGINSON, *Secretary*.

REVENUE DEPARTMENT,

Fort William, 3d Nov. 1772.

APPENDIX C

A PLAN FOR THE BETTER ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE PROVINCES OF BENGAL

THE distribution of justice in these provinces is yet very defective in two essential points: First, in the want of a provision for cases which are excluded by the late Act of Parliament from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Judicature; and, secondly, in the limitation of the powers of that Court, which is impracticable in many cases, and which, if it were practicable in all, would defeat the first purpose of its institution, if that purpose was to relieve the inhabitants from oppression.

We presume that the Legislature did not intend by the act to form a complete system either of Government or Judicature; but rather an introduction to one more perfect, which should be accomplished by successive improvements, as necessity and experience might suggest them. To effect this it is necessary in the first place that the Government itself should be made entire; the powers which it is permitted to exercise should be legally annexed to it; the distinctions of Nizamut and Dewanny should be abolished, and the British sovereignty through whatever channels it may pass into these provinces should be all in all.

The only use for which the Company have enjoined the observance of these distinctions cannot longer avail them. The French and Dutch have long since repeatedly declared that there is no ruling power in these provinces but the English Company; and if a fact of such glowing notoriety could be disputed, the late publications made under the authority of Parliament itself would afford incontestable evidence of its reality.

The uses, which may be made of these distinctions, in securing the acts of Government from interruption by warrants and writs issued from the Supreme Court of Judicature will be found fallacious on examination, and may be perverted to the most dangerous of all abuses. Those who are aggrieved by

unwarrantable acts of Government ought to have a refuge from it. Those who fly to the Court as an asylum against the regular and official acts of Government will be disappointed with costs and fruitless trouble; and it will soon be publicly known what cases are, and what are not, within the cover of its protection. But were every titular department of the Nizamut, and every agent of the Dewanny, to be exempted from the claims of justice, or, which would be the same in effect, accountable only to the Nazim or his sensible Minister, or to the Governor-General and Council, crimes of the most atrocious nature might be committed by such instruments, private property might be invaded, evidences suborned; and even the lives of men might be sacrificed to accomplish the designs of avarice or ambition, or to gratify private revenge. In a word, every evil, for the suppression of which the Supreme Court of Judicature was constituted and armed with such an extensive jurisdiction, not only over all British subjects and their dependents, but over every person directly or indirectly employ'd by the Company or their agents, might be practiced by those very agents with impunity under the sanction of the Nizamut and Dewanny, and the jurisdiction of the Court reduced to the trial of common felonies and breaches of the peace, and the examination of litigated property among the inhabitants of Calcutta.

The Government being constituted in the manner which has been proposed, let the power of the Supreme Court of Judicature, which should accompany it in every stage of its growth, be extended to all parts of the Provinces without limitation, and even to such countries as may at any time now or hereafter be annexed to them, as hath lately been the case with Cooch Behar.

If the bounds to which the Judges of the Supreme Court are by nature restricted, could admit of the possibility of their deciding in their own persons all the causes and offences which might be brought before them in so extensive and populous a country as this is, their jurisdiction alone would be a sufficient blessing to it. But this is impossible, they must have aids. These should be conformable to the laws, usages and manners of the people, to the necessities of the State, and to the constitution of the Supreme Court, in such points as might be found necessary to connect them with it, and fix their dependance upon it.

The following plan is proposed on these united principles. It has for its groundwork the plan which was formed by the late President and Council in August 1772 with the alterations since

made to it in December 1773 on the establishment of the Provincial Councils.

1st.—That the following Courts be established for administration of justice.

(1st) The Sudder Dewanny Adaulut or Superior Court.

(2nd) The Provincial Councils.

(3rd) The Courts of Adaulut Dewanny Zillajat, or Provincial Dewanny Courts.

(4th) The Courts of Adaulut Dewanny Mofussul, or Subordinate Dewanny Courts.

That the first of these shall be composed of the Governor-General and Council, and the Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature, assisted by the Royroyan, the Canongos and other Chief Officers of the Khalsa. That not less than three members shall decide on any cause, of whom one shall be a Member of the Council and another a Member of the Court, but that the whole may sit if they chuse it. That this Court shall receive all appeals from the Provincial Councils in causes of personal property exceeding one thousand rupees, or of Mulguzarry lands (or lands which pay the common rent to Government) the jumma of which (or rent paid to Government) is more than one thousand rupees, or of alienated or free lands of which the jumma is more than one hundred rupees. That its decrees shall be final. That it shall be lawful for the Court, if they see occasion, to receive fresh exhibits, and to examine new witnesses to any appeal before them; but not to take up any cause which shall not have been appealed from the Provincial Councils. That the Court shall sit every Wednesday without a summons, and as often besides as the business may require by a summons from the Governor-General.

That the second shall consist of the Provincial Councils in their usual and official meetings assisted by the Provincial Dewans, the Canongos, Mowlavies and Pundits. That they shall hear and determine all complaints from the inhabitants of their respective divisions, or refer them at their option to the 3rd and 4th Courts, and that they shall receive such appeals as shall be made to them from the 3rd and 4th Courts. That the judicial proceedings of the Provincial Councils shall be entered on their official records; but that separate copies shall be extracted of their proceedings on all cases which shall be appealed and be transmitted to the Sudder Dewanny Adaulut.

That the third shall be superintended by a Member of the

Provincial Council in each division in yearly rotation, assisted by the Provincial Dewan, the Canongos, one Mowlavy and one Pundit, who shall be appointed by the Governor-General and Council to hear and determine all complaints from the inhabitants of the division with an appeal, as above, to the Provincial Councils. That these Courts shall be held in the capital town of each division. That they shall sit regularly three days in every week, and oftener if the business shall require it. That the Superintendant of each division shall deliver into the Provincial Council, on or before the 5th day of each month, a fair copy of his proceedings in the preceding month, and that an abstract of the same containing the names of the parties and the causes of action, and expressing for whom the decree was given, be immediately transmitted by the Provincial Courts to the Sudder Dewanny Adaulut to be kept in the records of that Court.

That the fourth shall consist of the Naib Dewan and the Canongos of each respective district, one Mowlavy and one Pundit, which shall be appointed by the Governor-General and Council. That they shall be held in the Cutchery, or capital town of each district formerly superintended by the Collectors. That they shall sit four days in every week, and oftener if required. That they shall hear and determine all complaints from the inhabitants of their districts with an appeal as above to the Provincial Councils of the divisions to which they respectively appertain.

2nd.—That it shall be lawful for the Governor-General and Council and the Chief Justice and Judges assembled together in the Dewanny Court to frame such laws, rules, and ordinances as they shall judge necessary, whether for the regulation of the proceedings of the Dewanny Courts or for the good government of the country and for the welfare of the people, and to amend or repeal such laws, rules, ordinances and usages in being, as they shall judge detrimental to Government or to the welfare of the people; but that it shall be necessary in both cases that the majority of the Members of the Council, and the majority of the Members of the Supreme Court shall agree in the said resolutions, without which they shall not be valid. That such regulations shall be subject to the same controul in England as the rules and orders formed by the Governor-General and Council with the allowance of the Judges as directed by the Act of Parliament.

3rd.—That all the forms, usages and rules which have been generally practiced, or which have been constituted for the

management and collection of the revenues, shall be valid and legal untill they shall be repealed, or abrogated by the Governor-General and Council and by the Chief Justice and Judges in the manner directed by the preceding Article. This is proposed to obviate all doubts; although the practice of the Court has been invariably guided by this maxim, and the Chief Justice on reading this article has declared that he considers the local laws and customs of the provinces, proved in the Court, as rules by which he is to administer justice, in the same manner as the local laws and customs in England are understood to be part of the common law thereof.

4th.—That it shall be lawful for the Royroyan and the Superintendent of the Khalsa Records to issue their warrants under the seal of the Royroyan and signature of the Superintendent of the Khalsa Records to apprehend any person against whom complaints shall be made and referred to them, either by the Governor-General and Council or the Judges, or by any individual of either, to answer to the said complaints and to summon witnesses to attend and to give evidence on the same. That they shall report to the Sudder Dewanny Adaulut their proceedings on such complaints, but shall not inflict any punishment, nor detain any person in custody, against whom complaints shall have been made longer than forty-eight hours, nor on any person summoned as an evidence longer than the time which shall be required for his examination.

5th.—That it shall be lawful for the Royroyan and the Superintendent of the Khalsa Records to issue their warrants under the seal of the Royroyan, and signature of the Superintendent to apprehend any farmer, under-farmer, security, or other person of whatever denomination, on whom the Chief and Members of any Provincial Council shall have complained for payment of the public revenue, and shall require them by a letter under the hands and seal of the said Chief and Council to apprehend and send the said persons to the said Provincial Council; and that it shall be lawful for the Royroyan and Superintendent of the Khalsa Records to cause the persons whom they shall have apprehended in compliance with such requisition to be transported and delivered over to the said Provincial Council, to be dealt with as the nature of the case shall require. That each letter of requisition as aforesaid shall specify distinctly the cause for which the warrant of the Royroyan and Superintendent is required, and the sum in which the person, who is the object of it, is indebted; and that a copy of the said letter shall be

delivered to the party by the officer who shall serve the warrant upon him for his information.

6th.—That no officer of the Khalsa shall be liable to an action or punishment for the execution of a regular summons on warrant of the Royroyan or Superintendant of the Khalsa Records, nor the Royroyan or Superintendant be made accountable for them, but that if the farmer or other person who shall have been apprehended in virtue of the warrant of the Royroyan and Superintendant of the Khalsa Records, and sent to the Provincial Council which required his presence, shall deem himself aggrieved thereby, he shall have his action against the members of the Provincial Council, who shall be liable to such penalties as the Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court shall think proper to inflict, if it shall appear that they have acted without sufficient grounds to warrant such a proceeding; and that they have been guilty of wilful oppression.

7th.—That no officer of the Provincial Councils, or of any of the other Courts of the Dewanny, shall be liable to an action or punishment for any legal acts committed by him in the execution of a written order or warrant of the Provincial Councils or Courts given him in the usual form, but that if any person against whom any such order or warrant shall have been issued, shall deem himself injured thereby, he shall have an action against the person or persons by whom the said order or warrant was signed, who shall be liable to such pains or penalties as the Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court shall think proper to inflict, if it shall appear to have been a wanton or wilful act of oppression.

8th.—That it shall be lawful for the Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature to refer to the Provincial Councils, or to any other of the inferior Dewanny Courts, such causes as shall at any time be brought before them, which may be more easily or speedily decided in the said Courts, or which from the nature of the causes requiring numerous witnesses or exhibits, or from the distance of the places where the parties may reside, cannot without great loss or vexation to the parties be tried in Calcutta; and to order the said Courts to hear and decide the same in the usual forms, which order the said Courts shall be obliged to obey. And that it shall be further lawful for the Chief Justice and the Judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature to issue their orders to the Provincial Councils, or to the other inferior Dewanny Courts, to stop their proceedings in any cause, which shall be pending before the said Courts, that the

same may be tried in the Supreme Court, which orders the said Courts shall be obliged to obey.

9th.—That the following Courts shall be established for the administration of criminal justice :—

(1st) The Nizamut Sudder Adaulut.

(2nd) The Courts of Foujdarry Adaulut.

That these Courts be constituted precisely on the mode and form established by the plan formed by the late President and Council in August 1772 and intitled “A plan for the administration of justice,” but that it shall be lawful for the Governor-General and Council and the Chief Justice and Judges, or the majority of both, to constitute such other subsidiary rules and forms as they shall judge necessary for the controul, government and process of the said Courts, subject to the same controul in England as the rules and orders formed by the Governor-General and Council with the allowance of the Judges as directed by the Act of Parliament.

10th.—That the Daroga of the Nizamut Adaulut, under the title of Naib Nazim, be informed to confirm, mitigate, or change the punishments decreed in the Fellwabs or sentences of the Nizamut, and to issue warrants under his hand and the seal of the Nazim or under any other official form which may be after appointed for the execution of the sentences of the Nizamut Adaulut, or of such other punishments as he shall decree in their stead, provided that such warrants shall have been first submitted to the inspection of the Governor-General and Chief Justice and obtained their sanction to be carried into execution.

The latitude here proposed to be allowed to the Naib Nazim of changing the punishments ordained by the strict letter of the law has always been exercised by the Nazim, and is founded on a principle of the Mahometan Law which appears to be diametrically opposite to that of the Criminal Laws of England. These are highly penal and require mitigation from the Supreme Magistrate. The letter of the Mahometan Law inflicting punishment is mild to an excess; but the law itself enjoins the Magistrate to increase the punishment in cases of enormity, for the sake of example.

11th.—That the Amlas or Judges of the Foujdarry Adauluts shall not be made liable to any action or punishment on any complaint of imprisonment or punishment inflicted by them in the regular discharge of their functions; but shall be accountable

for their conduct only to the Nizamut Adaulut, which shall pass sentences thereon, subjected to the correction of the Naib Nazim with the ultimate sanction of the Governor-General and Chief Justice as in the preceding Article.

12th.—That no officer of the Foujdarry Adaulut shall be liable to any action or punishment for the execution of any regular warrant or summons of the Court under which he serves, but that the Daroga or Members of the Court who issued the warrant or summons shall be answerable for the legality of the same before the Nizamut Adaulut.

13th.—That the President and Members of the Board of Trade and the Chiefs of the Provincial Councils shall be Justices of the Peace.

14th.—That for the more easy and effectual maintenance of the peace in the City of Calcutta, and for the relief of the Governor-General and Members of the Supreme Court, who cannot bestow that portion of their time which is necessary to so important an object, the city be formed into a certain number of divisions, each of which shall be superintended by an officer called a Kut-wall, who shall be chosen by the Governor-General and Council and the Judges from amongst the people of that sect or nation which constitutes the majority of the inhabitants of the division, and shall preside over the peace of that division with power to imprison during no longer a space of time than twenty-four hours or to inflict corporal punishment not exceeding twenty lashes with a rattan on such vagabonds or offenders against the public peace as shall be apprehended within his division; and that an officer shall be appointed under the title of Superintendent of the Police, who shall receive daily reports from the Kutwalls, with such prisoners as they may have in charge, whom he shall either punish immediately by stripes given with a rattan not exceeding fifty in number or bind them over to the next quarter Session or Sessions of Oyer and Terminer; and that for this purpose he be invested with the powers of a Justice of the Peace. The subsidiary regulations which may be necessary to make this office more complete may be formed upon those which were published by the late President and Council, the 26th November 1772, and which require only the sanction of the Council and the Supreme Court for their legal confirmation.

15th.—That the plan for the administration of justice which was formed and published by the late President and Council in August 1772 be confirmed, except such parts of it as it is proposed either to amend or cancel by these regulations.

The following additional regulations have been recommended by the Chief Justice :—

16th.—That an able Advocate shall be appointed for the management of all lawsuits in which the Company shall be a party or indirectly engaged.

17th.—That as many offences may be committed which either partiality or other motives may prevent the superior servants of the Company from prosecuting with effect, and others which may be hid from their knowledge, an Advocate on the part of the Crown be appointed, who shall receive petitions, and being satisfied on a summary enquiry of the truth and enormity of the grievances complained of therein, shall be authorized to prosecute the offenders to conviction.

18th.—That there be a power in the Supreme Court to condemn criminals, who in England would be sentenced to be transported in His Majesty's American Colonies, to work on the highway, or on the public works, for such time as according to the degree of the crime the Court shall, in their discretion, think proper ; and also to give the like discretion to the Court to condemn for a limited time to the like punishment all capital convicts to whom His Majesty may hereafter be pleased to extend his mercy, unless he shall signify his gracious pleasure to the contrary.

WARREN HASTINGS.

RICHARD BARWELL.

APPENDIX D

THE ROHILLA WAR

MINUTE BY WARREN HASTINGS, 3RD DECEMBER, 1774

IN the beginning of the year 1772, the Mahrattas invaded the country of the Rohillas which, after a short but ineffectual opposition at Sukkertoll, was left at large exposed to their ravages. The Vizier, alarmed at their approach to the only part of his dominions which was easily accessible by such an enemy, applied with such earnestness to Sir Robert Barker, who was at that time with him, for the assistance of an English force, and the General thought the necessity so urgent, that of his own authority he sent orders to the first brigade, which was stationed at Dinapore, to march instantly into the Province of Oude. The Board disapproving this irregular proceeding refused their confirmation of it, and the brigade having reach'd the length of Benares remain'd there till the beginning of June and then returned to its former station. The Vizier availing himself of this movement offered his protection to the Rohillas and entered into a general treaty of alliance with the chiefs of that nation, and a separate one with Hafiz Rahmut Khan their principal, who, in their name and with their authority, engaged to pay him 40 lakhs of rupees for that support, whenever the Mahrattas evacuated the country. Translations of both treaties are recorded at length in the consultation of the 23rd of July 1772, and the original of the latter is in the actual possession of the Secretary, attested by General Barker, who was present at the ratification of both.

On the approach of the rainy season, the Mahrattas evacuated the country, and the Vizier demanded the stipulated recompense from the Rohillas, but they evaded the payment.

In the latter end of 1772, the Mahrattas having extorted from the King a grant of the districts of Korah and Kurrah which had been ceded to him by the Company for the express purpose of

maintaining his dignity, were preparing to take possession, and as this acquisition would have made them masters of the whole tract of country lying between the rivers Ganges and Jumnah, and bordering upon the Province of Oude, the Vizier again applied for assistance to repel such dangerous neighbours.

The proceedings of the late Council in their Secret Department of the 1st of February 1773, treat this subject very largely, and show how much they considered not only the safety of the Vizier, but even of the Company's possessions to be endangered by this formidable encroachment of the Mahratta State. It was ultimately concluded, to comply with the requisition of the Vizier, by sending the first brigade for the protection of his dominions against any attempt which the Mahrattas might make on them, and also determined to prevent their design on Korah, by taking prior possession for the Company, who had certainly the best title to it when the King could no longer keep it. It was not to be supposed the Mahrattas would submit quietly to the loss of a territory which they had used the most perfidious means to obtain, and every precaution was therefore necessary to guard against their efforts to recover it. The Company's orders of the 28th August 1771 expressly allowed the necessity of departing, on some occasions, from the limited plan which they had for a long time past enjoined, and in consequence the Rohilla country north of the Ganges was included within the line of action prescribed to the General in his instructions, because if the Mahrattas, either by the defeat, or, which was as likely to happen, by the desertion of the Rohillas to their cause, should gain a footing in that country, nothing could oppose their entering into the Province of Oude and laying it waste, in spite of any attempts of our forces to prevent them. The map which accompanies this will demonstrate this truth, more powerfully than any verbal argument.*

It was not to be supposed that the Mahrattas whose ambition for some years past had aspired to universal conquest, and who had extended their arms from the center of the Balaghaut to the northern extremity of Indostan, should sit down contented when they had added the Duab, Korah and Illahabad to their dominions. On the contrary, there was every reason to apprehend, and it was publicly reported in their own camp, that they would next carry their operations into the country of the Vizier, and even into the Company's own possessions.

On the grounds which I have described, it was agreed to main-

* No map was found by me in the bundle of papers. The records in the Imperial Record Office at Calcutta were searched in vain to discover it.—G. W. F.

tain the Province of Korah against the Mahrattas and afterwards to extend our arms beyond the prescribed line of the dominions of our ally into the Rohilla country, by a discretionary latitude allowed the General as above mentioned, which he accordingly made use of by marching the brigade as far as Ramgaut, and we have the strongest reason to believe that it was attended with every immediate advantage which we had projected from such a measure, as the Mahrattas lay during the whole campaign of 1773 in the neighbourhood of our army, but without daring either to cross the river or to approach the borders of Korah; and before the setting in of the rains of that year, their domestic troubles obliged them to return into their own proper dominions.

Of the resolution to enter the Rohilla country for its defence against the Mahrattas, the Court of Directors were first advised in the general letter by the Resolution of the 31st of March 1773, which arrived in England long before the departure of the transports.

The effectual protection thus afforded the Rohillas, and the departure of the Mahrattas, having established beyond all contest the right of the Vizier to the 40 lakhs which had been stipulated for this important service, and which by the terms of the engagement were really due the preceding year, on the retreat of the Mahrattas from their country, he demanded payment of Hafiz Rahmut Khan, who refused it. The Vizier also accused him of having secretly encouraged the Mahrattas and sent them a supply of money, and, if I mistake not, General Sir Robert Barker in some of his letters mentions the same circumstance. The plea of justice thus coinciding with the principles of sound policy, which dictated to the Vizier the necessity of securing himself against the perfidy and intrigues of the Rohillas, who from their situation were most capable of hurting him in his contests with more powerful enemies, and from their natural weakness and the jealousy inseparable from it, would ever seek for their safety in fomenting or joining in attempts against him, he formed the design of invading and reducing the country. As his own strength was unequal to such an undertaking, he solicited the aid of this Government for effecting it, and made an offer of 50 lakhs of rupees to be paid on its accomplishment.

As this proposal was urged in the warmest terms, both in person to Sir Robert Barker and in his letters to me, and this had long been a favourite project of the Vizier, the Board judged with me, that it might afford a fair occasion to urge the improvement of our alliance, by obtaining his assent to a more equitable

compensation for the expence attending the aid which he occasionally received from our forces, and to free the Company from the embarrassment to which they might be subjected by retaining the property and possession of the remote districts of Korah and Illahabad. For this purpose it was agreed that I should write the following letter to the Vizier which I beg leave to quote at large, because it fixes the source of these engagements, which took place by a progressive train of measures and terminated in the Rohilla war, and will mark at least that this was not the effect either of a precipitate and unweighed resolution or a tame acquiescence in the Vizier's schemes of ambition, but the result of long deliberation originally devised and consistently employed as an instrument of promoting the interests of the Company, of perpetuating the dependance of their ally, and converting it to the channel of solid utility.

Fort William, 21st April 1773.

"I have received Your Excellency's letter mentioning the particulars of your operations against the Mahrattas. You promise to the General that whenever the Mahrattas should be driven out of the Rohilla country and Hafiz Rahmut Khan shall fulfill his agreement of 40 lakhs of rupees, you will give half that sum to the Company, and that should the Rohilla Chiefs be guilty of a breach of their agreement and we thoroughly exterminate them and settle Your Excellency in the country, you will in that case pay the Company 50 lakhs of rupees in ready money, and exempt them from the King's tribute. Upon the same subject the General has also written to me fully. Every circumstance which you have written to me I consider as a proof of the cordial attachment which subsists between us, and of the confidence and reliance which you place in the friendship of the English Company; but the points which you have proposed require much consideration, and the previous ratification of a formal agreement, before I can assent to them, otherwise I may incur the displeasure of my employers.

"It is true that I have long thought that the union of the Rohilla country with yours, either by a sure and permanent obligation of friendship, or by reducing it to obedience, if they should render such an attempt justifiable by an act of enmity or treachery, would be an advisable point for you to attain, because by that means the defensive line of your dominions would be completed, by including within it all the land lying on that side of the river Ganges, and you would be in no danger from an attack

on that quarter, whenever the Mahrattas should commit disturbances in another.

“But it appears to me that this is an object not to be obtained by an occasional view of that country, and its distance from the province of Bengal will not admit of the continuance of the English forces longer than the period which remains of dry weather. You will please to remember they were sent for your assistance, and to defend the province of Korah against the Mahrattas. Thus far only I am authorized by the commands of my superiors to employ them beyond the limits of their own possessions, and even this is the cause of a heavy loss and risk to their affairs, especially in the expence of their troops and stores, and in the absence of so great a part of their force, which was originally destined for the sole defence of the countries dependant on Bengal. You have frequently repeated in your letters the remark, ‘that to wait till the enemy was at your door, and then to write for the assistance of our forces, could answer no good purpose, but that every year the same cause would require their return to the same service, and pass without effecting any purpose of real advantage.’ My friend, all this is true, but it proceeds from the want of proper measures having been previously taken, and from the imperfect footing on which affairs between us have been established.

“The concern which the Company takes in your safety, and the duties of friendship which their commands and our own inclinations equally enjoin us to observe inviolably to their allies, and especially one so closely united by an approved attachment to them, would not suffer us to withhold our aid when your affairs require it. But it has always been with reluctance that we have suffered the army to pass the frontiers of our own country, because the loss and inconvenience attending it was certain, and altho’ joined with your forces, there is no cause to fear the most powerful efforts of our enemies, yet the events of war are at the disposal of the Almighty, and the only fruits which the most splendid successes can afford us, are the reputation of having retained the faith of our alliance in opposition to every incentive of self-interest and self-defence.

“Thus circumstanced, we are precluded from deriving any benefit from your support, and ours can only afford you a relief from present danger, without any provision of future security. For these reasons I have often wished for a personal interview with you, for the purpose of removing difficulties and perpetuating the alliance with Your Excellency on terms more suitable to our mutual interests : Your Excellency also hath repeatedly expressed

the same inclination. I therefore write, that if your affairs will at this season admit of your giving me a meeting, I will hasten to obtain it as soon as I am able, after the receipt of your letter in reply to this; if otherwise, I must wait for it at some more distant period, as the affairs of this Government will indispensably require my presence at this place after three or four months, and it is uncertain when I shall again have an interval of leisure for such a journey.

"In the meantime Your Excellency and the General are at a great distance from the Province of Korah, and as the affairs of that Province require the presence of a person on the behalf of the Company to regulate and take charge of it, until it shall be hereafter determined in what manner it shall be finally disposed of, I have judged it advisable to depute Mr. James Lawrell, a gentleman of the Council of Calcutta, on this service, and he will set out accordingly in a few days, which I hope you will approve."

The allurements thus held out to the Vizier succeeded. He proposed in reply a meeting with me at Benares, which took place accordingly. I found him still equally bent on the design of reducing the Rohillas, which I encouraged, as I had before done, by dwelling on the advantages which he would derive from its success, but objecting with great force the orders of the Company restricting us from such remote schemes of conquest, to which therefore I could not assent without such conditions obtained in return for it as might obviate their displeasure and win their sanction to so hazardous and unauthorized a measure.

I fear not to quote these expressions, addressing myself to fair and unbiass'd judges who will not infer my real sentiments from the style and arguments of a political negotiation.

I told him that the Company had drawn themselves into fresh distress by the enormous load of their military expences, one entire brigade being kept up for the sole purpose of maintaining a connection with him, since it was useless and unnecessary to the protection of our own provinces, that if he wished therefore to avail himself of our aid, either in preventing or even in repelling the designs of his enemies, he must first agree to bear a more equal share of the burthen of the expence by paying the whole charge of the forces lent him for this service while they were so employed. To this, after much contention, he assented, and the sum of 2,10,000 rupees, which the General computed to be the amount of the expence, was fixed as the monthly subsidy to be pay'd for the brigade, when it should pass the borders of the

Province of Bahar on his requisition. Having obtained this point, which I considered in the light of a perpetual military fund, I easily yielded my assent to the Rohilla plan, on the stipulation of 40 lakhs for its accomplishment, 10 lakhs being deducted from his first offer on account of the difference which had taken place in the subsidy.

This agreement was no sooner made than he suddenly repented, desired to decline the war with the Rohillas, till a more favourable conjunction when he should be less embarrassed by other engagements, agreeing however to the monthly subsidy whenever his future occasions should oblige him to require the aid of our forces. Thus the Rohilla plan remained rather suspended than wholly abandoned, although it was left optional in our Government to reject or assent to it on a future occasion. Messrs. Lawrell and Vansittart, who were with me at the time, and to whom I made a daily communication in writing of the substance of every conversation which passed between the Vizier and myself, will vouch for the literal truth of this narrative, as corresponding with what I then repeated to them, and I believe it will appear from it, that although I had not engaged the Government by any express obligation to comply with any future application of the Vizier to support his pretensions on the Rohillas, yet as the most essential article of the Treaty had originated from this design, and had been yielded to in consideration of my agreement to engage in it, it would have been dishonourable to decline the undertaking, when proposed under circumstances as favourable to its success, and to the general interests of the Company, as they were when I first offered to engage in it.

Soon after my return to Calcutta the Vizier renew'd the proposal for invading the Rohillas, and repeated his desire of engaging in it on the conditions before agreed on. A variety of arguments concurr'd to favour it at this particular time; none to oppose it. The Mahrattas were so much occupied by their own dissensions that they could not even defend their own possessions in the Duab, much less were they likely to interrupt our operations against the Rohillas. The King had no means of interference, but by his General Nudjuf Khan, for whose attachment we had stronger security in his interest and his fear of his rival Abdulahed Khan, than his master had in his allegiance. The Rohillas were too weak to resist so powerful an attack, and as their country was open and undefended, either by defiles, woods or fortresses, and in its greatest extent did not exceed 200 miles, its entire subjection did not require any length of time.

To these inducements, which apply only to the success of the undertaking, other motives equally powerfully engaged our attention to it, as a measure necessary to the interests and safety of the Company.

All our advices, both public and private, represented the distresses of the Company at home as extreme. The letters from the Court of Directors called upon us most loudly for ample remittances and a reduction of our military expences; at the same time such was the state of affairs in this Government that for many years past the income of the year was found inadequate to its expences, to defray which a heavy bond debt, amounting at one time to a hundred and twenty-five lakhs of rupees, had accumulated. The Board bestowed much labour and time in the retrenchment of their expences, but much remained yet to be done, and the regulations which they had already formed required time to produce any visible effects. By allowing the Vizier the military aid which he required, a saving of near one-third of our military expences would be effected during the period of such a service; the stipulation of 40 lakhs would afford an ample supply to our treasury and to the Currency of the country. The Vizier would be freed from a troublesome neighbour, and his dominions would be made more defensible, while his alliance with the Company subsisted, by being completely shut in between the river Ganges and the Mountains, and his dependance on the Company would be increased by that extension of his possessions, as he himself was incapable of defending even his ancient possessions, without our support.

For a more ample discussion of these arguments, I beg leave to refer to the consultation in the Secret Department of the 26th November 1773, in which it was concluded after a long debate to consent to the Vizier's requisition. As a precaution against any effects which were to be apprehended from the Vizier's irresolution, the conditions originally accepted for this engagement were dictated to him in the form of a letter to be written by him, in which a clause was inserted that whether the country was conquer'd or a peace concluded between him and the enemy, the stipulation for the payment of the 40 lakhs should become equally due. Of this engagement I shall speak more hereafter.

On the 24th February 1774 the brigade arrived within the territory of the Vizier, on the 17th of April the united forces entered the borders of the Rohilla dominions, and on the 23rd of the same month engaged and defeated the Rohillas with the death of their leader Hafiz Rahmut Khan. From that period the

conquest of that country may be dated, no material opposition having been since made.

On the 6th of October the war was finally concluded by the treaty with Fyzoolah Khan, 15 lakhs of rupees which he engaged to pay to the Vizier in ready money were to be immediately appropriated to the payment of part of the stipulation of 40 lakhs due from the Vizier to the Company, and we are informed that the Vizier is returned with expedition to Fyzabad for the express purpose of discharging the remainder. The subsidy had been punctually paid to the end of September by the last advices received on that subject from Colonel Champion, dated the 24th of October.

I now proceed to answer the objections which have been urged against the propriety of this undertaking. These may be reduced to the following heads—

- 1st.—That it was contrary to the express peremptory and repeated orders of the Company.
- 2nd.—That it was contrary to the repeated declarations and promises of the Board.
- 3rd.—That it was unjust.
- 4th.—That it exposed the Company to the hazard of an indefinite or an endless war.
- 5th.—That it might have involved the Company in a war with the Mahrattas, and may still draw on us their future resentment.
- 6th.—That by a removal of the third part of the whole military establishment to so great a distance, our own Provinces were exposed to danger.
- 7th.—That by aggrandizing the Vizier it might render him a dangerous neighbour, and deprive the Company of the benefits of his alliance.
- 8th.—That it was resolved on precipitately without a formal treaty; the conditions of it appearing only in a letter from the Vizier, where they are loosely expressed and liable to evasion.
- 9th.—That the conditions which the Vizier expresses that the brigade should never depart without his permission was an instance of arrogance in him and of an unbecoming submission in the late Administration, and might prove the cause of their being detained for ever.

In the above articles I have not confined myself to the public records, but have endeavoured to collect the substance of all I have seen or have heard upon this side of the argument, and have chosen to clothe it in my own language; that which I have found prepared for me not being in every instance such as I allow myself to use, even in retaliation of personal injury, much less in application to measures which immediately regard myself, I shall reply separately to each.

Vide Mr. Francis's Minute entered in Consultation of the 3rd November.

1st.—I have read over with great attention all the letters which have been received from the Hon'ble Court of Directors since the year 1769 and long ago abstracted all the paragraphs written within that period upon the subject of the Company's political concerns, those having been given me for my special guidance in my negotiations with the Vizier the last year at Benares. I find nothing contained in any of these

General letter, 11th May 1769, para. 346.

30th June 1769, paras. 1st and 3rd.

which expressly applies to the case in question. I meet with injunctions, "to avoid new connections," to endeavour "to keep peace in Bengal and with the neighbouring powers," and to confine our views to the security and tranquillity of Bengal, not to acquire further possessions, but to advert to the good management of those which we have, "to incline to those few

Instructions to the Commissioners, para. 2nd.

chiefs in Indostan who are in a condition to struggle with the Mahrattas," "to defend the King's person and the district of Korah and Illahabad" which is mentioned as an exception to their limited plan, "to make known to the powers of India, that it is by no means the intention of the Company to encroach upon their neighbours or to acquire an extension of dominion by conquest,"

General letter, 15th September 1769, para. 28.

"that they regard with a jealous eye the encroaching power of the Mahrattas," and "that it would be bad policy to take part in any operations which might weaken the few remaining chiefs who are in a condition to oppose their encroachments." But the following extracts are so pointedly apposite to the subject, that I shall take the liberty to quote them at large.

"It is with the most serious concern we learn from your late advices, that the incursion of the Mahrattas had spread such a terror and despondency into the minds of those powers which were the remoter barrier of our possessions, that the irresolution and timidity of the most potent of them have given rise to such successes as have

General letter, 28th August 1771, para. 45.

encouraged the Mahrattas to invade the dominions of the King and lay claim to a part of the territory of Sujah Dowla, but the conduct of the Rohillas and Jauts is rather a matter of concern than surprise to us, as the King and Sujah Dowla neglected that occasion to unite with those powers effectually, to repell the common disturbers of the empire and confine them within the limits of their former possessions. To whatever causes this general timidity or supineness may have been owing, we find ourselves equally affected, and the tranquillity of the provinces endangered thereby ; but as the projects of the King or the conduct of the Vizier are at present too mysterious for us to decide on the motives of their inactivity, and as we know not what alliance may be formed to justify us in carrying our arms beyond the bounds of their dominions, we are prevented from proposing any plan for your guidance in this respect, but should your subsequent advices enable us to form a more certain judgment of the expediency of departing from the plan we have laid down, we shall communicate it to you by some early conveyance how far we may be disposed to carry our arms beyond the bounds of the Provinces or the territories of our allies and become the parties in an offensive war. In the meantime we trust your sole objects will be the security of our possessions and those of the powers with whom we are connected both by treaty and interest ; and as this appears to have been the guide of your conduct upon the Mahrattas invading the Province of Korah, we with pleasure approve the measures you have taken for defending the dominions of the King and Vizier from their inroads and depredations, more especially as those measures are not only justified by necessity, but are within the line which we have prescribed for your conduct in such a conjuncture."

"The line of neutrality is still recommended, but the Board are authorised to depart from it, whenever the interests of the Company shall be endangered, or shall materially require it."

General letter,
to Fort St. George,
24th November
1772, para. 10.

"The directions promised us in the letter of the 20th August 1771, have never yet been sent us, nor have we yet since received any further lights to guide us on this important subject, which I presume to place to the account of the troubles which have embarrassed the Company at home."

From the above quotations and the consistency which strongly marks all the orders on this subject, I apprehend it will clearly appear that the principle primarily insisted upon by the Hon'ble Court of Directors respecting their political and military opera-

tions was to avoid the extension of territory, and this we have never attempted.

The prohibition of military expeditions, undertaken beyond the prescribed bounds of their own provinces and those of their allies, on prudential and cautionary motives or other causes, independent of territorial acquisition, is only to be inferred from the tendency and tenor of their reasonings on their former subjects; it is evident that it was not from inattention that their orders never expressed a prohibition of this kind, but that they rather avoided it from a conviction that it might *sometimes* be necessary, and because it would have been difficult to mark the limitations of it. This conclusion I draw not only from the two last paragraphs of their orders which I have quoted at length, and which were dictated by the experience of past advices, and a more intimate consideration of the subject, but even from their orders so far back as the 30th of June 1769, in which having declared against an extension of possession in the 1st paragraph, they add in the 3rd their "opinion that the most prudent system they could pursue and the most likely to be attended with a permanent security to the provinces, would be to incline to those chiefs of Indostan who yet preserve an independence of the Mahratta power and are in a condition to struggle with them." But in the two last of the above quotations there is no occasion of logical surmises to discover the intentions of the Hon'ble Court of Directors; they tell us plainly that it is their wish "to confine their views to the security of their own possessions and those of their allies, but that they foresee the necessity in certain cases of carrying their arms beyond those bounds, and of becoming parties in an offensive war," and they promise in an *early* communication of their instructions with regard to the lengths to which they will allow this doctrine to be extended. In their letter to the Presidency of Fort St. George they authorise them in express terms "to observe no longer the neutrality so heartily wished for by them" in case they should judge it necessary for their interests to depart from it, and it is not to be supposed that the Court of Directors would recommend one line of conduct for their Government of Fort St. George and an opposite one for Bengal, much less that they would admit of such a deviation from their former pacific plan on merely political motives attended with a heavy expence, and yet prohibit it under circumstances which, in addition to the same motives, have every consideration of economy to recommend it with the prospect of an increase to their finances, at a time when their distresses both at home and abroad so urgently required

such an increase, and their most peremptory commands (as I have already observed) rendered it the first object of our attention.

I presume to affirm, both for myself and the other members of the late Council, that no period in the Company's annals has been more evidently characterized by an exact submission to their commands than that in which I have had the honor to preside in the administration; and for the truth of this I dare appeal to the Hon'ble Court of Directors.

But in cases to which their commands do not specially apply, to adopt such measures as at the same time approach nearest to the spirit of their general instructions and tend most to the advancement of their interests, is the fairest test both of our obedience and fidelity. We might have suffered the Mahrattas under cover of the King's grant to take possession of Korah and Illahabad, to have allied themselves with the Rohillas or established themselves in that territory, and lain with their armies unmolested on the borders of the open country of our ally the Vizier, till they had completed every preparation for invading it. Such a forbearance might perhaps have been vindicated, by the plea that the Company had promised at the distance of two years preceding it to furnish us with their instructions for a different conduct, and that, wanting those instructions, we took for our rule their latest orders on the subject, which enjoined us to confine our views to the bare security of our own possessions and those of our allies.

This might have been a sure way to guard our characters against legal imputation, although in fact it would have been inconsistent with the security required; but it is not by such cold and prudential cautions that the British name has acquired such a lustre in India, nor that the British Empire in Bengal is likely to be perpetuated, neither is this the conduct which the Company demands of us. Their orders are enforced by a more liberal spirit, and allow in such cases as are not reducible to fixed and invariable positions, a discretionary latitude for the zeal of their servants to exert itself for their security. I cannot better illustrate this than by the following extract of their general letter, dated the 30th June 1769, paragraph 5th—"We esteem ourselves bound by treaty to protect the King's person, and to secure him the possession of the Korah and Illahabad districts. When we wrote the 11th November 1768, we apprehended the consequences of keeping the brigade at Illahabad would be creating in Suja Dowla a jealousy that would involve us in fresh troubles, having

at that time no cause to esteem him an enemy, but impressed as you were with an opinion of his hostile intentions and growing strength at the time of the dispatch of the 'Valentine,' we shall not blame your conduct for deferring the execution of your orders for its removal, nor shall we at this time attempt to give positive directions for your conduct, which in such critical cases ought seldom to be done, and in which the situation of affairs may be varied by unforeseen events at the very moment we are writing; but having given you with as much precision as possible a general view of the system by which we wish to have our affairs regulated, we must leave it to you to improve to the utmost of your power every opportunity of drawing towards that point, and whenever you think yourselves obliged for our security upon emergent occasions to adopt measures of a contrary tendency, you are to give us very full reasons for such a deviation, and endeavour to return to the path we have marked out as soon as circumstances will admit."

2nd. The second objection is partly true: the Board has repeatedly declared in their general letters to the Court of Directors, their intentions to adhere to the defensive plan recommended to them, and confine their military operations within the limits of the Vizier's territories; and such were their determinations when these letters were written, but at those times they had not fully experienced the inconveniences which attended our engagements with the Vizier in the prosecution of that system, nor had the remedy occur'd which since presented itself in the conditions offer'd for prosecuting the Rohilla enterprize, and which has been successfully applied. Our treaty of alliance obliged us to support the Vizier, when his possessions were threatened with invasion at a heavy increased military expence, and the exportations of our currency with our troops; for three successive years these inconveniences had recurred, and it is impossible to say how often they might recur: at last an occasion took place when, by a slight deviation from the defensive plan, our alliance with the Vizier might be converted into solid advantages, the employment of our troops made to save near a third part our military expences, and the success of their operations to bring a large flow of Currency, not only into the Company's territories, but into their Treasury. In effect the very same reasons which before urged us to shirk every military expedition, namely the expence attending it and the exportation of our Currency, now operated in the contrary direction, and recommended the employment of our army for the purpose of reducing our expences and adding to our Currency.

The preceding argument respects only the general subject of foreign expeditions. It has been urged also, as an argument against the particular case in question, that the Board, when they adopted the measure of the Rohilla war, were convinced of the impropriety of it from the declarations made by them repeatedly in their letters to the Court of Directors, of their wish and hope that it might not take place. Upon this I beg leave to offer the following reflections.

A consistency of measures is difficult to be preserved among a body of men, because an accidental majority may occasionally decide for contrary resolutions, yet such a case has never happen'd at our Board. A consistency of opinions is not to be expected. The proposition of the Rohilla war, after having passed the Select Committee, was debated for three successive days in Council, in which the Board met, as I recollect, both morning and evening to discuss it: no two members agreed exactly in opinion, and it was difficult to reconcile them; at last they came to a final agreement to leave it to me, to accommodate my own as nearly as I could to the collective sense of the whole, which was done with much management, and the proposition was agreed to in the manner in which it stands in consultation, the 26th November 1773.

My sentiments were the same invariably from the beginning, as will be seen from my report to the Board of my proceedings at Benares, and my minute entered in the consultation above referred to. Private letters are not commonly admissible as authorities, but on this occasion I cannot produce a stronger both of my own fixed opinion from the first movement of this proposition, and of the apprehension which influenced the Board, and I confess myself also, against it, than the following extract of a letter which I wrote to Mr. Sullivan by the first dispatch after my return from Benares. "I was glad to be freed from the Rohilla expedition, because I was doubtful of the judgement which would have been passed upon it at home, where I see too much stress laid upon general maxims and too little attention given to circumstances which require an exception to be made from them; besides this, an opinion still prevails of the Vizier's great power and his treacherous designs against us, and I cannot expect that my word shall be taken as a proof of their non-existence. On the other hand, the absence of the Mahrattas and the weak state of the Rohillas promised an easy conquest of them, and I own that such was my idea of the Company's distress at home, added to my knowledge of their wants abroad, that I should have been glad of

any occasion to employ their forces that saved so much of their pay and expences."

When the measure was determined upon, and we had come to a general agreement, I was averse to introduce any new subject of debate, and therefore easily acquiesc'd in the expression of a wish entertain'd by the Board which might be construed as inconsistent with the resolution we had taken. My sentiments of the propriety of the expedition had undergone no change, but I will not deny that I felt myself influenced by the same fears which operated on the other members of the Council, that the propriety of the measure might not be seen in the same light by our constituents which we knew, from the temper of the times, might not only draw upon us their severe resentment, but aggravate the load of popular odium which has of late fallen on their servants, and, if I mistake not, these reasons were assign'd in express terms upon our proceedings.

3rd. The engagements between the Vizier and the Rohillas which have been already quoted, sufficiently evince the justice of the attack upon them; they agreed to make him an acknowledgement of 40 lacs of rupees upon certain conditions; he performed these conditions and they refused to pay any part of the money they had promised.

4th. No political transaction can be mathematically demonstrated to be totally free from danger: the probable advantages must be weighed against the probable disadvantages; when the present measure was undertaken there was every reason to expect that it would speedily be brought to a happy conclusion, and the event has proved that our expectations were well grounded.

5th. The Mahrattas did not possess nor had any claim upon any part of the Rohilla country on the north of the Ganges when we undertook to assist the Vizier in the conquest of it. They might with more reason have attacked us for opposing them in their designs on the Korah district, of which they had obtained a grant from the King. But, in fact, a timid conduct would have been more likely to have involved us in a war with them, than either of those measures; had they been allowed to subdue the Korah district and the country of the Rohillas, the Vizier's territories would have been open to their incursions, their numerous horse might have plundered it in spite of the efforts of our infantry, and their continued ravages might have obliged him to come to an accommodation with them as was once apprehended, on terms which would have afforded them an easy entrance into our own provinces. In short we are much better secured against their

attacks than we should otherwise have been, and the better we are secured, the less will they be disposed to attack us.

6th. In reply to this objection, I will in the first place affirm that merely for the defence of our own provinces, two brigades, upon the present establishment, are sufficient; a third is necessary to add to our influence among the powers of Indostan, to support our alliance with the Vizier, and to answer other exigencies, which may happen at a more remote period of time. Upon the late occasion, when the Rohilla expedition was undertaken, our apprehensions of an invasion from the French had entirely ceased; the dissensions among the Mahrattas fully employed them at home, and are mentioned among the secondary inducements in favour of the undertaking. There was no other enemy from whom we could have the least apprehension of danger: such was the occasion to be embraced for effecting our purpose by a temporary employment of a third part of our forces, and under such circumstances, even without reckoning upon the acquisition which was the immediate object of the enterprise, to reduce the Company's military expences by employing that proportion of their troops which was superfluous for the purpose of their own defence was a great and manifest advantage; but when the stipulated acquisition of 40 lacs and the political advantages resulting from the measure are superadded, the visionary idea of danger, which did not exist even in imagination at the time the expedition was undertaken, can have no weight as an objection; especially as from our knowledge of the open and defenceless state of the Rohilla country, we were morally certain that the undertaking would soon be brought to an issue. By our ancient treaty with the Vizier we are bound to assist him with our forces within his paternal dominions, and the distance between their borders and the remotest part to which our troops have marched is only 200 miles. I will only add that so long as no immediate danger threatens our own Provinces, it is my earnest wish that one of our three brigades might be constantly employed with the Vizier, as well to save so large a proportion of the expence to the Company, as to prevent the ill consequences of total inactivity to the army.

7th. The addition of territory acquired to the Vizier instead of raising him to be a dangerous neighbour, serves to render him more dependant upon us than before, as he has more occasion for our assistance to enable him to maintain it, and to support him against the claims of other powers. If his increase of wealth be an object of jealousy, let it be considered how largely the Company share in it. From September 1773 to September 1775 the sum

we have to receive from him by our late engagement amounts to 130 lacs of rupees.

8th. I have already remarked that the first proposition for the Rohilla war was made by the Vizier in a letter which I received from him in June 1773, that it was employed afterwards in the negotiations at Benares as an instrument for winning his consent to the payment of the full expences of our troops employed in his service, and that it was not finally resolved on till the 26th of November, after the most ample discussion in the Select Committee and in the Council: it was not therefore precipitately resolved on. It is true that no formal treaty was executed for the conditions on which we were to assist the Vizier, nor did the occasion, which was only temporary, require it. The multiplication of treaties weakens their efficacy, and therefore they should be referred only for very important and permanent obligations. The form which was dictated to the Vizier for the letter, which was to describe the conditions of this engagement it is true, is not of itself sufficiently clear, but it is explained by my letters which accompanied it, and the reference therein made to the conditions which had been formerly proposed at Benares, as they stood in the three first articles of the draft, which had been prepared for the treaty, before the Rohilla expedition was suspended, for the fuller elucidation of the subject. These articles are here subjoined; the two first had been agreed to by the Vizier, to the third he objected, wishing rather to engage for the payment of the whole sum at once, when the conquest was completed. It is fortunate that the latter mode was adopted; the completion of the conquest being actually effected, and the stipulation, although objected to by the Vizier when first demanded after the defeat of the Rohillas, having since been acknowledged by him to be due.

The three first articles of the first draft of the Treaty.

1st. "Whereas the Rohilla Chiefs in the month of June 1772 entered into a treaty with the Vizier in the presence and with the concurrence of General Sir Robert Barker, by which they engaged to pay him 40 lacs of rupees for his assistance against the Mahrattas, and which treaty they have treacherously broken. It is therefore agreed that a brigade of the Company's forces shall join the Vizier and assist to punish them, and that he shall pay the whole of its expence. By a brigade is meant two battalions of Europeans, one company of artillery and six battalions of sepoys, and the expense settled at sunant rupees 2,10,000 per

month. The Company's troops shall not cross the river Ganges, nor march beyond the first of the hills. The Vizier shall retain, as his own, that part of the Rohilla country which lies on the north-east side of the Ganges; but in consideration of the Company's relinquishing all claim to share in the said country, although it is to be conquered by their joint forces, the Vizier engages to make them an acknowledgement of 40 lacs of rupees, and in future to defray the whole expense of the Company's troops, agreeable to the date above mentioned, whenever he has occasion for their assistance, notwithstanding it is stipulated in the second article of the Treaty of Illahabad, concluded by the Vizier and the Company on the 16th August 1765, that he shall pay only their extraordinary charges."

2nd. "The Vizier may retain the brigade aforesaid on the above mentioned terms as long as he shall require it, unless it shall be necessary to recall it for the defence of the Company's own territories, and he may employ them for the protection of any part of his country, but they shall be kept together in one body and not dispersed on different commands, except such detachments as the commanding officer shall judge necessary in the time of actual service. He may return the whole or a part of the said brigade whenever he has no further occasion for their services, and he shall cease to defray their expences as soon as they shall enter the Province of Bahar. But as the Company cannot risk the credit of their arms, by allowing a smaller force to remain with the Vizier than half a brigade, it is provided that he shall retain one-half of a brigade, or return the whole. Upon their dismissal they shall return with all convenient expedition, and to prevent any future disputes from arising on this subject, the time of their march to the borders of his Province, shall be computed by the rate of 5 coss per day from the place where they commence their march."

3rd. "The Vizier engages to pay the 40 lacs of rupees stipulated in the first article, by monthly payments of 4 lacs, to commence from the end of the month Kilbi-ul-awul, or 10th of June 1774, but should any accident (which God forbid) oblige our forces to retire from the Rohilla country and prevent the Vizier from obtaining possession of it the said 40 lacs shall not be demanded."

9th. It was neither arrogant nor unreasonable in the Vizier to require that since his entire dependance for the success of the enterprise which he had projected was on the brigade of the Company's forces, the brigade should not abandon him while he

was engaged in it nor while the issue of it remained incomplete; nor can I devise any other condition which could have removed his apprehensions. If the Board judged the proposition reasonable, it certainly was not unbecoming in them to assent to it. It remains therefore to examine whether it was reasonable, and whether this power granted to the Vizier was liable to danger or inconvenience.

I have already shown that the removal of the brigade to such a distance could not prove of danger to our own provinces, because it was not wanted for their defence; that it could be productive of no inconvenience because it occasioned an entire suspension of the Company's payments during its employment. It is not to be denied that there are possible cases in which it may be wanted for the protection of Bengal, but these are out of the reach of all probability and too remote to be quoted as an objection to the present engagement.

I am not apprehensive that the Vizier will insist upon keeping the brigade continually with him; my fears are that he may dismiss it, as there is every reason to wish for its continuance with him, and none, no not one, for its recall. When the brigade was formerly employed with the Vizier and the share of its monthly expences defrayed by him was only 30,000 and afterwards 1,15,000 rupees per month, he never showed earnestness for its continuance with him beyond the duration of the particular service for which it had been wanted, but was ever ready to propose its return; it is not likely therefore that he should be more solicitous now for its perpetual residence in his country at an expence to him of 25 lacs a year, which he must pay, and which his income, with the late additions to it, can barely afford. He knows that whenever he shall require the presence of the brigade, it will be for our interest to grant it, and he will therefore part with it when his own occasions, which in this instance must be confined to the defence of his own dominions, no longer require it, that the charge of its maintenance may be shifted from his account to the Company's and that he may be subject to that burthen only when he is an immediate gainer by it.

This may suffice to show the little risk we ran, had we absolutely engaged the brigade to him as long as he might chuse to retain it. But in the present case (as I have already explained in the preceding article) it was understood by both parties and indeed is inseparable from the nature of the engagement and the original conditions of our mutual alliance, that we might recall it, if required for our own protection, not only without any imputa-

tion of breach of faith but (unless it was done in so precipitate a manner as to defeat the purpose of the expedition) even without affording him a pretext for refusing the payment of the 40 lacs.

I have been thus explicit in vindicating my conduct in relation to the Rohilla war for the sake of obviating any impression which a partial representation of this measure may make upon the minds of my employers, as I know that the majority of the Council, which has condemned it, will labour to paint it in the blackest colours which they can lay upon it, as an excuse for the precipitation with which they have proclaimed their reprobation of it, and violated the engagements on which the right of the Company to participate in the fruits of its success essentially depended. But it is not on the propriety of my conduct that I shall rest for proof of the impropriety of theirs, which is equally incompatible with the interest of the Company whether the transactions of the late Administration shall be approved or condemned by our superiors, whose judgement only can decide upon it. A recapitulation of the principal acts of the new Council will amply suffice for this purpose.

The three members who came passengers in the *Ashburnham* from England arrived at noon of the 19th of October. The next day I met them in Council, which was adjourned to the 24th, both to afford time to Mr. Barwell to join us, and to myself to prepare the business, which might be proper for the immediate cognizance of the new Board. To this effect I drew up a minute describing the nature and state of two subjects, which were undoubtedly the first in point of importance, the establishment of the revenue and the transactions in our political system. If I could have conceived a more regular or a more candid way of leading the Board into the knowledge of past affairs, without the influence of my own particular judgement or prepossessions, I would have adopted it. This minute I laid before the Council held on the 24th of October. On the 25th the General moved and the Board (Mr. Barwell only dissenting) resolved to require that I should produce the whole correspondence between me and Mr. Nathaniel Middleton, my agent at the Vizier's Court, and Colonel Champion, the late provincial Commander-in-Chief, both official and private, for their inspection: I offered the first and refused the second, for reasons which appear in my minutes. To what I have already recorded on this subject I will further add that there are few persons in the service of any considerable trust or rank in it with whom I have not maintained that distinct mode of intercourse. My predecessors have ever followed the

same rule, and I am persuaded would have thought it a dishonourable breach of confidence, had they inserted on the records of the Company, any letters which had been addressed to them as extra-official and private, without the consent of the writers of them. Lord Clive, Mr. Verelst, Mr. Cartier, General Smith and General Sir Robert Barker are able to contradict me if I have misquoted their practice, and I shall be glad to appeal to them for the truth of it, if there can be a doubt upon the subject. A circumstance exactly in point to the present matter in dispute, happened in the course of Colonel Smith's correspondence with the Select Committee in 1766, when by some mistake the subject of a private letter from the Colonel to the President was only alluded to in a letter from the Select Committee, upon which occasion the Colonel asserts his sentiments of the sacred rights of private correspondence in the following words: "I have been made accountable to a public board for an unprejudiced discussion of facts which ought never to have transpired beyond the breast of the right honourable person to whom, and whom only, they were addressed." And the Select Committee, by their silence, acquiesced in those sentiments.

The same subject was resumed the next day the 26th. On my refusal to deliver the correspondence in the manner in which it was required of me, Colonel Monson moved, and the General and Mr. Francis agreed, that Mr. Nathaniel Middleton should be recalled from his station, and it was resolved by a subsequent resolution of the same majority, that the negociations of this Government should be thenceforth committed to Colonel Champion (who ought by a parity of reasoning to have been recall'd too) or to the officer who on the receipt of the orders, should chance to be the first in command of the brigade in the field. To these acts Mr. Barwell and myself dissented, and I entered my protest against all the consequences to which they were liable.

The sentiments and intentions of the majority with respect to the Rohilla war and the future destination of the army were sufficiently manifested in this meeting, and left me less room for surprise at the propositions which were made at the next, which was held on the 20th. These propositions, which had been previously drawn up by the General, having undergone some alterations in substance and form stand recorded as follow.

The General proposes the following questions, *viz.*

1st.—"That the demand of 40 lacs from the Vizier be repeated and that Colonel Champion, or the Officer Commanding the second Brigade be instructed to that effect.

- 2nd.*—"That the Colonel or Commanding Officer be also instructed to make a demand, for such further payments as may be due from the Vizier on the receiving these instructions, and to liquidate what accounts may be unsettled with him at the time.
- 3rd.*—"That he be further instructed, that although he is to make an immediate demand of the whole 40 lacs, and for such other payments as may be due at that time, yet if he finds that it is impossible for the Vizier to comply with the whole of these demands, he is to receive what can be obtained in ready money not to be less than 20 lacs, and the rest to be payable in different periods within 12 months.
- 4th.*—"That the Colonel or Commanding Officer be further instructed, that in case the Vizier shall refuse to comply with these demands, he is to enter a protest against him declaring that the Company have fulfilled all their engagements with him, and within 14 days after the receipt of these instructions, to retire with the army under his command and withdraw it into the Company's territories.
- 5th.*—"That further orders be sent to Colonel Champion or the Officer Commanding the Brigade that after having finished the negotiations for the money now due, he do immediately withdraw the whole of the forces under his command within the limits of the Province of Oude, and that unless the Vizier should require the continuance of the troops for the defence of his original dominions, with the Provinces of Korah and Illahabad, he return with them to the Cantonments of Dinapore.
- 6th.*—"That in quitting the Vizier he shall acquaint him that the Governor-General and Council propose to appoint a person to reside at his court, and to declare that they mean to adhere strictly to the Treaties of Illahabad and Benares, till the pleasure of the Court of Directors, regarding the latter, be known.
- 7th.*—"That he be further instructed, that if he should apprehend any difficulty or danger from the Vizier in his retreat, that then he should suspend his declaration and take the best means in his power for the preservation of the army, and advise the Board immediately of his situation."

I prevailed upon the majority to defer coming to any conclusion upon these propositions until the next Monday's consultation, this being Friday, both to allow time for each to come prepared with his opinions upon them, and for the gentlemen of the majority to read all the proceedings which had any relation to the subject, and of which I had furnished them with a complete list of references in my minute recorded on the consultation of the 25th.

On Monday the 31st the Council being assembled, I delivered in a minute containing my opinion on each proposition. Mr. Barwell did the same, both expressed an assent to the three first, but objected wholly to the 4th, 5th, and 7th, and to the last clause of the 6th.

The sum of our objections to which I crave leave to refer as the force of them must be lost by an abridgement, was that the 4th was too peremptory, and left no room for the Vizier to propose any other alternative, in case his present means for future resources should not enable him to comply literally with the demands which were made upon him. That the 5th was a direct violation of the engagements which had been formed with him by the last Government, and would afford him a just pretext to declare his also void, and to refuse payment of the 40 lacs; besides the danger of losing the new conquered country by so precipitate a retreat from it. That the last clause of the 6th was an alarming suggestion of the invalidity of the public treaty, which ought not even to be supposed till it were pronounced by the Company; and that the 7th left it to the option of the Commanding Officer of the Army to declare war with the Vizier.

The other gentlemen brought no opinions in writing, but resolved on all the propositions except the last clause of the 6th which was omitted.

It is proper to remark that an army, joined by the Vizier's, had pursued the remains of the Rohilla forces which had re-assembled under the command of Fyzulla Cawn, to the extremity of the country and continued encamped more than a month within a very few miles of them, which interval had been employed in negotiations till the 2nd of October, when Fyzulla Cawn repaired in person to the English camp, and as it appears from Colonel Champion's letters on the faith of some assurances given for his safety. Since the negotiations continued the enemy remained in arms and our army still advanced nearer to them making preparations for an assault in case terms of peace could not be agreed on. Thus far our advices had reached us when the General

introduced the propositions above mentioned. Yet at this crisis of affairs, without waiting for the event which a very few days must have determined, the majority came with their resolutions decided for withdrawing the brigade from the service in which it was engaged whether it were completed or not, and to compel the Vizier to the instant adjustment of all his accounts dependent with the Company, or to abandon him altogether.

One reason alledged by the majority for the demand, which had with so much perseverance been made for Colonel Champion's and Mr. Nathaniel Middleton's letters, was, that without them, and specially without those I withheld from them, their knowledge of the state and circumstances of the Rohilla war, which was to enable them to judge of the propriety of continuing the army in that quarter, or to determine its removal, would be incomplete: yet they had neither taken time to read the series of the former political records which I had recommended to their perusal, nor the letters of Colonel Champion and Mr. Nathaniel Middleton, with which I had promised to furnish them, although these were surely as necessary for their information as the private letters addressed to me, the contents of which they could not know, and I had declared to them contained no information on the points on which they wanted it.

Soon after we heard that the Vizier had consigned over the 15 lacs which Fyzulla Cawn had engaged to pay him in ready money to Colonel Champion, in part payment of the 40 due from him, and had hastily set out on his return for his capital with Mr. Nathaniel Middleton for the declared purpose of acquitting himself of the remainder, and that the brigade was in orders to march back to Ramgaut. Fearing the consequences of the orders which had been lately issued, I thought this a fit opportunity to induce the majority to moderate that for the immediate recall of the brigade, and proposed, that as our payments were in so fair a channel of acquittance and Ramgaut lay at little more than 60 miles from the border of the Province of Oude, to which they had destined its future station, a discretionary power might now be entrusted to the Commander of the Army, to continue it at Ramgaut for a short period, until the Vizier's consent could be obtained for its entire removal, or until he himself should judge it might leave the Rohilla country without hazard of losing it by a fresh invasion or insurrection.

I think it incumbent upon me to remark a small geographical error, which I have committed in my report of the situation of Ramgaut, which I found laid down in my own handwriting upon

an old map in my possession at the distance which I have described, but having since received a more correct map of that quarter from Captain Barwell, the Surveyor-General, which accompanies these papers, I find that it is near 40 miles more remote from the territories of the Vizier, an error of little consequence I apprehend to my argument, but I mention it that it may not be imputed to me as a deception.

My proposal was rejected; for the reasons both for and against it, I beg leave to refer to my minute in consultation the 8th November, and to the replies of the majority in consultation of the 14th.

As a doubt is expressed respecting the nature of Mr. Nathaniel Middleton's appointment as Resident or Agent for the Governor at the Court of the Vizier, it is necessary I should say a few words to reconcile the propriety of styling him my particular agent, and at the same time considering his appointment in the nature of a public one. By the Company's orders of long standing and now repeated, all correspondence with the country powers is directed to be carried on by the President, and the intention of appointing a Resident with the Vizier was for the purpose of facilitating and perfecting this correspondence; which being the particular province of the Governor, he was my especial agent, and his appointment was at the same time a public one, as it related to the public service, and was conferred upon him by the Board, though at my recommendation.

That the objects of my remonstrance may not be lost or mistaken in the long narrative and arguments with which I have introduced them, I beg leave to repeat, I ground my charge against the members who form the majority of the Board on the recal of my public agent at the Court of the Vizier, on their precipitate resolution of abandoning the Vizier, and of withdrawing entirely from his alliance unless he complied in the given time of 14 days with their demands in the exact form and mode in which they were prescribed to him, on their resolution to withdraw the brigade from the Rohilla country, even if he did comply with these demands, whether the conquest of it was secured, or it was in danger of being wrested out of his hands; and, lastly, on the extraordinary licence which they have given to the commander of the brigade, of forcing the Company into a war with their ally under cover of taking measures to preserve the army from danger.

Actions so evident in their nature and bearing such strong appearances of determined hostility, though proceeding from the most just causes of provocation, seldom fail of producing sus-

picious of worse intended, and in the means which fear suggests for self-defence too often prove the cause of working up a slight complaint into the most fatal excess of a declared rupture; but under the circumstances of the present Government nothing could have so evident a tendency to precipitate this conclusion.

The jealousy with which a new administration is naturally viewed by those who are connected with it is of itself sufficient to render even their indifferent transactions liable to misconstructions; but what sentiments must have struck the Vizier, when with the first notification of the constitution of the present Council, he received advice of the recall of the public minister of this Government from his presence, and of the resolutions respecting the payment and the removal of the brigade. He will have concluded that a majority of the new Council had combined to overthrow my authority and to raise their own on its ruins, and had determined to force him to a rupture in order to depreciate the measures I had taken. It will avail little that these proceedings are tempered with solemn professions of an inviolable attachment to former engagements; such assurances accompanying the actual breach of engagements, are more likely to destroy confidence than to inspire it, as they too manifestly infer the conviction of an irregularity of conduct, which requires such declarations to explain and palliate it.

I have been too long versed in public affairs to look for a concurrence of all men's opinions in any one proposition however expedient, nor am I so much addicted to my own as to take offence at an opposition to it, where that opposition proceeds from a judgement unbiassed by personal animosity: I appeal to the minutes of the majority for proofs of the temper which swayed their resolutions. Had a mere sense of duty impelled them to declare their disavowal of the expedition in which they found a part of the army engaged against the Rohillas, or if they had judged the continuance of that force beyond the line of the Vizier's possession inconsistent with the orders of the Company, the path which they should have pursued lay very plain before them, by which they might have amply manifested their own fidelity and guarded the Company's orders against the like violation hereafter. In many cases I understand it to be a proposition of law that *quod fieri non debet factum valet*—and I believe it was never more applicable than to the present occasion. The measure was an act of the past Administration, it was on the point of being concluded; all the dangers and inconveniences to which it could ever have been liable were past; of the conditions

which had been agreed to on the part of the Company to this engagement nothing remained but to bring the war to a period, to place their Ally in the secure possession of the new conquest, and to retire within their former bounds :—the payments which formed the conditions of the Vizier's part of the engagements were just due, nor had any reason yet appeared to justify the suspicion that he would have failed in the performance of them.

Under such circumstances I presume that the members of the new Council, who disapproved of the enterprize, ought to have recorded their disapprobation of it, to have declared their determination not to give their consent to the employment of any part of the Company's forces beyond the line which they judged to be prescribed by the orders of the Court of Directors after the service in which they were then engaged should be accomplished, but to have permitted the brigade to have remained in the Rohilla country, so long as that service and the engagements subsisting between this Government and the Vizier required it, leaving the responsibility of the measure to the members of the last Administration who formed it, and under whose authority it was brought to the crisis in which the new Government found it.

The same temperate conduct might have been observed with respect to Mr. Nathaniel Middleton: his appointment as Resident on the part of the Government at the Court of the Vizier might have been confirmed, and the relation of it transferred from me to the Board at large.

Such a conduct without the smallest sacrifice either of their integrity or duty would have accommodated their sentiments to the faith of Government; the alarms unavoidably attendant on a change of Government and the consistency of its measures so totally new, would have subsided; the Vizier could have had no pretext to refuse or withhold the sums which were due from him, and the Rohilla war would have ended with honour, with unsullied faith, with the restoration of that lustre to our arms, which an inaction of many years had almost obscured in the minds of the people of Indostan, with a great addition of wealth to supply our almost impoverished resources, and without a single inconvenience or cause afforded to regret it.

Let the reverse of this conduct be examined in the first acts of the new Council.

By their violent recall of my agent from the Vizier's Court, they have proclaimed the annihilation of my authority in that branch of the Government in which the Company, for obvious political reasons, have ever thought it necessary to invest their

Governor with the ostensible power, and which in their very first orders to the new Administration, they have directed should be continued to be conducted through him.

They have disregarded the faith of our engagements which even in the most violent revolutions have ever been transmitted as sacred from one government to that which has succeeded it; they have exposed the conquest which the British arms have acquired for the Vizier, to be wrested from him, with the loss of our military reputation; they have risked the loss of the pecuniary resources, which were stipulated for the Company as the fruits of their successes, and they have precipitately withdrawn the brigade from its station, where its whole expence is borne by the Vizier, to become again a heavy and useless burthen upon ourselves.

* * * * *

I now once more make my solemn appeal to the Honourable Court of Directors, from the measures already decided by the majority of the Council, and protest against every future act of the same unvaried majority, declaring that I hold myself no longer responsible for the consequences which the interest of my employers are liable to suffer, while I am deprived of the means which their commands, which the Parliament of Great Britain, which (if I presume not too rashly on the information communicated to me) even the gracious intention of my Sovereign, have committed in an especial manner to my charge for the security of those interests, and the support of the national Honour and Dominions in this great and valuable branch of the British Empire.

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